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Balkan Politics

International Relations in No Man's Land


By Joseph S. Roucek

Today all eyes are on the Balkan nations—internally disunified, as ever pawns in the game of European power politics. In the wake of World War II, these strategic little nations are again in a position to breed trouble on an international scale, and avoiding this will require world-wide understanding of the economic, social, and nationalistic problems involved.

Writing for American readers, Dr. Roucek presents this geopolitical picture of the Balkan region, an up-to-date and objective analysis of a political melting pot. Each country is dealt with separately, and the author carefully evaluates historical, ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural, and political factors that have propagated over-all disunity in the area.

Nine maps showing the different regions and an extensive bibliography are prominent features of the book. Authoritative as text or reference, **Balkan Politics** is the newest member of "Stanford Books in World Politics," edited by Graham Stuart of Stanford University.

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
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Balkan Politics



Balkan Politics

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN
NO MAN'S LAND

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TO
DEAN WILLIAM HUNTER BECKWITH
WHO DID SO MUCH FOR HOFSTRA COLLEGE
DURING ITS CRITICAL PERIOD

PREFACE

EUROPE's international problems in the half-century preceding World War I had been closely bound up with Balkan problems—the disruption of the Turkish Empire, the disputed border points among the Balkan states, and the ensuing arguments over the spheres of interests among the Great Powers. World War I broke out as a direct result of the assassination of the heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in a little-known Balkan town—Sarajevo. After the signing of the peace treaties, the Balkan problems soon initiated another cycle of problems with world-wide implications; in fact, at the end of the first decade of the postwar years the Nazi plan to conquer the world by way of subjugating the Balkans and the Near East had pretty well crystallized. During the second postwar decade the plan was put into effect, step by step, and eventually culminated in World War II.

The debate in the war councils of the Allies over the question whether the European fortress under the Nazis should be attacked by way of the Balkans or through Normandy was of supreme importance, and the decision not to use the Balkans proved to be of tremendous significance to the course of world events. The Churchill plan for a Balkan invasion might have prolonged the war by a few months, but more likely it would have made unnecessary the present tragicomic spectacle of our anxiety to help Greece and Turkey as the last outposts of opposition against the growing expansionist policy of Soviet Russia in the Balkans and the Near East.

The Anglo-Saxon world knew at the end of World

War II just as little (or just as much) about the Balkan problems as those agitating Africa or the Near East. But the sudden awakening to the supreme importance of the Balkans was brought about in 1947 with the insistence of the United States government that this country must support the anti-Soviet regimes in Greece and Turkey, although during the war years we had already suspected that the feud between Yugoslavia's Tito and Mikhailovitch had something to do with the welfare of America.

The suspicions of the United States and of the rest of the non-Communist world received further impetus when, on October 5, 1947, the formation of a Communist "Information Bureau" in Belgrade was announced. This, in effect, amounted to the re-establishment of the Communist International (Comintern). Leaders of world Communism announced the creation of the new "Bureau" to combat what they termed American "dollar imperialism."

The secret meeting in Poland which saw the birth of the new Comintern called on Europe to align itself with the "Soviet Union and other democratic countries," against "the camp of imperialism and anti-democratic forces whose chief aim is the establishment of a worldwide American imperialist hegemony."

Thus the Comintern has again come out into the open, more militant and more powerfully backed than before. The countries in this new organization include France and Italy, where the Communist Party was numerically stronger in 1947 than anywhere outside the Soviet Union, as well as the lands in the Russian orbit (next to the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia). The moving spirit is Andrei Zhdanov, the member of the Moscow

Politburo who, in prewar days, before Molotov became so influential, was most frequently mentioned as Stalin's successor. Zhdanov reported on the international situation, and his report formed the basis of the warlike declaration issued by the conference. The meeting was a reunion of the Party organizers who had long worked together in Moscow. But in 1947 they were no longer conspirators plotting subversive movements by remote control; now they had either governments or well-organized mass movements behind them. The old Comintern represented sixty nations from all parts of the world, as against the eight European signatories of the new manifesto. But the smaller organization was far more important as far as Europe was concerned; for the Communists in these Balkan and Central-Eastern European countries were mobilizing for all-out political war—under the direction and with the full support of the Soviet Union, and with the avowed, the almost single, purpose of fighting the United States, which they accused of being the aggressor, saying it was bent on “enslaving Europe by means of the Marshall plan.”

In short, the manifesto meant that the Communists of Europe were being dragooned into a united front to undermine the influence of the United States; that the last illusions, nourished on the hope that out of the blood and sacrifices of World War II there might arise a new world order, based on the common interests of all nations, and able to banish forever the specter of new strife, were dealt a mortal blow; that all the wartime agreements from the Atlantic Charter to Potsdam were torn to shreds; and that all the Communist parties, not only in Europe but the world over, were stamped as the tools of U.S.S.R. imperialism.

A general opinion applying definitely to the Balkans

is that the value of any cause is relative to its cost, which may vary in accord with the speed of realizing it, and that the inevitability of any future is relative to the potentialities which are overlooked or excluded, especially when the future in question is a somewhat distant one. Furthermore, as long as we run our democracy on the assumption that the major decisions are made by a majority of the citizens we must be carefully and dispassionately informed about the facts involved in the governmental decisions pertaining to the Balkans. From such a point of view, this volume aims to provide the basic background for an understanding of the Balkan problems today, on the internal as well as the international scale. Surely, there will be readers who will disagree with the author's conclusions or evaluations, but every effort has been made to present the facts fairly and interestingly and to place in true perspective the international struggle in the Balkans.

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October 1947

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | PAGE |
|---------------------------------------|------|
| I. THE BALKAN GATEWAY | 1 |
| II. THE POLITICAL PATTERN | 15 |
| III. BULGARIA | 43 |
| IV. YUGOSLAVIA | 79 |
| V. ALBANIA | 125 |
| VI. MACEDONIANS | 147 |
| VII. GREECE | 169 |
| VIII. RUMANIA | 209 |
| IX. BALKAN FOREIGN POLITICS | 251 |

LIST OF MAPS

| | PAGE |
|---|------------------------|
| Enthological Map of the Balkans | <i>frontispiece</i> iv |
| Map of Bulgaria | 42 |
| Map of Yugoslavia | 78 |
| Map of Albania | 124 |
| Map of Greece | 168 |
| Map of Rumania | 208 |

I

THE BALKAN GATEWAY

ON THE WHOLE, it was a grim and even resentful Congress of the United States that had to start, in mid-March of 1947, dealing with the most important foreign-policy decision since the end of Word War II—that concerning President Truman's vigorous proposal that the United States must support Greece and Turkey against Communist pressure, as the direct result of London's admission that Great Britain's government was unable to continue bolstering up King George's anti-Communist régime and the hope that the United States would take Britain's place at the patient's bedside.

For in the background were irremovable geographic realities. The whole Balkan area, Greece being the only exception, was under the domination, direct and indirect, of Stalin's Russia. London's decision, and the pressure exerted by Russia and her satellites against Greece, induced President Truman, Secretary of State Marshall, and the Cabinet to suggest that the Russo-Communist aggression was confronting the United States with a dilemma which forced a choice. A majority of the comment in Congress, in the American press, and in the foreign capitals—except Moscow and those capitals within the orbit of Moscow's shadows—strongly supported President Truman's position. Such doubts as were raised were concerned chiefly with the question whether the methods proposed by President Truman were the best ones to cope with an admittedly critical situation. The basic aim of these methods was simple: that the United States draw a "point of resistance" on the Greek borderline against further Russo-Communist penetration in the Balkans.

Hence the problem of the Balkans was more than ever back with us again. Although World War I started there, and

although the Allied military command had to make one of its most fateful decisions when debating whether the Allied invasion was to be made by way of France or the Balkans, the Balkan region remained more than a puzzle to the Anglo-Saxon world in the uneasy postwar months following World War II when the Nazis were driven from there. But President Truman's address to Congress on March 12, 1947, suddenly and unexpectedly informed the American people frankly of the gravity of the international situation created by Russo-Communist aggression in the Balkans. Truman called unmistakably for action in the Balkans which will launch the United States on a new and positive foreign policy of world-wide responsibility, and which will probably force the United States to realize and learn about the hard-headed realities in this area.

WHAT IS MEANT BY "BALKANS"

For many years the word "Balkans" has been used derogatively with the implication of corruption, disorder, and anarchy, although in reality the Balkan peoples have set amazing examples by heroic battles for the principles of freedom and independence. To most Americans the Balkans are a blurred spot on the map, a mountainous region split up into small states that bicker with one another, a region sprinkled with Graustark castles, and peopled with half-barbaric nobles, bandits, and picturesque peasants.

Usually the name "Balkans" is used in a political sense, and then it includes Rumania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, and that small fraction of Turkey which lies in Europe. The geographic region of the Balkan Peninsula, on the other hand, occupies roughly the whole southeastern quarter of Europe between the Black and Aegean seas on the east and the Adriatic and Ionian seas on the west. There is no complete agreement as to the northern boundary, but in general it may be taken as the Danube River and its great western tributary, the Sava, with a line continued to the head of the Adriatic Sea. These boundaries enclose also Rumania, which periodically becomes ambitious enough to consider herself a non-Balkan state.

The Balkans have always been a rough highway, quite difficult to cross, for more than two thousand years, between Europe

and Asia. The Roman legions used it; centuries later Frederick Barbarossa led his armies through here on the Third Crusade. Forever, you might say, the Balkans have been the crossroads for warring empires. Hence more infrequently than frequently the Balkans formed a political unit. With certain exceptions, the Balkan countries were once comprised within the Ottoman Empire. Up to our day, however, the Balkans have remained a striking example of disunity—geographic, ethnical, linguistic, religious, cultural, and political.¹ Even today, when all the Balkan countries are under the shadow of Soviet Russia's domination, the region is still agitated by nationalistic claims and counterclaims; and a full-scale civil war, promoted by Greece's neighbors, was carried on during 1946 and 1947.

The region, by reason of both its geographical anchorage and its topography, seems to have been foredoomed to conflict springing from heterogeneity. Unlike its Italian and Iberian counterparts, the Balkan Peninsula has no natural line of demarcation from the European continent; in fact, the region is closely connected with it through the Danube. Similarly, at the other end, the Bosphorus and the Straits of Istanbul, situated in a submerged valley, form a link with Asia. Hence the Balkans offer easy transit to invaders, and all Balkan nations have been pushed and pulled between the active forces of two continents. For centuries Balkan resistance has been obstructing this narrow highway of the Old World, at the price of submission to the Turk, who was aiming at the heart of Southeast Europe—Vienna. Conversely, when the Christian nations rallied to repel the Turk—a process completed only in recent times—they had to step upon the Balkan peoples. Thus the Balkans for many years have been the scene of innumerable bloody clashes.

A line drawn southward from Belgrade via Nish to Salonica

¹ On cultural communality in the Balkans see R. J. Kerner and H. N. Howard, *The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente* (Berkeley, 1936), pp. 6-8. The authors accept C. Evelpidi's thesis (*Les états balkaniques* [Paris, 1930], p. 291) that there is a "community of ideas imposed on the Balkan peoples, at least along general lines, by their common descent, their common history, their common mentality, and finally by the community of their interests."

and another line from Nish through Sofia, Philippopolis, and Adrianople to Istanbul would roughly indicate the main passages followed by armies in ancient times as well as today by the Orient Express. The existence of two broad and divergent avenues, running respectively from north to south and from northwest to southeast, facilitates alien penetration and makes the formation of powerful and stable states unusually difficult.

Geographical accessibility from Asia Minor and from Europe explains the struggles between rival cultures, institutions, religions, and nationalities. Latin-Teutonic and Byzantine-Greco-Slav influences have met here on a battleground.² Moreover, throughout Balkan history both Rumania and Greece retained their cultural independence from Slavic forces. The contest between Byzantine imperialism and the imperialistic urges of the Slavic races forms one of the main themes in the early evolution of nationality conceptions in the region. In the Middle Ages this contest gave rise to Serbian and Bulgarian "Roman Empires of Slavonic Nations." Then came the Turkish domination, which eventually was opposed by the ever-growing nationalistic feeling of the oppressed Balkan nationalities; in the case of the Slavic nations, the support granted to them by the Czarist governments, proclaiming Pan-Slavonic idealism as the justification for such help, became a powerful ideological weapon which was used again and again before World War I in the agitation against the Austro-Hungarian Empire by the resentful Slavs. Similar propaganda was used by the anti-German underground fronts during World War II, as well as by the pro-Soviet spokesmen after World War II, who hoped to achieve a Balkan unity under the Communist aegis.

² See E. E. Eubank, "Sociological Factors in the Interpretation of International Relations, with Specific Illustrations from Southeastern Europe and the Near East," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, XIX (1925), 88-96; J. S. Roucek, "The Balkans as a World Problem," *Journal of Geography*, XXXIV (1935), 286-96; M. I. Newbigin, *Geographical Aspects of the Balkan Problems* (London, 1915) and *Southern Europe* (London, 1932); G. Young, *Nationalism and War in the Near East* (Oxford, 1915); D. Mitrany, *The Effect of the War in Southeastern Europe* (New Haven, 1936), pp. 3-26; American Historical Association, *The Balkans* (Washington, D.C., 1944); and Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Balkans* (London, 1945).

BALKAN SEPARATISM

Although integrally a part of Europe because of the Danube artery, the physical relief of the area suggests a hostile gesture against the northwest. All Balkan rivers flow toward the east and south. The broad triangle between Nish and Istanbul in the southeast on the one hand and Salonica in the south on the other is a region torn by almost inaccessible mountain ranges. Under-equipped in terms of communications, the people within this triangle are virtually cut off from the Adriatic coast. Thus Yugoslavia and northern Greece cannot develop the shortest routes to the sea because of the same physical obstacles. Again, the Rhodope ridges have cut Bulgaria off from the Aegean. Her Black Sea littoral is not much help because it increases the nautical mileage between Bulgaria and Western Europe.

Nature has granted no natural point of concentration around which a great state might consolidate itself and dominate the surrounding territory. The very word "Balkan" is the Turkish expression for mountain; it indicates correctly the rugged character of the region, which has served as a sanctuary to more than one race. The fertile areas are relatively small. In this respect, Rumania and Bulgaria are best endowed; Greece and Albania are almost entirely devoid of rich agricultural soil. On the whole, the most productive agricultural areas are located in natural pockets, so to speak. Their inhabitants are separated from their neighbors by mountain crests. The result has been a tendency toward social isolation, promoting the creation of independent worlds adverse to any outsider.

A wide divergence in temperature has contributed to this tendency. The northern and northeastern parts of the Balkan Peninsula are exposed to cold winds carrying with them much snow. In the south and southwest, protected by mountains and high plateaus, the climate is milder; rain arrives usually with winds from the south or southwest. But many districts suffer from sudden weather changes. Furthermore, a great contrast exists between the temperature of the day and that of the night. The extreme alternations, bringing in their wake storms and floods, frequently play havoc with transportation and communications.

THE HALTING STEP OF PROGRESS

The geographical conditions do not encourage rapid social and economic advance. The Adriatic ports of the Balkans are not closely integrated with the hinterland, and the seaboard of Bulgaria and Rumania is small. The Danube traffic and the sea communications of Greece alone are of importance.³ Not only is the cost of railway construction very high but there is also widespread lack of capital, and foreign investors have been reluctant to supply it. The main railway lines, built with the assistance of Austria, Germany, and France, were established not so much for economic as for strategic reasons.⁴ When in 1918–1919 Serbia (Yugoslavia) and Rumania gobbled up the adjoining territories of former Austria-Hungary, the newly acquired railway systems did not admit of reasonable co-ordination with their own. A considerable proportion of Balkan mileage is not of standard gauge. The development of good roads, too, is deterrently expensive. Only in aviation are the Balkans well provided. But the shining birds flying between the capital cities follow their cloudy course high above the humble peasant.

The foundation of Balkan wealth lies in agriculture—yet the peasantry is poor. A few years with insufficient rainfall drive the Balkan farmer into desperate straits. Even abundant harvests bring him small reward for his toil. The centuries of foreign exploitation are past, but national freedom has left him shackled. A declining agricultural price level, continually shrinking foreign markets for his goods, and the cessation of foreign loans have made a mockery of his efforts. The peasant masses know little of public health; epidemics and neglect take a frightful toll.⁵ High illiteracy rates are characteristic of all Balkan lands, except perhaps Bulgaria. Government efforts to ameliorate the situation have not substantially changed the picture.

Save for the Rumanian oil industry and the Yugoslav min-

³ Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Balkan States, I, Economic* (London, 1936), pp. 146–54.

⁴ See Herbert Feis, *Europe, The World's Banker* (New Haven, 1930), pp. 258–92.

⁵ F. A. Ross, C. L. Fry, and E. Sibley, *The Near East and American Philanthropy* (New York, 1929), is a valuable introduction to the social conditions of Albania, Bulgaria, and Greece.

ing industry, there are no specific industrial areas. The Balkans as a whole lack industrial raw materials, particularly hard coal. Whatever industrialization took place within the decades preceding World War II failed to serve the needs of the Balkan peoples. For, soon after Hitler's accession to power in 1933, the Nazi policy of conquering the Balkan nations by "peaceful" economic penetration chained these states to Hitler's war chariot's demanding needs. During World War II the Balkan countries became an area which, in the eyes of Hitler's planners, had no reason for existence but as an area of utter economic exploitation and, if necessary, of extermination of all elements opposing the Nazi goals.

THE HANDICAP OF HETEROGENEITY

A natural thoroughfare between Europe and Asia, the Balkans have become the home of a strange intermixture of national and racial groups tossed about by the ebb and flow of conquest. Wave after wave of invaders has overrun the region, imposing alien cultures upon the resentful victims and adding new deposits to a perplexing formation. For centuries the Balkan peoples have lived here, retaining in the shade of their mountains an indigenous particularism.

Among these diverse nationalities there are scores of tongues, dialects, and religions. European has crossed here with Asiatic at a dozen ethnic juncture points, Nordic with Mediterranean, and Slav interpenetrating both in innumerable combinations. Thus the Bulgar is Alpine Slav, whose blood has Asiatic, Finnish, and Turkish components. The Greek is Hellenic mixed with Nordic, mellowed by Mediterranean strains. Though the Rumanian will never acknowledge that he is anything else but a Latin, he is Slav grafted to Mediterranean and overgrown with Asiatic.

The census figures of each Balkan country may appear simple. But they would look like Chinese puzzles should they ever reveal fully the conglomeration of Armenians, Bulgars, Croats, Dalmatians, Germans, Greeks, Gypsies, Jews, Magyars, Montenegrins, Pomaks, Rumanians, Russians, Serbs, Slovenes, Turks, and others. Twenty-five centuries have not been able to create any national hegemony among the Balkan peoples. While

everywhere else the process of nationalization of alien and divergent minorities is fast progressing, here all these Balkan peoples are doing their best to remain the same as they were when they arrived.

Balkan history, rich in tidal sweeps, has imposed upon the present generation memories of victories and defeats, embroidered with passionate partisanship. At least a part of each of the Balkan peoples at some time or another has been under the domination of its neighbors. The legacy of historical hatreds is traditional. Boundary changes have never settled the problems of all groups involved. Bulgaria mourns Macedonia; Greece weeps over Epirus; Hungarians have been proclaiming vociferously their *Nem, Nem, Soha!* ("No, No, Never!") over the lost Transylvanian districts. No matter what territorial redistributions might take place, some minorities would be left behind in the reshuffling. Even the compulsory exchange of minorities between Turkey and Greece and "voluntary" migration between Greece and Bulgaria have not ended the controversies.

The disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian, Turkish, and Nazi empires made the map more complicated. Minorities under foreign rule are bound to feel "oppressed," while the "oppressing" state is bound to insist that it has granted all the "just" demands of its minorities.⁶ Minority protection forced upon all Balkan states by the Paris Peace Treaties and legally superintended by the League of Nations failed to attain its aims. It was manipulated by the Great Powers for their own political purposes, and it irritated Balkan governments, which looked upon this imposition of international obligation as an insult to the integrity of their countries and as an infringement of state sovereignty. In terms of Balkan disunity, the past has left its indelible impression.

⁶ Strange to say, the problem of European minorities has been viewed in America more as one of international law than as a social phenomenon. Cf. "The Minorities Problem," J. S. Roucek (ed.), *New Europe*, Vol. IV (July-August, 1944). The literature on the minority problem is enormous and cannot be enumerated here. See J. S. Roucek, *The Working of the Minorities System under the League of Nations* (Prague, 1928); C. A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities* (London, 1934); and "A Challenge to Peacemakers," J. S. Roucek (ed.), *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. CCXXXII (March 1944).

THE CULTURAL INFERIORITY COMPLEX

All these obstacles retarded the national and economic development of the region. Balkan patriots are painfully aware that the standard of living is far below that of Western and Central Europe. The rapid population increase and the restrictions imposed on further emigration to the United States caused growing economic pressure, not to speak of the problems arising in Greece and Bulgaria by the impact of their refugees. Delayed in their advance, the Balkan nations tried to make up for the loss of time and to reach with greatest dispatch the level of industrialized countries. This is a strenuous process. One of its concomitants has been a burst of "Western-mindedness," replaced by "Pan-Slavic-brotherhood-mindedness" now.

The Balkan intellectual resents being identified with what the term "Balkan" has come to connote. To suggest to a Rumanian that his is a Balkan country is frivolously tactless. Yugoslavia considers herself a Central European power. Even Bulgaria, located in the hub of the Balkans, likes to draw misleading conclusions from the fact that during World War I she fought on the side of the Central Powers. It was only at the turn of the second decade of World War II that such hypersensitiveness to an innocent geographical term became weakened by the official formation of a Balkan Union and Rumania's willingness to place her signature under a "Balkan Pact." Rumania, the most sensitive member of the Balkan family,⁷ in the postwar years of World War II started to be again pushed to a siding, and Pan-Slavism became fashionable with some Balkan spokesmen. Thus was the Russian-instigated Pan-Slavism of the nineteenth century resurrected in the twentieth century—this time with the motivating force of the Balkan states behind it. For there are about 20,000,000 Slavs in the Balkans (constituting not more than 40 percent of the population), and Balkan unity could possibly be achieved by advocating the new brand of Balkan Pan-Slavism.

⁷ Cf. J. S. Roucek, *Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems* (Stanford University Press, 1932), p. 170. S. Spanačević, "The Real Balkans and an Old Misconception," *Anglo-Yugoslav Review*, IV (Belgrade, 1937), 34-37, is one of the first serious attempts made by "Balkan" intellectuals to justify the characterization of the Balkans as "Balkans."

THE MOVEMENT OF POLITICAL IDEAS

When in the fifteenth century the Balkan Peninsula fell prey to the Ottoman Turks, the new masters were able to maintain peace by force, but made no attempt to integrate the region or merge it completely with the Empire. Administratively, all power was left within the pashaliks, disparate provinces, ruled by local dignitaries chosen by the Porte from among the subject peoples. In fact, the conquerors even permitted their Christian serfs to retain their religion under a patriarch officiating from Constantinople—on the theory that this arrangement would facilitate political control.

But memories of past independence and political grandeur lingered on among the Balkan peoples. Their leaders turned for inspiration and guidance to the West. The French Revolution precipitated a deeply felt national revival. Balkan patriots, many of whom found refuge in the Western capitals, called for the liberation of their nations, particularly after Napoleon's creation of the Illyrian Kingdom in 1809. The national awakening was accelerated by aggressive moves on the part of the Great Powers anxious to extend their influence over the decrepit and corrupt Ottoman Empire. By 1850, the Balkan peoples had again grown fully conscious of their identities. Balkan nationality found expression in a literary and linguistic renaissance and the development of national churches. Western concepts of nationalism, constitutionalism, and democracy had a strong appeal. National independence, however, spelled the doom of liberalism. The emerging ruling class nimbly combined lip service to such ideals with the straightforward pursuit of its self-interest.

Aside from French enlightenment, the Balkans absorbed German thought.⁸ German influences impressed themselves upon the development of Slovenic Protestantism, the Croat movement toward Illyrian independence, and the Serbian language reforms. German romanticism, however, prepared the way for an early infiltration of Marxist doctrine. Today demo-

⁸ Cf. Joseph Matl, "Die Bedeutung der deutschen Einflüsse auf die Entstehung der südslavischen Kulturen," *Deutsche Hefte für Volks- und Kulturbodenforschung*, I (1930-31), 209-25. On the concept of "*Zwischen-Europa*," see Alfons Margulies, *Entwicklungsphasen der südslavischen Kulturen* (Ansbach, 1930).

cratic and liberalistic ideology finds itself confronted with the forces of Balkan communism—a fundamental conflict that lends support to dictatorial solutions. Thus the cultural orientation of the Balkan states presents a picture of extraordinary complexity. The liberation campaigns of the Balkan Slavs against Ottoman domination produced a *rapprochement* between Russia as the Great Power of the Northern Slavs and their Balkan brothers. Throughout the nineteenth century, Russia considered herself the protector of the national churches of the Balkan Slavs.⁹ A bond of confidence developed that transformed itself into political ties. The battle for hegemony carried over into the competition of foreign news services for control of the emergent Balkan press. London's Reuter measured its strength with the *Agence Havas* and Vienna's news services.¹⁰ The flow of foreign credits followed similar tactics. During the years from 1919 to 1932, for instance, France extended loans amounting to more than 1.6 billion francs to Rumania, and 0.9 billion francs to Yugoslavia. In return, the nations thus favored consented to important concessions in the control of their revenues, supervised by foreign "technical consultants."

Riding on another wave of democratic enthusiasm, the Balkan states applied to their postwar political institutions the veneer of high-flown Western principles. The adoption of parliamentary methods proved to be an empty gesture. Within the first decade after World War I the Balkans had degenerated into a laboratory for dictatorial experiments. None of these experiments, however, produced its own supporting ideology. Personal regimes devoid of ideological content, the Balkan governments were wide open to totalitarian penetration from Germany and Italy. When the Nazis and the Fascists had to move out of the Balkans, new regimes took over the control. But this time, they started to proclaim loudly that they

⁹ Cf. G. Pfeilschifter, *Die Balkanfrage in der Kirchengeschichte* (Freiburg, 1913).

¹⁰ For general reference mention may be made of R. P. D. Stephen Taylor (ed.), *Handbook of Central and East Europe* (Zurich, 1938); Robert J. Kerner, *Social Sciences in the Balkans and Turkey* (Berkeley, 1930); and Léon Savadjian (ed.), *Bibliographie balkanique*, Vols. I-VII (Paris, 1931-1938). There are also important periodicals such as the *Revue internationale des études balkaniques* (Belgrade, since 1935).

represented the "people," backing their claims with "democratic" slogans borrowed from Soviet Russia. Even the Greek regime, the only postwar regime in the world which after World War II re-imported the exiled king, developed its ideological justification on "democratic lines," a claim which was supported by President Truman's statement of March 12, 1947, when he conceded that the Greek government was not perfect but represented 85 percent of the Greek Parliament, chosen in elections held under Allied supervision.

BATTLEGROUND OF TWO WORLDS

Always unknown and too far away to most Americans and Englishmen, the Balkans were forced upon the attention of the world by the course of events preceding and following the opening of World War II. When Hitler's plans for world conquest began to crystallize in terms of an empire lying on the direct line from Hamburg to Basra on the Persian Gulf, the Balkans loomed large in the history-shaking steps undertaken by Hitler and his schemers. And the Balkan nations, geographically only backdoor neighbors to the expanding Nazi Reich, figured as basic issues in World War II—just as they did in 1914. Once again the long and tragic history of the Balkans repeated itself, and once more the Balkans became the battleground of great powers.

Suffering to an unimaginable degree, the Balkans emerged from World War II liberated from the Nazi and Italian influence, but now they are under the controlling domination of Soviet Russia with Greece the only country left to the British sphere of influence. Though the whole previous history of the Balkans had shown a tendency of these nations to identify themselves, gradually, with the sphere of Western civilization, in 1945 for the first time in history the Balkans were being influenced by Soviet Russia. The Balkans, in a word, are becoming Russianized. In analyzing what this means, we think in terms of some kind of communism versus some kind of capitalism and we talk about Iron Curtains. But Russianization is something very much deeper and more radical than communism, which as such need be no more than an economic reorientation. Russianization entails a spiritual reorientation, of which Russia's communism is merely an outward sign. It means, among other things, the abandonment of Greco-Roman ideals and the

substitution of something quite different. It could mean, in short, the end of Europe as we understand it—by way of the Balkans.

The Balkans remain the "no man's land" between East and West. We often forget that "between East and West there has been an iron curtain for much more than a thousand years. It existed long before Stalin and Molotov, Lenin and Trotsky—in fact, before there was such a thing as Russia, or Britain, or France, or Germany, or America. There has been an iron curtain dividing the East from the West of Europe since the Roman Empire became irreconcilably divided, with one capital in Rome and another capital in Byzantium, and since Christendom became divided into the Latin and the Greek churches."¹¹

At times this iron curtain dividing the Eastern and Western worlds has been moved westward, and at times moved back to the East—as the whole history of the Balkans shows. But this division, this schism within Christendom, has never been overcome, and only now and then has it been partly and temporarily healed.

Today, the Balkans divide the East and West, and the forces struggling there are aiming to overcome the division of a thousand years. A solution of this problem is essential if civilization is to endure; and perhaps the price of agreement, in Dr. Benes' famous words, is the willingness of the Western world "to meet Russia slightly more than halfway," a proposition which is, however, doubted by many a realistic-minded American.*

¹¹ Walter Lippman, "Lippmann Asserts 'One World' Needs Toleration of Diversity," *New York Herald Tribune*, November 3, 1946.

* References for this chapter may be found on page 38.

II

THE POLITICAL PATTERN

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE still look upon politics as a game played among "gentlemen" on specified occasions and according to specific rules. According to this formula, we gather on electoral days, preceded by a few weeks of exciting and often silly speech-making, accept the decision made by a majority of voters (or of those who just go to enough trouble to vote), and then let the "dirty politics" ride until another election comes along. It seldom occurs to us that "gentlemen" have frequently little or nothing to say and that political bosses and pressure groups lurk in the background of all political decisions; that violence often features all political processes and that well-organized minorities often see to it that decisions in politics can be made only one way—that is, their way. Politics, played in terms of violence, murder, and terror, as well as in terms of ideological pretenses which have little to do with the social realities of the political arguments, are also known to us; although condemned as being "immoral," "unconstitutional," "dirty politics," and the like, such brands of politics cannot be simply ignored or eliminated easily because they do not come up to the standards set by our democracy and the constitutional system.

But while such political practices, featured in the extreme by the use of guns and fraud, are more often exceptions than the rule, Balkan politics can be understood only in the light of "power politics"—direct action unashamed of its "illegal" or "undemocratic" nature. Yet nowhere, in the prewar days of World War II, did one listen to such floods of eloquence on the intrinsic value of parliamentarism and constitutionalism, and today to so many affectionate commentaries on "democratic" and "popular front" proclamations, as in the Balkans. The

paradox resolves itself upon reflection. A rugged region, the Balkans reinforce on their inhabitants a localism which, until the use of the most modern methods of propaganda—the press, the radio, and the film—did not admit of mass movements and broad ideological surges. National and religious antagonisms are more intense here than elsewhere, because communities socially very much alike are divided by mountain ramparts. Geography itself is hostile to nation-wide allegiances. As a consequence, government conforms to the ancient pattern of personal leadership.

THE APPAREL OF DEMOCRACY

History has never given any breaks to any of the Balkan peoples. Wave after wave of invaders, either from the south or the north, from the east or the west, conquered time and time again this or that portion, or all of the Balkan Peninsula, always destroying and exploiting the natives. Chief among these conquerors was the Turk, who for centuries was master of the Balkans, and as such was a constant threat to the chancelleries of Europe. During the nineteenth century he was gradually pushed out by the combined forces of internal disintegration and the pressure of European armies on the Balkan frontiers; by the third decade of the twentieth century he had been almost entirely driven out—a process completed, however, only by the course of World War I. Although the army and the taxgatherer of the Turk are now gone from the Balkans, an unmistakable legacy remains, which is apparent in the Oriental notions of pomp, splendor, and luxury that still prevail among the upper classes of the whole Peninsula. It lingers in the widespread contempt for the man who works with his hands. It is seen in low standards of education, which are a sore and pressing problem. But it claims our most constant attention perhaps in the attitudes and psychological tendencies that have made the Balkans a synonym for violence, for an excessive nationalism coupled with a stubborn resistance to compromise which has so far balked all attempts at federation or permanent harmony.

THE CURSE OF HISTORY

Balkan politics cannot be understood without realizing that Turkey ruled all these peoples up to a century ago. The bad

habits still hang on. Until after World War I, vermin filled even the big hotels; tips (*baksheesh*) were—and still are—compulsory to get a locomotive engineer to drive his train, a stationmaster to pass a train through. Statesmen were pick-pockets. A fairly respectable profession was that of the professional assassin. All over the Balkans there is an association between highway robbery and revolutionary idealism which the Westerner finds disconcerting, but which is an inevitable consequence of the Turkish conquest. This crystallized the conditions of the fourteenth century, and in the Middle Ages anybody who stepped out of the niche into which he was born had no other resource but banditry; he could neither move to another district nor change his trade. If a peasant excited the displeasure of authority by standing up for the rights of his kind, he had to make himself scarce and thereafter live under cover of the forests and mountains, making forays on rich travelers, alike under the Nemanyas and under the Turks. Hence the Balkan peoples are not, to this day, initially shocked by a rebel who professes political idealism though he habitually loots and murders. But sooner or later they become irritated by the practical results of this application of medieval theory to modern conditions. The weak point in this program was, between World Wars I and II, the chronic lack of rich travelers. Conditions and consequences of World War II have again been favorable to these practices, as their aegis is now carried under the guise of pro-Communism, Fatherland Fronts, or the "people's battle against Fascism."

VIOLENCE AS POLITICAL ROUTINE

This brand of political behavior has, therefore, not only geographic and economic aspects but also those of religious, nationalistic, and communistic varieties of ideologies. Murder, or assassination, or execution, as one chooses, is often regarded as a constructive political act in the Balkans. The reason is not too deeply buried in the past. The Turk was a Moslem, and between him and his Christian subjects there was the wide religious gulf which led each to regard the other as "infidel." In all lands and all places this has, at times at least, been regarded as full license for murder. The Balkans were no exception. In fact, this added fuel kindled the already smouldering flame

of national hatreds between conqueror and conquered; and it early became a privilege, often a sacred duty, to kill such of the "oppressors" as inadvertently offered themselves for sacrifice. The inaccessible mountain ranges of the Balkans always sheltered bands of modern "Robin Hoods," whose deeds are sung in the ballads of all the peoples of the Peninsula. The fighting man became the symbol of Balkan nationalism; the peasant in the field, however, went unhonored and unsung. The military is even today the most privileged. It is not strange that this tradition of reckless violence should have become a part of modern Balkan political behavior, and that the act of murder long justified against the Turk should be justified against all "enemies," whether rival Balkan nations, or dissident minorities within the state, or pro-Communists or pro-Fascists, or just simply the critics of the "strong men" in power at the moment.

It is only fair to note that these people are not savage because they were born that way, or because of their peculiar "instincts." The prime cause of all this violence is, of course, five hundred years of misgovernment by the Ottoman Empire, or the lessons learned in survival during both World Wars, first from the German and Austro-Hungarian invaders, and then from the German Nazis and Italian Fascists. There is no more striking relic of crime than the despoiling of Macedonia and Old Serbia, where the Turks for five hundred fifty years robbed the native population to a point beyond which the process could not be carried any further without danger of leaving no victims to be robbed in the future. The poverty of all Bosnians and Herzegovinians (except the Moslems and the Jews) was as ghastly an indictment of the Turks as of their successors, the Austro-Hungarians. Dalmatia was picked clean by Venice. Croatia was held back from prosperity by Hungarian control in countless ways that have left it half an age behind its Western neighbors in material prosperity. Never in the Balkans has the Empire meant trusteeship.

The circumstances of Balkan life have forbidden any intertwining of religious and pacifist sentiment. The *comitadji* who waged guerilla warfare against the Turks displayed a wide range of character. Some were highly disciplined, courageous, and ascetic men, often from good families in the freed Slavic

countries, who harried the Turkish troops, particularly those sent to punish Christian villages, and who held unofficial courts to correct the collapse of the legal system in the Turkish provinces. Some were fanatics who were happy in massacring the Turks but even happier when they were purging the movement of suspected traitors. Others were robust nationalists, to whom the proceedings seemed a natural way of spirited living. Still others were blackguards who were in the business because they enjoyed murder and banditry. All intermediate shades of character were fully represented. This made it difficult for the Western student to form a clear opinion about Balkan politics; and it is still difficult to comprehend that the modern *chetniks* and partisans were but following the same formula during World War II, and that the same pattern is now being used in the Soviet-sponsored pressure against Greece.

WAR OF PERSONALITIES

Balkan politics is a political contest among the formal politicians and the leaders of various factions, including those heading guerillas, influencing Balkan politics—and that leaves no special groups there out of consideration. But first and foremost it is a struggle among personalities. While the royal courts, backed by the army, formerly ruled their respective countries in much the same way as former Turkish pashas, they have recently been replaced by Titos, Hoxhas, Grozas, and Dimitrovs. These dominant minorities, claiming their power on the basis of ideologies of the Fatherland or Liberation Fronts, rule the peasants, a growing middle class, industrial and agricultural workers, and national minorities. A Balkan election is a clash of personalities; seldom the real issues enter the contest. The reasons are several. The political parties are most often loose associations around personal leaders, the relationship being almost tribal in many respects. Until recently parties lacked programs; for the most part they emphasize nationalistic ideologies and generally expend their greatest efforts in arousing to a high pitch the rampant nationalism and emotionalism of the masses. This is in part explained by the lack of organization and clearly defined ideology usually associated with an agricultural society. Geographical isolation, with its inevitable corollary of suspicion, also plays its part. It is true that the

Balkan constitutions extol the values of parliamentary democracy, but these have been for the most part more imitation than reality, borrowing West European forms without a satisfactory background in the political evolution of the Balkans. Party discipline is of an unreasoning variety; there are countless desertions and numerous interparty feuds. It was only with the departure of the Nazis from the Balkans at the end of World War II that the political system imitating pretty closely the Soviet brand of politics began to be developed, both in regard to the organization as well as to the ideological appeals of the political party organizations.

Despite the highly emotional character of Balkan political campaigns there is an obvious sameness to the appeals of the excited partisans. "Unity" is now the banner they all unfurl. The clique surrounding the contemporary dictators conceives itself as a permanent ruling class; therefore it does not present new issues, new values, new ideas. The strategy of these leaders is to portray themselves as the bearers of the cultural traditions of the nation, as the avengers of the people against the former "pro-Fascist" and "reactionary" rulers, ready to replace the former sham parliamentarism with a proposed federalist democratic system under the benevolent smiles of approval by Moscow. But, fundamentally, all the ramifications of this kind of politics are based on the personalities of Tito, Hoxha, Groza, and Dimitrov. Even in Greece, postwar political trends were focused around the personality of King George.

Below the ruling élites the usual struggles are carried on along lines of personalistic conflicts among the several camps of bureaucrats (a Balkan "politician" is usually a bureaucrat without a formal position), each and all hoping to climb soon enough, or to stay, on the bandwagon of the currently successful dictators.

ROYAL SOLUTIONS

The proclamation of Zog as King of the Albanians in 1928, the periodic royal somersaults in Greece, and the exploits of Rumania's Carol exemplify the axiom that in the Balkans republican and democratic ideas were exotic flora. Circumstances may render a republic a useful *pis aller*; in the first resort and under conditions of a virtual dictatorship, it may be

worked successfully. But a monarchy provided an element of stability which no Balkan republic has ever been able to attain. This was attested by the Greek, Albanian, and Bulgarian experiments. While in other parts of Europe dynastic regimes yielded to defeat and opposition, monarchy was retained in Bulgaria. While elsewhere the reaction against democracy and republicanism took the form of essentially antimonarchical dictatorships, the revolutionary cycle in Greece led to the restoration of the legitimate ruler. When other devices for giving stability to the body politic had failed by progressive stages in Bulgaria, Greece, and Rumania, the obvious expedient was in all cases the establishment of royal dictatorships as arbitrators of group demands.

BRAND OF BALKAN PARTIES

Before the rise of the Fatherland Front parties, supporting the regimes of Tito, Hoxha, Dimitrov, and Groza, built on the pattern of uniting Communists with "converted" Fascists, with the Communists in the key positions, in general there were, up to the end of World War II, three major types of parties in the Balkans. The most numerous were the political organizations based essentially on the dominating personalities of outstanding political leaders; their programs were subsidiary. No less important, and of supreme significance in several Balkan states, were the avowedly dictatorial parties, which tried to exclude all other parties from existence. Finally, a few parties were founded largely on ideologies dealing with concrete social issues.

The fundamental and formative element of the most powerful and most prevalent parties in the Balkans was the political leader himself. The *régime personnel*, typical of Balkan politics, is in a sense the direct product of the physical character of the region. It was also an obvious device for maintaining a semifeudal system of feudal tenure. The large landholders and the urban classes overlording the peasantry were forced by their self-interest to support a monopoly of power incompatible with representative institutions. On the other hand, the decline of Ottoman hegemony and the liberation campaigns caused an inevitable infiltration of Western ideas, without changing materially the inherent realities of Balkan politics. At the bottom,

the theoretical predilection for these ideas and the outward respect accorded democratic forms were little more than mimicry. As a result, the dominant Balkan parties were less important than the leaders themselves. A typical party of this kind sometimes existed within the assembly, and the executive power knew of no influence counterbalancing its own strength.

Perhaps nowhere are designations more liable to be misleading than in the vernacular of Balkan parties. Most of them originated in the prewar days of World War I; their programs have become painfully obsolete. Rumania's Liberal Party was really the conservative party in the country. The People's Party of Greece, founded by Gunaris in 1920, was originally a monarchistic party with radical leanings, which later forgot its monarchistic dedication and was dissolved by the very monarch it had favored. The Party of Free Thought marshaled by Greece's Metaxas tolerated only its own free thought; its value as an organization lay in the support of its leader, who in turn supported monarchic restoration. Similarly, the National Liberal factions of predictatorial Bulgaria really stood on the extreme right of Bulgarian politics. Bulgaria's Radical Party concentrated in its ranks the conservative middle classes. The Radical Party of Pashitch in Yugoslavia was the most reactionary party of the kingdom.

With rare exceptions, Balkan parties had few or no native traditions.¹ Fewer still were based on class interests, unless we classify them roughly as peasant parties and urban parties. They were primarily the tools of strong personalities; abstract ideologies and social programs were at best of secondary importance. Indeed, political parties were transplantations from abroad. Balkan party politics was a conglomeration of superficial dexterities, with little relation to the currents of public opinion or the forces shaping national life.

POLITICS AND PERSONALITIES

The fundamental and formative element of the most powerful and most prevalent parties in the Balkans was the political

¹ The subsequent treatment is based on the revision of Joseph S. Rousek, "Social Character of Balkan Politics," *World Affairs Interpreter*, V (1934), 68-83. See also R. H. Markham, "Government—Balkan States," in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, VII, 81-84, and "Parties, Political—Balkan States," *ibid.*, XI, 628-30.

leader himself. A typical party of this kind sometimes existed within the framework of a party coalition, but its existence was conditioned upon its leader. If the leader died without succession, the party disappeared, since there was no longer a controlling reason for its existence. The party program was determined by the leader himself, and the party members, followers of the leader, remained faithful to him even if the program was changed, because they did not follow the program, but their political head. Such were in Rumania Averescu's People's Party and Professor Iorga's following, Dr. Lupu's Peasant Party, and even the Liberal Party of the Bratianus; in Bulgaria, the various Liberal factions, among them the Petroff and Smiloff groups, the Democratic Entente, the Tsankoff Party, and numerous other political clusters; in Greece, the Liberal Party of Venizelos, the Monarchist Party of Tsaldaris, the Progressive Liberals of Kaphandaris, and many other minor factions; and in Yugoslavia, the Radical Party of Serbia's Pashitch, the Croatian Peasant Party of Styepan Raditch, and half a score of smaller machines.

One of the causes of the emergence of such personal parties was the tradition of the feudal order. In many parts of the Balkans, feudal or quasi-feudal conditions have endured until our day. Governance by strong personalities was the large landholder's defense against the claims both of the masses and industrial and capitalist interests, which as yet do not dominate society. Consequently, modern political methods were being adjusted to the traditions of feudalism. For example, the Bratianus exerted a preponderant influence on the course of Rumanian politics. Representatives of the intelligentsia, they assumed the leadership of the upper classes irrespective of the questionable economic productivity of their ilk. Equally influential was the military caste. In addition, the names of the rebels who had fought for the national liberation presented an attraction for the masses to be reckoned with in electoral contests.

As political practice was dominated by personalities, it was natural that subjective elements came to the fore in political contests. Individual jealousies and squabbles over spoils were much in evidence, altogether out of proportion with major issues such as agrarian reform. Politics became a matter of

private gain and prestige. Most frequently, party leaders built up their following by sweeping promises or by placing their adherents in political jobs. Once at the helm, the politician had power of appointment over a vast variety of posts. As a rule, he threw out the followers of his predecessor to replace them by his own, whose grasping claws had grown while they were waiting. This rotation is considered natural by the public, especially by those who hope to profit by it. But if political parties became so strong as to monopolize the jobs, a new faction was formed around a leader who appeared to have a chance of propelling himself to a commanding position.

If those waiting for their turn to come had reason to feel impatient, a revolution was likely to occur. Sometimes a group of army officers sufficiently sure of troops would dictate political alternation by violent methods—a respectable mode of political action in the Balkans. Under Ottoman rule, the people dissatisfied with the local administration often took the law into their own hands.

That even Balkan sovereigns lack immunity was indicated not only by the assassination of Yugoslavia's royal dictator. The register included the murder of Serbia's King Alexander Obrenovitch and Queen Draga, and several of his predecessors; the kidnaping of a Bulgarian ruler; and the violence surrounding the careers of the Greek kings. Balkan sovereigns, in fact, have found themselves frequently at odds with their leading politicians.

In Rumania, on the other hand, King Carol built up his own political machine. He conducted the government in such a way as to make himself the master over all Rumanian parties. These came to office not because of the vote cast for them in elections, but because of the King's decision. Thus Carol became a kind of super-party in his country. He was working toward a one-party system. In Yugoslavia, similarly, King Alexander abolished the old political formations when he established his dictatorship in 1929. For the purpose of retaining the forms of popular support for this system, he organized through his lieutenants a single party, which functioned to the practical—although not constitutional—exclusion of all others for the plain purpose of giving façade to the dictatorial regime. This process continued under the Regency. In Albania, divi-

sion of political allegiance was simple: there were those who supported the monarch and those who opposed him. The latter group was effectively muzzled for the time being. In Bulgaria, the government only recently granted some latitude to the opposition; in any case, the dynast succeeded in becoming the pivotal influence in the politics in his country. In Greece, the constitutional course initially pursued by King George after his return from exile eventually slipped into a palpable imitation of Fascist techniques, controlled by a military leader, with general stewardship reserved for the monarch.

In marked contrast stood those political organizations which stressed their programs and ideologies more than their leaders. They were represented in Rumania by the National Peasant Party and to some extent by the Liberal Party. The latter had at times changed its complexion. Under the Bratianus it had placed emphasis on the leader, when need be, and on its ideological principles when supporting a policy of mercantilism and industrialism. Other program parties were the Agrarians of Greece; Bulgaria's National Agrarian Union; the Catholic People's Party of Dr. Koroshetz in Yugoslavia; the Republican Union (the Agrarian and Labor Party) of Dr. Papanastassiou in Greece; and all Socialist and Communist parties of the Balkans. The latter were program parties in the purest form, in spite of the fact that their ideologies were virtually beyond the grasp of the Balkan masses, who were attracted to them more because of widespread economic misery than because of a comprehension of their ideology.

In fact, radicalism here is not so much a doctrine as a state of mind. One may add to this group the Anti-Jewish League of National Defense and the Iron Guard of Rumania, both influenced by the Fascist and National Socialist ideologies. Significantly, the program parties were the least important politically. For their limited influence on the course of political affairs Rumania was an outstanding example. The National Peasant Party was able to dominate the political scene for only a short period of time. The Iron Guard was noticeable primarily for its terroristic acts and agitation. In Bulgaria, the rule of the Agrarian Union under Stambuliski was a conspicuous failure. Where mountains divide, the unifying effect of programs seems lost.

SOLDIERS AND REBELS

The political conditions of the Balkans leave much room for organizations which are not parties in the strict sense of the word, yet which exert powerful pressures and conduct their own kind of politics by specific methods. The past nationalist revolutions have kept the prestige of the military on a very high level. Uniforms are in evidence everywhere, and the army has become historically identified with both progressive and reactionary movements. Every Balkan ruler and his man Friday are dependent on the army as the paramount instrument of force. Thus the army has become an integral part of society and by no means its servant. Small-scale militarism had a real place in the Balkan social scheme. A military junta was comparable to a political party, but far stronger, because in addition to being effectively organized it was armed. In the presence of the latent threat of civil violence, the army was the only force which protected the regime against disorders, but retained freedom to rise against it. When a government completely succumbs to corruption, the pay of both men and officers, along with that of the civil officials, is often held up for months. Moreover, under such a government promotions may be dictated entirely by a self-assured politician in power. Such strain on army loyalty produces that discontent which has been a contributing factor in many Balkan revolts—a discontent fanned by the proverbial contempt which the military class feels for the politician and by the justifiable fear that internal weakness might endanger the country's independence.

Bullets have frequently played an important part in the political transformation of the Balkans. Certainly, military dictatorship is much more in harmony with the national tradition of government than is constitutionalism. As in nineteenth-century Russia, a considerable proportion of the army officers are among the most cultured and best educated sons of their community. For this reason, too, many of them are drawn into the state service as administrators. The military clubs are centers of informed political gossip. Efforts have been made in recent years to demilitarize politics, but the history of Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, and Rumania between World War I and World War II was shaped to a considerable extent by soldiers.

Albania's King Zog started his career as a tribal fighter, and in Yugoslavia generals were running the administration, lending weight to the dictatorial regime. In Rumania, Marshal Averescu had been premier twice, the senate had more than its share of military figures, and the army put King Carol back on the throne in 1930. In Greece, soldiers have been the government off and on.

Since most opposition was sent scurrying underground in all the Balkan countries, political agitation was carried on through subterranean channels. The jails of Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Bulgaria were crowded with political prisoners. Some of the Aegean islands became refugee camps for the democratic opponents of the Metaxas regime in Greece. Physical violence is today the only weapon that the opposition can use, a time-honored method of achieving desired goals. Most Balkan leaders must hide behind their stalwarts, especially since the successful onslaught on King Alexander in 1934. The bodyguards of Professor Alexander Tsankoff of Bulgaria or of Dr. Vladimir Matchek, the determined leader of the discontented Croats, exemplified the patent need for self-protection, which reminds us of the heyday of powerful underworld figures during our prohibition era. By 1946, Tito's NKVD-trained secret police force, OZNA (Committee for the Protection of the People), together with the Partisans, had liquidated an estimated 200,000 people and imprisoned an estimated 100,000.

The use of naked force for the sake of a fanatical creed became the outstanding technique of a superbandit organization in the Balkans, the IMRO, secret society of revolutionary Macedonia, a government within Bulgaria's recent prewar government.² For nearly forty years the chain of assassinations of enemies of Macedonian independence remained unbroken. The IMRO was singularly effective in disposing of its political opponents. During the first fifteen years after World War I it was safer to irritate the Bulgarian government than the IMRO in the two Bulgarian provinces of Petritch and Kustendil. Mihailoff, the head of the organization, ordered political

² The official name was Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization; the Bulgarian name was *Vatreschna Makedonska Revolutionarna Organizacija* (VMRO). See the chapter on Macedonians in the present volume (p. 147).

executions without the least regard for the laws of the country; he was the uncrowned king of the Balkan political underworld. The murder of Alexander of Yugoslavia must be credited to him.

STUDENTS IN POLITICS

While the IMRO fought in the dark, Balkan academic youth were accustomed to agitate in the open. The students, a factor in Balkan political life, were the vanguards of two opposing forces—Fascism and Communism. An interpretation of this social phenomenon must take into account several considerations. In the first place, there was the struggle between the younger generation, anxious to exert its own influence and critical of its control by the older generation identified with "the system." Second, the educated youth professed the conviction that liberal culture and professional training ought to be instruments of national service, primarily by way of appointments to government positions, as long as opportunities for business and industrial careers were limited. Third, there was a tendency to imitate the modes of living typified by Western Europe and to get away from the peasant milieu. The peasant, too, had come to hope that his offspring might rise in the social scale by benefiting from the sudden expansion of higher education after the liberation from the Ottoman yoke, and thus escape what approximated economic serfdom.

The hope for higher income levels, for an easier life attained by emancipation from hard manual labor, for a better social position, created a fetish of diplomas, the "academization" of occupational preparation. Moreover, the road of approach to governmental and political positions was being narrowed down. Only those who have passed through the higher institutions of learning can expect career opportunities. This is especially true because the upper classes have been in almost uninterrupted control in the Balkan states. Yet the higher brackets of the occupational structure have expanded little. Hence the growing body of unemployed intellectuals was perennially ready to join extremist movements promising "the way out." Demonstrations, riots, strikes, or anti-Jewish agitation have a peculiar appeal to Balkan academic youth. The students represent a political pressure group, unable to transform itself into a po-

litical party because of numerical weakness, but articulate enough to make its influence felt in any faction militating against the status quo.

THE INADEQUACY OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

The status quo is made more problematical by the inadequacy of political representation. Up to our day, the Balkans have remained predominantly agrarian. The general social profile of the Balkans is indicated in the following table, showing the remarkably broad agricultural basis of the different Balkan states:

PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE

| | |
|-------------------------------|------------|
| Rumania | 81 percent |
| Bulgaria | 82 percent |
| Albania (approximately) | 90 percent |
| Yugoslavia | 76 percent |
| Greece | 67 percent |

These figures are self-explanatory. They are, however, not reflected in the political make-up of the Balkan countries. Both political and social balance are lacking. Balkan politics have been dominated by classes whose interests conflict with those of the peasant. The governmental machinery was actually operated by the urban intelligentsia—merchants, small industrialists, and bankers. The character of this intelligentsia, however, differed from that of the middle classes of Western Europe. There it was the outgrowth of the economic and political revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the Balkans, the middle class arose on the wave of the nationalistic reaction against the foreign oppressor—the Turk. When the Balkan states were established, everyone with some measure of education was needed for the new state services. The professional man was much in demand.

But as time went on, and when the government positions had been filled, the Balkan intelligentsia came to nurture the notion that their education imposed a duty on the state to provide them with appropriate opportunities. Inevitably, politics became the goal of achievement for the nonpeasant groups, and political ambitions in the Balkans were boundless for every alert

member of this class. Business and professional careers were often utilized merely as steppingstones to political positions. As a result, political opportunism and petty bureaucracy became a paralyzing national vice in each Balkan country. Officialdom in too many cases deteriorated to become the tool of politics. Inefficiency and corruption were rampant. Government personnel in the Balkans was greatly in excess of actual requirements. The bureaucracy, customarily appointed en masse in reward for party services, was prone to employ governmental posts as an alchemist's stone in the absence of adequate salaries.

Because politics is the chief source of livelihood for the Balkan intelligentsia, political contests are very bitter and frequently assume the aspects of a minor war. Long-range economic policy and the solution of the farm problem attract much less attention than the vague but potent slogans of party politics. The social energy dissipated in political maneuvering is lost to planful economic development—a towering issue rarely faced. The Balkan intellectual has, however, a ready answer to such criticism. He will point out that Balkan statehood is still very young and that it had no auspicious start. His ancestors, he will add, led the revolutions against Turkish rule, and the revolutionary spirit is still within him. He belongs to a passionate people whose pulse has been quickened by the geographic and social milieu and by an unbalanced system of production. He can live with very little work, and the complex machinery of modern industrial life has not entwined him and made him a spineless conformist. His excess energies find outlets only in the fields he has come to value most highly—politics, literature, and art, but primarily politics. His experience makes him emotional and individualistic. Looking at the illiterate masses, he has no belief in the ballot, although he will praise the democratic provisions of his constitution. There is a general lack of faith and public spirit. The externals of representative government, alien to native tradition and superimposed on conditions indigenous to the Balkan countries, have failed to produce a sense of public trusteeship.

Although the peasant is the most numerous and the most stable social element in every Balkan country, yet, with an inconsequential exception in Rumania and Bulgaria, his basic interests have not been represented by strong political parties.

The explanation lies in the fact that the peasant is still timid, ignorant, and backward. The ruling cliques represent the urban areas—the advancing industrial interests seeking government favors, the clergy and professional groups, and the army of politicians. The masses of the people count politically for little in the life of the country. The world of which the modern Balkans are a part is outside their scope. They have almost no share in it, except by grudgingly surrendering their taxes and serving in the armies. They live by what centuries of experience have taught them to be the way of man under the sun. Humility, obedience, deference—these are their lot, and man's lot has been fixed as the course of the sun and stars is fixed. Release lies in periodic lawlessness.

Still, the Balkan peasant has become restive.⁸ World War I and the Russian Revolution roused the peasantry to a sense of political power. The grant of the vote to the masses induced the politician to come into the villages with a blinding array of glorious pledges. Thereafter the peasants began to formulate their distinct demands in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia—less so, if at all, in the remaining Balkan countries. As the farm population gained influence through political action, the upper classes were forced to defend their ascendancy with increased violence and shrewder wiles—as exemplified in the assassinations of Stambuliski and Raditch on the one hand and deceptive appeals to the peasantry on the other.

Most Balkan governments took steps to promote industrialization. The old social problem of Eastern Europe was being fought out anew with deep and belligerent exasperation. In the Balkan states there are few railways, excepting the great trans-continental service, few industrial centers, and little machinery. Here the peasant, more or less isolated in his village, goes about his work in much the way his ancestors did a thousand years ago. Often he has not even a steel plow and turns the soil with a wooden prong. Occasionally he goes to the nearest market with his grain or livestock, where he can see even an American motion picture. But this contact with what we call modern civilization shows him the tremendous divergence between his own standard of living and that of the town people. Slowly,

⁸ Wilbert E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (New York, 1945).

the main lines of social division between the political groups are becoming visible to him. In Rumania, the agrarian forces and the urban interests were unmistakably marked off against each other. In Bulgaria, the battle line ran between the peasants, reinforced by the outlawed Communists, and all the white-collar groups. In Albania, the numerically small intelligentsia and the new *bourgeoisie*, largely associated with the regime of King Zog, were fighting for the upper hand over the land-owners.

THE COMING INTERNAL STRUGGLE

The ancient feud between village and town is intensified by the fact that the Balkan peasantry forms the great debtor class, while the urban interests constitute the great creditor class. The peasant senses dimly that the whole political machinery functions for the benefit of the town people—and indeed, financial and industrial interests, however small, were being furthered by the Balkan governments at the expense of the masses. He was conscious, though vaguely, that things could be changed by resort to violence, and occasionally he flared up in angry revolt. Yet he knows that he is a prostrate figure, compressed between the vagaries of nature on the one hand and mysterious man-made forces on the other. He is beginning to realize, however, that in the past he has been grievously exploited. Consequently, the parties representing the peasantry have come to regard the agrarian problem as one of supreme urgency.

CONSEQUENCES OF WORLD WAR II

While the course of World War II, which imposed on the Balkan nations—with the exception of Greece—the regimes influenced by the pro-Soviet tendencies, the underlying pattern of politics changed very little. The old cliques of politicians were replaced by the course of World War I, but a similar type took their places: the politicians were again strong personalities, typifying more the *régime personnel* of old, rather than any ideological movements. While they all leaned toward the Communistic convictions, in order to please the Soviet masters, nearly all these leaders had very little in common with the Communist convictions. Could Groza of Rumania, Veltcheff and

Gheorghieff of Bulgaria, or Hoxha boast of training in the Communist underground? While it is true that Gheorghieff was the power in Bulgaria's government after Sofia's switch from the camp of the Axis powers, he had to put up Veltcheff as the government representative in order to satisfy the pattern understandable to the Bulgarian people. It was only in Yugoslavia that the pro-Communist leanings of Marshal Tito were prominently displayed. But even there, Tito had to use the symbols and rituals of a politician, characterizing him as a strong personality rather than as a Communist sympathizer.

All in all, then, the regimes of strong personalities remained in power after the conquest of the region by Russia. Even in Greece, the last outpost of Great Britain's influence in the Balkans, strong men were running the political show there. All in all, four essential points were common to the whole area.⁴ (1) The internal regimes were characterized by a strong trend to the Left, oscillating somewhere between the Soviet system and those of Western democracies. (2) The foreign policies of these various states leaned on the directives issued by Soviet Russia—with Greece the only country in that part of the world taking its directives from London and Washington. (3) A regional bloc seemed to be in formation in the Balkans, based not on any confederation (unless it could be the Pan-Slavic ideal), but on individual alliances between Soviet Russia and the separate countries. (4) The region was unfit for a communistic system of economy, and yet (with the exception of Greece) all these states adopted a definite state control over capital and a number of co-operative activities. Yugoslavia emerged in the area as the strongest single military power, able even to defy the United States by shooting down America's airplanes in 1946.

WORLD WAR AND CIVIL WAR

Unlike the United States and Britain, the Balkans fought civil wars during World War II. While in the United States and Britain the upper classes and big business played an im-

⁴ Stoyan Pribichevich, "Yugoslavia in the Balkans and Central Europe," *International Affairs*, XXI (October 1945), 448-58. But it ought to be noted for the sake of accuracy that we have not adopted Pribichevich's interpretation of the new regimes in the Balkans *in toto*.

portant, not to say decisive, part in war production and winning the war, the upper classes and business classes in the Balkans were more ready than the lower classes to make accommodations with the enemy—so that every pro-Fascist had come from the Rightist ranks.

Thus a Balkan specialist formulated three principles of this so-called “anti-Fascist democracy,” as it was called in the Balkans.⁵ The first principle was a militant concept of who is a “democrat.” According to the pro-Soviet line, a “true democrat” was in the immediate postwar years the man who had fought Fascism; but this concept was incomprehensible to the West. The second principle was that the limitless acceptance of opposition parties offered legal loopholes for Fascist infiltration, or resulted in anarchy, which was liable to undermine the Soviet’s concept of “democracy” and facilitate “Fascism’s rise to power”; therefore, the ruling combinations throughout the Balkans—always excepting Greece—were limited to political parties between the Center and the extreme Left. The third principle was that the masses of long-oppressed and exploited lower classes, especially peasantry, were groomed, through radical and economic and social reforms, for preponderant influence in the government. But the grooming process was only theoretical, for the new rulers were again the pawns in the struggle of power politics as the traditional crossroads between East and West.

Thus, while the West insisted that free competition of parties was an essential element of democracy, in the Balkans the ruling cliques insisted that democracy was identical with the one-party government and the slate of candidates put up by them for the popular approval. These candidates were mostly new leaders, brought up by resistance movements and nurtured by, or at least acceptable to, the forces sponsored by the Russians.

The most interesting feature of this process was the splitting up of the old peasant movements into right and left wings with the left wings usually joining the liberation government and the right wings staying outside. Sometimes the right wing were headed by the old party leaders and sometimes not. Orig

⁵ Pribichevich, *op. cit.*, pp. 449–50.

inally, peasant parties had been, alongside the Communists, the chief standard-bearers of opposition to autocratic regimes. They promoted extremely radical programs which certainly were more radical than the platforms of the liberation movements, opposing the monopoly of political power by the *gospoda* (the *bourgeoisie*) and favoring a co-operative peasant state, where big business, banks, and industries would be controlled by the state in peasant interest. But the peasant movements of Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia failed to attain or control state power. A large influx of the urban and bourgeois elements into the peasant leadership resulted in the switch of emphasis from peasant radicalism to nationalism; thus the Croat Peasant Party became more and more a *Croat* Peasant Party instead of a *Croat Peasant* Party, while the Serbian Agrarian Party was led by the elements promoting ideas of a Serbian separatism from Croatia, and Maniu's National Peasant Party approved Rumania's war on Russia to recover Bessarabia.

The general pattern in the Balkans, therefore, showed in the immediate postwar years a definite swing to the left, with the Communists hoping, and partly succeeding, in gaining a monopoly of power, but being unable to exercise their power in the same way as in Soviet Russia. In fact, with the exception of Greece, no postwar Balkan government was conceivable without Communist participation or approval—or leadership. That was true of Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania.

EXPERIMENTS AND HOPES IN FEDERALISM

The Communist ideas and leadership introduced, at the same time, new and revolutionary policies of the new governments in the field of nationalism and federalism. Parliamentary democracy, such as has been known to the United States and Western Europe, proved to be, as we shall show, only sham parliamentarism which ended in dictatorships. With the withdrawal of the Axis forces from the Balkans, the new Communist-dominated governments offered experiments in federalism, promising to solve the age-old nationalistic and minorities problems by a federalistic formula, veiled either under the ideology of Pan-Slavism or the Fatherland and partisan fronts. The lead in this respect was taken by Yugoslavia, where the state was transformed into a federal state of five recognized

nationalities: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins—with Bosnia, hopelessly mixed with Moslems, Serbs, and Croats, so that it was made into a separate state which was neither Serb nor Croat.

The idea was not novel, but was novel in its execution. For all former Balkan schemes had envisaged the minorities solutions in terms of centralized and centralistic states. But how much of the very idea was to serve the interests of Soviet Russia was another matter and a matter of serious concern not only to Great Britain but also to the United States, determined at all costs to prevent the domination of the Balkans by a single power. Yet, all the indications in 1946 were that the plans were underway to form the Balkans into a kind of closed economy, leaning on Russia, with Moscow intending at the same time to link all Slavs through military and other alliances which would create a federation of 24,000,000 people, stretching from the Black Sea to the Adriatic, and isolate Greece from Central Europe. Legally, nothing stood in the way of a federation of the Balkan states in 1946, since the last obstacle had been removed when Bulgarians, following the example of Yugoslavia and Albania, voted out their monarchy and proclaimed a People's Republic.

Obstacles to Balkan federation were great, however. Despite the power of the Greater Pan-Slavic idea, regional loyalties had remained strong. Success of such a federation would depend in large part upon the degree of regional autonomy permitted. Soviet Russia's program of cultural autonomy for her diverse nationalities had been highly successful, but would it satisfy Balkan nationalistic and regionalist forces in the face of the centralized economic and political life favored by the Communist-led governments of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania? Rivalry between Yugoslavia's Tito and the leader of Bulgaria's Communists, Gheorgi Dimitrov, was also bound to create difficulties.

OBJECTIONS FROM LONDON AND WASHINGTON

The main obstacles to the union or federation, however, was the opposition of the United States and Great Britain—as well as that of the other states in the Balkans and Danubia. London feared that a Balkan federation would be a Soviet pawn. Czarist

Russia used the Pan-Slav movement and penetration of the Balkans as a means of pressure against Turkey's Empire to achieve control of the Dardanelles; Britain opposed this drive throughout the nineteenth century—and opposes it today. Washington backed London in its efforts to keep Russia out of the Mediterranean and was ready to oppose the federation on economic grounds. The non-Slav countries of southeastern Europe had sought for years to find a basis for a Danubian federation that would strengthen them economically and aid them in resisting big power pressure. But, as always, they would oppose today the formation of a federation that would exclude them. Thus Austria, Hungary, Italy, Greece, and Turkey feared that the federation would support Moscow's efforts to bring them into the Soviet sphere.

THE FUTURE DILEMMA

In a final analysis, then, the future of the form of Balkan politics was not too bright as its growth could not be expected to find roots in the home grounds. The forms to be used will depend not so much on the wishes expressed by the masses of the Balkan peasantry and the trickle of the upper classes, as on the results of the big-power disputes over the Balkans. These disputes may result in the formation of two hostile blocs, one formed by Russia and the other supported by the Western powers. If Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania will combine under Russia's sponsorship, the United States and Britain may encourage alliances among Greece, Turkey, Italy, and Austria. Moves of one bloc against the other will produce interesting brands of Balkan governments and politics which will lean either to the Western or to the Soviet examples—depending on the ability of the West or the East to exert its influence in this no-man's land.⁶

⁶ It is too much to hope that the Balkans might, "even ideologically" be "made a bridge between Russia and the Anglo-Saxon world," for neither the West or the East has ever seemed to care what the Balkan people felt or wanted, and even cared less to use the Balkans as a bridge of ideological experiments. In 1946 the Balkans were—with the exception of Greece—behind the "iron curtain."

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
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III

BULGARIA

SITTING, geographically, in the very heart of the Balkans, Bulgaria again occupies the most strategic place there as Greece's and Turkey's neighbor; as such it serves, together with Albania and Yugoslavia, as Soviet Russia's base for pressure exerted against the only remaining Anglo-American outpost in the Balkans—Greece. The country has had probably the most unlucky rulers, who always seem to bet on the wrong horse in the game of power politics. Bulgaria joined both World Wars—and lost in both of them. After she had been liberated with Russia's help in the nineteenth century, Bulgaria's rulers frequently quarreled with this "big Slavic brother." Such policies frequently confused the masses of Bulgaria, who as often as not were told that they were (or were not) Slavs. After World War I, Bulgaria's Communists were butchered by the thousands, for basically the Bulgarian peasant, who is the backbone of the nation, is anti-Communist and an individualist; yet, the fortunes (or rather, misfortunes) of World War II forced Bulgaria's rulers again to turn their colors and proclaim their love for the "big Communist Slav brother" and to cultivate, on rebound, another, but this time, most dynamic and aggressive version of Pan-Slavism.

THE BATTLE FOR THE AEGEAN SEA

In Roman times Bulgaria was occupied by a population of Thraco-Illyrian descent; it was expelled or absorbed by the great Slavonic migration at the beginning of the sixth century. A semblance of unity was given to the scattered Slav tribes during the seventh century by the arrival of a horde of Finno-Tartar origin, called "Bol-Agalar" or "Bulgar" ("plowman"), a Turanian people, kin to the Huns, Avars, Finns, Turks, and Magyars. The Bulgars bestowed their name and political or-

ganization upon the race they conquered, receiving in return the language, customs, and local institutions of the vanquished. The adoption of the Slavonic or "Old Bulgarian" tongue as that of the official liturgy was the final stage in the assimilation of the Bulgarian race.

The shadow of Simeon the Great (893–927), whose first Bulgarian Empire included Serbia, Thrace, Macedonia, Thessalonica, Epirus, Albania, Valachia, and part of Hungary, still haunts the minds of the Bulgarians. But the dynasty did not survive, and the Bulgarian territories came under the suzerainty of the Byzantine emperors (1018–1186). The Second Bulgarian Empire (1186–1258) is remembered as another glorious epoch. In 1330 the country was incorporated into the Serbian Empire of Czar Duschan. Freeing herself after his death, Bulgaria bravely opposed the Turks until Tirnovo fell in 1393. Her last king died in a Turkish prison.

As early as the eighteenth century Bulgaria had almost been wiped from the memory of Europe by centuries of Turkish oppression. In 1762 there arose from a monastery cell of Mount Athos the voice of the monk Paisy, reminding his people of their great past. The nationalist revival forced the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate by Constantinople in 1870, freeing the country from the Greek Church, its cultural tyrant. The suppression of the Bulgarian revolt of 1876 was called to Europe's attention by Gladstone, who led the general outcry for punishment of the "terrible Turk." The same year Bulgaria, aided by Russia, won autonomy and was made into a principality under nominal Turkish suzerainty, but not until 1908 did she throw off fully the Sultan's rule and become an independent kingdom.

Although Russia had been responsible for Bulgaria's liberation, the Russian friendship was not altogether a blessing. Each time that Bulgarian arms won territory inhabited by Bulgarians from the Turks or the Serbs, the Concert of Powers, fearing the aggrandizement of an ally of Russia, invariably saw to it that some fruits of conquest were carefully withdrawn from the victor and restored to the loser. Thus, following the Russo-Turkish war of 1876–1878, Bulgaria lost Thracia, Macedonia, and Dobruja by the Treaty of Berlin. In 1879 the national assembly elected Alexander of Battenberg as first prince of

Bulgaria. In 1885 the East Rumelian government in Philipopolis was overthrown by a revolution, and the region was united with the principality. There ensued a successful war against the resentful Serbs. A year later, St. Petersburg, disgusted with Alexander's tendencies to disregard the orders of the Czar's government, instigated his resignation. Prince Ferdinand of Coburg was elected in his place in 1887.

Successful in the first Balkan War against Turkey in 1912, Bulgaria tried to acquire part of Macedonia and a frontage on the Aegean. But Czar Ferdinand made the mistake of striking against his Balkan allies in the Second Balkan War a year later, and Bulgaria was deprived of the booty by Serbia and Greece, while Rumania got a chunk of the Dobruja Quadrilateral. Ferdinand made another mistake for Bulgaria when he sided with Germany in 1915; the country collapsed, after initial success, in October 1918. The Peace Treaty of Neuilly (1919) forced Bulgaria to cede a strip of Macedonian territory to Greece and Yugoslavia, to pay reparations, and to disarm. Czar Ferdinand I abdicated in favor of his son, Boris, and lived thereafter in Germany (surviving Boris, in fact).¹

FARM SELF-SUFFICIENCY

Smaller than Kentucky, Bulgaria, with a population of more than six millions, covers 39,825 square miles, more mountainous than Rumania, though less so than Greece or Albania. The main ranges of the Balkans extend from west to east throughout the state. Open plains occupy less than a third of the country; agricultural use is made of about two-thirds.²

¹ J. G. Kersopoulos, *Bulgarie* (Extrait de la Revue *Les Balkans*) (Paris, 1937), lists books and articles covering Bulgaria's history from 1613 to 1937. See also P. E. Mosely, "Post-war Historiography of Modern Bulgaria," *Journal of Modern History*, IX (1937), 348-66; J. Buchan (ed.), *Bulgaria and Roumania* (London, 1924); A. M. Hyde, *Diplomatic History of Bulgaria from 1879-1886* (Urbana, Ill., 1931); R. H. Markham, *Meet Bulgaria* (Sofia, 1931), containing a wealth of valuable material on Bulgaria in general; D. Mishev, *The Bulgarians in the Past* (Lausanne, 1919); and S. S. Bobtchev, *La société bulgare sous la domination ottomane* (Sofia, 1935). See also Alois Hajek, *Bulgariens Befreiung und staatliche Entwicklung unter seinem ersten Fürsten* (Munich and Berlin, 1939).

² J. S. Roucek, "Economic Geography of Bulgaria," *Economic Geography*, XI (1935), 307-23. L. Pasvolksy, *Bulgaria's Economic Position* (Washington, D.C., 1930), remains the best work in this field. See also L. Leschtloff, *Die Staatsschulden und Reparationen Bulgariens, 1878-1933* (Sofia, 1934); and G. T. Danailov, *Les effets de la guerre en Bulgarie* (Paris, 1932).

Agriculture has been the main occupation of the Bulgarian people from the very beginning of their history. The livelihood of over 80 percent of the inhabitants is derived from the land. In addition, most of Bulgaria's industries are by-products of agriculture. Fortunately, in contrast with other Balkan countries, land ownership is widely distributed. On the whole, each peasant household is a self-contained economic and social unit.³ Yet agriculture is still in a backward state. Outdated methods of cultivation, ignorance of scientific appliances, and excessive subdivision of land are the major causes of stagnation. The effect of falling world prices and the paucity of capital are contributing factors. Crop yields are lower than in many other European countries. According to the 1926 census, the 4,469,987 hectares of cultivated surface were divided among 734,191 individual farmsteads, each on the average slightly over six hectares. In 1929 subparcellations had raised the number of independent holdings to 807,309, and by 1931 to 840,900.⁴ Indebtedness and lack of capital keep the small holders down.

The constant shrinking of the size of peasant holdings, due to subdivision among all heirs, is accentuated by a high birth rate—placing Bulgaria second among European countries in 1933. A peculiar feature of the holdings is that they are often separated into ten or even more different strips scattered about the village area. A great deal of land is thus wasted on roads and boundaries, which in itself militates against the introduction of rational cultivation methods. As elsewhere in the Balkans, the peasant suffers from the inequalities of the income structure. In 1926, for instance, the rural population earned but 60 percent of the national income, and only 50 percent in 1934. The agrarian debt is enormous. The total debt for bor-

³ Pasvolsky, *op. cit.*, p. 24. See also J. S. Molloff (ed.), *Die sozialökonomische Struktur der bulgarischen Landwirtschaft* (Berlin, 1936).

⁴ Absence of large estates precluded any agrarian reform having for its chief purpose the settlement of homesteaders. Still, in 1921 Stambuliski proclaimed a land reform preventing ownership of land in excess of what the farmer could work with his family. Actually 170,000 acres were expropriated from private estates and about 50,000 acres of parish land. The government of Tsankoff altered the law, but retained the general principle that holdings should not exceed 75 acres. In practice, the lands expropriated were returned to the former owners. For more details, see: Wilbert E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (New York, 1945).

rowings under 300,000 leva amounts to from 4 to 5 billion leva out of a grand total of about 12 billion.⁵

In spite of the quantity of cheap unskilled labor made available by the influx of over 200,000 refugees,⁶ industrial development has not made much headway. In 1933 only 33,000 Bulgarians were employed in industry, which, with the exception of mining, is in its infancy. The greatest number of industrial workers are engaged in the manufacture of agricultural products. Transportation and communications are far below desirable standards, although after World War I the employment of conscripted labor⁷ considerably reduced the monetary outlay. Bulgaria's international trade necessarily consists of the exchange of the yield of the soil for inexpensive manufactured goods.

THE SHADOW OF MISFORTUNE

"Dismembered Bulgaria" was not beset by minority troubles. More than 80 percent of the population were Bulgarians, and the largest minorities were placid Turks (10 percent) and Gypsies (2½ percent). The latter had no vote, but the minority policy was tolerant, granting a certain degree of autonomy in school matters. There were some colonies of German peasants.⁸ The population was predominantly Greek Orthodox (83 percent). This faith has acquired a distinct national form, a protest against the domination of the Greek patriarchate early in the nineteenth century. The peace treaty of Neuilly not only threw Bulgaria back from the Aegean Sea but also left more than one million Bulgars outside her national borders. Irredentist movements became the plague of Bulgaria's neighbors. Aside from the Macedonian IMRO, repatriates from the Dobruja joined forces in their own Internal Revolutionary Organization (VDRO). The peace treaty also burdened the

⁵ Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Balkan States, I, Economic* (New York, 1936), p. 69.

⁶ Cf. S. P. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities* (New York, 1932); and C. A. Macartney, *Refugees* (London, 1931).

⁷ Bulgarian youths must enlist for eight months in the national labor service. This service is utilized for government construction and amelioration projects.

⁸ For more details see *The Near East Year Book*, 1931-32, pp. 247-50; R. E. Crist, "A Nationality Map of Bulgaria," *Geographical Review*, XXVIII (1938), 327.

country with a staggering load of reparations. The total as originally fixed amounted to 2.25 billion gold francs. Up to 1935, Bulgaria had paid in currency or kind nearly 750 million gold francs. The disarmament clauses of the treaty placed Bulgaria at the mercy of her neighbors.

Between the liberation of the country in 1878 and 1941, the political life was stormy, not to say chaotic. The prewar record includes a suspension of the constitution, the dethronement of Bulgaria's first ruler, four wars, and the abdication of her second monarch. The postwar period of the 1920's brought an era of national humiliation and bloodshed, witnessed the class dictatorship of the Green Left; a *coup d'état* followed by assassinations and civil war, combined with the dictatorship of the bourgeois conservatives; a series of political murders carried out by the illegal government of the Macedonian Revolutionary Committee; two attempts on the life of the late Bulgarian King; another *coup d'état* maneuvered by the army; and an effort to solve all pressing problems by an authoritarian regime copied from abroad. The disillusionment caused by military defeat, together with the effects of venomous propaganda and war disruptions, produced maladjustments which periodically convulsed the country.

Although the authoritarian regime prohibited the existence of the "old" parties, their representatives still operated in one form or another. The roots of party division can be traced back into the 'seventies. Following the proclamation of the constitution of 1879, two parties entered the ring, the Liberals and the Conservatives. But soon the programmatic differences were forgotten and replaced by personal hostility among the leaders. The situation was complicated by a conflict of sympathies: one camp favored Russia, while the other placed trust in Austria-Hungary as the strongest power that might help to realize the nationalist ambitions of Sofia. Most leaders were young men trained outside of their own country, who profited from the political spoils.

At the turn of the century, Bulgaria was blessed with the National Party (Dr. Stoiloff, Gueschoff), the anti-Russian Liberal Party (Dr. Radoslavoff), the Young Liberal Party (Dimitri Tontscheff), the Progressive Liberal Party (Dragan Tsankoff, assassinated in 1907), the Democratic Party (Kara-

veloff, Alexander Malinoff), the Radical Democratic Party (A. Tsankoff, Kosturkoff), the Social Democratic Party, and the Agrarian League. Each main group was split into smaller factions. Party names—with the exception of the agrarian and socialist parties—denoted, however, no political, social, or economic tendencies. All they indicated was a preoccupation with the interests of the most articulate classes of the nation—the urban, professional, and military. The town, parading as progressive, ruled the village.⁹ No party was so crudely obvious as to call itself conservative.

AGRARIAN DICTATORSHIP

The reaction against bourgeois domination began to take form in prewar days of World War I. A few peasant leaders undertook missionary work among the farmers, trying to organize them politically. When at the end of World War I Czar Ferdinand and his politicians stood discredited, the peasantry was ready to take over. The short-lived cabinets of Malinoff and Todoroff gave way to the government of Stambuliski (October 1919–June 1923). With him, the farmer had seized the steering wheel.

The Bulgarian peasant is probably the most conservative and humorless of his class in the Balkans. The social outlook of every peasant is limited to the horizon of the village. He does his best to economize, since he never has enough, and the educated people have difficulty combating his Oriental acceptance of things as they are. The Bulgarian mother, with no special education, and tied solidly to her household duties by the complexity of her life due to utter lack of any improvements, worries about her children. She knows that the public schools leave much to be desired, that there are no good schools—although this nation has the highest rate of literacy in the Balkans. As a result, the entire emphasis is on securing a university education—preferably obtained abroad—for one son of the family at least, to pay for which the family at home

⁹ *The Near East Year Book* 1931–32, pp. 132–34; T. Tchitchovsky, "Political and Social Aspects of Modern Bulgaria," *Slavonic Review*, VIII (1928–1930), 176–87; G. Logio, *Bulgaria* (London, 1919), pp. 49 ff.; S. Balamezow, *La constitution de Tirnovo* (Sofia, 1925); and Markham, *op. cit.*, pp. 293–312.

economizes and often almost starves. Although nobody ever starves in normal years, the peasant is terribly poor—and the taxing system never allows him to raise his standards. Though he loves his country, he is not too keen about his government, which is but a necessary nuisance, and his sentiment is centered around the old peasant song celebrating the Haiduks of Bulgaria, who won their fame by practicing their marksmanship on Turkish officialdom and robbing the rich. Religiously, he is devoted to his Greek Orthodox church, which is an integral part of his nationalism.¹⁰

It is true that [the Bulgarians] do not feel the soft, yearning, entrancing, transforming mysticism that moves the Russians, who are the real guardians of the Eastern Orthodox religion. Nor are they subject to the religious emotions which so readily affect the Rumanians. . . . Yet for centuries religion, even though administered by foreign and by no means devoted priests, constituted the chief spiritual and social force operating upon the Bulgarians. It was the principal inspiration and the ultimate sanction in all matters of individual and social conscience. . . . The basis of this religious sentiment is not primarily awe nor aesthetic inclinations attracting the people to incense, golden robes, and pleasing motions, nor is it a tendency toward theological speculation but rather a love of order, a sense of obligation, and a tendency toward wise precaution. . . . They are not afraid of the church, nor are they eaten up by zeal for the house of the Lord; they have not left much property in possession of the monasteries which are now practically empty, nor do they for an instant permit the church to interfere with the advance of science or obstruct the progress of enlightenment.¹¹

The greatest representative of the Bulgarian farmer was Alexander Stambuliski (1879–1923), a peasant son who borrowed a small sum from his schoolteacher (later his wife) and went to study agriculture in Germany. By the time he was twenty-three he was editor of the chief organ of the Agrarian Party, descendant of the Agrarian League founded in 1898 as an early protest movement.¹² Elected to the *Sobranie* in 1908,

¹⁰ See H. H. Tiltman, *Peasant Europe* (London, 1934), pp. 80–106.

¹¹ R. H. Markham, *Meet Bulgaria*, pp. 32–34.

¹² A. Melianov, "A Bulgarian Experiment," in P. A. Sorokin, C. C. Zimmerman, and C. J. Galpin, *A Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology*, II (Minneapolis, 1932), 638–74, contains a good account of the origins of the agrarian movement in Bulgaria.

he soon became known as a brilliant orator. His primitive and forceful eloquence had an irresistible appeal for his peasant audiences. His dogged opposition to the Czar earned him a death sentence in 1915, though it was subsequently commuted to life imprisonment.

After Ferdinand's departure, Stambuliski, with his rugged physique and his Wilhelm II type of mustache, headed the government and signed the Treaty of Neuilly (1919). He dissolved Bulgaria's Parliament in February 1920 and thereafter ruled the country with such ferocity as later made Hitler famous. Many previous cabinet ministers were condemned to death or exiled and the nonpeasant leaders were persecuted. He gloried in the "wholesome ignorance" of the peasantry and hated any kind of formal education. To put props under his regime, he organized a Peasant Guard ("Orange Guards") to protect himself against any possible uprising.

To the credit of Stambuliski goes the introduction of the labor service system, his efforts to carry out loyally the terms of the peace treaties, and the improvement of Bulgaria's relations with Yugoslavia. But his conviction that a union of all Southern Slavs under peasant leadership would bring universal peace and harmony met fierce opposition on the part of the Macedonians. They joined the army leaders and bourgeois politicians in the *coup d'état* of June 9, 1923.

SWING OF THE PENDULUM

The revolt was carried through on the basis of a merger of the bourgeois parties—National, Progressive, Democratic, and Radical—determined to fight their common foe, the agrarian reformers and left-wing revolutionists. The new "Democratic Entente" was headed by Professor Alexander Tsankoff, whose two years in office represent one of the most tragic periods in modern Bulgarian history. Stambuliski, after being hunted for three days, was shot. Those branded as "radicals" and "communists" were brought to trial. Both Agrarians and Marxists retaliated by riots. The civil guerilla war continued. In April 1925, a hundred and fifty people were killed and many others wounded when "radicals" placed a bomb in the Sofia cathedral where members of the government were attending the funeral of a murdered general. A reign of terror followed. The govern-

ment made use of this incident to dispose of its opponents, classifying them all as "Communists." Some were shot without a hearing; others were jailed and shot "while trying to escape," or "committed suicide."

In January 1926 Tsankoff's place was taken by Andre Liaptcheff (1866-1933), who announced a more conciliatory program. He allowed the Agrarians to reconstruct their party. His regime was to last eight years—a record in Bulgarian history. Under him, the Parliament was permitted to complete its full term. The May elections of 1927 enjoyed the distinction of having been "relatively free." The government succeeded in concluding two foreign loans—a refugee loan and a reconstruction loan. Thousands of acres of hitherto unproductive land were drained; thousands of Macedonian, Thracian, Dobrujan, and Tsaribrod exiles found new homesteads. On the other hand, the cabinet was unable to check the murderous activities of Macedonian revolutionaries in Yugoslavia and Greece as well as at home.

By 1930 the cabinet had been reconstructed for the second time and in 1931 for the third. The June elections of 1931 gave it the *coup de grâce*. The ministry of Malinoff, replaced shortly by Mushanoff, was appointed the same month. The incoming National Union represented again a group of bourgeois parties (Democrats, Liberals, and Radicals); for the first time since 1923 three moderate Agrarians were included. But the internal situation was getting out of hand. The government had to deal with the most serious economic crisis Bulgaria had ever known. Very soon marked differences of opinion were evident between the representatives of the Agrarian Party and of the other cabinet parties. The Macedonian volcano was active again. In addition, there was continued Communist unrest; in September 1932 the Communist Party won nineteen of the thirty-five seats in the municipal council of Sofia. In June 1933 a state of siege was proclaimed. At the other extreme the growth of Fascism, represented by the Tsankoffists, became apparent in the municipal elections of November 1933. Fear of Communism led the army officers and the *bourgeoisie* again to take defensive measures. On May 19, 1934, Bulgaria once more succumbed to a dictatorship.

In a sense, the demise of democracy must be attributed to

the excesses of partisanship. "Two Bulgarians belonging to two different parties are like two men of different nationalities,"¹³ states a proponent of the cause of his countrymen. Has it ever been different? In prewar days, utilizing the vice of dissension for his own ends, Czar Ferdinand had organized his personal regime so tightly that he ruled as well as reigned.¹⁴ The heritage of intrigue, revenge, and invective has remained a pre-eminent feature of Bulgarian politics. When, for instance, an attempt was made upon Tsankoff's life in August 1933, the victim at once charged

. . . . that the Agrarians were the instigators—an accusation prompted, it would seem, by recollection of his followers' acts of which some Agrarians bear marks which are perpetual reminders. The Agrarians retorted by declaring that Dr. Tsankoff had staged the affair himself to give weight to his words—and some among them added that they would hate to see him die prematurely, for they hoped he might be driven insane by reflexion upon his past iniquities.¹⁵

With feelings running so high, a durable working agreement among the parties was out of the question. In fact the party system had degenerated into more than fifteen warring groups. Their undignified scramble for the spoils of office undermined the prestige of government and caused much superfluous expenditure—aside from corruption. Of Bulgaria's ninety-six ministers from the liberation up to 1926, no less than forty-eight were convicted by state tribunals; eight special courts were instituted to inquire into dishonest acts of cabinet members.¹⁶ Malfeasance in office has been encouraged by the disproportionate expansion of the administrative services. In 1908 the state employed 35,920 officials; in 1934, although the country had scarcely increased in area, the figure had risen to 88,000—or 140,000 if municipal and communal officials be in-

¹³ S. Christowe, *Heroes and Assassins* (New York, 1935), pp. 261–62. Quoted by permission of the publishers, Robert M. McBride & Company.

¹⁴ Logio, *op. cit.*, makes a bitter attack on the policies of Ferdinand by a supporter of Stambuliski; his *Bulgaria, Past and Present* (Manchester, 1936, Sherratt & Hughes), is a useful, although bizarre discussion of various aspects of Bulgarian politics, favoring this time the authoritarian regime.

¹⁵ *Near East and India*, XLII (1933), 779. By permission of the publisher (Great Britain and the East Company, Ltd.).

¹⁶ Logio, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

cluded.¹⁷ More than two-thirds of the country's budget was expended upon salaries and maintenance. To some extent the personnel increase has been due to the placement of retired army officers. Is it surprising that "there is much bureaucracy in the administration"?¹⁸

OCCUPATIONAL INSECURITY

Though rural Bulgaria has the highest percentage of educated youth in the Balkans, the sharp decrease in purchasing power caused by economic decline virtually closed the professional careers for which the institutions of higher learning prepare. Admission restrictions did not mitigate the situation.¹⁹ Still, among both peasant and city families, parents do everything possible to allow at least one child to study abroad—in Germany, Italy, or France.

The young people set forth with barely enough to keep them alive. Through the difficult years of training, they starve and struggle, in the attics of Berlin, Munich or Vienna, hungrily absorbing knowledge. At last they return home, splendidly equipped for careers in art or science, ready for jobs which their bankrupt nation is quite unable to provide, and now totally unfitted to take up the manual work which was the lot of their peasant fathers and grandfathers.²⁰

Jobless academicians sought a livelihood in politics. Their ranks were swelled by those who had lost their social foothold and occupations as the result of wars and political turnover. To this fermenting mass appealed the extremism of Communist agitation on the one side and on the other the philosophy of Professor Alexander Tsankoff, leader of the dissolved National Socialist Party. It was indicative of the widespread occupational insecurity that in 1927 no less than 40,000 candidates competed for the 273 seats of Parliament. Nor were manifes-

¹⁷ *Near East and India*, XLIII (1934), 396.

¹⁸ Markham, *op. cit.*, p. 292.

¹⁹ Cf. J. S. Roucek, "The Reorganized School System of Bulgaria," *School and Society*, XL (1934), 495-98, and "Education in Bulgaria," *ibid.*, pp. 775-79; W. F. Russell, *Schools in Bulgaria* (New York, 1934); and W. M. Kotschnig, *Unemployment in the Learned Professions* (New York, 1937), pp. 110-12, 209-11, 216.

²⁰ H. Leslie, *Where East Is West* (Boston, 1933), pp. 44-45. Quoted by permission of the publishers, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston.

tations of political aggressiveness infrequent among the student body. Attempts on the part of the government to tame this militancy provoked many outbursts. Thus in 1937 Sofia students,

. . . . dissatisfied with the new electoral law which deprives them of the right to vote staged several demonstrations in the course of which there were a number of casualties, as a result of clashes with the police.²¹

The intelligentsia presented problems rather than solved them. Much the same could be said of the influence of the military, especially the reserve officers, on Bulgarian politics. In a country without social equilibrium and effective administration, where the clench of political cliques threatens to paralyze government itself, the army as a consolidated body equipped to use force is necessarily a partner of the nominal ruler. Political remonstrances on the part of the soldiery were the order of the day. In 1932, for instance,

. . . . the Union of Reserve Officers sent to the Prime Minister and other members of the government a delegation, which was charged to draw the attention of the authorities to the dangers of the situation created by the persistence of corruption and waste, and above all by the negligence shown in the handling of the very grave difficulties and to recommend a general union of forces in the face of the Bolshevik menace. . . . They insisted upon the necessity of applying certain radical measures to appease the masses. . . . A memorandum on these lines has been sent to all the politicians who were visited by the delegation and who were warned that the army did not wish to see itself obliged to intervene afresh to save the country from anarchy.²²

Still, while army intervention is never an unmixed blessing for the military, increased army policing could well be urged by professional soldiers as both in the public interest and an employment proposition. For Bulgaria had more than its share of unemployed officers. Rapid army expansion before and during World War I was abruptly reversed by the stipulation of the peace treaty. In addition to large-scale retrenchment, the

²¹ *Great Britain and the East*, XLVIII (1937), 557. Quoted by permission of the publisher.

²² *Near East and India*, XLI (1932), 822. Quoted by permission of the publisher.

military academy annually turned out a considerable surplus of cadets who could not obtain appointments. Naturally, disgruntled officers tended toward politics. Two coups were performed with the aid of the army. The Military League founded by Colonel Veltcheff in 1922 (dubbed later the "Captains' League"—most members being of lower rank) helped to kill Stambuliski. Although dissolved in 1927, the League was revived by the Colonel two years later as a secret organization, with political aims. In May 1934 it carried through the *coup d'état* in co-operation with the *Zveno* ("Chain") Club, a Nationalist-Fascist group of former ministers, retired officers, and politicians out of jobs.

The appeal of army governance was closely associated with the growth of Bulgarian Communism. At the end of the nineteenth century, a group of young men who had studied in Russia, Germany, and Switzerland began toying with Marxist notions.²³ As a doctrine, dialectic materialism won a wide following among the intelligentsia, though it lacked organized support in a country still without a laboring class. Trotsky, when visiting Sofia in 1909, was amazed at the fanaticism of the "narrow" (*tesni*, or "doctrinaire") enthusiasts. The Socialist Party reached its zenith in the elections of November 1923, capturing 29 mandates. After that its strength was sapped by the Communists.

When Stambuliski was overthrown, a large body of peasants previously associated with the Agrarian Party turned instinctively to the Communists. The ever-increasing economic distress helped to broaden the basis of the Communist Party by an influx of underpaid state employees, schoolteachers, discontented town people, and impoverished farmers. Although dissolved in 1924 and 1925, the Communist Party continued to appear under various guises; in 1931 it returned to the *Sobranie* with 31 deputies. Its bid for the support of the left-wing Agrarians and its cell work in the army and police induced the government in 1933 to adopt sharp-edged countermeasures. Communist agitation was a causative factor in the coup of 1934. But Marxism survived; propaganda in the army and navy and among the peasantry continued. Incidentally, it was a Bulga-

²³ See T. Tchitchovsky, *The Socialist Movement in Bulgaria* (London, 1931).

rian Communist leader, Dimitrov, who took first honors at the Reichstag Fire Trial in Berlin by his dramatic defiance of blustering Triumvir Göring.

THE PARTISAN MILIEU

Bulgaria's party diffusion can be laid to some extent to the electoral law. Up to 1923, elections were held in accordance with the principle of proportional representation; thereafter the system was modified twice. Beyond technical niceties, one should not forget that, as a rule, the party in power mustered its support in the old-fashioned but tested manner of rank coercion. During the June elections of 1931, for instance,

. . . . the whole police, reinforced by thousands of agents newly enrolled and helped by thousands of others, armed by the government, were at the service of government candidates, terrorizing the population, trying to isolate villages from towns, and to prevent all communications and the entry of speakers, newspapers and even of ballot-papers. But this pressure, which in other circumstances would have had the desired result, had now the contrary effect a defeat unique in the political annals of Bulgaria.²⁴

Rural Bulgaria has its centers of political information at the village pump or in the local saloon; urban opinion is molded in the cafés. Each faction foregathers in its favorite coffee-house. Young and old share the delight of abusive criticism and malicious scheming, but in all matters of importance youth is accustomed to show deference to the graybeards of senior rank in the organization. With the exception of the Agrarians and the Socialist and Communist parties, the leading politicians were mostly old men, trained in the prewar craft. Young during the days when Bulgaria was embarking upon her career of independence, they clung to commanding positions for a lifetime. Their occupational distribution is suggested in the composition of the Parliament elected in 1931: lawyers headed the list (38 percent), followed by peasants (22 percent), merchants and bankers (10 percent), and journalists (6 percent).²⁵

Throughout the past decades the conduct of government at best maintained a loose relationship with constitutional require-

²⁴ *Near East and India*, XL (1931), 5. Quoted by permission of the publisher.

²⁵ *Annuaire statistique du Royaume de Bulgarie* (Sofia, 1931), p. 453.

ments.²⁶ The progressive constitution of 1879²⁷ (partly revised later, notably in 1911) had no organic roots in a country whose populace was almost entirely composed of illiterate peasants. Prince Alexander shelved the constitution in May 1881 and did not restore it until September 1883. "The Bulgarian monarchs and their advisers have often considered themselves, not as trustees and servants of the people . . . deriving their authority from the Constitution, but as Ministers of God, exercising power by divine grace. For this reason the constitutional rights of the Bulgarians have often been practically suspended."²⁸ The parties, too, never hesitated to place their interests above constitutional provisions. Assembly after assembly disqualified deputies on the pretext of electoral irregularities. The Communist regime of today is but using the tactics of previous administrations.

The czar's power of dissolution of the unicameral chamber was widely abused; of 21 parliaments, 16 were dissolved. In contrast with the constitutional provision that the fundamental law cannot be changed by an ordinary statute (Art. 86), the act of March 7, 1918, extended indefinitely the four-year term of the parliament then in session. While the cabinet ministers were responsible to the assembly (Art. 153), nevertheless, of Bulgaria's thirty-seven governments, only four were formed from among the assembly majority. Judges did not enjoy adequate guaranties of tenure; there was no administrative court to impose any checks upon the crown. The power of the king was further strengthened by making him the ultimate arbiter in all appointments, both civil and military.

The constitution was again suspended after the *coup d'état* of 1934. On April 21, 1935, the Tosheff Cabinet proclaimed its intention to offer a new constitution, but the government fell in November 1935 without putting forward any proposal.

²⁶ Cf. J. Caleb, "Le régime constitutionnel en Bulgarie," *Revue de droit international*, VII (1905), 214-36, 335-58, 578-602.

²⁷ See J. Delpech and J. Laferrière, *Les constitutions modernes* (4th ed.), I (Paris, 1928), 371-94, and III (Paris, 1931), 111-14; see also H. F. Wright, *The Constitutions of the States at War* (Washington, D.C., 1919), pp. 87-104. The best analysis in English is T. Geshkoff, "The Constitution of Bulgaria," in Bulgarian Student Association in New York City, *Pages from Bulgaria's Life* (New York), pp. 49-57.

²⁸ Geshkoff, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

THE ASCENDANCY OF KING BORIS

Czar Ferdinand, able and crafty, but unfortunate in his international decisions, was prone to rely on corrupt design to get his way. Parliament was directed from the royal palace.²⁹ His son and successor, bald and pensive King Boris, gave constitutional methods a careful trial. His frugal ways and irreproachable personal life soon placed him above the criticism of his opponents, even of the extreme variety. This may explain the fact that Bulgaria was the only country ruled by a scion of the royal line identified with national defeat at the end of World War I. Boris knew how to meet dangerous situations by astute common sense, tact, and patience. He spent much of his time roaming about the country and "meeting the folks." His two specialties, engineering and cordiality to all, endeared him to his people. Even the experiment in the authoritarian regime did not weaken the King's influence. He was, "in kingship, what Cinquevalli was in juggling and Blondin on a tight-rope By skill and guile he outwitted all enemies, revolutionary plotters and military conspirators alike."³⁰

Bulgaria's turn toward authoritarian rule arose from a background of mass impoverishment especially acute among the rural population, lack of energy on the part of successive cabinets, the indifference of political parties to the welfare of the people, executive paralysis, the ludicrous pretenses of an electoral institution devoid of any prestige, and disorganization of the state machinery—similar to the dilemma which in 1935 resulted in the restoration of monarchy in Greece. Growing indignation over the internecine activities of the Macedonians was a contributing factor. On May 19, 1934, a band of conspirators, members of the Zveno Club and the Military League, forced Boris at 4:00 A.M. to sign a manifesto overthrowing "the system."

They turned Mushanoff's cabinet out of the Democratic Party, and substituted an army-supported dictatorship with

²⁹ *König Ferdinand von Bulgarien* (Berlin, 1936), is a collection of studies of the career and character of Ferdinand from many angles by fourteen authors; H. R. Madol, *Ferdinand von Bulgarien* (Berlin, 1931), is an admirable biography.

³⁰ D. Reed, *Insanity Fair* (New York, 1938), p. 279. Quoted by permission of the publishers, Random House.

straw man Kimon Gheorghieff as its head, controlled in turn by Colonel Damian Veltcheff, one of the principal organizers of the coup of 1923, a one-time superintendent of the military academy in Sofia. Parties and Parliament alike were dissolved. The most spectacular action was the suppression of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, hitherto an *imperium in imperio* in the southwestern corner of Bulgaria, constantly jeopardizing Yugoslavian-Bulgarian relations. Sweeping reforms followed: debt reduction—for peasants by 40 percent, for craftsmen 30 percent, and for merchants 20 percent—a moratorium on all payments including those for the redemption of foreign debts, and the consolidation of the administrative districts from 16 to 7 and of the rural communes from 2,552 to approximately 800. Bulgaria was to have a "New Deal."⁸¹

As time went on, however, the liberators of 1934 failed to measure up to expectations. Constructive policy was impaired by their futile attempts to tip in their favor the equilibrium between the crown and the government. The King proved to be a masterful political tactician, placing himself above the widespread discontent with the "strong hand" and the corresponding craving for "normalcy" on the one side, and the military opposition to a revival of the old parties on the other. Veltcheff had taken for granted that Boris would remain passive and play only a decorative role. Instead the King gradually divided the Military League on the question of royal prerogatives and eventually brought about its downfall. Within a year he had shouldered off Veltcheff's supporters by clever maneuvers. When the challenged leader turned against Boris, it was too late. The discovery of Veltcheff's conspiracy in October 1935 enabled the King to liquidate both the League and the Zveno. He reinforced his victorious position by having the Colonel's death sentence commuted to life imprisonment in March 1936.

THE NEW PURITY

Under the circumstances, authoritarian cabinets started changing even more rapidly than was the case under the despised parliamentary system. None of them, however, was able

⁸¹ Cf. L. I. Strakhovsky, "Bulgaria Struggles On," *Current History*, XLIV (1936), 96-102.

to remake the pattern of Bulgarian politics. The parties continued to exist, even though they were driven underground. A new factor was introduced into the perplexing situation by the emergence of outright Fascist tendencies under the auspices of ex-premier Tsankoff and Professor Kantardjieff, both advocating a self-conscious nationalism, anti-Semitism, and dictatorial government. Each movement drew into its orbit merchants, lawyers, industrialists, Mihailoffist Macedonians, and high army officers. The contest was between the antimonarchists cultivating the totalitarian germs and those groups favoring the conception of monarchist benevolence personified in the King. The development seemed to be in the latter direction.

The King's determination to steer the country along a middle course found its expression in the municipal and communal elections of March 1937. The government took the unprecedented step of granting the suffrage to certain classes of women, mothers in particular. Before the present dictatorship, local autonomy, inaugurated in 1878, had functioned effectively.⁸² After 1937, both the urban and rural mayors were appointed by the government, while the elected council members were non-party men of recognized integrity enjoying a good reputation with the electorate. A measure of electoral competition was preserved, although free speech, the right of assembly, and the freedom of the press remained abrogated. The clerk of each community was appointed by the representative of the central authority, and was a permanent functionary. The school system, youth organizations, and sports were controlled by the government. In contrast with the municipalities, the communes (villages and towns) were combined into *okruzi* (counties), each with an elected county council. The central authority was represented by the prefect, who controlled the acts and decisions of the communal and county councils and preserved law and order in his jurisdiction.

The next halting step to reintroduce popular participation in government was the decree of October 21, 1937, calling for parliamentary elections. The number of constituencies was reduced from 274 to 160, with about 20,000 inhabitants in each.

⁸² For the form of Bulgarian local government before 1934, see Markham, *op. cit.*, pp. 288-89; and G. M. Harris, *Local Government in Many Lands* (2d ed.; London, 1933), pp. 170-78.

The right to vote was extended to all males over twenty-one and women if married, divorced, or widowed. Parliamentary candidates had to be at least thirty years of age, must have paid their taxes, must not have been convicted or been on trial for treason or other serious crimes, and must not have advocated Communism or the overthrow of government by violent means; in addition, they must have served in the army or in the ranks of the labor service, have a steady occupation and possess the fundamentals of education. Special provisions excluded from the eligible list all state and communal employees, soldiers, and students, and those sentenced because of their activities on behalf of the dissolved parties. Any citizen, provided that his candidacy was supported by the required number of fellow-citizens, was *prima facie* eligible—subject to court decision declaring him ineligible under the law.

In contrast to the provisions on municipal and communal elections, those who had belonged to any of the former parties were allowed to present themselves as candidates; this enabled former faction leaders to renew their political activities. Over 3,000 candidates were in the running during the subsequent March election of 1938. The former parties, in spite of official measures against their full resurrection, were able to make several electoral agreements. The final results showed that 104 seats fell to the government and 56 to the opposition.³⁸ Official hopes for greater occupational variety were doomed to disappointment, since again lawyers secured more than one-third of all seats.

When the new Parliament convened, its first task was the approval of the authoritarian decrees enacted in the preceding four years in order to satisfy the constitution (Art. 47). Within four days, on June 3, this formality was disposed of, when 1,138 decrees, in addition to other measures, were obediently approved.

WORLD WAR II AND AFTER

BULGARIA LOSES A KING, FINDS ANOTHER DICTATOR

The late King Boris made exactly the same mistakes as his father. He chose the pro-German camp in 1940, as his father

³⁸ *New York Times*, March 28, 1938.

had done in 1915. When Boris went to Berlin to see Hitler in the fall of 1940, he started a pattern of events resembling those which followed the unfortunate schemes of his father, Ferdinand I, who hoped to achieve his aims by joining the Central Powers in World War I. Ferdinand ended his career by resigning his throne and by bringing his country to the brink of disaster. Boris' decision lost him the confidence of his people and also ruined his country. The decision was made on March 1, 1941, when Bulgaria signed with Hitler and Mussolini at Vienna. Whether Boris took this step because of the pressure from the Axis or because he preferred the Axis to the Western democracies and Russia is something which will never be found out. But the well-tested Nazi fifth-column tactics had already weakened the country, and Boris, as already twice before, assumed the role of a puppet king. During the first two times he had been an amiable puppet, but this time he was beset from the outset with worries. He had to keep peace within his country and to stall for time against growing German insistence that he send Bulgarian troops to fight the Russians.

There were, probably, three reasons for the decision of Boris. In the first place, by 1940 Germany had taken nearly 60 percent of Bulgaria's exports and had been the source of about 70 percent of the imports. The entire 1941 tobacco crop had been bought in advance by Hitler's Reich, which had also been active in developing Bulgaria's minerals, especially copper, lead, and zinc. Germany had announced its active share in building roads in Bulgaria, while Italians had helped build rayon factories and cotton mills.

In the 1940 boundary juggling one of Bulgaria's demands for lost territory was met. At that time, Bulgaria's area was 39,825 square miles, about the same as that of the state of Virginia. Then Rumania was forced to cede to Bulgaria 2,800 square miles of the Dobrogea area, along Bulgaria's northeastern frontier. Germany's projected invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia promised Boris additional territorial returns. In fact, subsequently, Hitler helped Bulgaria to occupy the Macedonian districts in Yugoslavia and the Thracian region in Greece.

In the third place, Boris' decision to join the Axis may have been due to the influence of his father Ferdinand, who had been living since his abdication on his ancestral estate in Germany and

who was always a vehement Germanophile. Not so Boris! Often it was said of Bulgaria: "The King is pro-Ally, the Army pro-German, and the people pro-Russian."

But whatever the motive for Boris' change of allegiance, it was the most unfortunate decision of his life. As an ally of the Axis, Sofia declared war on the United States on December 13, 1941, after Pearl Harbor. The country was also at war with the United Kingdom, the Union of South Africa, Australia, Haiti, Greece, Nicaragua, and the fighting Czechs and Yugoslavs—something to be noted in view of the subsequent vociferous proclamations of the pro-Slavonic tendencies of the defeated Bulgarians. It might not be amiss to note that Sofia did not declare war on the U.S.S.R., although it signed the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1941. Boris did not dare to go so far, in spite of all the pressure and arguments exerted by Hitler's gang. The Bulgarian people, on the whole, were considered to be sympathetic with the Russians as related Slavs.⁸⁴ For in Bulgaria there had always been real historic, linguistic, and social sympathy for Russia, which not even the advent of Communism was able to break. Boris thanked Moscow after receiving Southern Dobrogea from Bucharest. However, if the heart dictated Moscow, the head dictated Rome-Berlin, and further territorial gains were given to Boris after the conquest of Yugoslavia and Greece by Hitler's hordes. But the gains cost thousands of casualties in Balkan guerrilla fighting, and Berlin was continually insisting on more and more help from Sofia. Furthermore, the brutal and terroristic Bulgarian policies in Macedonia and Thrace roused the hatred of the Greeks and Yugoslavs and the Bulgarian occupation troops were always harried by partisan activities.⁸⁵

Boris died on August 28, 1943, at 4:42 P.M. His six-year-old son, Simeon, succeeded him to the throne as King Simeon II. Boris' twenty-five-year reign had begun in war and chaos and closed in war and chaos, and we do not know as yet whether he was poisoned by Hitler's agents or whether his visit to Berchtesgaden had broken his health. He died while his coun-

⁸⁴ Before World War I, Soviet engineers helped to build the Black Sea airport at Burgas.

⁸⁵ For the documented presentation of the Greek case, see George Christopoulos, *Bulgaria's Record* (Chicago, 1944).

try was being plagued by internal violence and external pressure. Although at this time liberal and democratic parties were suppressed, they continued their existence underground, for the Nazi minister in Bulgaria and several additional divisions of Nazi troops were the real masters of the country. Of the four Regents, Prince Cyril was but a figurehead, while Professor Philoff was the true Nazi mouthpiece. Philoff ruled by terrorist methods.

THE COLLAPSE

The turn of the war against Germany caused the Sofia government to try to make a separate peace. The Germans, mindful that Bulgaria was the first of the Central European powers to break in 1918, reacted energetically to counter-Allied and particularly to Russian pressure on the Bulgars to get out of the war before it was too late. Basically, the point that made the Bulgarians hesitate was the uncertainty of retaining their loot gained from Axis partnership—mainly Thrace and Macedonia. Emissaries were sent to Cairo after Rumania's capitulation. But Moscow suspected that this was only a move which would eliminate Russia from the negotiations and at the same time allow Sofia to co-operate with Germany on the quiet. On September 12, 1944, the Moscow government suddenly declared war on Sofia. Within six hours Sofia asked for an armistice.

With the Red Army poised along the Rumanian-Bulgarian frontier, the Allies were in a position to enforce their demands that Sofia follow the road of surrender taken by Bucharest. Eyeing apprehensively the Red armies moving along the Black Sea coast, the Sofia government was quick to heed the Allied demands and declared war on Germany.⁸⁶ The Russian armies pushed their way to the Bulgarian capital, and the Bulgar troops aided in the Balkan cleanup. Bulgaria was the fourth country to abandon the Axis in World War II. The country had maintained trade with German-dominated countries as far away as Denmark, shipping to Rumania such varied commodities as lambskins and pyrites (used in Rumania's oil refineries) in return for oil, rock salt, and soda.

⁸⁶ Cf. "The Armistice with Bulgaria," *The Bulletin of International News*, XXI (November 11, 1944), 955-56.

THE RED CONTROL

When the German collapse in the Balkans began, there was formed in Bulgaria the Patriotic Front, composed of the Communist, Agrarian, Social-Democratic, and Zveno parties; and the Gheorghieff government was put into power. The Communists took the Ministries of Justice and Interior; they displaced the police and gendarmerie with a militia under their control. Thus, in spite of official appearance, Bulgaria's public life was, in the spring of 1945, under complete Communist sway.

The first consequence of this Communist ascendancy was the extermination of political opponents through trials in "People's Courts" and by other means. Between 1,500 and 2,000 politicians, administrators, professors, and journalists were sentenced to death and executed. No doubt some of them deserved punishment, but the guilt of many of them was, to say the least, open to question—so much so that the wholesale killings revolted the more moderate elements among the Communists and the trials were, for a time, stopped. By the spring of 1945, apart from these official executions, some 15,000 or 20,000 persons had been murdered, "a figure based on the knowledge that at least two persons, a local policeman and a tax collector, [had] been put to death in each of 8,000 Bulgarian villages."⁸⁷ How many other "Fascists" disappeared will probably never be learned.

The government presented a curious combination. Anton Jugoff, a Communist, was Minister of the Interior, although Tsola Dragoitcheva, woman secretary of the Party, was the guiding spirit. In the background was the famous leader of the old Comintern, Georgi Dimitrov, who had spent most of his life in Moscow but had landed in Bulgaria after its capitulation. The government was technically headed by Prime Minister Kimon Gheorghieff and Colonel Damian Veltcheff, both of whom had already left their mark on the history of the Balkans as well as of their own nation. Gheorghieff was described as a Communist leader, which he had never been, and Veltcheff as a traditional friend of the Soviets, despite his former anti-Bolshevik activities.

⁸⁷ "Balkan Reds Get Control by Ruse," *New York Times*, May 22, 1945.

GHEORGHIEFF-VELTCHEFF COLLABORATION

In accordance with the pro-Soviet policy, the Gheorghieff-Veltcheff government instructed Bulgarian army units to cooperate with the Yugoslav National Army of Liberation. As one of their first measures, they also sent greetings "to the heroic Yugoslav nation under the leadership of Marshal Tito" expressing the "wish for a close collaboration and the establishment of a new order in this part of the Balkans."

Thus the wheel had turned a full circle. Former Bolshevik baiters were working with Communists on democratic lines for the realization of a Great Slav coalition, one of whose pillars would be Russia, the other Yugoslavia; and it looked, in the immediate postwar years, as though the assassins of Stambuliski, with the help of his surviving supporters, were going to fulfill his Pan-Slavic and South-Slav dreams.

ALL THIS, AND DIMITROV, TOO

Within one year of Bulgaria's collapse, the cycle of history had completed a revolution and this erstwhile vassal of Hitler's Axis became a satellite of the Red Star. If there was any country in Eastern Europe where the Soviet armies could expect to be received with open arms, it was Bulgaria, for the Bulgarian people are deeply attached to the "big brother" in the Slavic family of nations. Furthermore, of all the countries in the Balkans, none had greater democratic potentialities than Bulgaria. The Bulgarian peasants, constituting 80 percent of the population, hold their land in absolute freehold and are used to a long democratic tradition as a result of communal ownership of pasture and woodland. During the years of Fascist opposition it was the Peasant Party, not the Communist, which was the most powerful rallying point for Bulgaria's revolutionary elements. The Communists, of course, aided by the fortuitous circumstance of traditional Russo-Bulgarian friendship, were also very active. And it was the Communists who took the lead in forming the Fatherland Front which soon united all anti-Fascist parties, including the Agrarians and Social Democrats, which resisted foreign and domestic totalitarianism.

The program of the Fatherland Front insisted that "all political rights of the people must be re-established and freedom

of the press reinstated as well as public meetings and organizations permitted." It warned that it would defend "national, economic, political, and labor interests against foreign interference," and demanded a "high standard of living for urban and rural populations." The program called for revolutionary action against Fascism: "All Bulgarians must unite to overthrow the present treacherous, Hitler-controlled government and replace it by a government of the people that will represent the whole nation and the true Bulgarian spirit."

When Russia declared war on Bulgaria on September 5, 1944, the Soviet government expressly referred to "Bulgarian ruling circles" as the culprits responsible for their country's plight. On the following day, the Moscow radio urged the Bulgarian people to revolt against the "ruling clique" and to "take fate in their own hands." The government that came into power after the armistice was genuinely representative of all the popular resistance forces; it also included, in addition to Communists, a number of left-wing and middle-of-the-road liberals. Best known among these were Petko Styanoff, the Foreign Minister, who belonged to the so-called "tolerated opposition" led by Nicola Muchanoff; and Nikola Petkov, a minister without portfolio, one of the leaders of the leftist "Stambuliski wing" of the Peasant Party. This government, it was assumed, was acceptable to the Soviet Union not because of its leftism, but because it had popular support which promised to stabilize the country's internal political situation and thus lead the way to firm postwar friendship with the U.S.S.R.

Its first action—deposing the pro-Fascist three-man Regency Council and arresting all pro-Axis government officials and parliamentarians—found general approval. It suggested that the government could be expected to translate into reality the democratic program of the Fatherland Front. Free elections in Bulgaria, most observers believed, would mean an even more leftist government than what was thought of as a strictly temporary administration.

But as soon as the government was firmly established, an almost impenetrable news blackout descended on Bulgaria. There were ominous reports of the liquidation not only of Fascists and collaborators, but also of Liberals and Peasant Party leaders who tried to follow a political course different from

that of the now increasingly Communist-controlled Fatherland Front. The fate of some of these, including well-known democrats like Nicola Muchanoff, Athanase Buroff, and Dimiter Guitcheff, remains a mystery. Dr. G. M. Dimitrov, former secretary general of the Peasant Party, found it necessary to seek refuge with the American diplomatic representative in Sofia to protect himself against threatened physical violence. Moderate ministers became the object of suddenly staged "popular demonstrations."

The two main democratic parties, the Agrarians and the Social Democrats, silently but reluctantly continued to co-operate with the Communists in the Fatherland Front because it was the only way to escape the accusation of being unfriendly to the Soviet Union. Their own helplessness automatically strengthened the well-organized Communist Party which, though numerically small compared with the other parties, was able to entrench itself in power before the democratic parties had a chance to resist the trend toward a Communist dictatorship. The issue came to a head, however, when the Communists tried to put their control over the Bulgarian people through the device of "democratic elections." At last, democratic cabinet members rose in protest and asked the Allied Control Commission to supervise the elections, scheduled for August 26, 1945. They were immediately forced to resign, and abuse was heaped upon them.

This was the background of the American and British protest which led to the last-minute postponement of the elections by the Bulgarian government. Soon after the delivery of the American and British notes, the Bulgarian Cabinet announced the postponement of the elections until November 18, and approved a series of measures intended to give legal standing to the four opposition parties and to permit free discussion and participation in the elections. But the Communists, with the portfolios of Justice and Interior in their hands, controlled the courts, organized a militia operating under their orders, and controlling press and radio, continued exterminating all political opponents through trials in "People's Courts" and by other means. Between 1,500 and 2,000 persons, indicted as "war criminals" or "collaborationists," were sentenced to death during 1945, including Prince Cyril and three former Prime Min-

isters (Bogdan Filoff, Dobri Boshiloff, and Ivan Bagrianoff).

As time went on, it became more and more apparent that the real power in Bulgaria was not so much the government as Georgi Dimitrov, the Bulgarian who had spent twelve years in Moscow, nine of them as chief of the Comintern.

THE RISE OF DIMITROV

Georgi Dimitrov (1882—), the son of a revolutionary workman, staged his first rebellion at the age of twelve.³⁸ Sent to an American mission school to study for the ministry, he provoked a quarrel with the minister, was expelled, and went to work as a printer in Sofia; at the age of eighteen, he became Secretary of the Printers' Union. He joined the Tesnyak Party, and in 1904 he organized a National Federation of Trade Unions and remained its secretary until 1923. Between 1908 and 1912 he personally took part in 680 strikes. In 1913, after reaching the required age of thirty, he was elected to the National Assembly and retained his seat for ten years, but he spent most of the last five years in jail or underground in opposition to what he termed the "imperialist war."

In 1920, disguised as a fisherman, he set out on the Black Sea in a sailboat for Russia to attend the Second Congress of the Communist International. Driven ashore in Rumania by a storm, he was charged with espionage, but stern Soviet representations, aided by careful bribery, won his release. He reached the Third Congress (1921) and was elected to the Comintern's executive committee.

In 1923, Dimitrov led an armed uprising against King Boris in northwest Bulgaria; his 1,000 armed workers, together with Dimitrov, were forced to find refuge in Yugoslavia. Ten years as Comintern chief in the Balkans followed. Then came the world-famous Reichstag trial; Dimitrov goaded Hermann Goering, number two Nazi, into hysterical rages and boasted to his judges that "for me, as a Communist, the highest law is the program of the Communist International." Joseph Stalin saved him by conferring Soviet citizenship upon him. In Moscow, in 1934, Dimitrov used his prestige and eloquence to change the Comintern line in face of the growing Nazi

³⁸ Based on "Dimitrov: Return of an Exile," *World Report*, I (September 24, 1946), 34.

danger, advocating the co-operation of the Communist forces with all and sundry anti-Nazi forces, whether "democratic" or otherwise. One year later he was elected secretary general of the Comintern and laid down the new "Popular Front" line, and Communist parties the world over jumped to make every coalition they could against the Axis. In 1944 Dimitrov headed a propaganda campaign to force Bulgaria out of the war, and in September 1944 drafted plans for a coalition government which became the Fatherland Front. He, with his youthful second wife and his nine-year-old son, moved into a large Sofia house surrounded by a high palisade; at night, searchlights illuminated all approaches, and a bodyguard accompanied him wherever he went.

Co-operating with Dimitrov was Tsola Dragoitcheva,³⁹ Moscow-trained secretary-general of the Fatherland Front Committee. "Tsola," as she was known in posters and public acclamations throughout Bulgaria, had been closely associated with Dimitrov. In 1942 she was dropped by parachute with other Bulgarian Communists to conduct underground activity and weld a coalition of Agrarians, Social Democrats, and the Zveno Party with the Communists. She did so well that she is credited with creating the machinery of the Fatherland Front. An excellent extemporaneous speaker with red hair and gray-green eyes, Tsola in 1946 occupied a position "equivalent to assistant premier," supervising, as secretary-general of the Fatherland Front, a subsidiary Ministerial Council virtually controlling the economic life of Bulgaria. (In 1946, she attended New York's Pan-Slavic Congress, and received a terrific beating in the press by Reuben H. Markham, a foreign correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*, who had been expelled by the Russians from all areas under their control.)⁴⁰

THE RUN-OF-THE-MILL ELECTIONS

On November 18, 1945, Bulgarians cast their ballots for a single slate of Fatherland Front candidates in their first National Assembly elections after World War II—in spite of a

³⁹ Seymour Freidin, "Bulgar Politics Dominated by 2 Communists," *New York Herald Tribune*, October 16, 1945.

⁴⁰ Reuben H. Markham, "A Bulgarian Lady Executioner," *New Leader*, October 5, 1946, pp. 8-9.

note from the United States government disapproving the elections and a new appeal from the opposition for postponement. According to an official announcement, between 85 and 90 percent of the electors voted, and 80 percent voted for the Fatherland Front.

Thereafter the Communist hold on Bulgaria tightened. A three-member regency consisting of one Communist and two non-Party university professors was technically responsible for the affairs of nine-year-old King Simeon II, but nobody paid any attention to it. The Zveno, where most of the potential monarchical strength lay and which included in its ranks former pro-Nazis, both active and passive, was now playing the role of pro-Soviet, hoping thereby to obtain softer peace terms. The old quasi-Fascist groups started co-operating completely in instituting social reforms. A land redistribution limited single ownership to seventy-five acres, and other measures were intended to encourage agrarian co-operatives and trade unions. The quasi-Fascists and the professional army were loudest in boasting of the contribution of the First Bulgarian Army, which had fought with the Russians under Tolbukhin in Hungary; the army, estimated at 350,000 in 1945, had suffered 40,000 casualties, and its leader, General Vladimir Stoicheff, was appointed Bulgaria's political representative in Washington. The old-line army officers, however, did not hesitate to talk—a little guardedly—of Bulgaria's agricultural products and livestock carted off by the Russians.

Although the United States and Great Britain were to have shared control through the Allied Control Commission, the Russian-controlled Commission continued to direct orders to the government without consulting American and British representatives.

In 1946 a provisional republic was set up, with Communist Vasil Kolarov as its Provisional President, to replace Simeon II, who was voted out in the September 8, 1946, plebiscite. Purge of all opponents of the Russian-controlled government continued and was accelerated. Veltcheff was removed and Gheorghieff was being eased out. The Communists, the driving force behind the government, started preparing for the day when the Russian army was to withdraw. Not being strong enough to Sovietize Bulgaria, although having already some

500,000 members, the Party preferred to work through the Fatherland Front, hoping to modernize the country slowly, mechanize its agriculture, and develop its industries. Their program was reformist, rather than revolutionary, and the machinery of the Fatherland Front was able to satisfy them for the time being. That did not mean, however, that Dimitrov was surrendering his lifelong belief in the dictatorship of the proletariat. He was merely trying to avoid the tremendous cost in lives and wealth that Russia suffered through over-rapid Sovietization.

The formula of running Bulgaria along the lines laid down by Dimitrov was repeated again in the 1946 Assembly elections. Four million Bulgarian voters—all persons over the age of eighteen were eligible—went to the polls again on October 27, 1946, to elect 465 delegates to the Grand National Assembly. Theoretically they could choose between the incumbent Fatherland Front government's slate of Communist and left-wing candidates and two opposition party slates. But actually the Soviet-backed Bulgarian government had turned down all American and British proposals to insure free elections. Even on election day, Dimitrov called voting for the opposition "traitorous." He added "It is worth remembering the fate of Draja Mikhailovitch." Incomplete returns on October 28 gave the Communist party alone a 55 percent majority and put Dimitrov in line for the Republic's presidency. Under such circumstances, the only surprising aspect of the election was the comparatively large vote with which the opposition had to be credited. Out of a total of 465 candidates, the Fatherland Front coalition won 364 (78 percent), the Agrarian-Socialist opposition won 101 (22 percent), and the Democratic Party, which ran independently, none.

On November 2, Dimitrov, founder of the Fatherland Front and chief of the Communist Party, was appointed Prime Minister, with Kimon Gheorghieff as Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cults.

The government included ten Communists, five Agrarians, two Socialists, two Zveno, and one Independent; as seen below, as a result of the elections Communist strength was slightly increased in this third Fatherland Front.

The new Grand National Assembly had the following line-up:

| | Parties | Mandates | Votes |
|--------------------------------|---------|-----------|-----------------|
| <i>Government</i> | | | |
| Communists | | 277 | 2,265,105 |
| Agrarians | | 69 | 560,413 |
| Socialists | | 9 | 78,268 |
| Republicans (Zveno) | | 8 | 71,228 |
| Radicals | | 1 | 8,742 |
| | | <hr/> 364 | <hr/> 2,983,756 |
| <i>Opposition</i> | | | |
| Agrarians and Socialists | | 101 | 1,208,882 |
| Democrats | | 0 | 22,755 |
| Christians | | 0 | |
| | | <hr/> 101 | <hr/> 1,231,810 |

The new Gheorghieff government, like the one before it, emanated exclusively from the Fatherland Front parties, with the exception of the Radical Party which consented not to be represented in the Cabinet at this time.

BULGARIA'S PAN-SLAVISM

This election put the United States in a dilemma. Under all wartime agreements, the United States, Great Britain, and Russia had pledged themselves to establish democratic governments in liberated Europe based on the free choice of the peoples concerned, in conformity with the Atlantic Charter. In the case of Bulgaria, the agreement was violated; and when the United States government started to write peace treaties in 1946 with Sofia's government, unrecognized by Washington, it faced another dilemma: before it could make peace with Bulgaria it would have to recognize a Bulgarian government, and it was difficult to recognize a government born of an election which both the American and British governments had already stigmatized as far from free.

It was a complicated situation. Sofia's ruling clique, which co-operated with the Nazis as an Axis satellite during World War II, wanted to save Bulgaria's territorial acquisitions and began to express vociferously the "big brother" line in regard to the Russians. To maintain Bulgaria's support, the Russians asked no reparations and backed Bulgaria's demands for

Greece's Western Thrace, a long-time national ambition, which was supported by all political parties in Bulgaria.

The United States opposed the decision of the Versailles Conference in 1919 which took Thrace from Bulgaria and gave it to Greece, depriving Bulgaria of an outlet to the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean. But, in 1946, Washington opposed taking Thrace from Greece, an Allied country, and returning it to Bulgaria, a former Axis satellite. Behind the United States argument, supported vigorously by Britain, was the fear that Thrace would give Russia a window on the Aegean, flanking the Dardanelles passage to the Black Sea. Having balked Russia's demands for ports or bases in Tripolitania, Trieste, the Dodecanese, and the Dardanelles, the United States and Britain were determined not to give way on Thrace—or Macedonia.

Another dilemma confronted the United States in Bulgaria's political situation in 1946–47. The United States wanted Russian troops withdrawn from Bulgaria. Russian troops were not to be withdrawn until the peace treaties had been concluded. If agreements could be reached on Thrace and minor economic clauses, the treaty could be signed. But signing and ratifying the treaty, in effect, would be recognition of the Fatherland Front.

Washington, therefore, was soon to be confronted with the choice of recognizing a Bulgarian government it regarded as unsatisfactory, or leaving Russian troops in Bulgaria indefinitely rather than put United States approval on the Fatherland Front. Meanwhile, although at the turn of 1947 the Red Army was preparing to leave the country soon, Moscow took no chances on any independent Bulgarian foreign policy in the future. Thirty thousand Russian settlers had already moved into Bulgaria, and more were on the way. Eventually, the largest group would settle in the Dobruja area, along Bulgaria's Black Sea coast—shortest land corridor from the U.S.S.R. to the Dardanelles.

Despite these developments, the United States, by the summer of 1947, had agreed to the peace treaty with Bulgaria.⁴¹

⁴¹ By the clauses of this treaty, Bulgaria lost no territories, but gained Southern Dobruja from Rumania. No changes were made in the boundary between Greece and Bulgaria. Bulgaria was forbidden to build fortifications on its side of the Greek frontier. Bulgaria was to pay in commodities over an eight-year period \$45,000,000 to Greece, and \$25,000,000 to Yugoslavia.

Bulgaria ratified it on August 25, and by September 14 the treaty, signed by the other great powers, took official effect.

Following close on the heels of his recognition of the Bulgarian government, and while Bulgaria was using her suddenly discovered Pan-Slavonic "sympathies" in the international field (notably in her drive to re-acquire Macedonia from Greece), this Balkan country again appeared in the headlines of the world press: on September 23, 1947, the Bulgarian government hanged Nikola Petkov. A leading member of the Agrarian Party, who had learned about jails and concentration camps at first hand during the King Boris days, Petkov became a ringleader of the national resistance movement when the Nazi hordes arrived and seized control in September 1944. As Deputy Premier in the early days of Russian occupation, he refused to become a yes-man for his former allies, the Bulgarian Communists. In the October 1946 elections, in spite of intimidation and stuffed ballot boxes, the opposition won nearly a third of the popular vote; Petkov demanded a coalition with the victorious Communists. In June 1947, the Communist government's police arrested this stubborn leader of the Agrarian party on the charge of engineering a military conspiracy to overthrow the government; on September 23, Petkov dropped through the gallows trap in the Sofia Central Prison.


A tremor of revulsion ran through the Anglo-Saxon nations; Bulgaria's Premier, Georgi Dimitrov, of the Reichstag fire trial, gave the execution a special shocking quality. For, when Dimitrov awaited trial in a Nazi jail, Petkov was one of a group of Bulgarian political leaders who arranged for Dimitrov's seventy-two-year-old mother, Baba Parashkeva, to visit him; gratefully she told him: "If my son lives through this, he will repay you a thousand times." Dimitrov made his mother's promise real to Petkov by the hangman's noose. In Petkov's memory, three visiting United States Congressmen (Carl Hatch, John Davis Lodge, and Walter H. Judd), shortly before they were due to leave Bulgaria by plane, laid a wreath on the fresh, unmarked grave of Nikola Petkov, eight days after his execution, each speaking a few words in memory "of one of the greatest democrats of all time."

Despite the Petkov execution, the United States restored

full diplomatic relations with Bulgaria on October 1, 1947, with the re-establishment of a legation and the appointment of an American minister in Sofia. Acting Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett emphasized, however, that "this step does not reflect either approval or condonation of certain recent actions of the Bulgarian government." Rather, the appointment of a minister to this Balkan country was "to keep itself informed concerning developments in Bulgaria, and to continue its efforts to protect American interests in that country."

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IV

YUGOSLAVIA

YUGOSLAVIA has the historical distinction of furnishing the scene of the incident that started World War I and also that of the first major shooting incident—by her own army—the first ultimatum, and the first wild rumors of a new war imminent, during the world's uneasy armistice after World War II. It was the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary at Sarajevo in 1914 that precipitated the first World War. Two generations of Americans unlucky enough to live through both World Wars knew little about the complexities of Yugoslavia's political scene between these two major world conflicts, but they were exceedingly wrathful when they learned in the fall of 1946 that Tito's soldiers had shot down and killed five unarmed United States fliers who, according to Tito, had violated Yugoslavia's sovereignty—Yugoslavia, one of the United Nations and America's recent ally in the fight against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy!

Although following the strictly pro-Slavonic line under Tito, Yugoslavia's past pan-Slavonic policies had been only a little less confusing than those experienced by Bulgaria. While the masses have always been pro-Russian, Yugoslavia's ruling house refused to deal with the "Reds" after World War I. With the assassination of King Alexander in 1934, Prince Paul's government turned reactionary, even looking for ways and means of playing ball with Hitler and Mussolini. But in 1946 Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito, as the true and trusted spokesman for Soviet Russia's Pan-Slavic schemes, "wielded more personal power than any other man in Europe except Joseph Stalin, and, with the same exception, he was perhaps the world's most successful proletarian statesman. He ruled a country which, by virtue of its position on ancient highroads of empire,

was a key territory in the strategy of present peace or future war."¹

With less than a hundred thousand square miles and a population of sixteen million, Yugoslavia was smaller than Rumania but sprawled across many climates and cultures. Among the Balkan powers, she ranked second to none in military strength. Yugoslavia—meaning a country uniting the Southern Slavs—was no artificial product of the Paris peacemakers, but the result of the historical development of the various branches of Yugoslav peoples. She combined the former independent kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro and the Yugoslav areas of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire—Croatia and Slavonia (hitherto a part of Hungary), Dalmatia (previously an Austrian crown land), Bosnia and Herzegovina (formerly under the condominium of Austria and Hungary), the Slovenian regions of Austria (Krain and a section of Styria), and the Voivodina (formerly under Hungarian rule).

BETWEEN WORLD WARS

The kingdom was founded on December 1, 1918, at a Belgrade gathering of delegates of all Yugoslav provinces. When at the end of World War I the Danube monarchy was falling apart, the Croats and Slovenes under Dr. Koroshetz, a Catholic priest, convened a National Council in Ljubljana, attended by representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Council soon took the character of an unofficial government in the Yugoslav areas of the monarchy. It strove toward a union with Serbia, but was holding out for satisfactory terms of self-government, foreshadowed in the Corfu agreement of July 20, 1917. The advance of the Italians from the west, however, compelled the Council to appeal for Serbian aid. Early in November 1918, Pashitch, Serbia's premier, met Yugoslav leaders and members of the National Council in Geneva. It was agreed that a joint Serbo-Yugoslav government should at once be set up, though the existing governmental agencies would continue functioning pending the drafting of a constitution by a Constituent Assembly. The Council sent a deputation to Prince Alexander of Serbia offering him the Regency. Meanwhile, Montene-

¹ "Proletarian Proconsul," *Time* (September 16, 1946), pp. 26-30.

gro's National Assembly deposed the unpopular King Nicholas, and declared her union with Serbia. A few days later, Alexander proclaimed the unification of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in one kingdom.

“CRADLE OF THE SLAVS”

The Southern Slavs, speaking various dialects of the same language, are close kinsmen and yet separated from one another by history, tradition, and religion. Historically, the cradle of the Slavic race was on the northern slopes of the Carpathians—what is now eastern Poland and southwestern Russia. The breakup of the Roman Empire in Central and South Europe caused the Slavs to migrate to the south and west—following the movements of the Teutonic tribes. In the end, the Slavs were in possession of Southeastern Europe. Subsequent Magyar invasions and the Germanic pressure from the west deprived the Slavs of part of this territory, and definitely separated the Slavs in the south from their northern brethren.² The settlements of the Southern Slavs in the northern Balkans were known as Slovenia from the beginning. The present Serb and Croat areas were occupied much later. Until the twelfth century, Bosnia and much of Serbia remained sparsely inhabited forest regions.³

The Serbs, most numerous of the Southern Slavs, are proud of their long and epic struggle for national independence. At the end of the twelfth century, their ruler, the Grand Zhupan Stefan Nemanja, had freed himself entirely from Byzantium. The zenith of national power was reached under Stefan Dushan (1331–1355), who proclaimed Serbia an empire; it embraced the greater part of the Balkan Peninsula (including Albania and all of Macedonia), with the exception of Salonica.⁴ However, the fateful battle of Kosovo (1389) marked the beginning of centuries of Turkish bondage. Today, the memory of the Kosovo Polje is sacred to every Serb as the battlefield where the Serbian empire perished. More than five centuries later, during World War I, the fertile plain, deep in snow, was crossed

² Cf. P. A. Radosavljevich, *Who Are the Slavs?* (Boston, 1919), 2 vols.

³ Cf. R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans* (London, 1917).

⁴ Neither Croatia nor Slovenia, however, formed a part of it.

by half-starved Serbian troops and civilians escaping the closing shears of German and Bulgarian forces—leaving behind a trail of 10,000 frozen corpses.

The Turks retained supremacy in Serbia until 1804. Then their rule was challenged by two men equally determined to liberate Serbia. Both belonged to the honorable profession of swineherds, and both desired the throne. Hotheaded Black George, "First Karageorgevitch," brought to death with his own hands scores of adversaries, including his brother and father, but he was killed in his sleep by Milosh Obrenovitch, who sent his head to the Sultan. The classic feud between the Karageorgevitches and Obrenovitches provided alternation on the throne until 1903, when nineteen revolver bullets and five saber cuts ended the career of Alexander Obrenovitch.⁵ Peter Karageorgevitch, thereafter returning from exile, became king. He gained Central Macedonia for his country in the Balkan Wars.⁶

The Croatians formed the first powerful government among the Southern Slavs under the redoubtable leader Tomislav, who was crowned king in A.D. 925. The monarchy was annihilated by the Magyars in 1102; Croatia entered into a union with Hungary, keeping a modicum of autonomy which included retention of her Diet. The union lasted 400 years, but Croatia gradually became a vassal of Turkey. By 1526 Slavonia, a separate monarchy, and a part of Croatia were included in the Ottoman Empire, while the Hapsburgs kept the rest. In 1687 both Croatia and Slavonia came under Hungarian control, which continued until 1918. As early as 1868 both regions were granted a degree of autonomy; in 1881, Slavonia was combined with Croatia into one administrative unit. During the preceding period, the Yugoslav element in Croatia had slowly increased by the immigration of Serbs, pressed northward by the Turks. At the end of the seventeenth century, the fugitive Serbs were invited by Hapsburg's Leopold I to settle in Hungary and form a barrier against the Turks.

⁵ B. Hardin, *Royal Purple: The Story of Alexander and Draga of Serbia* (Indianapolis, 1935), is a forceful historical novel describing this period.

⁶ Yugoslavia, Foreign Ministry, *La Yougoslavie d'aujourd'hui* (Belgrade, 1935), pp. 89-116, contains a fairly good bibliography of historical and other materials.

Montenegro, "Black Mountain," became a Venetian dependency during the fifteenth century, but from 1421 to 1526 she was ruled by the native dynasty of the Chernoyevitch. Bishop Danilo Petrovitch Njegus (1697–1735) freed his country from the Turks. In 1851 another Danilo made himself prince, but his reforms led to his assassination nine years later. His successor, Nikola, proclaimed the kingdom in 1908, which lasted until its union with Serbia.⁷ Those Serbs driven into southern Hungary during the sixth and seventh centuries settled in the Voivodina. Other Serbian settlers followed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They were joined by German and Hungarian farmers sent by Austrian authorities for colonization purposes.

Dalmatia, land of the old Croat state, changed masters several times. The Turks occupied the interior. In 1718 the Venetians extended their domination over all coastal Dalmatia—with the exception of Dubrovnik (Ragusa), an independent republic.⁸ Napoleon gave Dalmatia to Austria, and in 1805 transferred the province to the new Kingdom of Italy. Four years later Dalmatia was incorporated into the short-lived Illyrian Kingdom. From 1814 until the end of World War I Dalmatia was a province of the Danube Monarchy.

Bosnia, occupied by the Serbs during and after the twelfth century, became a Hungarian dependency in 1138, governed by a *banus*, then by a king after 1376. The Turks seized the territory in 1463. The Bosnian revolt of 1875 was a prelude to the Russo-Turkish wars of 1876–1879, after which Bosnia was placed under the administrative control of Austria-Hungary, a status modified by formal annexation in 1908.

CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC DIVIDES

To speak of Yugoslavia as a whole would belie facts. The country presents the most baffling mixture of race, language, custom, and belief imaginable. Here are Serbs, Croats, Mace-

⁷ L. Adamic, *The Native's Return* (New York, 1934), pp. 125–46, gives an amusing account of King Nicholas' rule and of Montenegro in general.

⁸ Radosavljevich (*op. cit.*, I, 146) says of Ragusa: "In the early Middle Ages Dubrovnik or Ragusa in Serbo-Croatian Dalmatia became the centre of a real Slavic civilization, and her schools and universities were celebrated, while she was the home of men and women of poetry and science at a time when central Europe was still in the darkness of barbarism."

donians, Magyars, Slovenes, Albanians, Moslems, Rumanians, Germans, and Jews. Here are Mohammedans, Protestants, Roman Catholics, and members of the Greek Orthodox Church. The official statistics disclose the complexity of the racial and religious pattern.⁹

| Nationalities | Percent |
|---|---------|
| Yugoslavs (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes) | 82.87 |
| Other Slavs | 1.46 |
| Germans | 4.22 |
| Hungarians | 3.90 |
| Albanians | 3.67 |
| Rumanians | 1.93 |
| Turks | 1.26 |
| Italians | 0.11 |
| Others | 0.58 |
| Churches | |
| Greek Orthodox | 48.70 |
| Roman Catholic | 37.45 |
| Greek Catholic | 0.32 |
| Old Catholic | 0.05 |
| Protestant (Lutheran) | 1.26 |
| Protestant (Calvinist) | 0.40 |
| Other Christian | 0.12 |
| Moslem | 11.20 |
| Jewish | 0.49 |
| Others | 0.01 |

While it is necessary to bear these contrasts in mind, we should note also that the Yugoslavs are divided among themselves into three groups: Serbs (about 8,000,000), Croats (approximately 3,500,000), and Slovenes (about 1,500,000). Together, the Yugoslavs represent the majority of the population. The Slavs of Macedonia are included in these totals, although Bulgarian ethnographic experts disputed with Yugoslav authorities the accuracy of such a grouping.

The Germans were the strongest national minority. The greater part consisted of descendants of colonists who in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries migrated from Hungary into Batchka and the Banat, to farm among the Serb and Ru-

⁹ See Yugoslavia, Bureau Central de Presse, *La Yougoslavie par les chiffres* (Belgrade, 1935); The Office for Foreign Trade, *Yugoslavia* (Belgrade, 1936), p. 8; and J. Chmelař, in F. J. Brown and J. S. Roucek, *Our Racial and National Minorities* (New York, 1937), pp. 770-80.

manian settlers. About 40,000 Germans came under Yugoslav sovereignty with the incorporation of Lower Styria after World War I. On the whole, the Germans, like the Magyars, were too scattered to play an important political role, although Hitlerism eventually exerted its influence among the younger generation. Most Hungarians lived in the Banat (Serbian Voivodina), and a smaller number in Batchka. They represented a more serious problem because of the revisionist propaganda emanating from Budapest, which did not tire of reminding them that they had once belonged to the ruling class. The Rumanian minorities were dispersed along the northeastern frontier of Old Serbia and in the Banat. The Albanians lived in the Macedonian regions and those belonging formerly to Montenegro. An insignificant number of Italians was widely distributed along the Dalmatian coast. Between 1919 and 1929 some 37,000 Turks emigrated to their native country; the remainder settled through South Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The religious distribution does not coincide with that according to nationality; regional influences are obvious. The Eastern Orthodox faith, professed mainly by the Serbs, the Rumanians, and the Albanians, had its strength south of the Sava and the Danube. In the east, as a result of Serbian migrations, it had expanded further. The Croats and Slovenes, as well as the greater part of the German and Hungarian minorities, were Catholic. The Catholic Church possessed considerable property and, like the Orthodox Church, received a state subsidy; it appointed its clergy in agreement with Belgrade. The attempt to establish more formal relationships between Catholicism and the government failed as a result of the violent opposition of the Serbian Orthodox elements to a concordat signed with the Holy See in July 1935. Most of the Protestants (Germans, Slovaks, and a number of Slovenes) reside in the Voivodina. A majority of the Moslems in South Serbia and Bosnia were, apart from Albanians and Turks, Islamized Serbs—the descendants of those Serbs and Croats who, after the Osman Turk assault, abandoned Christianity in order to belong to the privileged caste. The Jews, mostly Sephardic, were of economic importance in the urban areas.

Four-fifths of Yugoslavia consists of mountains and hills; one-fifth only is lowland. The rocky ridges have been hostile

to cultural contact. The soil of the valleys is overworked. Like all other Balkan states, Yugoslavia has not yet developed her economic resources to their full potentialities. While the country can boast of rich mineral resources—especially coal, iron, copper, manganese ore, and lead—it is still deficient in industrial enterprise for the exploitation of mines and the manufacture of products. This is due primarily to the lack of capital, technical knowledge, and experience. After World War I manufacturing progress was slow. Lead and copper alone were exported on a considerable scale. Industrial development is essential, as Yugoslavia's population is increasing rapidly, and as there are physical limitations to the expansion of agriculture. On the other hand, the country is one of the richest in forests, which cover almost one-third of its surface. But inadequate capital supply and the need for improved transportation facilities present acute problems for Yugoslavia's statesmen.¹⁰

The economic foundation of the country is agriculture. More than three-fourths of the population are engaged in it. Rural life governs the national standard. In fact only some 20 percent of the people live in towns and cities. Yet, the masses occupied in agriculture received only half of the national income, while the 11 percent of the population representing industry drew one-third, and the 3 percent associated with commerce and banking more than one-tenth.¹¹ The indebtedness of the small farmer was in the neighborhood of 8 billion dinars (about \$160,000,000). While these debtors did obtain relief by government measures reducing the interest rates, the amount of capital which they must eventually repay has been left untouched.

Crop agriculture prevails in eastern Yugoslavia, while cattle raising leads in the south and the west. In the aggregate, the yield is comparatively low; this is reflected in the peasant's standard of living. There is need for more rational working

¹⁰ See J. S. Roucek, "Resources of Yugoslavia," *Economic Geography*, IX (1933), 413-25; and K. S. Patton, *Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Yugoslavia)* (Washington, D.C., 1928). A recent treatment of banking and finance is that of Vladimir Košak, *Die bankmässige Finanzierung der jugoslawischen Industrie* (Frankfort, 1938). See also D. Arnaoutovitch, *Histoire des chemins de fer Yougoslaves 1825-1937* (Paris, 1937).

¹¹ S. Pribichevich, "The Nazi Drive to the East—Yugoslavia, Roumania, Hungary," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XIV (1938), No. 14, p. 174.

methods, modern machinery, and experimentation with selected seeds. Only Croatia-Slovenia and the Voivodina are reasonably well equipped with modern farm implements. In spite of the general preponderance of agriculture, the social structure varies in different provinces. Thus in the Voivodina, Croatia, and Slovenia the urban population is much larger than in Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Herzegovina. Again, in Serbia, Montenegro, and Slovenia small and medium-sized landholdings predominate, while the other parts of the country present a contrasting picture. On the whole, only 32 percent of all holdings were above 12.3 acres—the minimum for existence. More than a million peasants, or nearly one-tenth of all, were landless and had to earn their living as migratory seasonal workers.¹² Yet the share of agricultural land parceled out by expropriation of owners of large estates was under 10 percent.¹³ The density of population, while decreasing in the north, continuously increases in the south, averaging 153 inhabitants per square mile—a figure about three and a half times that for the United States. In 1933 the surplus of births over deaths in Yugoslavia was the highest in Europe—doubly remarkable considering the relatively high mortality rate and the effects of the war. Illiteracy ranged from 20 to 83 percent of the population in different districts (83.86 percent in South Serbia and 8.85 percent in Slovenia). Since the census of 1921, however, great strides have been made in the promotion of education.¹⁴

SERB VERSUS CROAT

The crux of Yugoslavian politics, from the very formation of the new state to this day, has been the alternative of centralization and federalism—the Serbs fostering the notion of "Greater Serbia," and the Croats advocating regionalism. The

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Balkan States, I, Economic* (New York, 1936), p. 20. For one of the most interesting survivals of the patriarchal community, "Zadruga," see P. A. Sorokin, C. C. Zimmerman, and C. J. Galpin, *A Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology*, II (Minneapolis, 1932), 57–67.

¹⁴ See J. S. Roucek, "Recent Changes in the Organization of the Yugoslav Universities," *School and Society*, XXXVII (1933), 331–32; "Educational Reforms of Yugoslavia," *ibid.*, XXXVI (1932), 150–53. "Development of the Educational Structure of Yugoslavia," *ibid.*, XL (1934), 250–53; and "The Secondary Schools of Yugoslavia," *Education*, LVI (1936), 584–86.

conflict between the Serbs on the one hand and the Croats and Slovenes on the other reached a climax in 1928 when several Croat leaders were shot by a Serb deputy in the National Assembly. It was this incident and the alarming domestic situation that led to the inauguration of King Alexander's dictatorship—a system of government which survived in a modified form until World War II.

What were the forces bringing about this grave crisis? The reply is simple. Yugoslavia has been enmeshed in a tangle of regional nationalisms, antagonistic creeds, and contrasting cultures, while being faced at the same time with exasperating economic and international problems. Despite their geographic proximity and their racial and linguistic affinity, the Yugoslavs are cursed with a heritage of separatism. The new state was unable to create spiritual unity among its constituent parts because its Slavic population had lived too long under different sovereignties—Austria, Hungary, Serbia, Montenegro, and Turkey. During the era of division, the Yugoslavs had been unable to participate in the same political, cultural, economic, and religious development. The geopolitical conditions of the Balkans intensified centrifugal tendencies; they emphasized differentiation and diffusion rather than integration. When the old dream of national unity had finally come true, tribal instincts were already too deeply rooted to give way to broader allegiances.

The Croats entered into the Kingdom with initial enthusiasm; but they were sure that they did not want the new state to become a mere extension of Serbia. They soon came to resent the course steered by their Serbian mentors. The adoption of the Vidovdan constitution without Croat consent added fuel to the incipient feud. Zagreb, ancient and obstinately self-assertive Croat center, strongly Catholic, seemed wider apart than ever from Belgrade, the new capital, "modern" in everything and proud of its record of war and victory. The heavy hand of Serbian administration, centralistic and overstaffed, released the full force of tribal enmity. The clash became inevitable. Although Serbs and Croats have the same literary language, both consider themselves separate cultural groups. The Croats and Slovenes use the Roman alphabet, while the Serbs write in Cyrillic. Memories of the early Croat Kingdom

and the wide autonomy enjoyed by the Croats in prewar Hungary taught the Croat his own conception of justice. "State's rights" in the American sense are his gospel. He is jealously defending the status of his province, suspicious of Serb interference. After the relentless fight against Magyarization, what could be worse for him than to become "Balkanized"? Too long had autonomy been the cherished weapon of national self-interest to make the Croat yield to Belgrade even in minor matters.

Religious differences make the contest deeper. As Catholics, Croats and Slovenes receive their inspiration from Rome, which had organized its followers more systematically, holding in obeisance also the politics and the intellectual life of the provinces. Many of the Croat leaders—and also Dr. Koroshetz—have worn ecclesiastic robes. Serbia's Orthodox Church, on the other hand, without an equally militant organization, had concerned itself much less with secular affairs, though it was nationalistic in its outlook. The upper classes of Serbia are not deeply religious, although they have recognized the social prestige of their church. Religion, for the Serb, is identified primarily with his nationalism; but so is in its essence the Catholicism of the Croat, who distrusts his Serb cousin in "oriental" Belgrade as an "infidel."

The gulf was widened by conflicting cultural traditions. Belonging to the "Western" cultural zone, both Croat and Slovene were convinced that theirs was an "older" and "higher" civilization than that of the Serb, who, in their eyes, was little more than a modern "barbarian," a ridiculous and brazen upstart. A comparison of the percentage of illiterates, much lower than in Serbia, provided another argument for the Croat, educated under the influence of Vienna and Venice. The Serb, for his part, detested Zagreb with its "Hapsburg" and Catholic baroque façades, and cared little for "antiquarian culture." His sufferings and sacrifices during past centuries imbued him with an obsession for his nationalistic cause. Devotion to this cause taught him to be quick to draw the sword and slow to put it down. Indeed, were not the Croat regiments, in the service of the Austro-Hungarian empire, confronting him on the battlefield while he was giving his blood for the liberation of the country? Still, Serbia saw her triumph, and the Serb was reap-

ing his harvest. Yugoslavia was to be strong and nationalist to the marrow—ruled from a truly Slav city, Belgrade, and by a real Slav dynasty.

The inequality of economic standards' also contributed its share. Industrialized Croatia and Slovenia, having received for their development financial support from Vienna and Budapest, were embittered by the thought that their economic interests and their tax revenue were being sacrificed to the support of almost purely agricultural regions—Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia. They complained that their own region, "Sava Banovina," was treated as a second-rate and remote periphery of Belgrade, although the numerical proportion of Croats to Serbs was roughly 4 to 5. They agitated for increased representation of the Croat element in the administrative system, career opportunities for their intelligentsia in the foreign service, the army, and the gendarmerie, which was almost entirely Serbian. Scandals in the administration naturally aroused deeper moral indignation among the Croats and Slovenes than elsewhere in the Balkans. Government censorship, for the same reason, created profound irritation. After the death of Raditch, Croat resentment found its most articulate mouthpiece as well as its symbol in the person of Dr. Matchek.

FACTIONS AND CAUSES

Politically, these were uncertain foundations on which to build a new state. To the non-Serbs, even the simple concept of statehood was problematical, because it derived connotations from the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish regimes. Yugoslav minorities under foreign rule had slowly grasped the only method available to them—passive and active resistance, a policy of opposition and obstruction. Unfortunately, these tactics were carried over into the politics of the new kingdom; the foolhardiness of Raditch in the postwar period was nothing else but ill-starred reliance on established prewar technique. Similar complications arose from the varied political experience of the different regions. While Serbia went through the school of national responsibility, the Voivodina had never seen the first grade. Croatian political activities prior to World War I had been limited to municipal life. In Slovenia and Dalmatia the situation was not different, though provincial government had

provided additional opportunities. Montenegro had little notion of the essentials of representation; Bosnia had less. Finally, South Serbia (Macedonia) could contribute the murderous art of IMRO revolutionists, but not much else.

Under such conditions the Yugoslav melting pot was to remain a figure of speech. The expressions of the stubborn spirit of sectionalism were formulated by the political parties. These fell heir to the party tradition of the preunion period. That there was no dearth of political parties in Yugoslavia can be seen from the following tabulation:

| Political Parties | Results of Elections | | | |
|---|----------------------|------------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| | Nov. 28, 1920 | Mar. 18, 1923 | Feb. 8, 1925 | Sept. 11, 1927 |
| Radical (led by Pashitch; after his death in 1926 divided into three groups: Trivkovitch, Gavanovitch, and Uzunovitch) | 93 | 109 | 140 | 112 |
| Independent Democratic (originating in 1924 from the Democratic Party, led by Pribitchevitch; including Democratic Party led by Davidovitch)..... | 94 | 52 | 59 | 82 |
| Croat Peasant (led by Raditch and Mathek) | 50 | 70 | 67 | 62 |
| Slovene Catholic People's (led by Koro-shetz) | 27 | 22 | 20 | 21 |
| Mussulman (led by Dr. Spaho)..... | 32 | 31 | 15 | 18 |
| Serbian Peasant (led by Yovanovitch) .. | 39 | 11 | 5 | 9 |
| Socialist (led by Koratch and Markovitch) | 10 | 3 | | |
| Communist (dissolved in July, 1921)... | 58 | | | |
| German (led by Kraft)..... | .. | 8 | 5 | 6 |
| Minor groups..... | 14 | 6 | 4 | 5 |
| Total..... | 417 | 312 | 315 | 315 |

The most important role during the period preceding Alexander's dictatorship was played by the old Radical Party of Serbia. Founded in 1881 by a group of young men who espoused the reconciliation of socialism with the patriarchal agricultural conditions in Serbia, the Party gradually lost its "radicalism" as its leaders assumed the control of the government. At the end of the century, its policies turned into opportunism and conservatism, representative of the aims of the urban middle classes—merchants, lawyers, contractors, and industrialists. Its leader, Nicholas Pashitch (1845–1926), a civil engineer, made himself the dominant figure of Serbian politics

for sixty years. After a forced sojourn abroad and in jail, he became premier in 1881, and later again spent nine months in prison. Under King Peter, Pashitch joined several cabinets. He and his party carried Serbia through the Balkan Wars and World War I; to him fell most of the credit for the fact that by 1919 the Kingdom's territory had increased more than three-fold. Weakened by the fall of czarism in Russia, he was forced to negotiate on equal terms with Yugoslav representatives under Dr. Trumbitch, with whom he signed in 1917 the Declaration of Corfu, although its principles offended his Pan-Serbian and Greek Orthodox convictions.

A powerful figure, with his white beard which gave him an air of grave dignity, he succeeded in realizing nearly all of Serbia's territorial ambitions. A Serbian patriot, he maneuvered through the centralistic constitution of 1921, and fought with all his might against the federalist demands of the Croats. He was one of the main causes of the sad plight of parliamentarism in Yugoslavia on account of his highhanded tactics, his insistence on Serbian domination, his irreconcilability of regional proposals. Communalism such as was implied in the word "Yugoslavia" was incomprehensible to him because he was determined to make the new kingdom he helped to form nothing else but the "Greater Serbia" of his imagination. While he lived, he was Yugoslavia's Grand Old Man, chauvinistic and archconservative. Starting his career as a radical, he died a true reactionary in December 1926, the day after he was called by the King to form another cabinet.¹⁵

The Radical Party stood for a simple program: a centralized administration from Belgrade, the *status quo* as established by the constitution of 1921, and promotion of business enterprise. The stronghold of its supporters was Serbia. A number of its members reached positions of prominence. Dr. Moncilo Nintchitch was foreign minister for many years; his comrade in arms, Uzunovitch, headed several postwar governments, and was still going strong under the dictatorship.

¹⁵ For more details on prewar Yugoslav parties see *The Near East Year Book* (1931-1932), pp. 829-932; C. A. Beard and P. Radin, *The Balkan Pivot* (New York, 1929); Count C. Sforza, *Makers of Modern Europe* (Indianapolis, 1930), pp. 148-63; I. Sarinić, "Die Ideologie der kroatischen Bauernbewegung," *Slavische Rundschau*, IV (1937), 147-56; and Count C. Sforza, *Nikola Pašić et l'union des Yougoslaves* (Paris, 1938).

Toward the end of the century the Young Radicals, opposed to Pashitch, offered the only serious competition to the rule of the Radical Party. In 1918 they united with supporters from Slovenia and Bosnia in a new Democratic Party. More liberal than Pashitch's following, the Party eventually favored a degree of decentralization and social justice for the peasant masses. Its outstanding leaders were Ljuba Davidovitch and Svetozar Pribitchevitch. It was the latter who as minister of the interior jailed Raditch in 1924, but later veered toward supporting the Croatian demands.

Croat discontent found its most active spokesman in the head of the Croat Peasant Party, Styepan Raditch (1871-1928). Expelled from school and imprisoned as a youth for his ideas on Croat autonomy within the framework of Hungary, he graduated from the *École politique* in Paris, and subsequently opened a bookshop in Zagreb. In 1904 he presided at a meeting which gave birth to the Croat Peasant Party. He knew how to hypnotize the peasant masses; demagoguery appealed to them, and Raditch supplied it. In November 1918 he opposed the Croat decision to surrender to the Yugoslav government, and refused to co-operate in the formulation of the Vidovdan constitution. His fruitless absence from parliamentary activities gave Pashitch an opportunity to pursue Serbia's centralistic policies.

In 1923 he visited London, Moscow, and Vienna; he returned to proclaim his faith in the Soviet government, his affection for Germany, and his distrust of France. He was due for another prison term in 1925, but abruptly decided to join the cabinet. After six months he resumed his active opposition, which made parliamentary co-operation impossible. The resulting tenseness reached its peak on June 20, 1928, when Raditch was shot while in Parliament. On his sickbed he made another *volte face*, announcing: "Nothing is left but King and people." He lingered on for weeks and died at Zagreb. His life had been full of inconsistencies, but he remained true to Yugoslav form by graduating from youthful radicalism and republicanism to the support of a conservative regime.¹⁶ With his death, leadership of the Party fell to Dr. Vladimir Matchek, a lawyer, who

¹⁶ C. A. Beard, "Autobiography of Stephan Raditch," *Current History*, XXIX (1928), 82-106.

became the spearhead of opposition against the Belgrade government.

The Christian Social Party, a prewar Catholic organization of Slovenes, provided the foundation for the Slovenian Populist Party, led by Dr. Koroshetz, a tested opportunist. He was the last prime minister prior to the dictatorship. Bosnian Muslims under Dr. Spaho, too, joined several coalition cabinets. The Germans, astutely guided by Dr. Stephan Kraft, have returned a few members to Parliament at every election since 1923; these were pledged to support minority rights regarding their schools, religion, and civil administration. The Turks, Albanians, Magyars, and Rumanians also sent deputies to Belgrade but were not strong enough to exert any appreciable influence on the course of government.

Yugoslavia's weak industrial system provided little impetus to the evolution of social policy. Furthermore, the rise of the Communist Party after World War I caused a marked reaction. In the elections of 1920 the Communists with 58 mandates became the third strongest party in Parliament. Communist triumphs, however, were not scored in the industrial districts of Slovenia, where the Party had received only four mandates, but in the backward parts of the Kingdom populated by small peasants and shepherds who had never seen a factory chimney or voted for Parliament before. When the government turned against the Communists at the close of 1920, they engineered a bomb attack on Alexander and killed a former minister. Dissolved, they have not ceased to operate. The Social Democratic Party met a similar fate. It was torn apart by the adherence of its Serbian members to government centralization and that of the Slovenes to a regional solution.

THE RULING CLASS

Besides the Croat Peasant Party, the Constituent Assembly of 1920 contained four other agrarian fragments of Serbian, Bosnian, Dalmatian, and Slovenian origin respectively; their initial agrarian radicalism had evaporated by 1927 when the "Peasant Club" returned only nine mandates.¹⁷ As is usually

¹⁷ See U. Stajitch, "The Agrarian Movement in Yugoslavia," in Sorokin, Zimmerman, and Galpin, *A Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology*, II, 667-71.

the case in the Balkans, the social demands of the peasantry found ineffective representation. Even the most pressing agrarian reforms had not progressed beyond a tentative stage. Collectively, the Yugoslav peasant played no important role in politics, although he displayed noticeable political interest. Current affairs were being discussed over innumerable cups of Turkish coffee in the *kafana*, or coffeehouse, the gathering place in agricultural communities. The peasantry's low standard of education was proverbial. Patient, plodding, uncomprehending, and superstitious, the small farmer lived in abject poverty, especially in the southern regions. "Many have meat only once a week, their clothing is patched and worn to the last shred, and their children are underfed and go barefooted."¹⁸ Yet they remained the most conservative and stable element of the nation, nearly self-sufficient, even their clothing material being still mostly homemade. The rural debt load represented largely tax delinquency incurred during bad years.

Above the peasant masses were placed the small clusters of urban population. Many sons of the upper class had been educated in foreign countries. They copied Western European civilization, and set themselves off from the peasant. Although they had lost the qualities of their peasant ancestors, they acquired little of the moral equilibrium of Europe's *bourgeoisie*. Left without the counterweight of a native nobility, the social aristocracy was one of wealth and education. Sensitive to the fact that the word "Balkan" on foreign lips often connoted "primitive" conditions, the aristocracy was apt to make strenuous efforts to show itself "civilized."¹⁹

Being under economic strain, the upper class hoped for a solution of its problems in the craft of politics, which it virtually monopolized. While the rural country suffered from an under-supply of professional services, economic complaint was widespread among physicians, teachers, and college-trained agricultural experts. Under the circumstances it was not surprising that the Parliament of 1927, for instance, derived nearly half of its entire membership from this social group. To peasants and agricultural laborers fell only one-tenth of all mandates.

¹⁸ F. T. Birchall, *New York Times*, December 15, 1937. Quoted by permission of the editor.

¹⁹ See D. Orr, *Portrait of a People: Croatia Today* (New York, 1937).

though 80 percent of Yugoslavia's population live by tilling the soil.

The students were among the most unruly elements. This was attested by the frequency of incidents caused by them. In 1932, for instance,

. . . . the disturbances created by students in various parts of the country led to the closing down of the Students' Hostel, which was a present of the King to the students. After the police had laid siege to the Hostel for two days, cutting off the electric light as well as food and water supplies, the students were obliged to surrender, and many of them were deported to the interior of the country or to lonely islands off the Dalmatian coast.²⁰

Or, to cite another incident, in 1935 demonstrations at Cetinje, Nikshitch, Podgoritza, and other centers in Montenegro

. . . . were organized by students sent down from Belgrade University in connexion with the disorders which led to the death of the Montenegrin student Mirko Srzentitch there, to protest against his murder. These demonstrations assumed considerable proportions and led to clashes between demonstrators and police. At Podgoritza a clash between nationalist youths and demonstrators ended in two deaths—one nationalist and one demonstrator.²¹

The rotation of cabinet offices called customarily for the redistribution of most administrative posts. The spoils system was a traditional feature. The national administration, overlorded by Serbians, had its roots in the past. "Originally created in a society essentially agricultural in economy, composed of people largely illiterate, and offering few opportunities for careers outside the government service, it has of necessity assumed the characteristics of a bureaucracy."²² While most of the recruits for the governmental service were in their early years drawn directly from the institutions of learning, special training was not offered. Both the absence of admission examinations and the practice of allowing each cabinet minister to appoint his personnel merely on probation worked toward a

²⁰ *Near East and India*, XLI (1932), 121. Quoted by permission of the editor.

²¹ *Ibid.*, XLIV (1935), 275.

²² Beard and Radin, *op. cit.*, p. 181. Quoted by permission of the publishers, The Macmillan Company.

concentration of appointments in Belgrade. Partisan politics determined the individual appointments. It was practically impossible, on the other hand, to remove incompetent bureaucrats, a fact which again promoted the growth of an oversized administrative establishment.

THE ABDICATION OF PARLIAMENT

Once the first thrill of national unity had been experienced, the country found itself burdened with serious problems—the technical difficulties of administrative integration, the great diversity of provincial patterns, and the economic dislocations caused by warfare and frontier changes. But instead of uniting their efforts toward the consolidation of the new state, Yugoslav politicians bickered for power as early as the days of the Constituent Assembly. The parties, essentially old factions in new gowns, emphasized regional orientation instead of programs designed to deal with national questions. Consequently, governmental coalitions never lasted long, and never reflected the combined will of all sections. During the first decade of the less perfect union, the succession of crises was not broken, with cabinet changes averaging nearly three a year. The turnover amounted to 130 cabinet posts. Ten cabinets lasted only a few months each; no more than two succeeded in remaining in office for the record of eleven months. Other governments were in office for only one month, and even for two weeks. Twenty cabinet members had their tryouts in from three to five different ministries; a few headed no less than six central departments in the course of their careers.

Political constellations were governed by illogical considerations, and policy veered from one extreme to another. Raditch, for instance, avoided jail by becoming a cabinet member, only to break with the King again a few months later. Seldom did cabinets resign because of any fundamental differences of opinion. The basic task of Parliament—constructive legislation—was almost wholly neglected. Personal friction increased from year to year. Although Parliament lived through more than three electoral terms, during the whole period it did not succeed in giving the country a uniform legislation. The different laws operative in the various provinces before the establishment of the union were still in force when the dictatorship

tried to cut the Gordian knot. Division, nepotism, and inefficiency ruled supreme. The antagonism between the Serbs and Croats—the greatest issue of Yugoslav politics—seemed to defy solution, due in part to the intransigency of the Serbs and in part to the shortsighted policy of Raditch. Intrigue became endemic, and personal jealousies gave rise to treachery. The newspapers, provincial in allegiance, fanned political passions. Said Beard and Radin: "Nowhere in Europe, perhaps, does personal abuse run to a higher pitch; nowhere do editors dare to make with impunity such reckless, sweeping, and slanderous statements about men in public life."²³

Elections remained under official pressure. The police did not hesitate to take a hand in inducing voters to come to the polls and to make the "proper" choice. Gerrymandering was widely practiced. It was this atmosphere that helped to produce the crisis of state on June 20, 1928.²⁴ When Raditch lay dead, his followers withdrew from Belgrade and set up their own parliament at Zagreb, where they passed resolutions refusing to recognize the "Rump" Parliament at Belgrade. At the tenth anniversary of the founding of the state, celebrated on December 1, the Croats remained at home. The only way out of this political impasse seemed the one pursued by the King—dictatorship.

ALEXANDER—THE "UNIFIER"

Alexander, the fourth child of Prince Peter, was born at Montenegro's capital, Cetinje, in 1888. Sent to St. Petersburg by his poor father, he was educated by the Czar's family—which explains his hate of the Soviet executioners and of the Communist system. He studied at the military academy at St. Petersburg and later in Switzerland. In 1903, when he was only fifteen years of age, his father became Serbia's king. His older brother, disqualified because of his psychoneurotic affliction, had to resign, and Alexander became Crown Prince in March 1909. He served in the Serbian army; in 1914, because of his father's illness, he became Serbia's Regent and headed its army when it was retreating before the forces of Austria-Hungary

²³ Beard and Radin, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

²⁴ For the programs of various governments up to 1923, see M. W. Graham, *New Governments of Central Europe* (New York, 1926), pp. 283-95.

and Germany during World War I. The way he shared the suffering and the unspeakable misery of his soldiers made him beloved by his countrymen. In 1921 he was crowned Yugoslavia's king. While Greece, Rumania, and Bulgaria had to import their rulers from other countries, Alexander, like Albania's Zog, had the honor of rising to Yugoslavia's throne from a domestic dynasty.

As a soldier, he tried to apply the military mentality to his problems. But until the state machinery began to stall at the end of the first decade of Yugoslavia's independence, he seldom interfered with his small politicians. Then he made his decision and acted. During the night of January 5-6, 1929, he overturned Yugoslavia's political chessboard. In his proclamation he said:

Parliamentary government which was always my own ideal as it was that of my unforgettable father has been so abused by blind party passions that it prevented every useful development in the State. It is my sacred duty to preserve the unity of the State by every means within my power. I have, therefore, decided, hereby to decree the Constitution of the Kingdom of 1921 abolished. The laws of the land will remain in force unless cancelled by my royal decree. New laws in the future will be made by the same method.²⁵

General Pera Zhivkovitch, one of the conspirators who murdered Alexander Obrenovitch and his Queen Draga in 1903, was appointed Premier to run the government by decree. Systematically the government tightened its hold on the country, aiming at as complete a centralization as possible. All parties were dissolved and all local autonomy went by the board. Croat and other newspapers were strictly censored. On October 3, 1929, the old official title of the "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes" was replaced by that of the "Kingdom of Yugoslavia." The historic frontiers of the provinces were replaced by nine banats (*banovinas*), and all confessional schools were integrated with a strict nationalistic system of education.

The methods of government, as could have been expected, were not always gentle, and police brutalities acquired a new

²⁵ J. S. Roucek, "Social Character of Yugoslav Politics," *Social Science*, IX (1934), 294-304; H. F. Armstrong, "The New Kingdom of Yugoslavia," *Foreign Affairs*, VIII (1930), 297-300; M. W. Graham, "The Dictatorship in Yugoslavia," *American Political Science Review*, XXIII (1929), 449-50; and S. Graham, *Alexander of Yugoslavia* (New Haven, 1939).

regularity. But the masses, for the most part, were acquiescent. Opposition came largely from disgruntled old-time politicians out of jobs. On the whole, the next three years showed definite economic and cultural gains. That the regime was intended to be only a temporary means for the elimination of regional loyalties and the creation of a sense of national unity may be assumed from Alexander's unwillingness to build up an ideology for his dictatorship. A step in the direction of its modification was seen in the proclamation of a new constitution on September 3, 1931.

THE LEGAL FAÇADE

The Vidovdan constitution of 1921,²⁶ a document of centralism, owed its main features to Serbia's basic law of 1888, which in turn was heavily indebted to the Belgian constitution.²⁷ It created a unicameral parliament. In almost every other respect, Yugoslavia's parliamentary monarchy suggested the political system of France. In contrast to American precedent, the constitution declared the *Skuptchina* itself to be the sole judge of the constitutionality of its laws. The crown possessed no veto power. The 315 deputies were elected for a term of four years by secret ballot, under a system of proportional representation. The document was voided in 1929.

The constitutional gesture was followed by the electoral law of September 12, 1931. Its provisions reserved candidacies for only one party, that of Zhivkovitch, since no party having less than 60 supporters in *each* election district in the country was entitled to participate. The party securing the largest vote in the whole kingdom was to receive two-thirds of the seats in the chamber of deputies; voting was to be oral and in public.

The outcome of the elections of November 8 was a foregone conclusion. By official pressure about half of the electorate was mustered up to vote. The government, naturally, "won," and the new Parliament dutifully approved all of the govern-

²⁶ French text in J. Delpech and J. Laferrière, *Les constitutions modernes* (4th ed., Paris, 1929), II, 439-73. English text in *Current History*, XV (1922), 832-47. The name of the constitution was derived from the day of its adoption, St. Vitus Day.

²⁷ Delpech and Laferrière, *op. cit.*, II, 431-33; H. F. Wright, *The Constitutions of the States at War, 1914-1918* (Washington, D.C., 1919), pp. 553-86.

ment's measures in January 1932. But matters were not going too well. The creeping economic and financial crisis, coupled with a slowdown in the regime's constructive achievements, brought about the sudden resignation of Zhivkovitch on April 4. Although the subsequent change in cabinet personnel made little difference in the internal policy of the country, premiers began succeeding one another. To provide relief, the Croat spokesman, Dr. Matchek, was sentenced to three years in prison for treason. Growing opposition to the system made itself felt even among the Serbs, notably in the student body, which staged riots at the University of Belgrade. The government saw no alternative to repression.

THE THREAT OF DIRECT ACTION

Alexander failed to achieve a slow transition from his authoritarian regime to constitutional government.²⁸ On October 9, 1934, he was assassinated in Marseilles. The murderer, Vlada Gheorghieff, "Vlada the Chauffeur," was a Macedonian patriot, the right-hand gunman of Mihailoff, master killer. His accomplices were Croat terrorists trained in Hungary. Their leaders, Dr. Ante Pavelitch and Gustav Pertschetz, enjoyed shelter in Italy, where another group of Croat extremists, *Ustashi*, had been trained for their exploits in Yugoslavia.

No less than three of Alexander's immediate predecessors had lost their thrones, two of them by assassination—Michael in 1868 and Alexander Obrenovitch in 1903. The last Obrenovitches, disreputable Alexander and Draga, had provided comic opera to all Europe. No comedy, however, was their rule to Serbian patriots. Beneath the surface worked the Black Hand, a secret society determined to rid the country of the degenerate Obreno clan and to enthrone exiled Peter Karageorgevitch. During the night of June 11, 1903, the conspirators forced their way into the royal palace; an hour later, they tossed chunks of the bodies of their victims out of the window. The successful *coup d'état* consolidated the organization. It took for its seal a clenched fist grasping a flag with a skull and crossbones, beside them a knife, a bomb, a flask of poison. Its activities ranged from vendetta to the plot to blow up King Nicholas of Monte-

²⁸ See J. S. Roucek, "The Tragedy of Yugoslavia," *World Affairs Interpreter*, V (1935), 330-40.

negro in 1907—a failure. The official name *Ujedinjenje ili Smrt*, meaning “Union or Death,” was adopted in 1911.

These adventures in terrorism and the “Pan-Slav” scheming in Austria-Hungary indirectly caused World War I. In 1914, three members of “Union or Death,” Prinzip, Tchabrinovitch, and Grabez— all Bosnian students—brought sudden death to Austria’s Archduke Francis Ferdinand at Sarajevo. At that time the leader of the Black Hand was Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevič, an officer of the Serbian general staff. He was later accused of an attempt on the life of Prince Alexander at Salonica, and in 1917 was executed with three other functionaries of the Black Hand.²⁹ But violence stalked on. As late as March 6, 1936, Yugoslavia’s Parliament, stained with the blood of Raditch and two other Croat deputies, was again the scene of terror. Four shots were fired at Premier Stojadinovič by Deputy Damian Arnatovič—outcome of a Fascist military plot to open the road for totalitarian forces. The Premier was more fortunate than his late monarch.

The assassination of Alexander filled the country with grief and horror. During the conveyance of the body to Belgrade all sections of the population vied with one another in demonstrating their esteem and affection. Even the Croat leaders came to pay their respects at the King’s funeral in Belgrade. The nation rallied as one to its youthful sovereign, Peter II, a child of eleven. Little criticism was voiced over the composition of the Regency—two nonpolitical figures headed by Prince Paul Karageorgevič. Hopes were widely entertained that it might be possible to form a government which even the opposition, especially the Croats, could join.

In a very short time, however, political passions reasserted themselves. The first test occurred when Prince Paul, though of conciliatory temper, clashed with the chauvinistic Serbian Radicals in the cabinet—Uzunovič, Maximovič, and Marinovič. A new government was formed in December 1934. Premier Yevtič began his career well. His cabinet contained several non-Serbs; he promised free elections and released Dr.

²⁹ See Hardin, *op. cit.*; A. den Doollaard, *Express to the East* (New York, 1935); E. C. Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913* (Cambridge, 1938), pp. 36, 41-47, 101; and L. Bittner, “Die Schwarze Hand,” *Berliner Monatshefte*, X (1932), 55-64.

Matchek from prison, but he was unable to control his Serbian colleagues. The victory of the government in the May elections of 1935, conducted under the electoral law of 1931, meant little—less since it proved not so triumphant as was expected in the circumstances.³⁰ Still, a more generous spirit was evident. The government permitted the formation of the Yugoslav democratic opposition—composed of the Croats and the Serbian liberal parties (Democrats, Independent Democrats, and Agrarians) under the leadership of Dr. Matchek, and joined later by Dr. Spaho. This was a remarkable phenomenon in Yugoslav politics. It meant not only the toleration of political activism on the part of the extreme opposition, but also the first formation of a Serbian-Croat coalition, including Serbs from Serbia proper as well as from the former Austro-Hungarian Serbia, under the command of a Croat. The Populists of Dr. Anton Koroshetz and the Serbian Radicals abstained from the elections.

Prince Paul, eager for further appeasement, soon found himself at odds with the Yevtich cabinet. A new ministry, headed by Dr. Milan Stoiadinovitch, was formed in June 1935—testifying to more propitiatory trends by the inclusion of several Croats, Slovenes, and Bosnian Moslems. The Premier organized a Yugoslav Radical Union with Dr. Koroshetz and Dr. Spaho. It stressed loyalty to the monarchy and pledged itself to the maintenance of a strong central government, although it favored a gradual change from dictatorship to parliamentary democracy. Offended, several of the Croats in the cabinet thereupon resigned. Opposed to Stoiadinovitch, an affable self-made man and a Rotarian, were not only Croat groups, but also conservative Serbs organized in the Yugoslav National Party, a semi-Fascist organization of extreme nationalist and centralist leaning.

AT THE CROSSROADS

After the death of Alexander, Yugoslav politics were characterized by the attempts to normalize political conditions and

³⁰ The government secured less than two-thirds of the total vote and the opposition more than one-third. But thanks to the anomalies of the electoral law, the government supporters occupied 303 and the opposition merely 67 chamber seats.

to attain a *modus vivendi* with the Croats. Dr. Matchek, whose influence among the Croats was unbroken despite government efforts to split the Croats and win over subleaders, was becoming aware that regional opposition could not be continued indefinitely. Indeed, deadlock might have worked eventually in favor of a Communist or Fascist orientation. Prince Paul, on the other hand, showed himself a more moderate ruler than Alexander had been. The dictatorship was still maintained, but considerable latitude was allowed to its opponents. Since the constitution of 1931 did not make the government answerable to Parliament, the factors controlling the regime lay outside the legislative assembly—that is, in the decisions of the Regency. Publicly Prince Paul was rarely censured, though he was the supreme strategist in cabinet changes.

Pivotal in Yugoslav politics were still the relations between Serbs and Croats. But Prince Paul was able to pull the extremes more closely together. In December 1936 the Prince received Matchek, the standard-bearer of Croat opposition, and in the following January a meeting between Stoiadinovitch and Matchek took place—"the first meeting of a Croat leader with a Yugoslav premier since the shooting of Raditch."⁸¹ The retirement of General Zhivkovitch in March 1937 was considered an indication of the break of the existing government with the dictatorial methods of 1929. About the same time Stoiadinovitch presented to Parliament a concordat granting the Roman Catholic Church a status equal to that of the Serbian Orthodox Church—another gesture to conciliate the Catholic Croats and Slovenes. Unfortunately, the sharp objections of the Orthodox Church forced the government to withdraw the measure. The December elections of 1938 gave 58.9 percent of the vote to Premier Stoiadinovitch's government coalition. Matchek's united Serb-Croat opposition bloc won 40.21 percent, while Zbor, fundamentally a Fascist group, polled less than one percent. The results offered the government no great encouragement, although the electoral law enabled it to claim more than 300 chamber seats out of a total of 372. When both the Serbian Conservatives and the Croats turned against the

⁸¹ M. W. Fodor, *Plot and Counterplot in Central Europe* (Boston, 1937), p. 53. Quoted by permission of the publishers, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston.

cabinet, the Slovene and Moslem ministers withdrew from co-operation with the Premier. Matchek went so far as to announce in February 1939: "The foe of our foe is our friend. The Croats are now the Sudeten Germans of Yugoslavia." Bewildered, Stoiadinovitch tendered his resignation. The reconstructed government under Dragisha Cvetkovitch, a Serbian moderate, included Croats, Slovenes, and Mohammedans. For the Croats, this share of cabinet responsibility might have been the road to autonomy.

What did the Croats want? Briefly, Dr. Matchek wanted a recognition of the political, cultural, social, and economic differences among the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. This could be achieved, he claimed, by a free and secret election. A new parliament would prepare a thoroughly revised constitution on the basis of the individuality of the three "nations," to be approved by a majority in each region.⁸² That his proposal was not devoid of validity was shown by the municipal elections held in September 1936. In Serbia proper, Stoiadinovitch secured 80 percent of the vote. In Croatia, Dr. Matchek polled nearly 100 percent. In Slovenia, Dr. Koroshetz, as leader of the Slovene Clericals, scored a large majority. This demonstrated that the old divisions still existed, and that regional loyalty had not been shattered, still less eliminated. The regionalist lines, however, were becoming blurred by the participation of Croats in the opposition as well as in cabinet co-operation with the Serbs.

WORLD WAR II AND AFTER

During the opening phases of World War II, Yugoslavia was truly in an unenviable position. The German military Moloch had an economic stranglehold on the country, and the difficulties were increased in the summer of 1940, when Italy's invasion of Albania and the entry of Rome into the war cut off the Adriatic coast from Allied operations. The only remaining communication line between Yugoslavia and the Western Allies was the Morava-Vardar Valley which, however, was entirely dependent upon the ability of the Allies' forces to maintain their foothold in Greece. Internally the situation was going from bad to worse. All the indications were that the *Sporazum*,

⁸² See J. E. D. Evans, *Belgrade Slant* (London, 1937), pp. 169-84.

the Serbo-Croat agreement of August 1939, failed to satisfy the Croats, while antagonizing the most militant Serbs. Subversive and underground activities were on the increase and many disgruntled youths, especially in the poverty-stricken districts of Macedonia, Bosnia, and Montenegro, were increasingly attracted to Communism. Berlin supported the separatist tendencies, together with Rome, of Ante Pavelich's extremists, the *Frankovci*, while Rome also was helping in Dalmatia and among Bosnia's Moslem population. At the same time, Yugoslavia's Communists, always propounding the line laid down by Moscow, supported the strange Hitler-Stalin Pact and insisted that Hitler's affairs were purely imperialistic and of no interest to the proletariat of Yugoslavia or any others.³³ These underground tendencies, in turn, weakened Prince Paul's government and its determination, if there was any, to stand up against Hitler's demands. Paul's friends were not slow in pointing out the swift downfall of France, the traditional friend of Yugoslavia, and the inability of Britain to provide arms, or any kind of assistance, to Yugoslavia in case of Hitler's attack. Hence Cvetkovich's government, while not willing to acknowledge, like the previous governments, that Yugoslavia's future depended on close trade and political relations with Germany, pursued dilatory and noncommittal tactics. When, in March 1941, Hitler insisted that Yugoslavia should join the Tripartite Pact—and thus free Germany's right flank in preparation for the attack on Russia—it appeared that the country was to follow the example of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary and acquiesce, reluctantly, in its own planned rape.

Prince Paul's royal-military oligarchy was truly on the spot. Both anti-Communist and anti-Fascist (and not Fascist because it had not created its own exclusive single totalitarian party; it resembled the regimes of czarist Russia and of South American dictators), it took its guidance from the Cliveden set and tried a series of appeasement steps. At the same time the great majority of Serbs and many Croats and Slovenes were determined, come what might, that Yugoslavia must not surrender to Germany; and Serbia's political parties, the Orthodox Church, and the army implemented this determination. When Paul's gov-

³³ P.S., "The Yugoslav Political Situation," *The World Today*, Vol. II (January, 1946), No. 1 (New Series), pp. 13-27.

ernment signed the Axis Tripartite Pact on March 25, 1941, popular reaction was immediate.

HEROIC RESISTANCE BUT IN VAIN?

At 1:00 A.M. on March 27, while all Belgrade slept, tanks, trucks, and artillery units moved swiftly to strategic points throughout Belgrade. At 2:00 A.M. the army officers roused the Ministers, forced them to dress, and hurried them to General Staff Headquarters. The Regent and Cvetkovich's government were taken into custody. Seventeen-year-old King Peter II assumed full royal powers. His Premier was General Dushan Schimovitz, popular ladies' man and veteran of the heroic Serbian Army in World War I.

Peter was a symbol; the actual rulers were the generals. The country reacted joyously. Preparations for revolt had no doubt been brewing ever since the Nazi occupation of Bulgaria on March 1. The coup occurred with such swiftness, however, that it caught Yugoslav and German generals unaware. The Croats were less aggressive, since their provinces full of farms and industries in the flat northwest were the most exposed and the least defensible. Prime Minister Schimovitz exerted all his influence to persuade Dr. Matchek to accept the post of vice-premier. Nintchich, an older statesman, was appointed foreign minister. The government announced a policy of strict neutrality and declared that the country was prepared to fight for it. In Moscow, Yugoslav Minister Gavrilovitch and Russia's Foreign Minister Molotov signed a treaty of "non-aggression and friendship."

Several international crosscurrents had played their parts in Belgrade's *coup d'état*. Winston Churchill had done much by risking an expeditionary force in Greece while Yugoslavia wavered. The United States had also played a part by passing the Lend-Lease Act and promising aid to Britain's allies. Russia had helped by pledging neutrality to Turkey if Turkey should be attacked, thereby suggesting to Turkey the advisability of a treaty with Yugoslavia. But those who had done most were the people, and the people appropriately rejoiced.⁸⁴

The task of reuniting all Croatia with Serbia and Slovenia

⁸⁴ See J. S. Roucek, "Hitler Over the Balkans," *World Affairs Interpreter*, XII (July, 1941), 136-52.

appeared the first and gravest problem of the new King and the army's coalition government, as one of the most dramatic weeks of Yugoslavia's history ended. The army itself continued to prepare for any eventuality with a single-mindedness that left no room for further adventures in politics or internal dissension at the same time. The Belgrade coup marked a setback for German diplomacy and served to delay the projected onslaught of Hitler against Greece and Russia.⁸⁵ In fact, we know today that "events in Yugoslavia contributed decisively to the German defeat," since the uprising threw Hitler's plans out of gear, postponing them from May 15 to June 22, when Russia was attacked.

In a military sense, Yugoslavia seemed ready. Reports stated that 1,200,000 men had been mobilized, but of this number probably no more than 750,000 to 900,000 were effective and not all of these were well equipped. Yugoslavia was believed to have had sixteen to eighteen first-line infantry divisions of varying strength, but those at full war strength might have numbered 25,000 men each. In addition, there were two cavalry divisions. With the mobilization of reserve divisions—not so well-equipped as the first-line troops—the total might have been brought to a maximum of about thirty-two divisions. The soldiers were natural fighting men; the infantry was excellent, but there was inadequate artillery support and few modern arms were available.

INVASION

Immediately before Hitler's invasion in April 1941, apart from some minor Fascist groups, there was, however, no evidence of pro-Axis sentiment in Croatia and Slovenia. Although these lay to the north and their plains were fearfully exposed to invasion, Dr. Matchek decided on April 3, 1941, to rejoin the government in the post of First Vice-Premier and called upon the military forces of his people to enter wholeheartedly into the general mobilization that was being completed for the defense of the land against the threat of Hitler's aggression. Yet, the seeds of internal dissension had already been carefully laid in the Croat and Slovene provinces by Nazi agents, particularly

⁸⁵ DeWitt C. Poole, "Light on Nazi Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, XXV (October, 1946), 130-54, and especially page 150.

among a number of extremist Croats who preferred to see a semiautonomous Croatia under German domination, rather than a province of Croatia as a part of a united Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia, from the Nazi angle, figured prominently in Hitler's plans for the Balkan action. For one thing, the most important lines of communication to the southeast ran through that country; for another thing, the most practicable route to the invasion of Greece—the Vardar River Valley—lay in Yugoslavia, just to the west of the Serb-Bulgar border. The original thought was that the necessary Yugoslav co-operation could be obtained through means short of war.⁸⁶ As the result of the *coup d'état*, Germany had to take on another enemy—one that, despite its potential million-and-a-half of soldiers, was "militarily impotent (due to low morale, dissension, lack of equipment, and unpreparedness)."⁸⁷ On the other hand, the situation regarding the vital communications to the southeast was definitely crystallized—Germany now could act, rather than ask—and the breadth of front potentially available for the attack on Greece was extended to include not only the Vardar Valley, but the entire Serbo-Greek frontier.

Germany was able to launch its campaign within a week of its diplomatic rebuff. At 5:15 A.M., Sunday, April 6, 1941, the full fury of the Nazi blitzkrieg struck at Yugoslavia and Greece from many directions with many techniques—with dive-bombing, parachute troops, tanks, mobile artillery, and mechanized infantry. Always the German juggernaut operated with an overwhelming advantage in machines and highly trained, fully equipped men. It had been thought that the mountainous and almost roadless terrain of the lower Balkans would at least slow up a blitzkrieg, if not make it impossible, but in the first days of fighting the German machines plowed swiftly ahead—plowed swiftly where they were least expected. Through the mountains from Sofia to Nish and Skoplje went drives intended to cut the vital Vardar Valley and divide Yugoslavia from Greece. Down the Struma River Valley toward Salonica went another drive to break the back of the Greeks and roll the British into the sea. The whole strategic Vardar Valley went

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

⁸⁷ Lieutenant Colonel Paul W. Thompson, *Modern Battle* (New York, 1942), p. 124.

under the Nazi heel in two days; Salonica fell in three days—Hitler's Panzer legions had won as a prize the best seaport on the Aegean, the port where an Allied drive was organized against the Germans in 1918—and Albania was reached in six days, thereby cutting off aid from Greece and the British.

The fundamental rule of German strategy, whether in war, politics, mass psychology, or terrorization, was to break the opposition into weak fragments. The Nazi technique was to "divide-and-rule," to cut and recut, until the enemy's communications, leadership, force, and plans were hopelessly decimated and disorganized. The Nazis' plan of action in the Balkans followed that strategy: cut Yugoslavia from Greece, pro-Nazi Croatia from anti-Nazi Serbia, pregnable Thrace from defensible central Greece, the tough Greeks from the tough British. If the Greek, British, and Yugoslav armies could have united, they would have constituted an army of about 1,300,000, an army greater in numbers, although weaker in air strength, training, and mechanization, than the German force in the Balkans. Therefore the strategy of division was especially imperative.

The first Nazi blow in Thrace was struck at about the same time as the main attacks were biting into southeastern Yugoslavia. Such was the swiftness of the Nazi advance that considerable Greek forces were isolated in Thrace. The Nazis claimed that 80,000 Greeks in Thrace had put down their arms. Meanwhile German bombing effectively disrupted all communications and service. Little could be done to stop this superior force. A wedge was hammered between Yugoslavs and Greeks, and then the divided forces were encircled and annihilated.

It had taken twelve days of blitzkrieg, from April 6 to April 18, to bring the Kingdom of the Southern Slavs to its knees. The Axis deathblows had been delivered by the German forces, which crushed the Third Yugoslav Army at Kachanik Pass, and by the Italians, who poured down the Adriatic coast.

CROAT QUISLINGS

When Hitler decided, in the spring of 1941, that Yugoslavia's attitude had to be solved by her dissolution and conquest, his instigations started a miniature civil war in certain parts of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia. Among those killed

was the brother of General Slavko Kvaternik, the general who was to become one of the chiefs of "Independent Croatia." The Croatian troops were already separated from the Serbs on the night of April 17, two days after the outbreak of the war. The first clash occurred in Bjelovar (Slavonia), where a Croat sergeant took command of the 180th Infantry Regiment. During the night he had the Serbian officers disarmed and arrested. The majority of the Serbian soldiers of the regiment, stationed outside the town, attacked the barracks. Only the rapid arrival of German troops saved the Croatian soldiers. In the port of Spalato there were six Yugoslav warships, of which three rallied to the new Croatian government, while the other three threatened to bomb the town. An attack by German planes settled their differences. In Zagreb, the governor of Croatia, Dr. Ivan Schubatic, left the town on the night of April 10, shortly before the arrival of Dr. Ante Pavelich; since the Governor was, as well, chief of the local police, the entire force immediately placed itself at the disposal of Pavelich.

Dr. Ante Pavelich, who announced the formation of an "independent Croatia," was a quisling worthy of the name. Dark, treacherous, he had been leader of the terrorist *Ustashi*, a band of rapacious Croat schemers who for years had hated the Serbs, Jews, and Croatia's own peasants, and who plotted with Italian, Hungarian, and German money to split Yugoslavia and bring the *Ustashi* into power. It was this future president of "independent Croatia," a peasant himself by birth, who had engineered the assassination of King Alexander (1934); after this he took refuge in Italy, which refused to expel him for French trial. He was sentenced to death *in absentia*. In April 1941 he proclaimed himself first president of the "new" Croatia, including Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and the old Croat province. He named as his Premier his fellow terrorist, Slavko Kvaternik.

JACKALS SNARL OVER YUGOSLAV SPOILS

With Hitler's conquest of Yugoslavia, the Führer had to consider as many as six claims. Even before the war had officially ended, the Axis jackals had begun to snarl over the spoils. To Germany went the northwestern province of Slovenia, which with its German minority had been until 1918 part of the

Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria each claimed a share of territory in the north, east, and south. In gratitude for their pro-Axis campaign of terrorism, Hitler deeded to Croat extremists, under Pavelich, a Croat state about as "free" as the "independent" state of Slovakia, which entered the "new order" in Europe under Italy's "sphere of influence" (Italy which had earned nothing in the Yugoslav campaign!) by getting the Duke of Spoleto of the ancient House of Savoy as King of Croatia. By this deed, territorially Italy received the part of the Dalmatian coast that she had asked in the London Treaty of 1915 as the price of entering World War I, and that was refused afterward. She received all the islands of the Dalmatian coast, which had formerly belonged to Yugoslavia (except Pago, Brazza, and Lesina). Shushak, Yugoslavia's rival to Fiume, became Italian also. Finally, and by no means least important, Italy got the former Austrian naval base at Cattaro and the coast down to Albania. That left two important outlets to the new Croat kingdom: one from Zagreb, which would include special facilities for use of the port of Spalato, and another from the rich mineral districts of Bosnia to the port of Ragusha. (But Germany did not like to see the Italians in Greece, and it was a curious but significant fact that the new government which the Germans set up in Greece, headed by George Tsolakoglou, was distinctly anti-Italian.)

It was most interesting to note that the powers tearing chunks out of the prostrate body of Yugoslavia did not even bother to justify their seizures by ideological justification, or by the much-used Hitler device of "liberating oppressed minorities." The job of rolling up maps was undertaken with less rhetoric than usual. Official comments indicated only that, along with the Croats, the aspirations of the Albanians, Macedonians, and Montenegrins would also be adjusted in keeping with the "principles of justice and decency." But, meanwhile, Hungary lost no time turning its four-month-old nonaggression pact with Yugoslavia into a scrap of paper, and Regent Horthy sent troops into Yugoslavia to seize 8,000 square miles of rich cornfields and dairy lands, watered by the Danube and Tisza rivers, which the 1918-1919 peacemakers had taken from Austria-Hungary after World War I. Inclusion of Macedonia (most of

which had been ceded to Serbia and Greece after the 1912-1913 Balkan Wars) in "Greater Bulgaria" was demanded in Sofia as a result of German military victories; the hope foreshadowed the settlement of a long-standing disagreement between the two branches of the IMRO. One branch, which previously had advocated an independent Macedonian state, now accepted the program which called for inclusion of Macedonia as part of Bulgaria. On April 20, Bulgaria's occupation of Greek and Yugoslav Macedonia, "liberated" by Germany, had been nearly completed. Rumania, like Hungary a junior partner in the Axis, started to move into the southern section of the Banat area in which Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia formed a boundary "corner."

GERMAN VENGEANCE

The real importance of the German victories in the Balkans lay in their strategic considerations. The conquest of Yugoslavia and Greece gave Hitler a springboard from which he hoped to—but did not—leap to control of the Eastern Mediterranean. Yugoslavia's collapse only strengthened Germany's hold on copper and bauxite. But the Nazis wreaked a terrible vengeance upon Yugoslavia's people, particularly the Serbs. Serbs in Croatia were murdered by the thousands by Pavelich's *Ustashi* and in the Bachka by the Hungarian soldiery, while the Albanians and the Bulgarians "fully lived up to their traditional qualities of barbarism."³⁸ Serbia, under German military rule, was dotted with concentration camps, and reprisals were exacted on a stupendous scale. Yet, despite all this, resistance remained alive—and the Yugoslavs were to survive the war, despite odds which seemed overwhelming.

THE RISE OF PARTISANS AND GUERRILLAS

During the Nazi invasion, King Peter escaped and eventually set up an exile government under Allied protection in London. At home, two powerful resistance movements were showing the world that Yugoslavia's love of freedom was very much alive. The first to attract world notice was the Chetnik movement of General Mikhailovitch, a Serb leader who organized

³⁸ P.S., *op. cit.*, p. 19.

bands of guerrilla fighters. The Allied nations, including the American people, applauded him and began to send supplies to strengthen his fight against the German armed forces. American enthusiasm over him was certainly high.

Mikhailovitch, a short, stocky professional soldier with a heavy gray-brown beard, was a colonel in command of a mountain regiment when the Nazis seized his country in April 1941. He organized peasant volunteers and army remnants into guerrilla forces. The bespectacled Chetnik commander, who loved to sing and strum the Serbian mandolin, was horrified by Axis reprisals against civilians. A career officer, he felt guerrilla raids were most effective in close support of regular forces; he wanted to hold his fire, conserve his strength, and wait for an Allied invasion of the Balkans. This program, in turn, coincided with British instructions to resistance groups all over Europe and with the desires of the Yugoslav government-in-exile, functioning in London, which believed British troops would restore its rule.

Soon, however, a new resistance leader challenged Mikhailovitch. Tito became the big name in Yugoslavia. Tito and Mikhailovitch were supposed to be fighting for the same cause, but this fact did not make them comrades in arms. Mikhailovitch called Tito a Communist, and Tito labeled Mikhailovitch a Fascist. Each accused the other of seeking power at home instead of concentrating on the fight against the Germans. Tito even charged the Chetniks with helping the Nazis in their campaign to weaken the Partisans.

TITO

Russia supported Tito from the beginning. At first, Britain and the United States favored Mikhailovitch, but they were finally won over to Tito. A peasant's son, he was born Josip Brož on a Croatian farm in 1890. He did not assume the name of Tito until years later, after he had been using it as a pseudonym for articles he contributed to the illegal Communist press. Sent to war in 1914 as a private in Austria-Hungary's army, he deserted to Russia the next year and was in a Russian prison camp until 1917, when he was released to fight with the Red Army for four years. Returning to the newly formed Yugoslavia after Comintern training, Tito became a radical

agitator and a Croat labor leader. His activities soon landed him in prison on charges of Communist conspiracy and he served five years at hard labor. Released in 1934, he promptly resumed his underground activities for the Communist Party. During the Spanish Civil War he played an important part in smuggling men into Spain to fight against Franco, and he helped to organize the International Brigade, although he did not fight himself.

The Nazi conquest of Yugoslavia found Tito living in Zagreb, but he did not become active in the resistance movement until Russia was invaded two months later and the Partisans began their guerrilla war on the Nazis. Tito explains the delay as "tactical expediency."

Assuming leadership of the Partisans, Tito built up their strength from a mere handful to an estimated force of 200,000. The Partisans were a political as well as a resistance movement; besides harassing the Nazis, they also fought the Chetniks of Mikhailovitch, Tito's rival for postwar power. With strong Russian sponsorship, Tito finally succeeded in getting the Western Allies to accept him as the main leader of Yugoslav resistance.

THE FEUD BETWEEN TITO AND MIKHAILOVITCH

Mikhailovitch's movement was made up largely of Serbs; it was pro-royalist and bitterly anti-Communist. Tito's movement originated, it is true, in Serbia, but later developed in the other parts of the country; although Communist in direction and command, it was yet politically adroit enough to conceal this fact under a cloak of progressive nonparty patriotism. Mikhailovitch, a regular soldier possessing neither great intelligence nor particular imagination, believed that operations during 1942-1943 would bring down reprisals upon Serbia and decided simply to lie low—and occasionally, for the sake of his survival, to collaborate with the enemy. Tito, on the other hand, was a man of great personal charm, a Communist agent trained in the underground work, who was astute enough to know that a resistance force could find its morale only in action—even at the cost of heavy reprisals on the civilian population. In their hatred of the Communists, the Chetniks collaborated first with the Italians (1942) and later with the Germans (1944), while,

in their turn, Tito's Communists collaborated with the Germans at the time of the Nazi attack against Yugoslavia in 1941.

PETER'S GOVERNMENT IN ECLIPSE

The behavior and leadership of King Peter's government in London complicated the fraternal troubles even further. King Peter, young and inexperienced, was unable to control his governments which were passing from crisis to crisis, concerned only with problems of doctrinaire importance and failing to comprehend the realities at home. To the Allies, the whole collection of these "statesmen" appeared as a collection of tired and quarrelsome old politicians.

THE RISE OF TITO

Before the war was over, Tito had extended his power over all Yugoslavia, assisted by not only Russia's help, but eventually by that of the Allies. This helped to a great degree to impose his dictatorship upon a lukewarm, if not unwilling, country. His prestige was at its height in the autumn of 1944, built up by the reports of his military exploits by Russia's propaganda agencies, and in the United States by the vociferous activities of Louis Adamic. At that time Tito's regime was at least accepted, if not actively supported, by a majority of the country, particularly the younger people hoping to rebuild a new Yugoslavia. The British forced King Peter to remove Mikhailovitch as Minister of War with the government-in-exile. (The British claim that the decision was made reluctantly, after futile advice to the Chetniks to attack the Axis; Mikhailovitch's American defenders say that this was done to appease Soviet Russia.)

As soon as peace came, Tito's machinery started to remodel the country along Russian lines. This meant tearing down a way of life which had changed little since the Middle Ages. On the liberation of any given area, administration was started through the local party representative acting under the direction of the Communist Control Executive, which had in its hand two powerful instruments for crushing any opposition—the Army and the Secret Police, the OZNA. The AVNOJ, a kind of transitional National Assembly, gave authority to *ad hoc* jurisdiction of the partisan control committees and of the previous Jajce Assembly. The law courts were turned into faithful

servants of Tito's state, and the power of the OZNA soon covered every corner of the country.

INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND INTERNAL SYSTEM

At Yalta the Soviet government persuaded Roosevelt and Churchill to agree to a recognition formula for Tito's regime similar to what they had adapted for the Polish Lublin Committee; Tito's government was to be "broadened." Through a series of maneuvers and diplomatic pressures, the government-in-exile in London was forced by Washington and London to merge with Tito's Cabinet. Six new members were added to Tito's government, including Milan Grol and Dr. Ivan Subasitch. A Serb and an admitted opponent of Tito, Milan Grol became a Minister "without portfolio" and soon resigned. Dr. Subasitch, a careerist Croat politician, the first "Premier" of Tito's government, concluded the famous Moscow Agreement which gave the regime a façade of legality. But he was only a stopgap premier. The immediate purpose of his appointment was to grant Tito the political, administrative, and financial support which he needed and was able to obtain from Washington and London. Subsequently Tito appointed himself Premier, with Subasitch as Foreign Affairs Minister for a while before his early passing into the fog of historical oblivion.

LEGALISTIC FAÇADE

Gradually, but persistently, Tito was able to strengthen his power. Many Serbs were definitely hostile to Tito's regime. Tito undertook to remove the numerically superior Serbs from the political, economic, and cultural life of the country. One of these measures was his attempt to divide the cohesive Serbian groups by creating separate "federal units." Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia were named as six units of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. In addition, there will be areas within states having autonomy and limited representation in the Assembly. Voivodina in the northeast and Albanian-populated regions in the south are in this class. The Constitution of January 31, 1946, followed faithfully that of Soviet Russia.³⁹ It brought

³⁹ For a propartisan interpretation and summary, see United Committee of South Slavic Americans, *Yugoslavia's New Constitution*, which may be obtained from 465 Lexington Ave., New York 17, N.Y.

foreign trade and numerous industries under government control, provided for central planning of the country's economic life, called for dividing up the greatest estates among small farmers. Like Russia's constitution, it provided for a two-house legislature, but placed supreme power in a special board called a Presidium.

The Presidium convenes and adjourns the National Assembly and fixes the election dates, decides whether or not laws agree with the Constitution and gives binding interpretations of federal laws, and promulgates the laws. It also has the right to grant amnesty, to ratify international treaties, to appoint representatives abroad, to accept credentials and letters of recall, to distribute decorations, to appoint special committees within the Cabinet, to hold referenda upon decision of the National Assembly or at the proposal of the Cabinet. Finally, when the National Assembly is not in session, it carries out some of its duties such as declaring war, ordering mobilization, appointing ministers and their substitutes, etc. . . . The Cabinet is appointed and dissolved by the National Assembly in joint session . . . Each Republic has its own National Assembly, which is the highest organ of state authority in the republic.⁴⁰

Tito made short work of his political rivals, including King Peter who was ousted when, by the new Constitution, Yugoslavia was proclaimed a federal republic instead of a monarchy. Mikhailovitch found that the Communism he had opposed was firmly in power, that the King he had defended had been deposed, and that the Greater Serbia about which he had dreamed, had been transformed into a federation. Mikhailovitch was tried and executed as a war criminal on July 17, 1946, although his American defenders pointed out that the Chetniks had saved the lives of 600 American airmen shot down over their territory.

TITO, PROLETARIAN PRO-CONSUL

In 1946, Tito "wielded more personal power than any other man in Europe except Joseph Stalin, and, with the same exception, he was perhaps the world's most successful proletarian statesman. He ruled a country which, by virtue of its position on ancient highroads of empire, was a key territory in the

⁴⁰ *Yugoslavia's New Constitution*, pp. 11-12.

strategy of present peace or future war.”⁴¹ It was his army that had caused “the first major shooting incident, the first ultimatum and the first wild rumors of imminent war of the world’s uneasy armistice.”⁴²

It was he, this five-foot, eight-inch, stocky, blue-eyed man, known to the world as Tito, who dared to oppose the might of the victorious United States in 1946 and shot down five Americans who “dared to violate Yugoslavia’s sovereignty” by flying over Tito’s territory. Tito claimed that the United States Air Forces had crossed Yugoslavia’s territory thirty-two times in one week; the State Department replied, “Not so,” and most Americans began to realize that Tito, at first considered the paladin of Yugoslavia’s democracy, was more of an autocrat, using the techniques so well known to all dictators of the past and the present.

Tito, in fact, was the same staunch friend of Russia he had long been, serving as a front man for Stalin in international situations where the Soviet Union did not want to take action openly. Many observers believed that he would not have been so bold as to shoot down America’s planes if he had not had Stalin’s prompting and support. Whatever might be the case, Tito was a welcome visitor at Moscow, and his trips there usually had been the occasion for lavish reception and display. Tito’s and Stalin’s foreign policies were identical. Moscow was also backing the development of close relationship between Tito’s followers and Bulgaria’s Communists and had encouraged the formation of a Balkan Slav bloc which would also include Greek Macedonia, with the port of Salonika. The Kremlin also encouraged Tito’s ill-timed attempt to gain control of Italy’s Trieste and Austria’s Carinthia by force of arms, with the result that the Trieste question was not settled even in January 1948.

Internally, Tito’s OZNA (officially UDB—State Security Administration), together with his NKVD (trained secret police), was implemented with a nationwide network of Soviet-like “people’s councils,” whose secretaries usually double as local Communist Party secretaries; they issued a secret *karakteristika* (character reference) for each citizen, which had to be

⁴¹ For a ferocious but a reliable survey of Tito’s regime, see *Time*, September 16, 1946, pp. 26–30.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 27.

shown to employers and superiors; a standing army of some 800,000, supervised by Red Army officers, armed with Red Army guns, and decorated with Red Army insignia, was the mainstay of his rule. The new civil service was carefully purged of all non-Communists. Tito's chief adviser was humorless Vice-Premier Edvard Kardelj, a former schoolmaster, who had spent six years in Yugoslavia's prisons for writing Communist pamphlets and later learned underground work in Odessa's Revolutionary School for the Balkans. Another of Tito's "braintrusts" was Mosha Pijade, Jewish vice-president of Yugoslavia's powerless Parliament.

The ruling clique, however, still had troubles in 1946. The Croats were restive under the pro-Communist trends, and Dr. Matchek did not hesitate to express his resentment during his visit to the United States in 1946. The anti-Communist forces, headed by the Catholic priests, were consequently attacked, and in the same year Archbishop Aloysius Shtepinac was sentenced to sixteen years at hard labor for "crimes against the people," together with twelve other priests also accused of collaboration with the Germans and *Ustashi* (Croat) quislings. "Concern and deep worry" over the sentences were expressed in Washington by Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson. It was proper that he should comment on Yugoslavia's "internal situation," he declared, because United Nations members had an obligation to respect the rights of man, regardless of local laws. The Vatican, which reported "minor excommunication" of Marshal Tito on October 7, denounced the trial as "ignominious."

The displeasure of the State Department of the United States over Tito's behavior grew steadily, and protests became increasingly frequent. In 1946 Tito's soldiers and those of United States were carrying on a small war in and around Trieste. Although the UNRRA had saved some 5,000,000 Yugoslavs from starvation, UNRRA became, astoundingly, an instrument of ill-will against the United States. Tito's propaganda harped on the theme that the Western democracies were little more than quartermasters in the war in Europe, and it emphasized the Yugoslav claim of 1,800,000 war casualties as against only 1,000,000 for the United States (forgetting that many of Yugoslavia's casualties were the result of interne-

cine warfare and revolution).⁴³ After the capture of Mikhailovitch, Tito's government refused the request of the United States for permission for officers to give evidence at the trial, stating that it had no right to influence a military court regarding the calling of witnesses. On April 2, 1946, Belgrade gave a formal assurance that it was prepared to observe existing treaties and agreements with the United States; it was provisionally recognized on April 18. Then Washington's objections to the ways and means of holding elections were also ignored, and Tito's Fatherland Front for the First Chamber rolled up a majority of 90 percent from 88 percent of the electorate which voted on November 11, 1945.⁴⁴ On December 22, 1945, the State Department of the United States officially recognized Tito's government, but a note to the ambassador in Washington said it must be understood that the decision did not "imply approval of the policies of the regime, its methods of assuring control, or its failure to implement the guarantee of personal freedom promised to its people." But the troubles continued to crop up, owing to the tense Trieste situation and the Shtepanic trial; in September the United States Embassy, at the request of Tito, had to close the American reading room and library in Belgrade and terminate all functions of the United States Information Service. The following month, the State Department sent a stiff note to Yugoslavia, accusing that country of keeping in virtual slavery persons holding American citizenship.

Tito's international diplomacy reflected the new internal regime of the Left, which was just as dictatorial as that of the prewar days. While the former pro-Serb and Centralist regime under King Alexander and Prince Paul tried to hold the country together by the dictatorship of Belgrade, Tito's partly Communist regime had its props in a dictatorial one-party system, the Communist Party's army, the Party's courts, the Party's police, the Party's monopoly of the press, education, and political action. Much emphasis was placed on parades, slogans, and posters. "As a Roman of ancient times, called Diocletian, dei-

⁴³ L. D. Hochstetter, "Sellout in Yugoslavia," *Saturday Evening Post*, CCXIX (November 2, 1946), 14 ff.

⁴⁴ It was this Constituent Assembly which, on November 29, 1945, proclaimed a republic and deprived the king and his dynasty of all vested rights.

fied himself and made the whole Roman Empire not only serve him as emperor but worship him as a god, so Partisans now build Yugoslavia on the myth of one man, Tito."⁴⁵

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
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⁴⁵ R. H. Markham, *Tito's Imperial Communism* (Chapel Hill, 1947), p. 193.



V

ALBANIA

LESS THAN FORTY miles of blue Adriatic waters separate Italy from Albania, formerly a half-mythical mountain kingdom, one of the youngest and probably the least known of all European countries, a country of patriarchal clans and high-perching villages, less populous than New York's Borough of Queens.¹ With 11,629 square miles, Albania is smaller than New Hampshire and Vermont taken together. She is the only European country without a yard of railroad track in operation and without a university of her own.

Albania has often been described cynically as a musical comedy in world politics. Although of peanut size, Albania's importance has been really out of all proportion to its size. Regarding its admission to the membership of the United Nations, its chief contribution to United Nations assets would be its position on the Strait of Otranto, controlling the entrance to the Adriatic Sea, for the Italian side of this strait has no natural harbors to compare with Albania's ports, Durazzo and Valona. But its geographical importance was demonstrated in 1946, when Albania's application for membership in the United Nations brought a sharp denunciation from Greece and some pointed questions on its eligibility from the United States and Great Britain. For in the background was the Greek declaration that Athens would regard favorable action on the Albanian application "as a reward to the Albanians, in spite of sheer

¹ Albania has produced such outstanding personalities as Ismail Kemal Bey, former Grand Vizier of Turkey; Crispi, the great Italian statesman; Mehmet Ali, leader of the Egyptian revolt for independence in 1881 and founder of the dynasty of Khedives in Egypt; and Admiral Konduriotis, first president of the Greek Republic.

justice, for their treachery toward Greece" during World War II; furthermore, Greece also claimed the territory of northern Epirus; Washington, on the other hand, questioned Albania's willingness to accept the obligations of the United Nations charter.

Later on, Albania was again featured in the headlines of America's newspapers, when London submitted to the United Nations its dispute over mines allegedly laid down by Albania in Corfu Channel, at the turn of 1947. Meanwhile, another extremely significant step was taken by Albania's postwar dictator, Colonel Enver Hoxha. At the end of 1946, Yugoslavia and Albania concluded a customs union which geared up the poor and unproductive Albania into Yugoslavia's new Federal Union. Albania became virtually a province of Yugoslavia—pointing the way to a Russian-sponsored federation of Balkan states. The new treaty made Marshal Tito's government a partner in every important branch of the Albanian economy and placed the future development of the strategic areas firmly in the hands of Yugoslavia. By establishing a customs union of the two countries and equalizing their currencies, the way was paved for political union—a fact of extreme importance to the United States, which was hoping and trying to stop the ever-expanding Russian influence over the Balkans and across Greece's border. Meanwhile, Albania's former King Zog was living on his "savings" in Egypt, a next-door neighbor to Italy's exiled King Victor Immanuel III, under whose regime he had been driven out of his country by Mussolini's hordes.

BETWEEN WORLD WARS

ALBANIA'S BACKGROUND

The kingdom combined the former Turkish provinces of Scutari and Jannina and sections of the vilayets of Kosovo and Monastir. Albanians claim descent from Europe's oldest tribes, the Illyrians and the Thracians, whose settlements became a part of the Eastern Roman Empire. Serbs and Bulgars conquered the country during the Middle Ages. The greatest historical figure of Albania, George Kastrioti, called Skanderbeg (1444-1468), united the Albanians and won many battles

against the Turks.² After his death Albania fell again under Turkish rule, although Ottoman sovereignty, shaken by Albanian revolts, was never effectively established.

In the nineteenth century the growth of Balkan nationalism had its repercussions in Albania. A general uprising occurred in 1912; in its wake the Turks granted autonomy to Albania. Ismail Kemal Vlora, supported by Vienna and Rome, proclaimed Albanian independence. Soon, however, European diplomacy was to enter the field. A conference of ambassadors at London recognized Albania as a sovereign state, but placed Prince William of Wied on the throne. He landed at Durazzo on March 7, 1914; rebellion drove him out as early as September. During World War I, the retreating Serbian armies forced their way to Corfu through the principality, which saw occupation by Greek, Italian, Austrian, Hungarian, and French forces. After the armistice Italy took possession of part of the land but was subsequently pushed out of Valona. In 1920 Albania sneaked into the League of Nations, despite the desire of Greece and Yugoslavia to partition her.³

Early in 1920 a temporary regency council of notables was elected; the inevitable struggle for control ensued. In the fall a new star of Albanian politics appeared on the political horizon when Ahmet Bey Zog led his tribesmen from Mati against the invading Serbs. In November 1921 the Great Powers once more affirmed the independence of Albania.

THE AVARICE OF NATURE

Albania's is probably the most defective system of communications in Europe. There are no harbors of importance. Most agricultural areas are located in minor coastal plains, lake sur-

² Mehmed Bey Konitza, "The Albanian Question," *International Conciliation* (May 1919), No. 138, is a comprehensive review of Albanian history. Cf. also C. H. Chekrezi, *Albania Past and Present* (New York, 1919). J. G. Kersopoulos, "Chronologie albanaise," *Les Balkans*, IV (1937), 161-239, is the best available chronology of the history of Albania, with ample bibliographical references. See also H. Louis, *Albanien* (Stuttgart, 1927); N. B. Jopson, "A Survey of Albanian Studies," *Slavonic Review*, III (1924-1925), 412-18; and Albert Mousset, *L'Albanie devant l'Europe, 1912-1929* (Paris, 1930).

³ The best study of this problem is E. P. Stickney's *Southern Albania or Northern Epirus in European International Affairs* (Stanford University Press, 1926).

roundings, the elevated districts south of Scutari, and the regions of Tirana, Elbasan, Berati, and Delvino. Albanian peasant life has not progressed beyond the rural conditions of medieval Europe. Cultivation methods have remained primitive, although the government has been attempting to introduce modern ways. Moreover, of the total territory of Albania only about 8 percent is arable, and of this but a small part is actually utilized. Under Turkish supremacy no effort was made to develop Albania's resources. Where the Ottomans could enforce their authority, the Albanian had to deliver a third of his crop to his foreign landlord; this system induced the tenants to concentrate exclusively on produce essential to their own existence. Warfare and blood feuds added to the uncertainties of living. Most of the fertile areas of Central Albania are still in the hands of large landowners (beys), while freeholding is largely limited to less desirable regions. The Agrarian Reform Law of April 17, 1930, aimed at remedying this situation. Every bey's land was to be divided into three parts: one third to be left under his free control, provided that he worked it to its full capacity; another third to be made inalienable to prevent him or his successors from selling out and leaving his family destitute; and one third to be expropriated by the government and resold on easy terms to the peasants. It seems, however, . . . that too long a time has elapsed between mooted the reform, passing the law, and putting it into execution. The other day governmental officials went down to Fjer in Myzeqe to expropriate certain land, and found that the owner had so sub-divided it among various members of his numerous family by ante-dated deeds of sale or gift that there was nothing left to expropriate. The same thing has happened near Tirana also. At Elbasan, too, a certain youthful Bey received early information that grazing lands were to be exempted from expropriation, then evicted his tenants at almost a moment's notice, burned their houses, and turned down to grass all the land they had formerly cultivated.⁴

The Albanian village is built more for purposes of protection than economical farm operation, the houses usually huddled together on hillsides to offer easy defense against attacks. Physical maldistribution added to the lack of adequate soil pro-

⁴ *Near East and India*, XLI (1923), 741-42. Quoted by permission of the editor.

ductivity and oppressive tenure conditions have discouraged initiative. The peasant's economic individualism is almost static. Subsistence is wrested from nature with practically no effort at systematic and modern cultivation. Singly, man cannot live from the soil. The family and the village are the economic and social units through which food, clothing, and shelter are provided.⁵

Forests cover vast tracts of land, but their acreage is not known. Nor are the mineral deposits as yet methodically evaluated. Industry is negligible. The adverse balance of trade was barely adjusted by Italian loans and by the remittances of Albanian immigrants in the United States. In fact the Italian grants to Albania were economically indispensable and hence an obvious instrument of Italian diplomacy.⁶ Thanks to them, Albania can now boast of over 1,200 miles of good roads for the country's 2,200 motor cars, some 2,000 modern bridges, the reconstruction of the harbor of Durazzo, the transformation of Tirana into a capital of 30,000 inhabitants, and airplane connections between Scutari, Tirana, Valona, and Kortcha. Italy's Society for the Economic Development of Albania (SVEA) was compared with England's East India Company of the past. In 1925, Italy extended a loan of sixty million gold francs, and in 1931 one of one hundred million. A 45-mile pipeline brought oil from inland Petrolia to the port of Valona for shipment to Italy.

Of a total population of little over one million, the Albanians, with a mixture of Vlach, form 92 percent; 4.7 percent are Greeks, and 3.1 percent represent other nationalities. Thus Albania is the one Balkan country almost free from irksome minority problems. Italians served in the centers as advisers and administrators. As to religion, some 71 percent of the people are Moslems, the aftermath of Turkish rule; about 10 percent, chiefly in the north, are Roman Catholics, while 19 percent, mostly in the south, belong to the Albanian Orthodox Church. Albania is also the only Balkan state in which religion

⁵ See J. S. Roucek, "Economic Conditions in Albania," *Economic Geography*, IX (1933), 256-64; J. Swire, "Albania," *The Near East Year Book, 1931-1932* (London, 1931), pp. 1-110; and E. A. Ackerman, "Albania, A Balkan Switzerland," *Journal of Geography*, XXXVII (1938), 253-62.

⁶ E. Staley, "Italy's Financial Stake in Albania," *Foreign Policy Reports*, IX (1932, No. 7), 80-86; Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Balkan States, I, Economics* (New York, 1936), p. 44.

and nationality are not virtually synonymous. The Albanian does not cling tenaciously to religion, and it forms no obstacle to social fraternization between Moslems and Catholics. With only a few Jews, Albania finally is distinguished among European countries by an absence of anti-Semitism.

TRIBAL MENTALITY

Geographical conditions influenced to a remarkable degree the course of events in Albania. Located in a strategic stronghold, the country withstood the onslaughts of the Christian and Turkish Empires. The conflicts of Europe's imperialist policies still affect the country. Despite continued foreign aggression, however, the Albanians in their mountain retreats have been able to preserve for two thousand years their cultural heritage, their customs, their institutions, and their language.⁷ Isolation is reflected in the narrow self-sufficiency and the nonco-operative spirit of Albanian tribalism. Blood feuds have continued, although a resolute war was waged against this evil by energetic King Zog, who seemed determined to place his country on a new foundation.

The Albanians are divided into two cohesive groups of tribes, the Ghegs of the north and the Tosks of the south, separated by the river Shkumbini—though both, as Albanians, call themselves "Shkupetars" and their land "Shkupenia" or "Shkuperia," the former being the Gheg, the latter the Tosk form. The Ghegs, living in greater isolation, are usually described as fierce, superstitious, and predatory, but also as brave, simple, and faithful; they are renowned as soldiers and rebels. The Tosks, on the other hand, broadened by intercourse with the Greeks and Vlachs, have turned to commercial and agricultural occupations, in contrast to the pastoral pursuits of the Ghegs. Thus the Gheg is more morose, stern, and haughty; the Tosk is more talkative, lively, and affable. Natural antipathy still exists between these two main groups, and the Ghegs look down from their mountain fastnesses with distrust and contempt for the Tosks, whose valleys have been flushed by invasion. The Tosks, in turn, take pride in education, and view with scorn the igno-

⁷ M. E. Durham, *Some Tribal Origins, Law, and Customs of the Balkans* (London, 1928), is the best study, with a good bibliography.

rance of the Ghegs. The language has many dialects, which do not, however, obstruct mutual understanding. But the differences in culture patterns are more than obvious.

Hostile to any foreign overlord, the Albanians developed their defense technique by forming half-wild bands in the least accessible parts of their country. Brigandage became an honorable profession, glorified in legends, ballads, and folklore. The rifle became the Albanian's most reliable friend. Violence still dominates Albanian politics—a factor well understood by the central authority in Tirana.

THE YOKE OF NATIONHOOD

This background has deeply affected the Albanian notions of nationalism and statehood. An essentially tribal society has developed its peculiar organization in which kinship and family occupy the most prominent place in the determination of the social relations between individuals within the tribe and with other tribal groups. The Albanian brand of nationalism can be interpreted as the personal loyalty of a tribesman to his chief. Its substance is derived from a central theme—warfare, the prowess of warriors and their leaders, the victories and defeats of the clans. The idea of an organized state as known to Western peoples, on the other hand, is foreign to the Albanian. He does not want the state to interfere in his simple and segregated tribal life, especially if it is dominated by an alien. In fact, to him the state represents at best an ever-present nuisance. He looks at taxes as a form of outrageous robbery; and conscription, subjecting him to drillmasters, is highly unpopular. In Albania the process of state building and nation making confronts difficulties not encountered elsewhere to the same extent.

The relations of the Albanian tribesmen to the central authority are problematical. Chieftains gladly visit Tirana in order to accept a pension or an honorific title, but for their men contacts with the government were limited to the tax collector or the gendarme. There were nearly four hundred of Zog's gendarmerie posts, so located as to control the surrounding areas—if possible, with the assistance of the tribal chief. No revenue official dared to make his rounds in rural areas without adequate escort. The appearance of government agents was universally

taken as an ominous sign, and often it signaled the imminent punishment of a tribe member who may have done nothing wrong according to the rules of his clan. If he did take the law into his own hands, what of it? In the day of the Turk the legal machinery worked slowly, if at all—unless for the benefit of the Turkish magistrates. Evasion of justice was relatively easy. To preserve his share the Albanian tribesman learned to handle justice in his own way, punishing offenders according to the code of the mountains. The code defied repeal. Thus one December 19, 1932,

. . . . Kapidan Mark Gjomarkaj, one of the newly elected deputies for Shkodra, was murdered in the Adjutant's room of the King's Palace at Tirana by Geg Markagega, a fellow-Mirdite It seems to be a blood-feud of seventy years standing.⁸

It is in the towns that the Law of Lek was replaced by the law of Zog; in the northern highlands it died hard.⁹

Yet, the Law of Lek is losing ground, and Albanians themselves are causing the transformation. Ever since the establishment of Albanian independence, an important influence on the traditional social attitudes has been exercised by returning American immigrants. The prosperous have built "lavish" homes, with all the latest improvements, including electricity, steam heat, and modern plumbing facilities. The repatriates are settled mainly in Central and South Albania. To the American Albanians goes also the credit for financing Albania's delegation to the first Paris Peace Conference. The return of the natives, however, was no unmixed blessing. Having enjoyed civil liberties in the United States, a sizable fraction has held to these foreign conceptions. Restiveness among this element, imbued with the cultural and political experience of the New

⁸ *Near East and India*, XLII (1933), 62. Quoted by permission of the editor.

⁹ Contrary to the popular impression, the blood feuds were not lawless, nor based on personal strife or hate. They were a form of capital punishment, executed according to strict rules. Murder started a blood feud; canons of vengeance had to be faithfully observed. The Law of Lek, as administered by a council of clan elders, represents one of the oldest forms of jury trial. The relevant materials are now being collected for publication by the Franciscans of Shkodra. For details see Swire, "Albania," *The Near East Year Book*, 1931-32, p. 14; R. W. Lane, *Peaks of Shala* (New York, 1923), p. 30.

World, expressed itself in 1924 in a revolt against Zog engineered by Fan Noli, a graduate of Harvard, and Bishop of the Christian Albanian Church in Boston.¹⁰

NEW VERSUS OLD

Until very recently, the beys, Albania's landed gentry, were accustomed to control the affairs of the country as in the Middle Ages, when assemblies were exclusively composed of the feudal lords. The masses are still willing to tolerate bey governance, though they are less so in the districts of Kortcha and Argyrokastro, where repatriates are especially active. Short of foreign invasion, few national issues incite the illiterate populace. Tribal clashes give rise to sporadic disturbances and revolts; but these pose no issues to assume national proportions. The stillborn revolution of May 1937, for instance, lasted only forty-eight hours.

The revolt was started by Etem Toto, who was until eight months ago Minister of the Interior. He began his career as a police officer, worked his way up through the police service to the rank of prefect of a district, and then became Minister. . . . He was thrown out of office after the exposing of a plan he was working out to hold new elections which he would so arrange as to make himself all powerful in the new Parliament. His assistants were his brother, Ismet Toto, a captain of the Gendarmerie and an ex-captain of the Army. Besides at most a few 100 supporters from his own native district, he had some 50 gendarmes, and he hoped for the support of several hundred prisoners he set free from the prisons of the places he captured.

He based his hope on the fact that there is much dissatisfaction in Southern Albania, for three reasons. (1) The conservative Moslem elements of the south are strongly against the reforms of Zog, and especially the obligatory unveiling of their womenfolk. (2) For the development of oil concessions and other purposes, a considerable part of the land in this district, already insufficient for the needs of its population, has been let to Italians. (3) This district is the very centre of the strongest Albanian nationalist . . . feeling. It has had to fight constantly for independence against Greeks,

¹⁰ See J. S. Roucek, "Albanian Americans," in F. J. Brown and J. S. Roucek, *One America* (New York, 1945), pp. 233-42; and "Characteristics of Albanian Politics," *Social Science*, X (1935), 71-79.

Serbs, Austrians and Italians. It was these people who in 1921 drove the Italians into the sea of Valona.

The revolt was easily liquidated.¹¹

Under prevalent conditions, the state can exist only because of the domination exercised by entrenched individuals, ready to use arms and to face personal dangers. Prestige is enhanced by family fame and military record. The political programs are built around those who propound them—and with whom they also fail. Save for reasons of personal attachment, political groupings remain in flux. Membership is changed without much scruple.

There are few educated Albanians, but nearly all of them are in politics. As Albania can fully absorb her intelligentsia, the contest for political spoils has not been acute. But the administration was by no means perfect. Although the iron fist of Zog replaced the confusion of endless feuds, Albanian officialdom remained a replica of the wide-pocketed Turkish administration. In 1932 an audit revealed graft and theft at Tirana on such a scale as to warrant official confirmation—unusual indeed in Balkan annals.

ZOG—MASTER POLITICIAN

Before Zog reached the peak of his cometlike rise to absolute command, Albanian politics had slowly deteriorated from the national fervor of 1919–1920 to personal squabbles adorned with Western verbiage. As Zog's leadership asserted itself, the issues crystallized around his personality.

Dapper, ambitious, wary-eyed, Ahmet Bey *Zog I*, *Mbreti Sqiptarvet* ("Bird the First, King of All the Sons of the Eagle"), the quiet-mannered and pomp-loving chieftain of the Mati tribe—who fell in love with a photograph and in 1938 married the unwitting conqueress of his heart, a Hungarian Countess with Virginian blood—was born in 1895, a son of the most powerful Moslem clan in North Albania. Educated at a military academy, he distinguished himself during World War I in a series of amazing feats of daring in the Austrian army. When it was discovered that he had vague intentions of conspiring with the Bulgarians to re-establish Albanian independ-

¹¹ *Great Britain and the East*, XLVIII (1937), 767. Quoted by permission of the editor.

ence, he was treacherously interned in Vienna. After the armistice, Zog returned to his native land.¹² Though only in his twenties, he was instrumental in driving an Italian army of occupation out of Valona, halting another Yugoslav invasion, crushing numerous tribal insurrections, and securing the recognition of Albania's independence by the Great Powers.

By 1920 he was minister of the interior and commander in chief of the army; two years later he had become prime minister. In 1924 the first attempt was made on his life; soon afterward, still suffering from his wounds, he fled the country. Mustering an expedition with Yugoslav help, he returned as a rebel within six months and overthrew Fan Noli, who later went back to Boston; both eventually came to terms, and for a number of years Noli received financial aid from his former archfoe. Zog rose to the presidency on January 31, 1925; on September 1, 1928, he made himself king—the only European ruler who established his monarchy in the postwar period.

After 1925 the King had the upper hand in his country.¹³ Every once in a while there was a local flareup, swiftly suppressed (1932, 1935, and 1937). During the same period, in 1930, a second effort was made to eliminate him, this time in Vienna. But most of his opponents slowly resigned themselves to his domination; others were pushed off the stage by gentle or violent means. Lomis Gourakuchi, for example, was assassinated in a Bari café—his assassin was speedily acquitted. Few of Zog's public critics have found it wise to live in the kingdom. Their ablest representative, however, Fan Noli, professed full reconciliation in 1938, when visited in Boston by the King's sisters and Faik Konitza, then head of the Albanian legation to the United States.¹⁴ A number of former opponents—such

¹² Lane, *op. cit.*, pp. 301 ff., gives a good description of Zog's activity during one of Albania's revolutions.

¹³ For the composition of various cabinets see Kersopoulos, *op. cit.*, pp. 203–39; *The Near East Year Book, 1931–32*, pp. xix, 20–29; and J. Swire, *The Rise of a Kingdom* (New York, 1930), *passim*.

¹⁴ Both brothers, Mehmed Bey Konitza and Faik Konitza, were outstanding personalities in modern Albanian history. To Faik Bey Konitza the Albanian nation owes the expurgation of foreign words from the Albanian language and its reconstruction. In 1908 he came to America and formed the Pan-American Federation *Vatra* (Hearth) in collaboration with Fan Noli. Interned in Vienna with Zog during the World War, Konitza at first offered opposition during Zog's climb to power. In 1926, while the head of *Vatra*, Konitza was appointed Albanian minister to Washington.

notables as Sotir Peci, Suleiman Delvina, Bescheb Kikovitza, and Dr. Michael Turtuli—took advantage of the political amnesty of September 1927 and returned to Albania to fill government posts. Under Zog's leadership the emerging *bourgeoisie*, though divided among itself into the older and younger generations, made inroads into the political domain of the landowning beys.

Under Zog, Albania was slipping into a modern gown. A civil code, modeled upon that of France, abolished polygamy and instituted state control over education, marriage, and divorce. A penal code, based on the Italian example, took the place of the Ottoman law. National consciousness was promoted by the use of a common language in which all school-books, newspapers, and literary works were printed, superseding local dialects. Another national aim was attained by the official recognition of the native Christian Albanian Church, which uses Albanian language and ritual. The agrarian reform laid the foundation for the creation of a class of peasant proprietors attached to national authority. "Law and order" received some meaning in the hands of an efficient gendarmerie organized by British advisers. In his foreign policies, the King was fond of hinting at Albania's independence of Italy—to show that he was no mere puppet in Mussolini's hands.

"THE LAW OF ZOG"

In order to carry out his aims, Zog gravitated naturally toward the organization and methods of a closely knit military system. Albania was a one-man country—and Zog was the man.¹⁵ His lieutenants and supporters were placed in a strictly hierarchical order. At the bottom was the electorate, theoretically sovereign, in practice carrying out the wishes of the commander. The elections were conducted with the "aid" of the army and the country's 3,000 gendarmes. As military precepts require, unconditional obedience was demanded; open criticism or any sign of disloyalty to the King was "treason," punished

¹⁵ According to J. I. B. McCulloch, *Drums in the Balkan Night* (New York, 1936), p. 178, and J. Swire, *King Zog's Albania* (New York, 1937), p. 207, the power behind the throne was Abdul Rahman, nicknamed *Crossi* ("The Bald One"), foster father of Zog and administrator of his estates, who is completely illiterate.

according to the standards of the military profession—by execution. The executions were carried out without undue formality. Preparations for an execution were made by the gendarmerie. The procurator read the offense, sentence, and the royal decree to the condemned man. Death was administered by an executioner, most often a gypsy. The body remained until the next morning.

The elections were conducted in a roundabout fashion—appropriate to the illiterate character of the mass of voters. Lists of all men over twenty-one, save those serving their term in the army, were posted in the electoral districts into which each prefecture is divided; the districts contain from 500 to 1,500 souls. At fixed dates the voters cast their ballots for local figures of prominence and standing who, if they polled at least 250 votes, in turn voted for the parliamentary deputies from their prefecture. One deputy was elected for every 15,000 inhabitants. In practice, "most of the country people vote only because the local gendarmes have ordered them to go and do so."¹⁶

The parliamentary elections held in Albania on January 31, 1937, ended in a sweeping victory for the government, which succeeded in winning one hundred percent of the seats. The youngest of the Balkan states, having spent its infancy amid falling democracies and diverse experiments in corporate and other forms of dictatorial government, has evolved a system which conserves all the names of democracy—parliamentary elections, candidates, voters—but which has excluded all chance that opposition candidates may be elected. One of the first results of such a system is the complete apathy of the people. In the election of voters, for each district elects a number of representatives who go to vote in the name of the whole district, there were districts in which only eighteen men out of 187 cast their votes. The fifty-eight candidates elected are mostly men who have been deputies before, and who belong to the parties supporting the government in practically the same proportion as those who made up the last Parliament.¹⁷

The populace, of course, did not look upon Parliament as an instrument of government. For them, a deputy was a big man to whom the king granted a large salary, and who in turn

¹⁶ *Near East and India*, XLIII (1932), 900.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, XLVIII (1937), 202. Quoted by permission of the editor.

granted small salaries to smaller men for keeping the peace. Nor was it a secret to them that the deputies voted only as they were told to. Whatever Parliament did, whether right or wrong, was therefore set down to the credit or discredit of the king. The same reasoning was applied to the administration. When a local official was oppressive, it was to the King, not to Parliament, that appeals for redress were submitted.

Loyalty to the king was fostered, with emphasis on ranking troublemakers and tribal leaders, by a system of "pensions" and "salaries" connected with the granting of military titles. The usual procedure was that the beneficiaries were required to present themselves at Tirana once a year to pledge their *besa*. The important figures were received by the king. Then they returned home with their commissions and cash.

THE SYMBOLISM OF REFINEMENT

Albania had the distinction of being the Balkan country where there was little or no pretense at constitutional monarchy, although due lip service was paid to the constitution. The constitution of March 7, 1925, establishing the republic was Albania's third organic law.¹⁸ When Zog decided to have himself proclaimed king, another constitution, dated December 1, 1928, was put in force. It was a verbose document of 234 articles.¹⁹

According to its basic law, the Kingdom of Albania was a democratic, constitutional, and hereditary monarchy. There was no state religion; all creeds were equal before the law. All power was derived from the nation, and vested in the king and a unicameral parliament. Both were authorized to initiate laws. The authentic interpretation of the laws pertained to the legislative power (Art. 10); in practice it was reserved for the king. The traditional division of the government into the legisla-

¹⁸ French excerpts can be found in J. Delpech and J. Laferrière, *Les constitutions modernes*, I (4th ed., Paris, 1928), 39-47; for brief comments, see E. B. Christie, "The New Albanian Constitution," *American Political Science Review*, XX (1926), 120-23.

¹⁹ French text: Delpech and Laferrière, *op. cit.*, III (4th ed., Paris, 1931), 7-29. In 1933 Articles 206 and 297 were amended, nationalizing all schools. For the background of these measures in the relations between Tirana and Rome see J. S. Roucek, "Recent Albanian Nationalistic Educational Policy," *School and Society*, XXXVIII (1933), 467-68. See also A. Giannini, "La costituzione dell'Albania," *Europa Orientale*, X (1930), 297-321.

tive, executive, and judicial branches had been adopted. The chamber of deputies was elected every four years. The deputies received an annual stipend of 8,400 francs—a very comfortable income in Albania. Moreover, they could not be imprisoned for their debts (Art. 25). The king was the highest authority of the state, inviolable and absolute; he selected the prime minister, who appointed his cabinet, consisting of six ministers (interior, finance, national economy, public works, education, and foreign affairs). Except for measures taken by the king as the commander-in-chief, his acts must be countersigned by the premier and the competent minister. The king could veto laws and had “the right to make regulations for the execution of laws” (Art. 78). Furthermore, he had the right to suspend legal procedure for political crimes (Art. 79), and could proclaim war in case of aggression.

The judicial system was headed by the High Court of Cassation (*diktim*). The High State Tribunal, constituted in case of need by royal decree, passed judgment on ministers, judges of the *diktim*, members of the Council of State as well as the Court of Accounts, and the General Procurator. The Council of State drafted legal codes, prepared and examined all bills, and gave its views on treaties and concessions.

The king headed the military service, compulsory for all Albanians. The gendarmerie formed a branch of the armed forces. Civil rights were guaranteed to all Albanians. Censorship could not be imposed, except in times of war, mobilization, or national emergency. “The meetings held in the open air, which could threaten public peace, can be prohibited” (Art. 199). Primary education was obligatory, and was given free in all schools.²⁰ Revision of the constitution was complicated, and certain articles, concerning mainly the form of the state and the powers of the king, could not be revised (Art. 225).

Albania's fundamental law rested on the surviving monarchic constitutions of Western Europe, and to some extent on the former Bulgarian and Greek constitutions. As the Albanian language lacks appropriate legal terminology, French terms were added in several cases. An uninhibited document, the Albanian constitution expressed almost completely the political

²⁰ See J. S. Roucek, “The Albanian Educational Progress,” *School and Society*, XXXVII (1933), 149–51.

practices of the country. It differed in this respect from all those Balkan constitutions which gloried in unreal democratic achievement until tossed into the wastebasket.

Local government was the rule of the few, ornately constructed.²¹ In May 1929 the country was divided into 189 communes, each with its president, council, and secretary. The prefect was the highest regional official, responsible to the ministry of the interior. Subprefects held sway over the commune governments. The prefect was assisted in his duties by an administrative council, headed by the prefect. The members were: the first secretary of the prefecture and its director of finance, senior engineer, and senior agricultural official; the regional educational officer; the gendarmerie commandant; and four members elected by the prefecture voters. Similarly, administrative councils existed for the subprefectures. The administrative councils dealt with matters such as appeals against administrative decisions, the arrangement of public sales, and the letting of contracts.

A commune had at least 2,500 inhabitants; the largest hamlet in the commune was the seat of government. The president of the commune council was appointed by royal decree, its secretary by the minister of the interior, with the approval of the prime minister. Councils were elected every four years; the voters had to be over eighteen. Ten days before the election, a list of those qualified to vote was posted. The voter wrote the name of his candidate on a slip—or asked a friend to write on his behalf.

The mayors of Tirana and of other municipalities were appointed by the cabinet. So was the executive committee in Tirana. Elsewhere the executive committee was elected by the municipal assembly; it was composed of twenty-four members—six businessmen, six teachers, doctors, or other professional men, and twelve additional citizens who had to be able to read and write. Needless to say, the entire attractive machinery was dedicated to the "Law of Zog."

In his curious world, "Bird the First" did the work which Providence had assigned to him—with zest, urbanity, and serenity, combined with well-timed ruthlessness. His personal qualities stood him in good stead in a realm where the quickest

²¹ See *The Near East Year Book, 1931-32*, pp. 1-110.

trigger reigns over the quick trigger—until Italy, stirred by Hitler's Prague adventure, grabbed the kingdom in April 1939.

ZOG'S DEPARTURE AND WORLD WAR II

What shocked American women particularly about Italy's conquest of Albania was the fact that pretty Queen Geraldine had borne a son two days before. This Hungarian daughter of an American mother was obliged to rise from her bed and flee over perilous mountain roads to Greece; it nearly cost her her life.

The exact sequence of events leading to the Italian invasion on April 7, 1939, still remains somewhat obscure, but it appears that Zog had objected to the demands further increasing Italy's hold on his country. The occupation was virtually completed within a few days. On April 14 it was announced that Rome had accepted, on behalf of King Victor Emmanuel III, the Albanian Crown, offered by an Albanian Constituent Assembly on April 12. In June a new constitution vested legislative and executive power in Italy's king, with the assistance of a Supreme Fascist Corporative Council; defense and foreign representation were transferred to Italian control.²² Meanwhile, the exiled King Zog was on the way to Norway in his odyssey around the non-Fascist periphery of Europe to avoid the Rome-Berlin Axis; he had saved a bust of Napoleon and a rumored \$4,000,000 in treasure.

Soon after the occupation, Italy's army started building roads to the borders of Greece and Yugoslavia. Rome's propaganda hurled manufactured accusations at Athens concerning the "oppression" of Albanian nationals in the Greek province of Epirus. At 3:00 A.M. on October 28, Italy sent Greece an ultimatum—and Mussolini's armies began marching three hours later by way of Albania. But the Italian advance was soon checked at all points; after five weeks' fighting, the campaign was stalled entirely on Albanian territory. Hitler was forced to come to the aid of his Axis partner in April 1941. After the crushing of Greece, Italy extended the frontiers of Albania by annexing a considerable area of southern Yugo-

²² See R. M. W. Kempner, "The New Constitution of Albania: A Model Constitution for European Vassal States," *Tulane Law Review*, XV (1941), 430-34.

slavia with a large Albanian population; a large part of Greek Epirus was also administered from Tirana (although not formally incorporated into Albania).

The Italians had, however, their persistent troubles with the Albanians. Shevket Verlaci headed the first quisling government (April 1939 to December 1941), and was followed by others. Mussolini had promised the tribes something resembling autonomy and the peasants the long-sought agrarian reform. But he failed to keep his pledges. True, there was some expropriation of land, but it was for the benefit of Count Ciano, Mussolini's son-in-law, and Gacommoni, governor of Albania and husband of the daughter of Cabellero, the Italian general; both also appropriated valuable timber stands and expropriated the Albanian oil properties in the south. Albania's upper crust, the feudal beys, were silenced and made pliable by means of arrests and threats.

While national sentiment was feeble before the occupation, due to the lack of that strong middle class which elsewhere had developed a strong political consciousness—as shown by the fact that the tribes did not lift a hand when the Italians occupied the country (and the largest tribe in the east, the Miridites, actually disarmed Zog's retreating troops)—the situation changed radically under Italy's rule. The beys, deprived of political power, were resentful; many of their sons were fighting by 1942 in the ranks of partisans. For the first time in Albania's recent history, there was a situation in which all sections of the population had a stake in the country's independence. Nationalism—a revolutionary nationalism—was rising. The reports of the struggles of Yugoslavia's guerrillas in the neighboring Montenegro sounded across Albania's borders like a tocsin of freedom. This even inspired a degree of cooperation between the Albanian rebels and the Yugoslav Chetniks—a remarkable fact when one takes into account the old and rankling Serb-Albanian conflicts, eagerly exploited by Italian propaganda.

In fact, the resistance movement sprang up almost the day after the invasion on Good Friday 1939. After Russia's entry into the war in 1941, an illegal Communist party was formed. In September 1942 a secret meeting was held at Peza, a small village not very far from Tirana, which laid the foundations

of the Movement of National Liberation; it eventually came under the sway of the radical wing, headed by Communists.²⁸ When the Nazis took over Albania's administration from the resentful Italians, a considerable section of the nationalists believed Nazi promises of Albania's self-determination—partly because they were ready to collaborate in order to eliminate Communist influence. Then followed a period of struggles between the National Front and the National Liberation Movement (LNC). The split helped the Germans to enroll a certain number of people in the armed forces which were used to fight the Albanian partisans. Only Allied intervention succeeded in curbing possible civil war.

Between June 3 and June 20, 1944, the Nazis opened a full-scale offensive against the various partisans; the guerrillas vanished, however, into the hills and the German drive failed. While fighting was in progress, elections were held for a national congress which met and nominated an anti-Fascist committee to administer all territory liberated from the Germans under Enver Hoxha as president and Muslin Peza as vice-president. In December 1944, to the accompaniment of a twenty-one-gun salute and dancing and singing in the streets, Hoxha's government entered the liberated capital Tirana, on the thirty-second anniversary of Albanian independence.

THE LAW OF HOXHA

Hoxha's 30,000 leathery Partisans swiftly took over their mountainous, Vermont-sized country. On November 10, 1945, the Big Three recognized his cabinet as the provisional government, and the constitutional convention election in December brought the expected results. Hoxha's 82 candidates were certain to overwhelm the 20 venturesome men who had turned up in opposition, so he permitted "free and secret balloting," under a system rude but effective. Each voter was given a rubber ball the size of a marble, instructed to place his hands, fists closed, in all the little boxes for the government candidates and then in the one big box for the opposition. Then

²⁸ T. Zavalani, *Albania Under Nazi Oppression* (London, 1943), is the best available pro-partisan account of this period; see also: Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), pp. 99-107.

he raised his hands, palms open, to show that in one of the boxes he had dropped the rubber ball. The voters approved the rule of the thirty-seven-year-old leader, Hoxha, who had learned French as an Albanian diplomat in Belgium, had run a flower shop to mask his activities against King Zog, and had led the guerrillas against the Italians and Germans. King Zog was dethroned on January 11, 1946, and the People's Republic was proclaimed.

Born at Argyrokastron, birthplace of Albania's independence and scene of Greece's famed stand against the Italian invasion in 1940, Hoxha became professor of French before taking to politics and war. In his first published interview, he went on record as favoring democracy for Albania and a "close alliance" with Tito's Yugoslavia, to which Albania was now bound by "ties of blood."

In fact Yugoslavia was the first state to send a representative to Tirana, and Hoxha ceded to Tito, without pressure, the district of Kosovo which in 1941 was allotted by Mussolini to Albania, and which has an Albanian population of at least 70 percent. For Hoxha's Albania had become a strong pillar in the Soviet combination of power, and the government was patterned along the pro-Communist, pro-Russian lines evolved in the Balkan Partisan movements. In 1947 it was an open, established Left-wing dictatorship, with all secret-police trap-pings, and it engaged in the ruthless elimination of opposition elements. In the northern Roman Catholic districts around Scutari, Catholics were being abused, and widespread arrests were reported; religious schools closed, and numerous nuns and priests were expelled from the country. Antireligious and, above all, anti-Catholic propaganda was carried on along Soviet and Yugoslav lines, while members of the Greek minority were being evicted from their homes, despite constitutional guaranties of equal rights for minorities. The Socialist and Liberal opposition, gathered around former guerrilla groups, was crushed.

Economically, Hoxha was gradually establishing authoritarian state socialism, with co-operative stores strongly encouraged and the nationalization of the limited Albanian industry and business enterprises continuing. The title of "comrade" was used in formal speeches, and deputies addressed one another

as "Comrade Assemblist." The Albanian-Yugoslav Treaty, signed on November 27, 1946, made Albania practically but another province of Yugoslavia, drawing her closer into the Russian family and turning her away from the West, where she had formerly sought loans and other economic assistance that she must have. The deal also tightened Tito's grasp on one of the best oil deposits in Europe—the Devoli field in Albania, which produced 1,500,000 barrels of oil in 1940. It has an estimated reserve of 25,000,000 barrels. A customs union is to abolish the economic frontier between the two countries and combine them into one customs area. Monetary systems of the two states are to be co-ordinated by equalizing the value of their currencies; this is just short of establishing a single monetary system.

Politically, the pact was the most concrete step yet to appear, by the turn of 1947, in the development of closer relations between Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria that was going on with the encouragement of Moscow.

As a puppet state of Russia, Albania was refused admission to the United Nations at the instigation of the United States, with Great Britain and Greece leading the opposition. The United States, which refused to grant full recognition to the new Albanian republic, voiced misgivings over Albania's intentions toward honoring her prewar treaties. London was alarmed over the fortifying of the Island of Saseno, just off the Albanian coast, as well as the Bay of Valona and the port of Durazzo. Of Albania's 1945–1946 budget, totaling 1,016,600,000 Albanian francs, 600,000,000 were appropriated for military expenditures (with the total Albanian currency circulation at 320,000,000 francs).

Particularly difficult was the problem presented by Hoxha's role assigned to him by Russia in regard to Greece. In 1946 the Russian military engineers were building a road from Kukus, a town northeast of Scutari on the Yugoslav border, to Peshkopeja as a link with the already existing road leading to Koritza, on the Greek border, through Elbasan and Pogradetz. The strategic value of this road becomes obvious when it is recalled that troops could formerly move only along the coastal road that leads from Tirana to Scutari and then veers north-eastward to the Yugoslav border. With the new road troops

coming from Yugoslavia could more speedily reach the Greek frontier in an almost straight line and without using the coastal road, which would be exposed to naval bombardment.

In the background was the Russian scheme of promoting, for Soviet purposes, a Balkan league under Marshal Tito—one that would cover all Eastern Europe from the Danube Valley to the Mediterranean—and the opposition of Greece, supported by Great Britain as well as the United States, to this Pan-Balkan scheme. In the struggle to achieve it, Balkan minorities inside Greece were useful weapons to Tito and his Russian mentors; in the struggle to prevent it, Greek minorities inside Albania were useful to the royalist leaders of Greek nationalism. Thus, Greek claims to the province of Northern Epirus²⁴ were designed to weaken the Albanian government, headed by Hoxha.

Under Hoxha, in 1947, the "People's Republic of Albania" was modeling itself faithfully along Soviet designs.

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²⁴ See C.H.G., "Greek Claims in Southern Albania," *The World Today*, Vol. II (October 1946), No. 10 (new series), pp. 488-94.

VI

MACEDONIANS

WHILE ACCEPTING the nation-state ideologies of Western Europe, the Balkans have been unable to absorb the idea of the state's monopoly of force. Recourse to violence in the struggle of underground organizations for a share of political power has been developed into a technique supplementing the ordinary constitutional processes. The Balkans are best known to the world for the ruthlessness of their secret societies. The assassination of Archduke Ferdinand at Sarajevo in 1914 was laid by Austria to a Serbian revolutionary organization. The international scope of secret society activities is typified by the well-planned murder of King Alexander and Barthou at Marseilles in 1934. The assassin, Georghieff, was a Macedonian "patriot," a member of the terrorist IMRO which had superimposed its own law upon the internal and international politics of the Balkans for more than forty years.

THE HABITAT OF VIOLENCE

The fateful importance of Macedonia is indicated by her location in the very heart of the Balkans; whoever dominates the Vardar Valley is master of the Peninsula. The possession of Macedonia has become the common objective of the nationalist and strategic ambitions of three Balkan powers—Bulgaria, Yugoslavia (formerly Serbia), and Greece. Each has tried to impose her own cultural pattern on the inhabitants of the Vardar Valley and its surrounding regions. They have been exposed to a constant barrage of propaganda intended to persuade them to recognize themselves as Bulgars or Serbs or Greeks. Jurisdiction over the territory has been shifting back and forth as one or the other claimant won a round in the intricate contest for a European balance of power. Although a

perennial object of contention, Macedonia has remained a vaguely defined area; she has never formed a racial, linguistic, or even political and administrative unit. The fact is that Macedonia has been a political problem rather than a geographical entity. The physical extent of this problem is adequately indicated by drawing on the Balkan map a semicircle with a radius of about 150 miles around the port of Salonica as a center.¹

After the collapse of Roman hegemony, Macedonia formed a part of the Eastern (Byzantine) Empire. The assault of the Southern Slavs ended in conquest. The Bulgarians dominated Macedonia from about 860 to 1018 and again for some time in the thirteenth century. The Serbs made her a part of their realm from about 1260 down to the Turkish deluge in 1389. Instead of attempting nationalization, the Ottomans established in Constantinople a Patriarchate for the Balkan Christians which, being dominated by the Greeks, became eventually an active agent for the expansion of Greek nationalism into Macedonia and other parts of the Peninsula. The Bulgarians, on the other hand, have never forgotten that their country as created by the Treaty of San Stefano included not only West Thrace but also Macedonia, although they had to return her to Turkey by the decision of the Congress of Berlin. From that time on the chief goal of Sofia's foreign policy was Macedonia. Bulgarian troublemakers immediately went to work. But now the Turks, unwilling to allow Bulgaria a lone hand, started to play off the Christians against one another.

The Greeks organized their combatant bands openly and hardly cared to deny that many were under Greek officers. These *Ethnikê Etaireia* imitated the brutalities of the Bulgarian bands.² The Greek clergy stimulated further mutual hostility

¹ The literature on Macedonia is enormous, and most of it is sharply partisan. For the Bulgarian side of the question see G. Bazhdaroff, *The Macedonian Question Yesterday and Today*, translated by R. H. Markham (Sofia, 1926). Bulgaria, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *The Bulgarian Question and the Balkan States* (Sofia, 1919), contains excellent maps and numerous quotations of authorities. One of the most sober accounts of the internal and international aspects of the problem is offered in *The European Economic and Political Survey*, IV (1928), 149-64. Jacques Ancel, *La Macédoine* (Paris, 1931), is one of the best surveys with a bibliography. See also G. Weigand, *Ethnographie von Makedonien* (Leipzig, 1924); L. Schultze-Jena, *Makedonien* (Jena, 1927); and A. F. Krainikowsky, *La question de la Macédoine et la diplomatie européenne* (Paris, 1938).

² J. Mavrogordato, *Modern Greece* (New York, 1931), p. 78.

between the followers of the Greek Patriarchate and the Bulgarian Exarchate, the latter granted by the Porte under Russian pressure in 1870.³ The Serbs also awoke to the danger of Bulgarian proselytism and soon were conducting a campaign of their own, with armed bands in the field. Macedonian uprisings were put down ruthlessly by the Turks. When, in 1902, however, a series of bomb outrages at Salonica set off Turkish atrocities, the Great Powers intervened and delegated Austria and Russia to solve the problem. Macedonia was placed in charge of an international police force, none too effective in the inaccessible mountains. The arrangement was a complete failure because it did not settle any claims of the rival aspirants. Anarchy continued to hold sway.

In the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 Macedonia became the bone of contention among all Balkan states touching on her ill-defined borders. After defeating Turkey, the allies—Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria—promptly quarreled over the division of Macedonia, each claiming the major portion on the basis of historic rights and ethnography, a dispute the more acrimonious because of the mixed character of the population. Though humbled, Bulgaria did not give up her hopes. Conflicting propagandas grew more irate each year.

MACEDONIAN MEDLEY

Racially, Macedonia consists of a medley of peoples. The majority are Southern Slavs. They belong to the Orthodox Church. The liturgical books are the same in Macedonia, Serbia, and Bulgaria. The ritual is everywhere conducted in ecclesiastical Old Slavonic, according to an ancient tradition. Neither Bulgarian nor Serbian has ever been the language of this church. Yet the Bulgarians maintain that the participation of the Macedonians in the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate (independent Bulgarian church) was fundamentally a nationalist process; religious traditions and dogma played only a small part; its aim had been a liberation from the political, intellectual, and cultural subjection to the Greek clergy. The Serbs, on the other hand, propound the thesis that this movement was

³ Central Committee of the Union of the Macedonian Political Organizations of the United States of America and Canada, *Pro Macedonia, The Macedonian Slavs, Their National Character and Struggles* (Indianapolis, 1927), p. 1.

concerned only with the use of the Slavonic language in the church and the separation of the Orthodox worshipers from the Greek Patriarch.

To make matters more confusing, the differences between literary Serbian and Bulgarian, although definite, are not considerable, while the Macedonian dialects are neither one nor the other. With an even distribution of the odds, Serbs, therefore, class Macedonians as "Old Serbs" or "South Serbs"; again, no one will ever convince Sofia that the Macedonians are not truly Bulgarian. The Greeks put in their bid by regarding the Macedonians in their territory as "Slavophone" (Slav-speaking) Greeks.⁴ Moreover, before World War I at least, the Slav majority was intertwined with Greeks, Turks, Arnauts, Kutso-Vlachs, Spanish Jews, and Gypsies.

The Second Balkan War left to Bulgaria only a small portion of the disputed area, including Strumitsa and a few districts farther to the north. During World War I, Bulgaria cast her lot with the Central Powers and occupied the whole region. But Sofia paid dearly by suffering a complete reversion, including the loss of the Strumitsa salient and her northern share. The Treaty of Neuilly awarded to Greece and Yugoslavia sovereignty over practically the whole of Macedonia, rechristened "South Serbia" and "North Greece," respectively. Bulgaria retained only the Petritch district. Over 200,000 refugees from Greek and Serbian Macedonia flocked across the border. Their constant pressure for the repatriation of "Bulgaria irredenta," coupled with the murderous brigandage of the IMRO, was to determine the trend of Sofia's foreign policy for years to come. It nearly led to a war between Greece and Bulgaria in 1925, and caused frequent diplomatic protests from Yugoslavia and the Great Powers.⁵

"LIBERTY OR DEATH"

In the fall of 1893, in Ressen (Resna), a small town of Western Macedonia, Damo Grueff, Sofia university student, and Pera Tosheff founded the first central committee of the

⁴ Stoyan Christowe, *Heroes and Assassins* (Robert M. McBride & Company, New York, 1935), p. 45.

⁵ See M. S. Ingalls, "The Balkans in the World Crisis," *Foreign Policy Reports*, IX (No. 20, 1933), 222-32; and A. Londres, *Terror in the Balkans* (London, 1935).

Macedonian Revolutionary Organization according to the example of the Carbonari societies of Italy. It adopted the name of "Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization" or IMRO (as it worked internally), in contrast to the Vrhoven Committee, founded in 1894 by Stojan Mihailoff, which aimed to support the imperialist policies of Czar Ferdinand and worked for the acquisition of Macedonia by Bulgaria. Avoiding co-operation with other Macedonian societies in Bulgaria, the IMRO proclaimed the ideal of "Macedonia for Macedonians." Article I of its constitution read: "The purpose of the Macedonian Revolutionary Committee is to gain complete political autonomy for Macedonia."⁶

The organization rapidly extended its network. Soon its symbol—a piece of black cloth, signifying serfdom and oppression, with the words "Liberty or Death" embroidered across it—was widely known. Local branches were founded, led usually by schoolteachers, and monetary contributions were collected. The country was divided into revolutionary regions, districts, and communes, with officers at the head of each. The local committee, elected by universal suffrage, sent a delegate to the rayon committee; above this was the okrug committee, corresponding to the area of the Turkish vilayet. The okrug committees sent forty-seven delegates to the regular general congress, which elected and granted executive authority to the central committee of three members at Salonica. In addition, there was another body, known as the *Zadgranitchno Predstavitelstvo* ("Beyond-the-Frontier Representatives"), appointed by the central committee, with the power to negotiate with all outsiders.

All authority was delegated in every case only to committees. Hence the significance of the word *comitadji*, meaning literally committee—the local name of groups operating within the framework of the IMRO.⁷ The military force of the IMRO was well organized. The *chetas*, under the authority of the rayon committees, enforced the decisions of the IMRO and of its courts as well as the collection of taxes. Supporting them, in case of emergency, were the secret village militia bodies, with

⁶ Bazhdaroff, *op. cit.*, pp. 10–11.

⁷ See Kosta Todoroff, "The Macedonian Organization, Yesterday and Today," *Foreign Affairs*, VI (1928), 473–82.

hidden arms. There is no doubt that the IMRO soon became a state within the state throughout Macedonia. Matters came to a climax in 1902, when bands of Sofia-inspired young Macedonians, led by Bulgarian officers of Macedonian origin, invaded Macedonia. They were confronted not only by the Turkish forces, but also by the IMRO.

Between the Vrhoven Committee and the IMRO, as well as within the IMRO itself, there were frequent struggles. These were caused mainly by the questions how to determine the relations of Bulgaria to Macedonia in case of the latter's liberation from Turkey, and how to define the extent of Bulgarian interference in the movement. The essential problem was whether Macedonia should become autonomous or should unite with Bulgaria on the basis of a federalist arrangement. The problem was never solved, though temporarily submerged in blood. A chain of murders and "executions" gradually disposed of the leaders in both camps, until the process of extermination had reached the point of exhaustion.

ALEXANDROFF—HERO OF THE CAUSE

When the first Balkan War flared up in 1912 the new IMRO chiefs, Todor Alexandroff and Alexander Protogueroff, favored recourse to arms against Turkey. At that time, the central committee knew nothing about the contents of the military treaty between Sofia and Belgrade or the secret provisions about the division of Macedonia. The *comitadjis* expected to gain Macedonia's freedom as the reward for their support. The result of the Balkan Wars, however, made it plain that the IMRO had been deceived by Bulgaria. Still, union with Bulgaria could have been endured more readily than the ultimate arrangement favoring Serbia. The *comitadjis* instantly turned their fury on Serbia as they had before on Turkey, confronting the new regime with ferocious guerrilla warfare.

During World War I the personal and program differences in the IMRO came to rest. The *comitadjis* formed the Macedonian division, a part of the 11th Division of the Bulgarian Army, and terrorized the Serbian element in occupied Macedonia.⁸ The end of that war found the Bulgarian nation dis-

⁸ See Article 118 of the Treaty of Neuilly. Out of 1,662 "war criminals" demanded by Yugoslavia for extradition, 216 were leaders of the IMRO.

traught and critical of all those associated with the national disaster; the IMRO came in for its share of the blame, and nearly ceased to exist in the next few years. The passivity of the organization, however, did not last long. The humiliating provisions of the Treaty of Neuilly revived Bulgarian nationalism and also the IMRO. The society was reorganized under Protogueroff and Alexandroff, who had escaped from the prison where they had been put by Stambuliski. The central committee was placed under Todor Alexandroff. The band scheme was replaced by the use of groups of two or three terrorists (*dvoika* or *troika*). The IMRO was able to secure financial support abroad. Italy gained a foothold in Bulgarian politics by unofficial subsidies to the organization, made available through the Sofia branch of the Banca Commerciale Italiana. Representatives of the IMRO approached on several occasions international conferences to which they submitted their grievances. Thus in 1922 a memorandum advocating an autonomous Macedonian state under the protectorate of the League of Nations was laid by the organization before the Lausanne Conference. In September 1924 another memorandum was sent by the central committee of the IMRO to the League of Nations.

Todor Alexandroff (1886–1924) was born in Central Macedonia. He took part in the *comitadji* activities against Turkey as a student and teacher.⁹ After World War I he retired to the mountains near Petritch and reorganized the IMRO. The strategic location allowed him not only to terrorize the surrounding Macedonian territory, but also to defy the Bulgarian, Yugoslav, and Greek border authorities. His group helped to bring about the downfall and murder of Stambuliski in June 1923, when the Premier dared to propose the extinction of the terrorists. Under the premiership of Tsankoff, Alexandroff was practically an independent ruler of his district. But Alexandroff's aspirations went still further. He entered into

⁹ For dramatized personal experiences in the IMRO see A. Sonnichsen, *Confessions of a Macedonian Bandit* (New York, 1909). Helen Stone, a Boston missionary, has given an account of her captivity in a series of articles, "Six Months among Brigands," *McClure Magazine*, Vol. XIX, June–October, 1902. Corrine and Radoslav Tsanoff, *Pawns of Liberty, A Balkan Tale of Yesterday* (New York, 1914), is a story of the organization of revolt and of peasant and town life in Macedonia before the First Balkan War.

negotiations with Turkey, then with Raditch, the Croat peasant leader, and finally with the Third International.

On the recommendation of a Bulgarian Communist emissary, Dima Dimoff (killed in Sofia in September 1924), a treaty between the Macedonian autonomists and the Third International was signed.¹⁰ When it was rumored that it bore the signature of Alexandroff, the IMRO leader realized that he had overreached himself. Though he quickly repudiated any such assertion, violent dissensions broke out in his group over the advisability of accepting Russian cash. When Alexandroff eventually decided against Moscow, Aleko Pasha, head of the Communist wing of the IMRO, invited him to a meeting, and on August 31, 1924, had him murdered in the presence of Protogueroff, his colleague on the central committee. The latter instantly signed death warrants for those involved in the killing. The funeral of Alexandroff was attended in Sofia by about 50,000 people. When the procession began, news that the murderers themselves had been murdered reached Sofia.

RIVALRY AND REVENGE

Fundamentally "personal interests and the passions for vengeance were at the bottom of the feud."¹¹ But the question of tactics and ideological goals remained recurrent throughout. Some Macedonians, despairing of the realization of autonomy, had become federalists, dreaming of the formation of a League of Balkan Soviet Republics with the help of Moscow. Led by Peter Chauleff, the third member of the central committee, the group called itself the "IMRO United" and published *La fédération balkanique* in Vienna. They were opposed bitterly by the autonomists, one of whose factions, that of Protogueroff, favored a more sober course and was inclined to co-operate with Bulgaria. The other, headed by Ivan Mihailoff, a former student at Sofia, who assumed control after Alexandroff's death, stood for extreme violence and absolute autonomy. Its ideology was expressed in the declaration of the Eighth Regular

¹⁰ According to Christowe (*op. cit.*, p. 176), Christian Rakovsky, a Bulgarian by birth, then Russian ambassador to France, took part in these negotiations.

¹¹ Christowe, *op. cit.*, p. 245. Quoted by permission of the publishers, Robert M. McBride & Company.

General Congress of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, held in April 1932:

The . . . Congress . . . established the fact that the political situation in the Balkans, and especially in Macedonia, sanctioned by the peace treaties, is flagrantly at variance with the historic ideals of our people, i.e., the objective conditions for the peaceful progress of the Balkan nations, and the juridical foundations underlying the pacification of the warring nations 1914-1918. These treaties trample upon the principles of human liberty and citizenship, upon the right of the nations to self-determination, and the peaceful development of mankind. Especially is this true with regard to the Treaty of Neuilly, which cut Macedonia into several parts, thereby dooming it to physical and moral oppression. Therefore the Eighth Regular Congress of the IMRO, in its capacity as the real representative of our subjected fatherland, that is, of the will and the liberty-loving tendencies of its population, emphasizes once more the unswerving determination of the IMRO to continue relentlessly the struggle for the conquest of freedom and political autonomy for Macedonia, thereby creating conditions for the friendly co-existence of the Balkan peoples, and the insurance of the peace of Southeastern Europe . . . The Serbian and the Greek governments, disregarding their international obligations, have subjected the Macedonian nationalities to a regime of denationalization and physical destruction. Confronted with this grim reality, the Congress of the IMRO, in executing the will of the Macedonian population, declares that it will continue, faithful to the traditions of the past, as well as to the principles of justice and liberty, to struggle with all its means hitherto employed against the terror initiated by the Greek and Serbian governments, renouncing all responsibility for future international complications.¹²

Opposed radically to any idea of a Balkan Entente, the IMRO made the following declaration on that point:

As to the conferences concerning the Balkans federation, officially encouraged by the present Balkan governments, the Congress asserts that they are attempts on the side of the Balkan victors to stabilize the present status quo in the Peninsula, and as such it denounces them completely. The Congress recognizes that the unification of the Balkan peoples into a federation is desirable and beneficial, but such a federation is possible only on the grounds of complete political emancipation of the peoples residing therein.

¹² *Macedonia*, I (1932), 105.

The Protogueroffists, on the other hand, denounced the Mihailoffists as traitors to the Macedonian revolutionary movement, paid by foreign money, who had to be "fought by all means so that a new catastrophe for Bulgaria will be prevented."

After Alexandroff's death and up to the time of the dissolution of the IMRO in 1934, the various factions of the organization were settling their ideological and personal differences by the pernicious process of mutual annihilation. In the course of a few years most of the outstanding personalities of the movement were silenced forever. In fact, more Macedonian activists died as victims of the IMRO's internecine strife than by old age. When Protogueroff began advocating a *rapprochement* with Yugoslavia, he was attacked in Sofia during the winter of 1927 at the orders of Mihailoff, but escaped with wounds. Though he signed a proclamation giving up his activity in the IMRO, the radical wing did not believe his assurances, and on July 8, 1928, the chief was shot to death in Bulgaria's capital.

His followers knew no bounds to revenge. The deadly struggle between the adherents of the two rival leaders overshadowed all issues. Both factions were sentencing members of the opposition, and their sentences were executed with barbarian effectiveness. The fierce butchery went on at home as well as abroad. Thus Raykoff Daskaloff, Stambuliski's minister of the interior, was shot in Prague in August 1923. Peter Chauleff, the leader of the federalists, was murdered in Milan in December 1924. In May 1925, Todor Panica, an old Macedonian voivode, was perforated with bullets in the Burg Theatre in Vienna by a young woman, later the wife of Mihailoff. It is impossible to detail all the terrorist acts perpetrated in Yugoslavia and Greece. These activities were supported morally and financially by a number of American Macedonians.

THE ROLE OF AMERICAN MACEDONIANS

Macedonian rebellions brought a number of refugees to the United States, encouraged to emigrate by their leaders, who expected financial help from them.¹⁸ Thousands of Macedonian

¹⁸ See F. J. Brown and J. S. Roucek, *Our Racial and National Minorities* (New York, 1937), p. 255. J. S. Roucek, "Les Bulgares d'Amérique," *Les*

volunteers crossed the ocean when hearing of the outbreak of the first Balkan War. But a number of them returned when the Bucharest Treaty shattered their hopes of making Macedonia free. Far fewer sailed to join Bulgaria's colors during World War I.

The rejuvenation of the IMRO after World War I, however, found an echo in the United States. The Macedonian Political Organization was founded in 1922; its headquarters at Indianapolis co-ordinates all branch activities in the leading Bulgarian settlements such as those at Detroit, Michigan; Steelton, Pennsylvania; Granite City, Illinois; Fort Wayne, Indiana; and Springfield, Ohio. The aims of the Macedonian Political Organization were at first "to work in a legal manner for the independence of Macedonia"; after 1931, however, and especially after 1933, the influence of Mihailoff prevailed. The organization contributed large sums of money to Mihailoff's cause and tried to appeal to the American public on its behalf. It educates the American-born descendants in "the spirit of the Macedonian aspiration which is the liberation of Macedonia."

BULGARIA'S CURSE

The inability of Bulgaria's Green Dictatorship to put a stop to the IMRO's uninterrupted brigandage had far-reaching effects. There are more than a quarter of a million Macedonians woven into the social and political life of Bulgaria; they have helped to nurture the dream of a liberated Macedonia, the common tenet of the national ethos of all rival groups. For thirty years the Bulgarian government had tolerated and even sought favors from the IMRO, supporting it with money, munitions, weapons, asylum, immunity, and diplomacy. Stambuliski signed his own death warrant when he tried to curb

Balkans, IX (1937), 55-79, gives more details. The American Macedonians have been able to interest, from time to time, American scholars to support their cause. See, for instance, the remarks of Professor John Bakeless regarding his visit to Mihailoff at the roundtable discussion chairmanned by Professor Bernadotte E. Schmitt in Institute of Politics (Williams College), *Report of the Round Tables and General Conferences at the Twelfth Session* (New Haven, 1932), p. 114. See also J. Bakeless, "The Macedonian Question," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, CLXXVII (1935), 223-31; F. Schevill, *The Balkan Problem* (Chicago: Macedonian Independent Association, 1931).

Macedonian terrorism. In 1928 a Bulgarian premier, Malinoff, rationalized the dilemma in the *Sobranie* as follows:

The advice coming to us from different sources, according to which the Government must settle the question by recourse to the most vigorous measures, and at any price, shows that the meaning of the revolutionary movement is not understood. To try and effect a settlement with the organizations and their members will not solve the problem. Even if solution is sought by the means recommended to us on different sides, I am convinced that you will not only fail to settle, but you will even aggravate the problem and perhaps expose the country to grave dangers.¹⁴

Mihailoff openly flouted the authority of Sofia. In a statement made in July 1930, he said:

The past congress of the IMRO gave a mandate to the new central committee elected by it to discover and punish the persons guilty of the killing of Alexandroff. In direct connection with this decision the murder of Protogueroff was executed as a punishment.¹⁵

This candid admission of guilt gave the Bulgarian authorities an opportune chance to bring Mihailoff to account. But he refused to appear before the court, and the central committee of the IMRO published a proclamation in which the government's step was considered "a daring political act, directed against the liberation movement in subjugated Macedonia."¹⁶ The case was eventually dismissed "for lack of evidence." No less than 207 lawyers had offered themselves to defend Mihailoff.¹⁷

Under these conditions the IMRO reigned supreme in the districts of Petritch, Djumas, and Nevropitch, levying taxes elaborately computed—based on tobacco yield and heads of cattle—and using the region as a base for its operations in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Greece. Its technique forced the Yugoslavs to turn their frontier with Bulgarian Macedonia into a veritable battle front, bristling with barbed wire and block-houses equipped with machine guns. Mihailoff's influence,

¹⁴ *The European Economic and Political Survey*, IV (1928), 149.

¹⁵ *Slovanský přehled*, XXII (1930), 532.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 688.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 756.

furthermore, extended into the highest administrative offices of Sofia, and his "executioners" carried out his orders openly in the streets of the capital. On December 28, 1932, for example, a street battle, in which a policeman was killed and eight persons fatally or seriously injured, was fought between thirty members of the two Macedonian factions under the very windows of the royal palace, with King Boris as a spectator.¹⁸

TWILIGHT OF IMRO

The endless feud, however, began to wear down even the most patient and patriotic Bulgarians. They were not much worried about the autonomist proclamations of the IMRO, since such propaganda suited the official foreign policy of Sofia, eager to keep alive the question of frontier revision. But many a Bulgarian began to suspect that the IMRO was concerned primarily with the settlement of personal grudges and the control of money extorted or "collected" by the organization. By 1933 the changing international situation also affected the picture. King Boris was conscious of the growing power of the newly formed Balkan Entente. In order to avoid complete isolation of his country, he initiated a policy of reconciliation with Yugoslavia. It was obvious that such a course could be crowned with success only by taking decisive steps against the IMRO. The last parliamentary government of Mushanoff had introduced capital punishment for political murders and complicity—with a view to checking the Macedonian vendetta. After the *coup d'état* of 1934, Colonel Kimon Gheorghieff persuaded the Protogueroffists, with whom his group was in sympathy, to disband voluntarily; he then set out to suppress the Mihailoffists. Mihailoff himself found asylum in Turkey. The elimination of the IMRO from Bulgarian politics was accomplished without much ado—for the time being.¹⁹

¹⁸ *New York Times*, December 29, 1932.

¹⁹ In October 1938, Macedonian terrorists renewed their activities in Sofia after a five-year period of quiet by slaying the chief of staff of the Bulgarian army, Major General Yordan Peyeff. The assassin was a thirty-five-year-old Macedonian revolutionary, Vaso Josifoff, who, after discharging two pistols at Peyeff and his aide-de-camp, shot himself with the last bullet. General Peyeff was at one time the foremost adherent of Colonel Damian Velcheff; after separating from him he became a strong supporter of the present regime.

PAWN IN POWER POLITICS OF WORLD WAR II

Despite the periodic incursions of the *comitadjis* into Greek and Yugoslav Macedonia, order generally prevailed in these regions in the years preceding World War II. With the establishment of order, human contacts, economic as well as cultural, developed. New habits, new conditions of life and ways of thinking slowly infiltrated among the populations of the annexed Macedonian territories, so that the amorphous and indecisive mass of the Slav population of Macedonia began to take shape. Instinctively it found its new orientation in the political centers of Belgrade, Sofia, Salonica, and Athens. The progressive assimilation in the new ethnical and political surroundings was accompanied by the natural attraction emanating from the new political and cultural centers around which the Macedonian population gravitated. This was rather easy, because, as indicated, the national consciousness and the ethnographic origin of the Macedonian people lacked to a large extent a clearly defined national character.²⁰

But the course of World War II opened up the old question again.

Bulgaria signed a Pact of Perpetual Friendship with Yugoslavia in January 1938, under the influence of German diplomacy which aimed to break up the Little Entente by creating a South Slav bloc, and this pact was followed by a Non-Aggression Pact with the Balkan Entente in July 1938. However, the outbreak of World War II gave Sofia a chance to reassert the old, smoldering revisionist aims. Bulgaria's armies followed the German armies into Greece and Yugoslavia in 1941, only too glad to have the permission of Hitler to occupy Macedonia (and Thrace). The policy of Bulgarization and terrorization in these territories will long be remembered by the Greeks (and possibly by Yugoslavs also).²¹

Sofia's policy during these war years had one supreme purpose: the annexation of Macedonia. This policy was supported by the Bulgarian nation as a whole, irrespective of party. This ideology was principally promoted by the committee, known as

²⁰ Joseph S. Roucek, "Bulgaria and the Menace of Macedonia's Independence," *New Europe*, IV (1944), 25-29.

²¹ For more details, see Joseph B. Schechtman, *European Population Transfers 1939-1945* (New York, 1946), pp. 420-24.

BMPO (the *Vatresna Makedonska Revolucionna Organizatsia*), headed by Ivantso Mihailoff. The Committee, which found many collaborators among the pro-Bulgarian communists of Greek Macedonia, had immense power, even in Sofia; between it and the Bulgarian governments there was seldom any disagreement.

The alliance between Bulgaria and Germany brought Mihailoff in personal touch with King Boris and with Hitler. The Committee became almost omnipotent in all Bulgarian affairs. It controlled the two special organizations—the Macedonian-Bulgarian Committee of Kastoria, composed of a few hundred *comitadjis*, and the *Okhrana*, an armed force of Macedonian and Bulgarian volunteers.

Like the *Okhrana* in Czarist Russia, its duties were terroristic. Toward the end of 1943, the Committee of Kastoria was in dissolution, largely as a result of the Italian surrender. Many of its members had joined EAM (Greek National Liberation Front), taking their weapons with them. Kaltseff, a Bulgarian officer (whose activities came to light during his trial held in Athens in the summer of 1946), used those who remained to reinforce the *Okhrana* who, on Greek territory—in the regions of Kastoria, Edessa, and Florina—numbered nearly a thousand armed men recruited from the Slavophone population of Greek Macedonia.²²

Kaltseff, who took his instructions from Sofia and from the BMPO, suggested to the Germans that the whole population of Greek Macedonia should be armed. The Germans and Sofia then supplied the arms which were distributed by the agents of BMPO; many Slavophone peasants were recruited by force. Officers of the Bulgarian Reserve were appointed chiefs, under Kaltseff, of the *Okhrana*, in the districts of Edessa, Florina, Kastoria, and Yennitsa.

About the middle of 1943, EAM created a special force of its own, named SNOF (the *Slavionomacedonski Nationalen Osvoboditelen Front*), the Slav-Macedonian Liberation Front, recruited from among the Greek Slavophones. Collaboration

²² F. A. Voigt, "The Present State of Greece, II," *The Nineteenth Century and After*, CXL (1946), 12-13. The Slavophones of Greece speak a Slav language and regard themselves the real natives of Macedonia; the Bulgarians claim that the Slavophones are really Bulgarians.

between the Bulgarian-controlled *Okhrana* and the EAM-controlled SNOF followed upon an agreement that Macedonia should become autonomous. Patriotic Greeks in the ranks of EAM were reported to the Germans or Italians; many were executed, but none of the pro-Bulgarian members were molested. Many Bulgarian Communists were appointed to commands in EAM and—by agreement with KKE, the Greek Communist Party—executed Greek patriots who had joined EAM, especially professional people, police officers, and priests, if they refused to support the political purpose of KKE or opposed the demands of the Slavophone members for Macedonian autonomy on the charge of being “Fascists” or “Reactionaries.”

The special task assigned to SNOF by EAM was to represent the Greek Slavophones and to organize a Slav-Macedonian administration. The Macedonians who had a grievance against the Greeks now had the opportunity to exact vengeance, as well as to work and fight for Macedonian autonomy. The command of the Macedonian units was entrusted to Dimakis, a Greek Communist of pronounced pro-Bulgarian opinion. Members of the *Okhrana* were enrolled in a special Macedonian contingent which received Bulgarian uniforms from Yugoslavia and was joined by Partisans from Tito's army. Men who served under General Mikhailovitch and found their way into Greece were executed by ELAS (National Popular Liberation Front).

The Germans played off one Greek faction against another. When EAM was strong they supported the Security Battalions, who were anti-German almost to a man, but feared the terrorists of ELAS more than they feared the Germans. When EDES (National Democratic Greek Army) grew strong, the Germans attacked them and forced them to retire into Epirus.

SOFIA'S MANEUVERS TO SAVE MACEDONIA

When it began to be apparent, by 1943–1944, that Sofia faced the unavoidable necessity of disgorging the territories she had stolen from Greece and Yugoslavia in the wake of the German invaders in the Balkans, Sofia started raising the question of an “independent Macedonia” with the status of a distinct nation, which would form part of a future Balkan federation. Under the influence of new pro-Slavic ideologies, Yugoslav statesmen around Tito started advocating the creation of

a South-Slav Federation, with Macedonia as one of its units. Nevertheless, the advocates of such a federation did not seem to be in complete agreement as to which districts of Macedonia would be included in the contemplated South-Slav Federation. For instance, Dr. Josip Smodlaka, Tito's foreign minister, in 1944 specifically excluded Greek Macedonia from the scope of that federation. As for the Bulgarians, although some of them wanted to absorb the Bulgaro-Macedonians into a "Greater Bulgaria," and others advocated the creation of an "autonomous Macedonia," their approach to the Macedonian question was again characteristic of Sofia's methods. From the time of the Treaty of Neuilly until the Axis occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece, Bulgaria had vociferously championed the independence of Macedonia and pretended to espouse the rights of the Macedonians. As soon as Bulgaria occupied the Greek and Yugoslav Macedonian territories as a reward by the Axis for becoming its satellite, Bulgaria's attitude changed completely. Official spokesmen and the Bulgarian press expressed disapproval of any suggestion of Macedonian independence, claiming these occupied territories as purely Bulgarian and thus belonging to the Bulgarian state. In 1944, when the fortunes of war turned in favor of the Allies and Sofia was called upon to return the territories, it tried to raise again, through active propaganda, the Slavic aspects of Macedonian independence.

PAN-SLAVISM AND ITS MACEDONIAN USE

The Slavonic aspects of Macedonia's existence fitted like a glove into the Pan-Slavonic weapon of the Soviet anxious to extend its influence over the Balkans—and Greece. About that time the Kremlin started to formulate its plans in regard to the countries located behind the "Iron Curtain"—and Greece. The idea was to form the Slavs, the Albanians, and some of the Greeks into a Slav federation, led by Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, which would be the base for a Balkan League that would cover all Balkan Europe; this huge bloc of land would follow the lead of Moscow. Salonica, as an excellent naval base, became the hub of this Aegean strategy, and its Macedonian background was just the thing that Moscow wanted to use for its pan-Slavic arguments. Furthermore, the question of the control of the Dardanelles was coming up, and Greece's control of

its Macedonian territory involved the country's unique facilities as a base for political and military activity from the heart of the Balkans to the center of the Mediterranean.

TITO'S INTERESTS IN MACEDONIA

Macedonia lies on the northern shore of the Aegean Sea, between Turkish Thrace and the Albanian mountains. Russian interference in Macedonia dates from czarist times. After the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, the Treaty of San Stefano, imposed by the victorious Russians, gave Macedonia to Bulgaria and practically converted the Balkans into a Russian-dominated great Bulgaria with an Aegean coast line. Later, at the Congress of Berlin, Britain and Austria forced the czar to disgorge most of his Balkan booty. As a sop, they let him keep strategic Kars in Asia Minor.

When Bulgaria joined the Axis, Moscow was quite incensed at the Bulgarian "brothers," especially when the Bulgars proceeded to Slavitize the population (even altering tombstone inscriptions) after the Macedonian acquisitions procured with Hitler's help. But when, in August 1944 under Marshal Tito's eyes, 125 Macedonian delegates met at Bitoly in southern Yugoslavia and proclaimed an autonomous Macedonia with federal Yugoslavia, an Allied military mission looked on. A Macedonian government started functioning in Skoplje, in Yugoslavia, about sixty miles from the Greek frontier. At the second session of the Anti-Fascist Liberation Council (1944), it was proclaimed: "Yugoslavia is built on the federal principle which will insure full equality for the peoples of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina."²³ Macedonia was no longer to be an apple of discord

²³ On December 28, 1944, the Second National Assembly of Free Macedonia met at Skoplje and selected Dimitar Vlahnov as its acting president, while Lubtcho Arsov and Lina Balinska became secretaries and Kiril Grigorov, Colonel Pantcho Nedelkovsky, and Pavel Statev became members of the executive body. The Presidium of the Assembly selected the following members to the Yugoslav Macedonian Cabinet: Kiril Petrushev, Interior; Kiro Gligjrov, Finance; Strahil Gigov, Industry and Trade; Kiro Milomski, Commerce and Supplies; Dimitar Mirevski, Education; Petre Piruze, Justice; Nikola Minev, Organization of the Administrative System; Mira Atnosov, Forests and Mines; Boguja Fotev, Agriculture; Atso Petrovski, Social Policy; Sterio Bozdov, National Health; and Georgi Vasilev, Communications and Public Buildings.

between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, but an independent link in the chain of South Slav peoples and a bridge between the two Slav "brothers" on her borders. Thus Macedonia, which had been the main cause of the inability of the Yugoslavs to get along with the Bulgarians ever since their independence—because Sofia had never been reconciled to the acquisitions of its portion to Serbia and then to Yugoslavia—suddenly became a "natural bridge" between the two countries, with the hope, of course, that the arrangement would permit Bulgaria to have Macedonia in her sphere while recognizing the autonomous status of the province.

The arrangement with Tito and the renewed propaganda line on the Slavic foundations of the Macedonian peoples, now supported by Russia, gave new courage to Sofia in her international dealings. Sofia rejected all Greek demands for frontier changes—and even was willing to cede territory for the formation of an "independent Macedonian state if the Macedonians wish it"—Premier Kimon Gheorghieff declared in November 1945. As a result, the Macedonian issue continued to brew ceaseless troubles in 1945, 1946, and 1947. "Greek provocateurs, reactionaries, and troops are shooting across our frontier, trying to provoke us," snapped Marshal Tito in July 1945, and he proclaimed that he would not be provoked by assaults on his "brother Slavs."

Unfortunately, the "Slavic brotherhood" had little to do with the whole Macedonian question. Greece has a very important strategic value for Britain. Its mainland and islands control the entrance to the Turkish Dardanelles and the entire Turkish littoral. Together, Crete and the Dodecanese are almost in position to neutralize the entire eastern Mediterranean, including Beirut, Haifa, and Alexandria, as well as an entrance to the Suez Canal. Thus Macedonia is a vital core of the game played in the diplomatic alignment, not only of Turkey but also of the entire Middle East.


All these factors could conceivably enter into any discussions of Macedonia—although up to the end of 1946 the "pan-Slavic brotherhood" had been featured mainly. In all this, Bulgaria, together with Yugoslavia and Macedonia is drawn without volition into the drive of Soviet Russia to the Dardanelles and the eastern Mediterranean, and Pan-Slavism, a movement

sponsored by Czarist Russia to win friends, influence people, and promote imperialism in the Slavic Balkans, is now being used by the Soviet Union to the same ends. Tito, checked in 1946 by Anglo-American forces in his attempt to annex Trieste and thus establish a Slavic stronghold at the head of the Adriatic, was working at the same time on the problem of "Aegean Macedonia," whose fertile plains yield Greece revenues from a big tobacco crop and whose strategic port, Salonica, flanks the Dardanelles.

As in the case of Austria and Trieste, Macedonia brought the ambitions of Britain (backed by the United States) and Russia into conflict. How far will the Soviets back Tito in unifying the southern Slavs? Will Britain and the United States be able to keep Greece from giving in to Tito's demands? These questions suggest that Macedonia had become, by 1948, a pawn in the game of power politics, as it had been at the time of the Congress of Berlin, but they also suggest that a renewed dispute over Macedonia would seriously strain not only European but intercontinental world relations.

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VII

GREECE

BRTAIN, in March 1947, its government had announced, no longer possessed the resources to continue its comparatively puny military aid to Greece. Americans who between boyhood and manhood had seen the collapse of four Empires—Russian, Austrian, German, and French—were hardly able to grasp the fact that the Greek crisis was not merely President Truman's request for a grant of 400 million dollars in support of non-Communist economic and political regimes in Greece and Turkey, but a desire to prevent Soviet totalitarianism from spreading further in the Balkans, and thus further undermining the last remaining bases of the liberal-democratic system in that part of the world. This request by the President of the United States, made at the moment when the Big Four Foreign Ministers were meeting in Moscow to discuss the foundations of peace, was one more illustration that the United States stood at a crossroads in its foreign policy—because of a Balkan nation. For the issue of Greece was bigger than Greece herself. Like Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938, Greece was in 1947 one of the cornerstones of the balance of power upon which peace must rest. If Greece, the last citadel of Western ways and influence in the Balkans, were to fall under Russian domination, it would serve notice to the world that the West was either unwilling or too weak to maintain that balance. The testimony of the Commission of the United Nations which was investigating, at that very moment, the responsibility for the smoldering civil war in Greece had revealed a wide rift between Soviet Russia and Poland on the one hand and the remaining nine members on the other—demonstrating thereby that the situation was beyond present remedy by the United Nations, where action is easily stymied by the veto.

The maintenance of Greek independence and territorial and administrative integrity was therefore up to the West, which meant primarily Britain and the United States. Washington promised support, short of armed intervention, and the proposed \$250,000,000 loan was to be the first step in that direction. This problem of supreme importance to the United States has to be projected against the whole interrelated progression of world politics after the end of World War II. England's decision to withdraw support from King George's wobbly and backward-looking Greek regime, a *dénouement* long demanded by liberals and left-wingers in America and England, would not mean that Greece would become independent and democratic. Quite aside from the internal problems agitating Greece at the turn of 1947, it was clear that the Yugoslavs, abetted by Albanians and Bulgarians, were working to incorporate Greek territory into a reconstituted Macedonia which would be one of the Federated Republics of Yugoslavia. The rebels had their own grievances but it was beyond question that they were being exploited by the neighboring states, all satellites of Moscow, in order to break the resistance of the one remnant of the Balkan Peninsula outside the Soviet orbit.

Greece was never a German satellite. Alexis Kyrrou, Greek spokesman, reminded the United Nations Commission that Greece alone among the occupied countries did not send a single soldier to fight against Russia. Economically, and politically, weak as she was then, riven as always by factions, Greece was not morally weak during World War II. Among all the small Balkan countries, she held the record for resistance to the Axis. Instead of being a point of conflict between her great allies, she should be a point of unity.

As things were at the turn of 1947, should Greece be abandoned by the West, she would be lost to the Western world. And with Greece drawn into the Soviet sphere, Turkey could not withstand the pressure she had resisted only because the national will had been stiffened by Western support. If Turkey should go, the argument over the Dardanelles would be purely academic. The American government was asked to be willing to assume a great part of Britain's commitments in the Middle Sea, cradle of Western civilization and today more than in the past, perhaps, the strategic center of the world. America was

asked to do in Greece what the British had been trying to do—to keep it and the eastern Mediterranean from being annexed to the Soviet empire. America was asked to succeed Britain—not as an empire, for the traditional Empire is finished; not in competition with Communism; not even in a struggle against Russian expansion, except as that struggle is part of the age-long fight for a balance of forces against world domination. The British question merely underscored the change in that balance. It revealed to the American people what has been always apparent to others—that the hour has come when the course of history depends on America's choice—and on the course of events in a "far-away country," a little Balkan country, Greece.

HISTORY

Although the authentic history of Greece does not begin until about 776 B.C., Greeks enjoy tracing their national culture back through four millennia. After 350 years of Roman domination Greece became in A.D. 395 a part of the Byzantine Empire which, saturated with Greek ideas, remained the heart of civilization for ten centuries.

BIRTH OF A KINGDOM

Under Turkish rule from 1456 to 1821, Greece was still able to preserve contact with Western Europe. The grant of ecclesiastic and communal autonomy permitted the Greeks to keep up their own educational institutions and racial traditions. As early as the time of Russia's Peter the Great, religious prejudice was mustered to influence the Greeks against their Ottoman rulers; Russian pressure toward Constantinople supported several insurrections in Greece. The revolution of 1821 rode on a tide of philhellenic sentiment sweeping Europe and America. Lovers of liberty were fired by Byron's passionate poetry. President Monroe voiced American sympathies in his message to Congress of December 4, 1822; the Senate, moved by the eloquence of Daniel Webster, passed resolutions of encouragement.

The intervention of Great Britain, Russia, and France culminated in the Peace of Adrianople of 1829, which conceded to Russia a Balkan hegemony and proclaimed Greece an

independent state. Count John Capodistria, murdered a year later, was elected president of the Republic. In 1832 Greek independence was placed under the protection of Great Britain, France, and Russia, with Prince Otto of Bavaria as the new dynast. The revolution of 1862, however, forced the ruler to leave the country. Subsequent turmoil was ended by the installation of Prince William George of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg, who became George I, King of the Hellenes. Territorial concessions, mainly by the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, extended the realm. Crete was assigned to Greece in 1913 as the result of the Balkan Wars, together with southern Macedonia, Salonica, and the Chalcidice Peninsula. In March 1913 the monarch was assassinated; his heir, Constantine (1913–1917), ascended the throne. He lost it in 1917, abdicating in favor of his second son, Alexander. Alexander's unexpected death in 1920 led to the re-enthronement of his father, who was displaced again in 1922. Constantine's eldest son succeeded him as George II, only to be expelled in 1924.

When Turkey joined the Central Powers on October 29, 1914, Greece was asked by Serbia for help on the basis of a treaty of alliance; the king refused. Placed between conflicting pressures, Greece witnessed the revolt of Venizelos and the dethroning of her ruler. In 1917 Greece entered World War I on the side of the Allies; she was rewarded in 1919 with West and East Thrace, Adrianople, and the protectorate over Smyrna—at the expense of Bulgaria and Turkey. The outraged Turks, led by the resourceful Mustapha Kemal, ended the ensuing Greco-Turkish War in 1922 by the crushing defeat of the Greeks and by their ejection from Asia Minor. King Constantine returned from exile in 1920 amid great popular enthusiasm, but in September 1922 he was forced to abdicate in favor of his son George, and he died in exile early in 1923. By the Treaty of Lausanne of the same year Greece had to give up Smyrna and East Thrace, and agreed to a compulsory exchange of populations with Turkey.¹

¹ Cf. C. W. Crawley, *The Question of Greek Independence* (Cambridge, 1930); and J. Mavrogordato, *Modern Greece* (New York, 1931). W. Miller, *Greece* (New York, 1928), is the most outstanding contribution by a well-known authority on the Balkans; see also his "Recent Publications on Medieval and Modern Greek History, 1928–1931," *American Historical Review*, XXXVII (1932), 272–77. A. A. Pallis, *Greece's Anatolian Venture and After*

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT

In 1923 Greece was left with an area of 50,146 square miles—about the size of the state of New York. As a result of the population exchange, some 1,500,000 refugees deported from Turkey brought the number of inhabitants up to more than 6,500,000. Unlike the other Balkan states, Greece is not a compact territory, nor is it as pre-eminently agricultural. Its many peninsulas have encouraged maritime activities, which play a considerable, though subordinate, role in the national economy. Without large mineral or forest resources, Greece depends upon the soil and the sea.

While commerce and, particularly since 1931, industry are not negligible, the mainstay of the people is agriculture. Over 60 percent of the population make their living as farmers. The great majority are small landholders cultivating their fields with the help of family members. The density of population is close to the average for all Europe—133 per square mile. The Greek birth surplus was in 1933 the seventh highest in Europe. But the land is far more overpopulated than the figures indicate because of the scarcity of arable land; barren hills and swampy lowlands are setting physical limits. Furthermore, the system of land tenure still shows traces of feudalism. In spite of expropriations of state and church lands and of much privately owned property, decreed during the period of 1920–1930, only 50 percent of the agricultural area has been redistributed. Nor were the beneficiaries of reallocation supplied with cattle and agricultural machinery. Holdings are uneconomically small; thousands of peasant farmers do not own more than a little over an acre, an animal or two, and a wooden plow.² In 1929 the average area per holding was as low as 3.6 hectares. There is scanty hope for improvement, for it is the custom for each

(London, 1937), is likely to remain the standard work on the subject. A more general work of the same importance is Ed. Driault and Michel Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours* (Paris, 1925–1926), 5 vols.

² Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Balkan States, I, Economic* (New York, 1936), p. 21. See also J. S. Roucek, "Economic Geography of Greece," *Economic Geography*, XI (1935), 91–104; E. G. Mears, *Greece Today* (Stanford University Press, 1920); and K. A. Doukas, "Agrarian Reform in Greece," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, V (October 1945), 79–92.

son to receive an equal share of his father's holdings, and intensive cultivation has been held back by the lack of capital. In fact, poverty has always been the lot of the Greek peasant.

The capital shortage may be illustrated by the fact that at the end of 1931 the proportion of budgetary expenditure allocated to debt service—almost entirely for foreign debts—was more than 30 percent.³ Until 1929 the country had no organization specifically devoted to the provision of agricultural credit; interest paid by the farmers ranged upward to 50 or even 80 percent.⁴ The establishment of the Agricultural Mortgage Bank did not materially change the situation. The Bank relied for its funds primarily on the foreign capital market, and the interest rates paid on its mortgage loans were still high.⁵ The total agricultural indebtedness approximated nine billion drachmas, of which about seven billion was owed to the state.⁶ The social and economic situation of the Greek farmer presented gigantic problems not yet faced. Among them was education—of the population over ten years of age, no less than 1,962,330 were classified as illiterate in 1928.⁷ Another economic problem lay in poor communications. Nearly half of the railroad mileage was not of standard gauge. The resulting deficiencies were somewhat offset by a relatively large merchant marine, though most vessels were old bottoms. The roads were “probably the worst in Europe.”⁸

Tobacco production, developed particularly since 1922 in Macedonia and Thrace by government support of the refugees, represented on the average three-tenths of the value of all crops and half the value of Greece's total exports—made up of tobacco and no more than four other commodities: wine, olives and olive oil, currants and raisins, and, of chief importance, figs. In recent years the tobacco industry had been passing through a crisis, principally because of the decline of world demand for choice quality tobaccos and the competition of neighbor coun-

³ *The Balkan States*, p. 9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

⁷ See J. S. Roucek, “The Educational Changes in Greece,” *School and Society*, XXXV (1932), 62–64.

⁸ *The Balkan States*, p. 148. Quoted by permission of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.

tries. In addition, Greece had a great variety of minerals in limited quantities. Here, too, she was handicapped by meager capital and coal resources. Mining was antiquated. In her foreign trade Greece showed a steady adverse balance, which was not fully covered by shipping, tourist travel, and emigrant checks.⁹

| Nationalities | 1920 | | 1928 | |
|------------------------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|
| | Number | Percentage | Number | Percentage |
| Greeks | 4,470,000 | 80.75 | 5,822,000 | 93.83 |
| Turks | 770,000* | 13.91 | 103,000 | 1.66 |
| Bulgarians | 139,000 | 2.51 | 82,000 | 1.32 |
| Albanians | 18,000 | 0.32 | 20,000 | 0.32 |
| Jews | 65,000† | 1.17 | 70,000 | 1.13 |
| Armenians | 1,000 | 0.02 | 35,000 | 0.56 |
| Foreign citizens | 73,000 | 1.32 | 73,000 | 1.18 |
| Totals..... | 5,536,000 | 100.00 | 6,205,000‡ | 100.00 |

* Including 300,000 Turks of East Thrace, which in 1920 was occupied by Greece.

† Salonica alone.

‡ The area of Greece was then 50,257 square miles. The density of population was 100 per square mile in 1920 and 133 in 1933.

Up to the Balkan Wars, the population was nearly exclusively Greek. Subsequent campaigns gave to Greece territories inhabited mostly by Greeks, but also by considerable minorities. A far-reaching change was wrought by the Greco-Bulgarian and Greco-Turkish population exchanges. All Turks left the country, save those in West Thrace, which was excluded from the exchange. Slavs also emigrated under the agreements. Their places have been taken by Greeks from Asia Minor, East Thrace, and Bulgaria.¹⁰

For the whole of Greece the ethnological changes are demonstrated in the preceding table.¹¹ By Balkan standards, the

⁹ M. Choukas, "Greek Americans," in F. J. Brown and J. S. Roucek, *Our Racial and National Minorities* (New York, 1937), pp. 339-57, describes the role played by Greek emigrants in the social life of the country. See also H. P. Fairchild, *Greek Immigration to the United States* (New Haven, 1911); and H. J. Booras, *Hellenic Independence and America's Contribution to the Cause* (Rutland, Vt., 1935).

¹⁰ See S. P. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities* (New York, 1932); and L. Leontiades, "Der griechisch-türkische Bevölkerungsaustausch," *Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht*, V (1935), 546-76.

¹¹ Ladas, *op. cit.*, p. 702. See also H. Gaitanides, "Bevölkerungsprobleme Griechenlands," *Leipziger Vierteljahrsschrift für Südosteuropa*, II (1938), 69-74.

homogeneity of Greece is extraordinary. So is the religious composition of the people:

| Religions | 1928 | Percentage |
|------------------|-----------|------------|
| Orthodox | 5,962,000 | 96.08 |
| Catholic | 35,000 | 0.57 |
| Protestant | 9,000 | 0.15 |
| Moslem | 126,000 | 2.03 |
| Jewish | 73,000 | 1.17 |
| Total..... | 6,205,000 | 100.00 |

Minorities are no longer an issue in Greece. The Turks are confined to the districts of West Thrace, the Bulgars to the westernmost part of Macedonia. The Albanian Moslems, who settled here in the fourteenth century, live in a compact mass in the district of Chamuia on the Adriatic coast, opposite Corfu. The Vlachs (Kutso-Vlachs) occupy the wooded slopes of North Pindus between Epirus and Southwest Macedonia; in the winter months they move to the plains of Thessaly and Macedonia.

Save for the Orthodox faith, religious groups were without importance in Greece. For a long time the government exploited the Orthodox Church as a political expression of national unity. The clergy is paid by the state; most of its members are narrow-minded villagers. The ecclesiastic self-government of Mount Athos is traditional; it has merited a special section of the Greek constitution.¹² The Catholics were in the main limited to the lands formerly under the rule of the Venetians. Jews were located primarily in Salonica, Athens, Corfu, Crete, Zante, Chalcis, and Volo. On the whole, the government has been none too friendly with the remaining Slav minorities in Macedonia and Thrace, which is perhaps comprehensible in view of the bloody record of the IMRO. Periodic complaints come also from Tirana regarding the treatment of Greece's Albanian minority. The compulsory exchange of population between Greece and Turkey was a constant source of irritation between the two countries. The irredentist Enosis movement in Cyprus, 80 percent of whose population was Greek, gave concern to Great Britain.

¹² See M. Choukas, *The Black Angels of Athos* (Brattleboro, Vt., 1935).

VENIZELOS—"THE DELIVERER"

Modern Greek politics has passed through three definite cycles. For the forty years of the first cycle, the political arena of Greece was overshadowed by the towering figure of Eleutherios Venizelos. The internal division brought about by him was unbridgeable up to 1936, regardless of whether he was on the scene or in exile, in the forefront or the background. The second cycle is marked by the restoration of monarchy; it was soon followed by the third, leading to the establishment of an authoritarian dictatorship now in full bloom.

Venizelos (1864–1936) attained the premiership of Greece seven times after he first assumed the position in 1910. Born in a hamlet outside Canea, the capital of the island of Crete, he was given the prophetic name of Eleutherios—Zeus, the Deliverer. After studying law in Athens, intoxicated by theories of nationalism and Pan-Hellenism, he joined the revolutionaries of Crete in their struggle against the Turks.¹⁸ For the next twenty-five years he fought the Moslems in the mountains of his native islands, negotiated with the consuls of the Great Powers, and in his spare moments taught himself English. He was the soul of the successful revolution of 1906.

His great opportunity came in 1909. The young Turks had risen to power in Constantinople; Austria had annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina; Bulgaria had declared her independence. Crete on her part demanded outright union with Greece. Greece herself was in fermentation. The Military League overthrew the government, tired of parliamentary nonsense; their leaders looked out for a "New Deal" man, and turned to the young fire-eater from Crete. In September 1910 Venizelos was made prime minister. His Liberal Party made an auspicious start. The constitution was revised so as to make it possible to pass reform legislation; foreign missions were called in to reorganize the army and navy; local self-government was overhauled. By 1912 Greece was in shape to participate in the Balkan Wars. When Venizelos signed the peace treaty in November 1913, his native Crete had been restored to Greece, along with South

¹⁸ See A. T. Polyzoides, "Venizelos of Greece," *World Affairs Interpreter*, VII (1936), 14–22; and Count C. Sforza, *Makers of Modern Europe* (Indianapolis, 1930), pp. 164–82. See also E. Schramm-von Thadden, *Griechenland und die grossen Mächte, 1913–1923* (Göttingen, 1933).

Epirus, South Macedonia, and a number of Aegean islands. Greece had practically doubled in size and population.

His master stroke was executed during World War I. He broke with King Constantine over the question of whether Greece should remain neutral or join the Allies—the origin of the feud between the uncrowned “father of his country” and the monarchy which persisted to his death. Venizelos, playing his cards more cleverly than the King, identified himself with the grandiose scheme of a Greater Greece that fired the imagination of the people. Constantine, married to the Kaiser’s sister, was pushed off the throne. The provisional government headed by Venizelos plunged into the war on the side of the Allies.

When in the early fall of 1920 Venizelos returned to Greece with the spoils of Paris, he was considered the savior of his nation. But the Treaty of Sèvres had given Greece more than she could digest; and soon another war was under way. Weary and bewildered, Venizelos was overwhelmingly defeated in the elections of November 14, 1920, accused by the royalists of dictatorial methods. A delirious movement brought Constantine back, though not for long. The war with Turkey ended in disaster. With the collapse of the Smyrna offensive, King Constantine once more fled abroad, a broken man. His heir, George II, ascended the throne in 1922 only to be exiled in 1923. He was to return to his palace twelve years later.

The revolution of September 7, 1922, washed to the political surface a fox-faced army colonel, Nicholas Plastiras. His ruthless acts discredited the cause of Venizelos, on whom the royalists concentrated their hatred. In the long and ferocious war between the monarchistic and the republican forces, Venizelos became the symbol of fratricidal struggle. Once established, however, the republic was able to suppress a counter-revolt in October 1923. Admiral Paul Konduriotis was proclaimed provisional president.

The royalists were on the whole representative of the Greek *bourgeoisie*, deeply distrustful of the rebel of Crete, but unable to offer a more constructive program. Most of the royalists recognized as their leader Demetrius Gunaris (1866–1922). In 1920 he had founded the new National Party, later renamed Popular Party, an organization without a social program of its own, except for its opposition to Venizelos. Its wheel horses

were mostly prewar politicians whom Venizelos had dispossessed and who were eager to repay him in his own coin. The debacle at Smyrna, however, fell back on Gunaris. He and five other leaders were condemned to death. The execution of the "Six" left an indelible mark on Greek politics.

Thereafter the monarchists were in public disfavor. Their policy was commonly identified with the loss of Asia Minor and East Thrace and the expulsion of the Greek population from Turkey. They split into two new parties—the personal friends of Gunaris rallied around P. Tsaldaris, and the more moderate foes of Venizelos found their leader in Jean Metaxas, who had served as a confidential adviser to Constantine. The plebiscite of April 13, 1924, decided in favor of the republic; the issue itself, however, was dwarfed by Greece's shrewdest politician. The Republican majority of 758,700 was overwhelmingly Venizelist, while the 323,400 votes cast for the monarchy could accurately be described as personal opponents of the "Lion of Crete."¹⁴

THE REPUBLICAN EXPERIMENT

At bottom, the alternative of monarchy and republic was devoid of fundamental meaning. Political groupings fluctuated freely. The left wing of the republican elements eventually gathered around Alexander Papanastassiou's independent faction. The right wing, the "National Republicans," turned to General Kondylis (1879–1936), the "Cromwell of Greece." He succeeded Papanastassiou as prime minister in 1924. Soon displaced, he headed the movement against General Theodore Pangalos, whose episodic dictatorship came to an end in August 1926.

By 1928 Greece was thoroughly tired of factional strife, attempts at dictatorship, huge deficits, drachma depreciation, and refugee loans. Venizelos, having kept himself prudently in the background, was carried by another wave of popularity into the premiership. He pledged himself to save Greece from

¹⁴ N. S. Kaltchas, "Post-war Politics in Greece," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XII (1936), No. 12, pp. 146–60, is the best available survey of the period, in addition to several of W. Miller's articles, particularly "Greece Since the Return of Venizelos," *Foreign Affairs*, VII (1929), 468–76; "New Era for Greece," *ibid.*, XIV (1936), 654–61. See also J. S. Roucek, "The Social Forces in Greek Politics," *Social Science*, IX (1934), 54–63.

what appeared to be certain economic ruin. Without much regard for the constitution, he compelled the President to issue a decree changing the method of election from proportional representation to the system of single-member constituencies. The resulting contest between the Venizelist republicans and the royalists turned into his triumph; his government won 203 seats against an opposition of 37 deputies. But his four-year rule failed to rejuvenate the political life of the country. His victories were scored in foreign affairs. Preaching a union of the Balkan peoples, "The Balkans for the Balkans," he signed in quick order treaties of friendship with Yugoslavia, Italy, Albania, and Turkey.

Domestically, however, matters grew worse. In October 1928 General Pangalos again reached for power, though to no avail. Kaphandaris and Papanastassiou were alienated from the government, and the rift with General Kondylis was turning into irreconcilable enmity. The republican unity was broken. Deflationary and arbitrary measures helped to undermine the aging leader's popularity. In spite of his scheming, the elections of September 1932 went against him. Parliamentary stalemate ensued. Venizelos found himself under pressure from all sides. Yet to the last he clung to office. He who at Paris had dazzled the statesmen of the world with his wit and wisdom could not persuade himself to concede his defeat. Finally, however, he yielded to the Popular Party, whose royalist leader, Tsaldaris, unequivocally promised to uphold the republican form of government. Attempting a comeback, Venizelos blocked the new cabinet with the result that in January 1933 he was able to form his eighth ministry. The March elections, however, demonstrated beyond doubt that he had lost his grip on the country. The same people who had idolized him five years ago now crushed him—his opposition gained a clear mandate.

Having lost out in the parliamentary game, Venizelos pulled a Cretan trick. Six months after the elections General Plastiras, a Venizelos henchman, engineered a military coup, and bloody fighting took place between republicans and royalists. His one-day dictatorship revived old passions. Venizelos was accused of complicity; in June 1934 another attempt was made on his life in an Athens suburb. The following year saw a last uprising of republican army officers, speedily suppressed by General

Kondylis. Twelve months later Venizelos, a pitiful political wreck, died in Paris.

THE RISE OF METAXAS

The parliamentary elections of June 1935 were cornered by the Tsaldaris-Kondylis coalition, the new—and ominous—champion of the republican cause. General Metaxas' Royalist Union secured no more than 7 seats out of a total of 300. The General boldly attributed his defeat to repressive government measures. A new twist was given to the situation by another *coup d'état*—this time by Kondylis (October 10). The "Thunderbolt" established himself as regent and dictator; it was he who "made" the plebiscite on the restoration of the monarchy—with the result known in advance and Greece under martial law. Force swung the vote, boycotted by the republican opposition. On November 25, 1935, George II returned to Athens, the second monarch to be King of Greece twice within twenty years.

Kondylis, the kingmaker who once had played a chief part in ousting George, disagreed with his sovereign from the very start. Opposing the King's intentions for a sweeping amnesty, he discovered himself politely dismissed. A nonpartisan, stop-gap cabinet headed by Professor Constantine Demerdjis called another election for January; it resulted in a stalemate between Venizelist adherents and opponents, with fifteen Communists thrown in for good measure. Able to choose freely, the King in April chose as premier Germanophile General Jean Metaxas, known as "Little Moltke," stocky, blue-eyed, and bespectacled strategist of opportunity.

Within a few months a strange combination of circumstances had changed the political picture. Death had removed Kondylis, Venizelos, Demerdjis, and Tsaldaris between January and April. This, however, did not facilitate the task of forming a parliamentary government. Metaxas labored for three months. Finally he gave up. On August 4, 1936, he assumed dictatorial powers, speaking vaguely of an attempted Communist revolt. The same month Parliament was abolished by royal decree. Thereafter all political parties were declared dissolved. An era that had witnessed no less than twenty revolutions within little more than a decade was pronounced closed.

ARMY VETO

During the past four centuries seminomadic warriors known as klephts—the counterpart of the Slav Haiduks—had preserved native justice without or against the Turkish authorities; their exploits warmed Greek hearts. The High Porte, since the sixteenth century, had found it wise to come to terms with the boldest leaders, appointing them as *armatoles* entrusted with local power—poachers turned gamekeepers. Both klephts and *armatoles* distinguished themselves in Greek uprisings.¹⁵ Their traditions have transmitted themselves to Greece's soldiery. As a rule revolutions have been made in barracks rather than on barricades. But the army's periodic excursions into politics have often reflected the popular sentiment of the time because officers and men formed a representative cross section of the nation. In 1843 the army was instrumental in compelling King Otto to grant a constitution; again, in 1862, the military helped to dethrone him because of his insistence on violating the constitution. The most striking instance of army veto occurred in 1909, when popular discontent culminated in the insurrection of the Military League composed mostly of non-commissioned officers; the movement forced King George I and the politicians of the day to surrender the government to Venizelos.

These precedents gained a deeper appeal during the subsequent contest between the royalists and the republicans, which involved wholesale removals of officers by both sides. In 1922 the defeated army retreating from Asia Minor turned its fury on the cabinet. The execution of the "Six" set a new style in exterminating opponents. The army, divided into the "ins" and "outs," became a praetorian guard of rival politicians and the perpetrator of successive republican and monarchist coups which culminated in the destruction of the republic. As a result, Greek generals enjoy a reputation in public life that few civilians can hope to attain. There is hardly a political party which does not boast of a prominent military name on its roster. No Greek can think of politics without the association of soldiers and military revolts. Under the circumstances, politics is both

¹⁵ Similar to their activities were those of the Greek Corsairs, who in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries conducted warfare against the Turks in the Aegean Sea.

a virile and a risky profession. "Safe" elections are costly affairs, and most cabinet ministers—despite rank graft—have lived and died poor.¹⁶

THE GULF BETWEEN CITY AND VILLAGE

Greece, too, has been cursed by the chasm between the intellectuals and the wealthy on the one side and the people on the other. The differences between city and hamlet are conspicuous. Most educated Greeks display the arrogance of a privileged minority and little understanding for the downtrodden and neglected peasantry. The center of political and social gravity is Athens, which enjoys life's latest comforts. The village, cut off from the world, is forced to foot the bill for the activities of the capital and vainly tries to obtain its share of power. Frugality, thrift, and soberness are the virtues of humility in the country districts. Two-thirds of all Greeks are small landholders living in villages that represent enlarged families.¹⁷ For centuries exploited by their masters, they accept their lot without much murmur of protest. The postwar history of Greece has created no agrarian party of consequence.¹⁸

The cleavage between city and village is widened by the peculiarities of the Greek language. Discrepancies between the spoken and written language have persisted since the sixth century. The written language, *Katharevousa*, a mixture of classical and popular Greek, is used in official, scientific, and legal documents, and also by the newspapers; it is gradually losing ground. The spoken or popular language, *demotiki*, is now widely used in Greek literature. The fact remains, however, that the uneducated Greek cannot understand the high Greek, while the educated understands both. Instruction of the peasant, then, is practically in a foreign tongue.

¹⁶ According to Great Britain, Admiralty, Geographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division, *A Handbook of Greece*, I (London, 1920), 96, "one of the most costly claims upon a political candidate is the duty of standing godfather to the children of constituents, every godchild costing him from 30 to 50 drachma at least."

¹⁷ See C. L. Fry, "Greece," in *The Near East and American Philanthropy* (New York, 1929), pp. 114-42.

¹⁸ P. A. Sorokin, C. C. Zimmerman, and C. J. Galpin, *A Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology*, II (Minneapolis, 1932), 664-65, describe the agrarian movement in Greece.

The eternal struggle between urban and rural standards has been intensified since World War I by the influx of 1,500,000 Greeks from Asia Minor. The refugees were the heirs of an old city civilization. They brought a modest prosperity caused by a refugee loan from the League of Nations, as well as new industries such as carpetmaking, coppersmithing, silk-weaving, and glassmaking. They made the Greek villager more factory-conscious and injected in their peasant neighbors the virus of craft competition.

Sheer economic pressure has caused a nation-wide surge toward the institutions of higher learning. Statistics show that Greece possesses one doctor for every 1,200 inhabitants and one lawyer for every 1,720.¹⁹ These figures indicate a serious professional overcrowding in a country largely agricultural. In 1937 there were 2,610 graduates from primary and secondary schools—and only 90 professional vacancies.²⁰ Six hundred lawyers are called to the bar yearly as against 250 who retire. The academic *numerus clausus* of 1933 only heightened dissatisfaction. In 1937 the government announced further restrictive measures, and a new program of instruction intended to be practical rather than intellectual. Technical, especially agricultural, education is emphasized. But to keep the peasant's son on the soil instead of letting him swell the ranks of the unemployed at Athens will not be easy. Another step in this direction has been the transfer of the Agricultural High School at Athens to the university of Salonica—with the object of preventing agricultural students from being spoiled for their essentially rural profession by becoming accustomed to the life of the capital.

Athens, on the other hand, has rarely spoiled Greeks for patriotic pursuits. Marxism has never been able to compete with the "grand manner" of the capital. It is among the tobacco workers that Communism has made the greatest number of proselytes. In the industrial districts of Salonica, Kavalla, Volo, and Piraeus, agitation has continued even under the dictatorship. The government views as particularly dangerous the Communist-supported idea of a "free" Macedonia.

¹⁹ *Great Britain and the East*, XLVIII (1937), 365.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, XLIX (1937), 101.

THE HABIT OF SOMERSAULT

Although the Metaxas regime tried to eliminate the old political pattern, the battle cries of the past twenty years were by no means dead. Nor could political division be eradicated. The refugees, on the whole more vigorous and progressive, differ as a group in the character of their allegiance from those who have inhabited "Old Greece" for more than two millennia. The majority of the refugees, suffering hardships after their repatriation, fell under the spell of Venizelos and came to share his dreams of a Greater Greece. They backed his opposition to the monarchy which, they thought, was responsible for their plight. During the 1935 revolt, the strongest resistance against the royalists was offered in eastern Macedonia, where the refugees—called "new" Greeks—live in compact settlements. To them, the restoration was a victory for the "old" Greeks.

There is no question that between 1915 and 1936 the vital issue was not the choice between republic and monarchy, but between constitutional government and autocracy. Clear-cut contours, however, were blurred by ever-changing reaffiliations; all political stars circled around Venizelos. Parliamentary government degenerated into "bossism." Free from programmatic ties, deputies made their terms with the party chiefs, and defections were common. "Personal ambitions and partisan hatred have played a role as pernicious as in any other Balkan State."²¹

In the past, the Turk plucked the country, offering no values in return. Her postwar politicians gave Greece anything but an effective short course in the art of responsible self-government. As a result, the Greek distrusts government authority. He likes to be his own party. Proportional representation, introduced in 1926 and applied again in 1932, strengthened the tendency toward ephemeral alliances of small factions. In 1922, for instance, Greece had seven cabinets under six different prime ministers. This instability is partly conditioned by other factors. The wars carried on by Greece from 1912 to 1923 have created economic and psychological exhaustion. The defeat in Asia Minor and the dislocations coming on the heels of the

²¹ Editorial, *Near East and India*, XLVI (1935), 272. Quoted by permission of the editor.

Lausanne settlement of 1923 placed a tremendous strain upon the morale of the country. The modern Greek is both national-conscious and clannish. To himself he is a Cretan or Mainote or Agraphiote; and indeed there are very real distinctions of character, disposition, and mode of speech. The deeply indented coastline with its strings of islands and a mainland divided into valleys have segregated the people into many narrow compartments, each fostering its own conception of righteousness. The dislike of the Greek for mass discipline and organization is deepseated.²² It has expressed itself in politics.

Unlike the political clubs in the United States, the centers of partisan discussion in Greece are open-air institutions—the coffeehouses. They are the natural rendezvous for social intercourse and business transactions as well. Women are seldom seen, as either waitresses or customers. The coffeehouse is the man's club and as such a decisive influence in the community. Here the Greek reads his favorite newspapers, all vitriolic sheets, airs his political convictions, and partakes of the latest rumors. The coffeehouses grouped around the Alexander Hotel in Athens have seen the making of many a premier.

CONSTITUTIONAL VARIATIONS

Past experience shows that parliamentarism and constitutionalism are institutions alien to the Greek political pattern. During the period between the abolition of monarchy and its restoration in 1935, Greece solicited autocratic rule as an escape from the logical consequences of republicanism. Thus in turn General Pangalos, Venizelos, General Plastiras, and "Cromwell" Kondylis stepped in to supply the country with a steward whose prestige would transcend that of the ordinary faction chieftain.

The frequent shifts in the style of government demonstrate also that no document, whether republican or monarchical, has been looked upon with great respect. This is reflected in the whole constitutional history of Greece. The hazards faced by Greek monarchy since its foundation in 1832 offer ample evidence. Of the five kings, three were dethroned and forced to

²² For good discussions of Greek national mentality see H. P. Fairchild, *Immigrant Backgrounds* (New York, 1937), pp. 58-70, and *op. cit.* (above note 9), pp. 12-42; H. Morgenthau, *I Was Sent to Athens* (Garden City, N.Y., 1929), pp. 288-301.

leave the country—Otto in 1862, Constantine in 1917 and a second time in 1922, and George II in 1923 and 1941—while one, George I, was assassinated in 1913. Thus only one greek monarch, Alexander, Constantine's second son, has been permitted to die a peaceful death in his native land—the result of a monkey bite. Most of these changes, on the other hand, have been bloodless. Similarly businesslike procedures were followed on two other occasions—when the republic was established, and when, after a fanciful plebiscite, the present King returned to Greece without a shot being fired.

Neither the President of the Republic—who in 1928, contrary to the constitution, canceled by decree proportional representation—nor the cabinet heads paid much attention to the most elementary democratic principles of Greece's basic laws. Arbitrary power was wielded by each faction that happened to be at the helm; their main concern was to pull the military and naval forces into the government camps. Even Venizelos when out of power would not accept the constitutional principle of a majority rule. The electoral law was manipulated outside the constitution, and the series of amendments which it suffered evinced the zeal of each regime to use it for purely pragmatic ends.

The orgy of constitution making began in 1821 and has continued unabated ever since.²³ The last outburst, a ponderous document, recorded in the constitution of June 2, 1927,²⁴ concluded with this thoughtful passage: "To the patriotism of the Hellenes the observance of the Constitution shall be entrusted." Made obviously in great haste, the constitution was both thoroughly disorganized and so detailed that it is tiresome reading. Borrowing its democratic and constitutional principles mostly from French and British doctrines, it tried vainly to introduce a true parliamentary republic.

²³ P. J. Papassoteriou, *Greece Back to Democracy* (New York, 1928), pp. 165-73, gives a good discussion of her constitutional development. See J. Delpech and J. Laferrière, *Les constitutions modernes*, I (4th ed., Paris, 1928), 621-56; and C. Seymour and D. P. Frary, *How the World Votes*, II (Springfield, Mass., 1918), 239-65.

²⁴ English text in Papassoteriou, *op. cit.*, pp. 207-51. A summary is to be found in *The Near East Year Book*, 1931-32, pp. 310-18; and *European Economic and Political Survey* (July 15, 1927), pp. 709-14. For a summary with comments see Miller, *Greece*, pp. 309-24; B. Mirkine-Guetzevitch, "Constitutional Problems in Greece," *Political Quarterly*, VI (1935), 411-17; and A. Giannini, "La costituzione greca," *Europa Orientale*, X (1930), 65-89.

Administratively, Greece was divided, on the basis of the French example, into 37 departments, each under a prefect appointed by the central authority, and 141 eparchies supervised by subprefects. The scheme was strongly centralistic; police control was particularly rigid. There were 40 municipalities (*demoi*), with a municipal council presided over by a mayor; in towns of more than 10,000 inhabitants both mayor and council were elected by general vote. The 4,990 communes (*koinotetes*) were administered by elected communal councils, which choose, as in the case of the smaller towns, their presidents from among the council membership. Macedonia, Epirus, Crete, and Thrace were administered by governors general, with the rank of cabinet ministers.

GREEK AUTHORITARIANISM

The King's decision of August 1936 to follow the example set by King Alexander of Yugoslavia and King Boris of Bulgaria was another attempt to inaugurate a transition period until "the golden age without political parties" could be reached. The steps taken to accomplish this ideal recall those of Hitler's Germany. In short, from the moment that Metaxas suspended the Constitution (August 1936) until his death after the Italian invasion (January 1941), the dictator held Greece in an iron grip, censoring the press, using a secret police and uniformed organizations of a semi-military character, and prohibiting the existence of free trade unions. To the politically minded Greeks these steps were extremely abhorrent, and both the King and the dictator were sincerely hated. Government was even more highly centralized than in the preceding decade, and the mayors of Athens and Piraeus—hitherto popularly elected—became nominees of Metaxas. All political freedom was ended. On the surface, Metaxas was able to produce an atmosphere of calm, lasting four years, which put an end, for the time being, to Greece's usual political instability featured by weak governments and parliaments.

THE GLORY AND HORRORS OF WORLD WAR II

Under the shadow of World War II, Metaxas tried to pursue a policy of neutrality. In spite of periodic protestations of friendship, relations with Italy had not been basically easy,

owing to the annexation of Albania in the spring of 1939 and rumors of Italian designs on Corfu. But efforts were made to keep up the appearance of friendship, and in September 1939 the Greeks and Italians withdrew their respective forces from the Albanian border, reaffirming the Pact of Friendship, Conciliation, and Judicial Settlements (signed in Rome on September 23, 1928); the problem of the Dodecanese Islands, with Rhodes, were lately kept in the background. Hitler's Germany was, however, the growing menace. Goering, Goebbels, and Schacht had visited Athens, and Berlin had spent large amounts on archaeological research and cultural propaganda. Although, economically, Greece was less important to Berlin than any other Balkan country, Greek foreign trade was far greater with Germany than with any other country. Britain tried to bolster its traditional policy of friendship with Greece by signing a financial agreement in January 1940, whereby Britain agreed to buy the greater part of the tobacco crop.

The precarious hope of peace disappeared, however, nearly overnight. With the collapse of France, and Italy's entrance into the war, Italy's possession of Albania offered to the Axis a land route to Salonika and thence to the Middle East, made even more attractive by the loss of the French naval forces and the doubtful attitude of the French troops in Syria.

On October 28, 1940, in the small hours of the morning, the Italian Minister in Athens called at the house of General Metaxas, who received him in his dressing gown. The invasion of Greece was imminent, and the preliminary indications had been on the way in terms of "incidents" on the Greek-Albanian border; the Fascist radio had been harping on imaginary British violations of Greek neutrality. A three-hour ultimatum demanded "as a guarantee alike of the neutrality of Greece and the security of Italy, the right to occupy . . . a number of strategic points in Greek territory." But the Minister could not state which "strategic points" Rome had in mind. Metaxas replied that Greece would fight.²⁵ Within two and a half hours—even before the ultimatum expired—Italian troops were advancing into northwestern Greece.

²⁵ For more details on this period, see, Francis Noel-Baker, *Greece* (London, 1946); A. W. Gomme, *Greece* (London, 1945); and Marcel Hoden, *A Diary of World Affairs* (New York, 1941).

The Greek people forgot their differences and their hatred of Metaxas and joined in the war with the greatest enthusiasm. This accounted for Greece's higher morale; the Italians in the main had little stomach for the war. Their commanders neither understood the sort of warfare that they were to wage, nor equipped themselves for it, nor appreciated the quality of the enemy and their understanding of its nature and their greater adaptability. The outside world will long admire the record of courage and bravery made by the Greek people. Despite the great superiority of the Italian weapons, the Greeks drove the invaders from Greek soil, even pushing them into Albania. Evidence was produced at the Nuremburg trials which showed that the unexpected resistance in the Balkans upset the German army's schedule for the attack on Russia, which had to be postponed from May 15 until June 22, 1941, and that the losses of picked German paratroops on Crete prevented a plan for synchronizing an attack on Syria with Rashid Ali's revolt in Iraq.

The Axis would have suffered a decisive defeat if the Nazis had not come to the rescue of their Fascist partners in crime in the spring of 1941. With the arrival of the Nazis, the British sent a small expeditionary force into Greece, but the weight of the Nazi machine was so great that the country was overrun and placed under the iron rule of the Axis. Metaxas died on January 20, 1941, after a throat operation, and his successor, Koritzis, the Governor of the National Bank of Greece, committed suicide on April 18. The King escaped first to Crete and then to Cairo and London.

Immediately after entering Athens, the Nazis put up Tsolakoglou's puppet government. Unable to be of any use to the conquerors, quislings began to succeed each other.

The sufferings of the Axis occupation were made more bitter by the behavior of the Bulgarian forces which followed on the heels of the Germans and occupied Macedonia and Thrace without a fight, and finally annexed Western Thrace (October 1941), although right up to the previous month, Premier Filov had promised not to invade Greece. (The Germans controlled Salonika but later permitted the Bulgarians to cross the Vardar north of that city.)

The outrages of the Bulgarians explain why the Balkan peoples are persistently bitter in their memories about their in-

vading neighbors. A systematic policy of evicting the Greek element and replacing it by Bulgarian settlers was inaugurated; in fact, the Bulgarian policy was characterized as "a frantic desire to Bulgarize Western Thrace and eastern Macedonia as soon as possible by all means at their disposal."²⁶ Surnames had to be given a Bulgarian form and the best land was handed over to the Bulgarian settlers, while Greeks had to pay higher taxes and received less rations.

With the possible exception of Poland, it is doubtful whether any nation suffered more cruelly during World War II at the hands of the Nazis. It is estimated that at least half a million persons, out of a population of five and a half million, were slain or died of privation during the years the Nazis dominated the unfortunate country. This figure, high as it is, does not reveal the true toll exacted by the Nazis, for it does not take into account the general weakening of the population caused by more than three years of malnutrition and planned starvation. Large sections of the Greek population have become prey to tuberculosis and many other diseases as a result of the Nazis' ruthless policy toward this ancient land. It is estimated that one out of every six Greeks was afflicted (1946) with tuberculosis; such diseases as typhus and malaria were widespread. In addition to the loss of human life, some 1,500 villages were destroyed by the Nazi brutality, accounting for nearly a fourth of all the houses in Greece outside the large cities. Furthermore, about a third of the nation's wealth, represented by factories, railroads, and other assets, was destroyed.

THE GUERRILLAS

During the long months of the occupation, the Greeks again displayed their courage by engaging in effective guerrilla warfare against the oppressors. The underground was causing serious trouble to the Italians and Bulgarians as early as the autumn of 1941. In the following summer, the Allied command started co-ordinating this resistance through British officers introduced to the country from time to time. They found that the resistance was directed mainly by the Greek National Liberation Front (EAM), which controlled the National Popular

²⁶ For more details see Joseph B. Schechtman, *European Population Transfers, 1939-1945* (New York, 1946), pp. 420-21.

Liberation Front (ELAS), and the National Democratic Greek Army (EDES). These various groups co-operated for some time, and sometimes succeeded in driving the Germans and Italians out of many country districts. An EAM contingent, for instance, destroyed the Gorgopotamus bridge, cutting rail communications between Athens and Salonika and interrupting the flow of German supplies to North Africa at a vital moment in Rommel's campaign.

Both EDES and EAM favored the establishment of a republican form of government and were united in their opposition to the restoration of the monarchy. But the EAM was more radical than the EDES and was known to have among its leaders a considerable number of Communists.

By the summer of 1943 the EAM had "freed" about a third of the mainland; with the Italian capitulation in September it acquired great quantities of Italian arms and ammunition. When liberation came, EAM controlled almost all Greece, except big towns, strategic points, and lines of communication held by the Germans. Organized on military lines, at the head of each unit were three men: a *capetanio*s (guerrilla leader), a military commander (often a former Greek army officer), and a political adviser. Actual control was usually in the latter's hands—and he was usually a Communist. This, with the fact that toward the end Communists occupied most of the key positions in all branches of the EAM, was at least partly due to their superior training and experience in organization and subversive work.

The resistance lost, however, some of its effectiveness because of internal dissensions among the guerrillas; the feud between the EAM and the "nationalist" groups eventually culminated in civil war after the liberation. Nevertheless, Greek resistance was a very definite military asset to the Allies. It immobilized between fifteen and twenty enemy divisions during the occupation, proved a constant and serious embarrassment to them, and on several occasions deceived the German High Command about Allied intentions.

LIBERATION AND CIVIL WAR

On October 14, 1944, Greek and British troops occupied Athens, and on October 30 Greek patriots seized Salonika. The

government-in-exile, which had been established in Cairo and later moved to Naples, returned to the capital. It soon was faced with a bloody and bitter civil war.

In the background was the old monarchical question and the British control of Greece. The exiled King had returned from London to Cairo in March 1943; in the following September six guerilla delegates visited Cairo and demanded that three members of the resistance movement should join the Greek government—and that the King should not return to Greece until a plebiscite had been held to determine the popular will in the matter. Their demands were refused, but the idea was popular and resulted in the mutiny of the First Greek Brigade and by a large proportion of the Greek navy. The British forces saved the Greek forces for the King, since London was working for the King's return. But the King promised to submit freely to the judgment of the Greek people after the expulsion of the enemy from the country.

Upon returning to Greek soil, Premier George Papandreou tried to reorganize his Cabinet so as to include representatives of all political parties within Greece. Meanwhile the EAM, baffled and frustrated, became more and more Communist and more extreme; it was intensely suspicious of British intentions and of the anti-EAM premier and ministers in the government. On the right were the "nationalists": British protégés; victims of EAM reprisals; people who feared the left and "revolution"; and those who had fallen for German propaganda and turned quisling or joined "Security Battalions."

The liberation "honeymoon" lasted for just about two months. In November the Premier insisted on the disbandment of all "private armies" as the first step toward re-establishing the rule of law; the EAM insisted on the disbandment of its opponents also. On December 3 a large EAM demonstration, banned at the last moment by the government, marched toward Athens' Constitution Square. The police opened fire and a number of the demonstrators were killed. On December 5 the civil war began.

The fighting in Athens in December 1944 and January 1945 was variously described as a "Communist revolt," "the second liberation," "British reactionary intervention," and "the maintenance of law and order." There are arguments to support

each of these descriptions. It is true that the EAM was dominated by the Communists trying to seize power; it is also true that in many of the EAM-controlled areas the inhabitants were living under a terror regime which had become worse than German or Italian occupation; for them, the end of the civil war was a "second liberation." On the other hand, without British intervention, the fighting would have permitted the EAM government to exist and would have eliminated its active political opponents on the grounds that they were Fascists or collaborators.

The world-wide importance of the struggle was shown by the visit to Athens paid by Eden and Churchill on Christmas Day, 1946. They arranged to have Damaskinos, Archbishop of Greece, appointed a regent.

THE RULE OF DAMASKINOS

Churchill and Eden used their influence to insure Damaskinos' return. They wanted a government in Greece which would maintain friendly relations with Britain, thus safeguarding the vital Mediterranean sea lanes upon which the British depend for trade with the Middle East and the Orient. The British felt that a monarchy, even a limited one, would be "safer" than a government which might be Communist-dominated and inclined to follow the wishes of the Russians. The civil war ended by the installation of Damaskinos, pending a plebiscite to determine whether or not the exiled King should return to his throne; the ELAS was disarmed, and a new government was formed under the leadership of General Plastiras.

Damaskinos held his regency and kept his government in power only with the support of the British Army in Greece. Tall (6 feet, 4 inches) and full of dignity, he cut a figure unique among modern statesmen. He was born of peasants 54 years ago in the brown hills of Thessaly, and he was one of thirteen children. He had an uncle, a well-to-do priest, who shepherded him through the schools of Karditza, where he excelled as a wrestler and javelin thrower. He studied law as well as theology at the University of Athens, and in 1918, the year after he took holy orders, he achieved his first political triumph—

an agreement resolving the nationalist quarrels of the Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian monks in the monasteries of revered Mount Athos.

Damaskinos visited the United States in 1928 to raise money for earthquake victims, and again in 1930, when he succeeded in uniting divided Greek Orthodox factions. In 1938, with the violent opposition of Dictator-Premier Metaxas and the King, he was elected Archbishop of all Greece—by one vote. Metaxas promptly annulled the election, put in Chrysanthos of Trebizond, and exiled Damaskinos to the mountain monastery of Phaneromene on Salamis. But he returned to Athens when his old opponent, Chrysanthos, was dismissed for refusing to swear in the first quisling premier, General George Tsolakoglu. However, the new Archbishop proved to be no stooge. He saved hundreds of Jewish lives by encouraging Orthodox Greeks to harbor them; he achieved undying fame by substituting his name and those of his Bishops for a list of hostages about to be shot for the death of a German soldier. His philanthropies, although not connected directly with any one resistance movement, also succored the men in the hills. He banded his clergy into the EOCHA (National Organization of Christian Solidarity) to help those interned by the occupying powers.

Even with British support, Regent Damaskinos had hard going. Greece was a hungry nation, in spite of the help extended by UNRRA. Inflation was on the march. The Leftist EAM and its disarmed ELAS, had been vitiated, but Greeks did not forget the valor or the sins of the resistant left. Damaskinos' ministers often outdid the repressed left in rigorous repression. The ever-seething question of whether King George II should take the throne embroiled Damaskinos' first choice for the premiership, General Nicholas Plastiras, and led to his overthrow. Distrusting him, royalists published the fact that Plastiras had invited German intervention during Greece's heroic war with Italy. Into office came harassed, tubby Admiral Petros Voulgaris, commander-in-chief of the Greek fleet and a follower of Eleutherios Venizelos. Beating upon the Regent were minority Communists and equally vocal Rightists. And beating upon him from without was the big-power contest for the Mediterranean.

BATTLE ROYAL

On March 31, 1946, Greeks had their first free elections since 1936. Under the supervision of 1,400 British, American, and French inspectors, there was little disorder and any Greek who wanted to could cast his ballot. Between 60 and 70 per cent did. The Leftist parties boycotted the elections, although apparently many of their members did not observe the ban. Backed by propaganda from Moscow, they had charged that the balloting was being conducted under circumstances of Rightist terror that made a fair vote impossible. The Rightists, backed by the British, in turn charged that the Leftists had stayed away because they knew they could not win. (The election returns showed 1,040,000 votes cast, of which 557,909 were for the Populist coalition; 344,578 for the Papandreou-Venizelos-Kanellopoulos group, and 142,038 for Sophoulis' Liberals.)

The electoral differences went beyond Greece herself. Essentially they represented a showdown between the British and the Russians. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was in effect forced to insist that the elections be carried out despite the Leftist boycott. Any postponement would have been interpreted as a victory not so much for the Greek Left as for Russia. An overwhelming political pressure against the British might have added to the military pressure that was already evident in the ratio of Russian and British forces—200,000 Red Army troops in Bulgaria as against 40,000 British troops in Greece.

The explosive issue of the return of King George II, exiled in London, plagued the government immediately after the victory of the royalists. The question was supposed to have been settled in November (1945) with an agreement that the royal plebiscite would not be held for two years after the March elections. But the royalist Populist party won them—and it had never formally agreed to postpone the plebiscite. The royalists and their exiled chief wanted to bring the issue to a head soon. The British, fearing renewed violence over the monarchy, wanted to stabilize the situation, keeping Archbishop Damaskinos as regent indefinitely. They hoped the King would agree.

Thus when the Archbishop sent King George a routine telegram of resignation following the election, he expected to

receive from His Majesty a hearty message asking him to continue. Instead, he got a lukewarm telegram accepting the resignation and asking him to remain in office only "until the Cabinet was fully formed." His Beatitude was enraged, and in a stormy interview with Sir Clifford Norton, British Ambassador to Greece, who urged the continuance of his regency, the Archbishop waved the King's telegram at the ambassador and said: "I have no wish to be kept on, like a chambermaid, for a week or two."

Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin then sprang into action. In an urgent telegram sent April 9, he informed Archbishop Damaskinos that "Your Beatitude's withdrawal from office at this juncture would have a most disturbing effect. It seems to me your duty to your country leaves you no choice but to continue in office for the present." Simultaneously, Sir Orme Sargent, Permanent Foreign Under Secretary, was hurriedly dispatched to Claridge's Hotel to prevail upon King George to be more gracious in his dealings with the Archbishop. The King, however, was not co-operative.

In his refusal to permit continuation of the regency, the King was backed by 165 newly elected Populist deputies, who cabled him their support. Greece, at that time, was run by the government of Premier Constantin Tsaldaris which was drifting closer and closer toward dictatorship.

TSALDARIS: ROYALIST DEMOCRAT

Although Tsaldaris is from ancient Corinth, he was born in Egypt (1885) while his parents were visiting there. He studied law at the University of Athens and then completed his education in England, Germany, and Italy. The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 added the stern experience of service in the army. By World War I, Tsaldaris already had made his mark as a government administrator; he was Prefect of Corfu when the Allies occupied that island in 1916 and enlisted his immediate co-operation. Four years later he became Governor-General of Crete, largest of Greece's islands and the most politically conscious. Politics, with its broader field, beckoned during the 1920's and Tsaldaris became increasingly active in the royalist circles, achieving Cabinet stature in 1933 as Minister of Communications. He was one of those to protest to the King against

the dictatorship which General John Metaxas set up in 1936, and he repeatedly refused official posts which Metaxas kept offering him. In World War II, when the Axis overwhelmed Greece, Tsaldaris became a moving spirit in the resistance movement. He was arrested by the Italians but later managed to escape to Egypt in 1944. He did not participate in any of the exile governments, holding their policies too revolutionary. Returning to Greece after the liberation, he polled a top majority in the 1946 parliamentary elections.

Not a very impressive figure—short, rather stout, and often nervous or irritated in manner—his popularity with the Greeks was enhanced by the way he upheld the Greek cause at the Paris Peace Conference in the face of a concerted assault by the Soviet Union and its satellites. And when those assaults came from Yugoslavia, Greece's most violent critic in 1946, no man could better appreciate the irony of history. For it was Tsaldaris, as Prefect of Corfu, who gave haven to the refugee government and the army of Serbia in World War I, after the German and Austrian armies had overrun the country. And it was from Corfu that the refugee Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes issued the now historic Declaration of Corfu demanding complete national unity for their peoples—a demand which led to the creation of Yugoslavia.

Tsaldaris wanted to be sure that the plebiscite of September 1, 1946, would return King George II to the throne, since Greece depended for its very existence on American dollars and British troops. A new "emergency decree" abolished habeas corpus, deprived all political "suspects" of the right of assembly, and vested sweeping life and death powers in special summary courts. Tsaldaris ruled that the impending plebiscite, originally intended to decide the issue of monarchy versus republic, was to determine only whether King George or some other regent should take over Greece. In charge of the polls was Minister of the Interior John Theotokis, who had a way with elections: he organized the 1935 plebiscite on the monarchy, and produced a 97.5 percent majority for the King.

The Greeks saw that their cupboards were bare and that their jails were full. They saw that the British were apparently either unable or unwilling to stop the growing threat of civil war between Right and Left. The center parties were growing

weaker, the Communists were gaining strength, and some British on the spot obviously thought it might be better to oppose the Communists with dubious allies than not to oppose them at all. The British themselves were at least partly responsible for this dilemma because they failed to remedy economic misery and tried in 1946 to fight Communism with royalists and reactionary extremists.

UNEASY CROWN OF GEORGE II

The elections came out "right": Out of 1,861,146 electors, 1,691,592 voted; for the King, 1,166,512; for the Republic, 521,268. King George II returned home, after sixty-five months in exile, to rule over the war-impooverished Greek people. George had never been a popular figure, nor was his father, who had twice been forced to abdicate: once for pro-German sympathies during World War I, and the second time after the defeat of Greece by Turkey in 1922. He was hated by left-wing Greeks for turning the country over to the dictatorship of Metaxas in 1936; he was also reproached for not encouraging resistance groups led by the Communists during the German occupation and for constantly supporting Greek governments that were dominated by conservative politicians.

When George stepped off the plane that brought him from Britain, he found himself up to his neck in trouble. Undeclared war raged between Greek factions, and on all her borders Greece was plagued by territory-seeking neighbors.

As one of the danger spots on the fringes of Russia, Greece will bear close watching for many years to come. Two of Russia's ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean are to gain a corridor to the Aegean Sea and to secure the flanks of the Dardanelles—the forty-mile-long strait between Europe and Asia. These ambitions can be fulfilled only if British and American influences are driven out of Greece, the only Balkan country over which the "Iron Curtain" had not fallen by 1946.

Russia, therefore, supported Bulgaria and Albania, which had ridden the Hitler bandwagon against Greece, who had poured out her lifeblood and resources in heroic battle against the Axis. Also for that reason Russia exploited local rivalries in Greece.

Bulgaria wanted Greek Thrace as an outlet to the Aegean.

Albania claimed Greek Epirus, the most northwesterly province of Greece, a backward, mountainous, sparsely settled area along the Adriatic coast, as her reward for helping Mussolini attack Greece. But the Greeks reconquered the land before Hitler's Panzers swept in from the north.

Yugoslavia wanted Greek Macedonia in order to obtain the Aegean port of Salonica. With Salonica in Yugoslavia's hands, Russia would gain a better port than Dede Agach of Thrace and would almost certainly become the controlling power in Greece.

The internal conflict was the unhappy offspring of the Greek civil war in 1944-1945. At the end of 1946, the struggle for control continued between the extreme Right and the extreme Left with few "middle-of-the-roadsers."

This was the situation that confronted George as he set foot on Greek soil for the first time since April 1941. George got a 101-gun salute, attended *Te Deum* services, and spoke to his ill-fed, ill-housed, ill-clothed people by radio.

King George's reign did not bring peace to Greece, split by doubt and fear and bordered by its neighbors' militant hatreds. The British, who had come to Greece as liberators, had failed. The presence even of a friendly, homesick, token-size British army hurt Greek *philotimo* (a kind of self-esteem); the Communists just hated them. Politically, the Right, more reactionary than conservative, was led by Constantin ("Dino") Tsalدارis, heading the Populists, largest right-wing party (151 seats in Parliament) and General Napoleon Zervas (National Party, 24 seats), who fought well against the Germans but had a somewhat shady reputation. The extreme left was bossed by Greece's Communists: George Siantos, wartime secretary-general of the party, whose strength was waning, and Kiko Zakhariades, present secretary-general, a Moscow-trained veteran party organizer who once shot a man in an Athens square. Between these two irreconcilable extremists were feebly gasping Greece's weak Centrists with weak leaders: Themistocles Sophoulis (87 years of age), a former archaeologist and Themistocles Venizelos, bridge-playing, insignificant son of Eleutherios Venizelos, Greece's last first-rate politician. King George's reign brought no solutions to the political tug-of-war. In fact, the internal problems became even more complicated by the Slav-

onic pressure from the north, integrated with Albania's traditional antagonism; this problem called forth a United Nations Commission which not too hopefully started hearings on Greece's imbroglio with her northern neighbors. Meanwhile, in January 1947, former New Dealer Paul A. Porter, ex-OPA-administrator, also reached Athens as head of a United States economic mission; he refused to grant Greece any loans, insisting that the Greeks must put themselves on the road to orderly recovery. His minor success was the willingness of the government to slash the number of its proliferating ministries from 43 to 15. But by that time, Tsaldaris was already out; his place was taken by frail, ailing ex-banker Demetrios Maximos, a non-party ex-Royalist. Greece was one of the most unfortunate and suffering "United Nations" nation at the turn of the year.

GREECE'S NEW KING

In April 1947, George II, "the laughless one," who had returned in the fall of 1946 to the throne he loathed after his third exile in twenty-five years, died of a heart attack. His brother, Paul, who had arranged the plebiscite which brought George out of exile, inherited the hottest seat in Europe. What Greece needed at that time was a strong man. George was not the man; on paper, neither was Paul. Most of his 45 years had been spent in frivolity at European play spots like Monte Carlo and in becoming adept at flying, yachting, mountain climbing. In 1938, with 40 princes present and 20 bishops officiating, he married Princess Frederika, German-born great-great-granddaughter of Britain's Queen Victoria. She may turn out to be a real power in Greece's monarchy; an ardent feminist and eager to organize the women of Greece into an effective political force, she has a personality which is more forceful than that of her husband. In Paul's favor is his war record as a commander in the Greek navy, and, after the Nazi triumph, in Cairo, South Africa, and with the exiled Greek government in London. Better still is the fact that he had no part in George's dealings with the hated dictator, "Little John" Metaxas.

Liberal and royalist deputies heard Greece's sixth King since the nation won independence from Turkey in 1833 take his

oath: "I shall devote all the strength of my soul to the good of the nation. Our eternal fatherland is calling us today to a struggle of existence for her independence and her liberties. United, we shall bring this struggle to an end. Long live Greece!" But no monarch's words could bring union to strife-torn Greece; to Leftists it makes no difference that King Paul had replaced King George—for what they hate is the monarchy itself.

THE TSALDARIS INTERLUDE

After the elections, a series of Populist-dominated right-wing coalition regimes ruled Greece—until August 1947. In January 1947, the Premier was Demetrios Maximos, but the real boss was Constantin Tsaldaris, Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister, chief of the Populist Party. Closely associated with him was General Napoleon Zervas, Minister of Public Order, known as the most extreme Rightist in the government. In August 1947 these three men became involved in a Greek Cabinet crisis—a crisis in which the United States played an important part. When the United States Congress passed the Truman doctrine to aid Greece, there was sharp criticism in America of the Maximos-Tsaldaris-Zervas regime; many observers termed it reactionary, inefficient. Although Washington supported it, it was evident that the State Department was pressing for a more liberal regime. On the collapse of Maximos' government, Dwight Griswold, head of the United States mission to administer the Truman doctrine funds, and Lincoln MacVeagh, American Ambassador, participated in the discussion aiming to form a broader base of the government. The Americans urged inclusion of Liberal Party leaders who, however, refused to join a Tsaldaris government. After attempts to form a broad coalition regime had failed, Tsaldaris announced, on August 30, establishment of an all-Populist regime, with himself as Premier and Foreign Minister; General Zervas was not included. This exclusion pleased the American representatives; Ambassador MacVeagh believed him to have "dictatorial and fascistic tendencies." But in spite of these concessions, the United States was disappointed in the new Greek government which was just as conservative and even more narrow than the one it had succeeded.

As Greece's new helmsman was setting his course, Britain officially pulled up stakes in Greece, though it was continuing token assistance until the United States should come to the rescue. In seven years Britain had spent \$349 million (\$164 million in the last 15 months) to bolster Greek economy and fight Communism—at a cost of \$3.50 for every man, woman, and child in the United Kingdom.

Tsaldaris was, however, unable to hold to the helm of state; on September 4, 1947, he agreed, in a sensational reversal just before the meeting of Parliament, to hand over the Premiership to Themistocles Sophoulis and to serve under him as Deputy Premier. This was a big day for Loy Henderson of the State Department of the United States, and for Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh, whose intensive political activity was widely considered to have laid the groundwork for fruition of the United States efforts to bring the Populists and Liberals together in a broad government. If this coalition could be maintained, the new regime should bring Greece nearer to a strong government and political unity than she had been since the end of World War II. Was this too much to hope?

THE UNITED STATES IN THE POWER-POLITICS GAME

By August 1947, the United States prepared to spend \$350,000,000 in Greece by a method it has tried out on a small scale in Latin America. A small mission of American experts, led by Dwight P. Griswold, was to be the real masters of Greece. Their purse-string power was to give the United States effective control over the Greek economy.

The model for the activities of the American mission comes from United States experience in Latin America, where, on a smaller scale, the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, a United States government corporation, worked out a technique to supervise the spending of \$71,000,000 in eighteen Latin-American republics, with constant control by the United States of how the money is used. George C. McGhee, co-ordinator of the Greek-Turkish aid, was drawing heavily on the Latin-American experience.²⁶ In Greece, the plans called for setting up of five

²⁶ For more details, see "Safeguards for U.S. Spending in Greece," *World Report*, III (July 8, 1947), 16-17.

co-operative bureaus. In every case, the director was to be an American from Griswold's mission. Agricultural rehabilitation was to cost the United States about twenty million dollars; under this part of the program, United States money and technicians, pooled with local resources, will run food-packing plants, soil-improvement projects, fishery projects, veterinary services, farm-machinery programs, and related enterprises. Reconstruction will absorb about fifty million dollars. Only 59 percent of Greece's prewar railroad mileage can be used for through service; since 1939, 82 percent of the country's freight cars and 76 percent of the locomotives have been lost. Plans for reconstruction are aimed to make a start at rehabilitating railroads, roads, ports, communications, and housing. Auto transport will be reorganized. Public health will claim about three million dollars. Training of Greeks to carry on after the Americans depart will be an important phase of the program, costing perhaps two million dollars. Eighty million dollars were set aside for imports, part to come from the three hundred millions earmarked for Greece under the Truman program and part out of Greece's fifty-million-dollar share of the \$350,000,000 United States fund for relief shipments to Europe and China. The supplies to be purchased will include food, agricultural equipment, textiles, clothing, footwear, fertilizer, pesticides, medicines, and petroleum products. They were intended to prime the pump of Greece's faltering economy until a home-grown recovery can get under way.

The military phase of United States aid to Greece, costing \$150,000,000, will be confined mainly to furnishing the Greek army and police with supplies to keep order in the country. The task of the United States military mission, headed by Maj. Gen. William G. Livesay (with 26 American officers, 10 enlisted men, and 26 civilians), will be to see that the military supplies get into the hands of the troops instead of being diverted into the black market or other unauthorized channels.

Mark F. Ethridge thought that the Truman program of aid to Greece had a 55 percent chance of success. But the flow of distressing news out of Athens at the beginning of August 1947 indicated that Ethridge might have set his odds too high. After twelve months of civil war, the guerillas held one-third of Greece. Civil war had halted nearly all travel by railroad and

highway. Production was only 60 percent of the prewar level, but profits ran as high as 80 percent. "Soak the poor" taxation had spawned millions of paupers. At least a million and a half were homeless. Inflation, disease, and hunger were rampant. Food was plentiful, but expensive. In a country 75 percent surrounded by water, fish sold for nearly three dollars a pound. Skilled workers were getting \$3.00 to \$5.00 a day, common laborers \$2.40, but they were barely able to keep bread and olive oil (only rationed items in Greece) on the family table.

Even Mother Nature seemed to have it in for Greece. Frost did thirty-five million dollars' worth of damage to the grape crop. Drought withered one-third of the grain crop, including an estimated 700,000 tons of wheat. The total loss was figured at \$30,000,000. Wheat shipped from the United States to Greece would cost \$104 a ton, or a total of \$9,800,000. Yet while the Greek government sought \$30,000,000 from the United States to cover this grain loss, it was hoarding 20,000 tons of olive oil to get a better price. Precious foreign exchange was being spent to bring luxury goods into this land of poverty, American-made nylons were selling for \$10 a pair, girdles at \$25, and fountain pens at \$48; Scotch whiskey was plentiful at \$7.50 a fifth.

At the same time, Balkan Communists and their followers were stepping up their campaign to gain control of Greece. They were considering the enlistment of outside help for the Greek rebels to offset American and British aid to the Athens government. General Markos Vafthiadis, Greek guerrilla leader, in August 1947, proclaimed the organization of a "free government" in northern Greece. This proclamation was supposed to have originated in Albania.

If fully carried out, the Communist plan could quickly involve the whole Balkan area in the Greek conflict, transforming the civil war into an international war and endangering world peace.

How to prevent such a catastrophe was the chief worry of Secretary of State Marshall, with the rest of the world keeping their fingers crossed and hoping for the best—or fearing the worst.

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
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VIII

RUMANIA

NEXT TO Yugoslavia the most powerful state in the Balkans between World Wars I and II, Rumania suffered terribly as a result of circumstances which forced her to join the Axis camp during World War II. Like the Bulgarians south of them, the Rumanians are an exceptional people in being linguistically of one race and physically, at least for the most part, of another. As in Bulgaria, also, it was apparently but a small body of invaders who gave their name to the Slavs who were found in occupation of this region. But while the Bulgarians, of Mongol origin, lost their language, exchanging it for a Slavic tongue, the Roman soldiers who settled on the Danube gave their speech, so the proud Rumanian nationalists claim, to modern Rumania. The people are proud to call themselves "Rumans," but their civilization and history are part and parcel of those of the Balkan Peninsula. They are of the Balkan states, if not strictly in them. Like the Balkan states proper, Rumania was until recent decades a part of Turkey. The Rumanian people were, in fact, but little known until recently. It was even supposed that their language belonged to the Slavic group; this probably led the United States Bureau of Immigration to place them, at the turn of the present century, as it did the Hebrews, in the "Slavic division."

Officially, however, the Rumanian spokesmen refuse to have their civilization identified with any Slavonic backgrounds, claiming that there is a direct connection between Roman legionaries and Vlach herdsmen and the present-day Rumanian people, enriched, of course, by an admixture of a score of other races.

But these claims put the Rumanians in a dilemma today. For, during World War I, Rumania acquired considerable ter-

ritories from Russia, and was not on speaking terms with the Soviet regime in the years following World War I. The specter of Communism was haunting Rumania's rulers; at any rate, although eventually Rumania's relations with Russia improved, the Bessarabian question always remained open.

The outbreak of World War II found Rumania, already infiltrated with Hitler's fifth columns, intent on remaining neutral and maintaining a policy of anti-revisionism. But the collapse of France and the entry of Italy into the war upset all her calculations. King Carol's government tried to save the situation by throwing itself into the German camp to seek German protection against revisionist claims. But this *volte face* came too late to save Rumania. First Soviet Russia acquired Bessarabia, together with North Bukovina. Similar success attended Bulgarian claims for South Dobruja, while the Axis-dictated award of Vienna of August 30, 1940, handed over two-fifths of Transylvania, the cradle of Rumania's nationalism, together with considerably over one million Rumanians, to Hungary, Rumania's traditional enemy.

This break-up of Greater Rumania, formed at the end of World War I, brought about the downfall of King Carol, and under another dictator, General Antonescu, Rumania had to fight Germany's battles, especially in Russia. Bessarabia was regained, but the Nazis were milking Rumania dry. The sweep of the Russian offensive in the East and the Anglo-American invasion of France in the summer of 1944 forced the collapse of the pro-Nazis and the Rumanian declaration of war against the Nazis. As a defeated nation, Rumania tried to salvage whatever she could from the wreckage. The pro-Soviet premiers simply had to toe the line laid down in Moscow and to gear up Rumania's policy into the great Pan-Slavic bloc in the making in the Balkans in 1947.

HISTORY

Rumanians like to trace the history of their nation back to A.D. 101, when Roman legions conquered the Dacians, a Thracian tribe occupying the Transylvanian and Carpathian region. Roman rule lasted less than two centuries, but so thoroughly Romanized was Dacia that today the Rumanian tongue closely resembles the original Latin. When the Roman frontier was

withdrawn to the Danube, Rumania was left a prey to the Gothic, Hunnish, Magyar, and Slavic invasions from the east. The original inhabitants retreated to the Carpathian ridges, and there preserved their ways and customs. By the end of the ninth century the Magyars had conquered the country "beyond the forests" (Transylvania) and subjugated the Rumanian *voivodes*.¹

NATIONAL GROWTH

The two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, which later were to form the nucleus of the Rumanian nation, were founded in the fourteenth century by the princes of a powerful feudal family—the Basarab. Toward the end of the sixteenth century, the Basarab dynasty contributed one of the most epic figures to Rumanian history, Michael the Brave, who for a brief span of time succeeded in uniting and freeing all the Rumanian provinces—Moldavia (including Bessarabia and Bukovina), Wallachia, and Transylvania. He realized the dream of a united Rumania, so greatly cherished in later days by the Rumanians, and he remains to this day the symbol of national unity. Even before he died, however, Michael lost Transylvania again to the Magyars. In the subsequent centuries Rumania struggled continually against the Ottoman menace as well as against Poland and Hungary. In 1774, Russia forced Turkey to recognize a Russian protectorate over the Rumanian principalities. The close of the Crimean War (1854–1856) sounded the knell of Russian domination over the principalities. A united Rumania was finally achieved in 1859, when the principalities elected the Moldavian Colonel Alexander Cuza to be their prince. Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, his successor, declared his country independent, on May 10, 1877.

Carol I, during his reign of forty-eight years, saw Rumania grow.² The Peace of Berlin in 1878 gave Southern Bessarabia

¹ Magyar historiographers contend that the Hungarians were in original possession of Transylvania and that there is no proof of Rumanian settlement before the thirteenth century. See J. S. Roucek, *Contemporary Roumania* (Stanford University Press, 1932), pp. 4–5. E. Horváth, *Transylvania and the History of the Roumanians* (Budapest, 1935), is by far the most respectable presentation of the Hungarian case.

² On the political stewardship of Carol I, see also Queen Marie of Rumania, *The Story of My Life* (New York, 1934), and her *Ordeal* (New York, 1936).

to Russia, but Bucharest got most of Dobruja. In 1913, after the second Balkan War, Rumania received a further section of this area, known as the "Quadrilateral." By deciding in 1916 to fight on the side of the Allies, the Rumanians eventually realized their national ambition: under the peace treaties they won Transylvania from Hungary, Bessarabia from Russia, and the Bukovina from Austria³—a triumph that did much to reinforce the reign of Ferdinand I, at the helm since 1914. The former Roman Dacia came out of her historical grave to live again.

From a small triangular area entirely surrounded by other states, Rumania has become a compact country bordering the Black Sea—largest in population of the Balkans and full of extraordinary possibilities. Her territory has increased from 53,244 square miles to more than 113,000 square miles—an area equal to the combined territories of the states of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and Connecticut. On this count, Roumania is practically on a par with Norway or Italy. Her population exceeds nineteen million.

THE ECONOMIC PARADOX

The economic wealth of Rumania rests chiefly on agriculture. Almost 80 percent of the population are peasants. The majority lives on small holdings providing no more than the bare minimum necessary for existence. Before the agrarian reform of 1919–1921, 42 percent of the land consisted of large estates (about 250 acres or more) and 58 percent of small holdings. After the reform, the former percentage had dropped to 11.2, and the latter increased to 88.8.⁴ But to buy seed and tools, the peasants had to borrow money at interest rates ranging from 30 to 50 percent. Moreover, thousands of them, unable to

³ On modern Rumania cf. Roucek, *op. cit.* (containing an extensive bibliography, pp. 383–411); C. U. Clark, *United Roumania* (New York, 1932), pp. 82–250 (with bibliography, pp. 377–96); T. W. Riker, *The Making of Roumania* (Oxford, 1932), covering the period from 1856 to 1866; G. C. Logio, *Roumania: History, Politics, and Economics* (Manchester, 1932), presenting a wealth of data; D. Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Roumania* (New Haven, 1930), a brilliant study. Professor Iorga's latest work, entitled *Histoire des Roumains et de la Roumanie orientale* (Bucharest, 1937), (thus far four volumes), is the most exhaustive and scholarly.

⁴ L. Pasvolsky, *Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States* (New York, 1928), p. 420.

sell their grain, were forced into bankruptcy. The agricultural per capita debt became the highest in the world.⁵

How is it, the leaders of the National Peasant Party asked, that the richest soil in Europe could produce on a square mile only one-third as much as Denmark's less fertile land? Why is it that the daily meat consumption of the Rumanian peasant, according to official figures, was one thin slice of ham—less than a third of an ounce? Why did the Rumanian farmer have to work forty-five days to buy one pair of shoes? Why is it that 37 percent of the rural families possessed no draft animals, and 46 percent not even sheep? What of public education for the peasant masses? More than half of the population was illiterate when the new state was formed.⁶ Free and universal education, given "where there are schools," is a comparatively recent attainment and has not reached hundreds of thousands of adults. Hospitals and infirmaries are lacking in many districts. There is a distinct dearth of doctors willing to live in rural communities. Pellagra, tuberculosis, and dipsomania are widespread, and even such diseases as leprosy and trachoma are endemic in some parts of the country.

Second in significance to agriculture are the timber products.⁷ In addition to her vast forests, Rumania has large quantities of excellent oil, inexhaustible salt deposits, much coal, some iron, even gold and silver, and extensive fisheries. By far the most important source of mineral wealth lies in the oil deposits, since oil is the only mineral exported on any considerable scale. At present, the industry is faced with difficulties, owing to low prices in international markets and the serious Russian competition. Rumanian oil has, however, much attraction for the German economy.

After World War I, Rumania witnessed much industrial advance. Transylvania, the Bukovina, and the Banat are more

⁵ S. Pribichevich, "The Nazi Drive to the East—Yugoslavia, Roumania, Hungary," *Foreign Policy Reports*, XIV (No. 15, 1938), 177.

⁶ See Roucek, *op. cit.*, pp. 373–81; the same author's "Recent Tendencies of the Roumanian Educational System," *School and Society*, XLIV (1936), 377–79, and "The New Educational System of Roumania," *ibid.*, XLVI (1937), 537–38.

⁷ See Roucek, *op. cit.*, pp. 247–356; the same author's "Roumanian Manufacturing Industries," *Bulletin of the Geographical Society of Philadelphia*, XXX (1932), 200–206; "Mineral Resources of Roumania," *Journal of Geography*, XXXII (1933), 191–99; and "Economic Geography of Roumania," *Economic Geography*, VII (1937), 390–99.

industrialized than the Old Kingdom. All branches of industrial production are represented today, the foremost being food-stuffs. Thus far, however, Rumania's industrial proletariat is not a serious problem. Most labor is agricultural. Skilled workers from the provinces supply the needs of industry under the direction of foreign specialists. Even so, Rumanian industry is in very serious straits, suffering from the lack of credit and the extremely low purchasing power of the people. In proportion to the area of the country and the size of its population, the kingdom is considerably below the Central European standard with respect to railways. The increasing commercial use of the automobile makes it necessary to maintain and develop a system of highways; most of the old roads are in unsatisfactory condition.

NATIONALITIES AND CHURCHES

The troublesome problem of minorities in Rumania after World War I is attested by the following tables:⁸

Nationalities (in millions)

| | |
|---------------------|-------|
| Rumanians | 13.20 |
| Hungarians | 1.35 |
| Jews | 0.83 |
| Germans | 0.78 |
| Ruthenians | 0.46 |
| Bulgars | 0.37 |
| Russians | 0.31 |
| Turks-Tartars | 0.23 |
| Serbs | 0.05 |
| Poles | 0.04 |
| Slovaks | 0.03 |

Churches (in millions)

| | |
|---|-------|
| Greek Orthodox | 13.03 |
| Greek Catholic | 1.32 |
| Roman Catholic | 1.19 |
| Calvinist | 0.72 |
| Lutheran | 0.39 |
| Unitarian | 0.07 |
| Jewish | 0.98 |
| Islamic | 0.16 |
| Others (Gregorian, Baptist, etc.) | 0.16 |

⁸ Census figures of 1930 and 1931. See J. Chmelař, *National Minorities in Central Europe* (Prague, 1937), pp. 37-47; Roucek, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-216. For systematic presentation of the Hungarian case, see the issues of *The Hungarian Quarterly* since 1936.

The Rumanians (about 73 percent of the population) were distributed throughout the country in equal proportions, and nearly all belonged to the Greek Orthodox Church. It is interesting to realize that until about half a century ago the Rumanian language was written in Cyrillic letters; thereafter the alphabet was changed into 23 characters—a transliteration of the Old Slavic with the use of diacritical marks.

The most numerous and, with the exception of the Jews, the noisiest minority were the Hungarians (almost 8 percent of the population). They lived in the frontier districts of Transylvania, which formerly belonged to Hungary. The largest body of them were the Szekels, who, more than a thousand years ago, settled here in compact masses, to defend the eastern frontier. The Hungarians of Transylvania, especially the town population, considered the Rumanians on a lower cultural level. There were also religious differences, because most of the Magyars are Roman Catholics. Magyar propaganda was constantly promoting the revisionist dream of this formerly dominant minority in Transylvania.

The Germans (4.3 percent of the population) also belonged to the Roman Catholic Church, or were Lutherans. They may be divided into the Saxons of Transylvania, the Bukovina Germans, the Swabians of the Banat, the Bessarabia and Dobruja Germans, and the Germans of the Old Kingdom. They represented the German colonization of the twelfth century and later. The Transylvanian Germans maintained a large number of scientific and cultural institutions. The Germans, after 1930, came under the sway of National Socialism. The Ukranians and Russians were confined to Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. The majority of the Bulgarians were located in that part of the Dobruja acquired by Rumania in 1913, and in Southern Bessarabia. In addition, there were Poles in the Bukovina, Serbians in the Banat, and Turks and Tartars in the Dobruja and in Southern Bessarabia.

Rumania was used to making much of her Jewish problem. The Jews (4.6 percent of the population) were widely scattered, living primarily in Bessarabia, the Bukovina, Northern Moldavia, and Northern Transylvania, as well as in the towns of the whole kingdom. The chief cause of the Jewish population increase in Rumania after World War I was the annexation, un-

der the Paris treaties of 1919, of Transylvania and Bukovina, and the seizure of Bessarabia from Russia. These territorial accretions nearly tripled the number of Jews in Rumania. Since then there has been no appreciable immigration of Jews that has not been compensated for by emigration. The only postwar influx was that of approximately 45,000 Jewish refugees reaching Bessarabia from Soviet Russia; but of these about 40,000 were evacuated from Rumania by private Jewish organizations. The Jews fall into two distinct groups. The majority of the Eastern Jews still retain their Semitic customs, language, and manners. Another group, the descendants of the Spanish Jews who arrived in Rumania in 1494, is completely assimilated and plays an important role in the economic development of the country.

The clergy of the Rumanian Orthodox Church draw their salaries from the state, and other creeds, if recognized by the state, receive a subsidy from the Treasury, in case they have over 50,000 parishioners. With the creation of Greater Rumania, the country acquired a considerable number of Roman Catholics. In several districts of the Dobruja, on the other hand, the Moslem population was predominant. On the whole, religion has never played a conspicuous role in Rumania's national life. Religious conflict is rare. The church is a state instrument, and the state is nationalist and oligarchic. The intimate co-operation of the state and church was reflected in 1938 in the appointment of the Patriarch to the position of prime minister. The hold of the church on the masses must not be overestimated. The Rumanian peasant has never been truly religious.⁹ His piety springs from the "fear of sin" and its tangible consequences; to be on the safe side, he strives to comply with the formal prescriptions of the church. The village priest, whatever his ignorance, will know that the flesh is weak.

PARTY RULE

On the eve of Rumanian independence, a servile peasantry left the government to a small minority of privileged landowners, professional people, and urban merchants. Up to World War I, office was held alternately by two political parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals. The Liberal Party, relatively

⁹ Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Roumania*, p. 529.

progressive at that time, was also emphatically nationalistic. It was favored by the throne. Its great leader, Ion C. Bratianu (1821-1891), is justly regarded, with King Carol I, as the founder of modern Rumania. Indeed, the Bratianu "dynasty" practically ruled the country from the establishment of the Hohenzollerns up to 1930.

Time and age, however, transformed Bratianu's group into the representative organization of the upper classes and the vested interests. By the turn of the century, Ion I. C. Bratianu (1864-1927) and Vintila I. C. Bratianu (1867-1930), the sons of the Grand Old Man, controlled the Liberals. After the outbreak of World War I, Ion, attracted to France like his father, did not hesitate to obstruct actively the Germanophile orientation initiated by Carol I. With the aid of Queen Marie, he persuaded the new King Ferdinand that Rumania should throw her lot with the Allies. Although the fortunes of war at first turned against Rumania, ultimately the dream of a *România Mare* was to come true. Bratianu staunchly opposed the domineering attitude of the Allies at the Peace Conference; he resented particularly the Minorities Treaty and the demand that he evacuate Hungary—then in the grip of Bolshevism. Though not fully successful, he could consider his work crowned when he attended in 1922 the ceremonies for King Ferdinand and Queen Marie as the sovereigns of Greater Rumania.

The Conservatives, representing almost exclusively the landowners, were less often in the saddle than the Liberals. The Germanophile inclinations of Marghiloman's war government, which signed a humiliating peace with the Central Powers in 1918, and the effects of the agrarian reform proclaimed in 1919 terminated the party's existence. Minor dissident groups appearing from time to time in Rumanian politics have proved entirely ephemeral.¹⁰

On the other hand, the birth of Greater Rumania added to the prestige of the Liberals. King Ferdinand trusted Ion Bratianu to the fullest extent, and permitted him even to maneuver the exclusion of Crown Prince (ex-King) Carol from the suc-

¹⁰ See Roucek, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-134; the same author's "Social Forces behind Roumanian Politics," *Social Forces*, X (1932), 419-25, and "The Political Evolution of Roumania," *Slavonic Review*, X (1932), 602-15. *Politics and Political Parties in Roumania* (London, 1936), is a useful collection of documentary material.

cession. But having become the Bratianu machine, the Liberal Party had definitely lost its former progressive tendencies. The Conservatives had disappeared only to make room for the Liberals on the right of Rumanian politics. Protecting the financial, industrial, and commercial interests, the National Liberal Party—under the leadership of the Bratianus and Ion Duca, finally of Tatarescu—has been the Peasant Party's main rival. Its nationalist character has led it to oppose foreign domination of Rumanian enterprise, financial and commercial, as well as oil concessions to foreign companies. It advocated the so-called "royal parliamentarism" typical of the Balkan states—monarchic authority within the forms of a parliamentary system, with the king as governor, not as mere conciliator.

From 1922, Ion Bratianu was in charge of the government for four years. The electoral results of March 1922 showed Bratianu's ability to keep his grip on the country. While in the elections held in May 1920 the Liberals had received only seventeen seats, now their representation leaped to two hundred sixty mandates. Maniu, the peasant spokesman, refused to recognize the outcome, and his Transylvanian peasantry expressed their protest by boycotting King Ferdinand's coronation in October 1922. But in spite of all opposition, Bratianu pushed through the Constitution of March 28, 1923. Afraid that the heir to the throne, Crown Prince Carol, might dispense with him if once in power, he forced his abdication, and saw to the appointment of a Provisional Regency Council in view of the precarious state of King Ferdinand's health. Only the strain of mounting financial difficulties induced Bratianu in March 1926 to withdraw temporarily from power in favor of General Averescu.

The personal basis of Rumanian politics was clearly shown in this appointment. The General had the support of only a few deputies; yet he was asked to form a cabinet. Having no parliamentary majority, he "made" it by the subsequent election. Averescu was a new element in Rumanian politics. The national hero of a famous World War I battle, "Papa" Averescu formed the "People's League" during Rumania's dark hours on the basis of a vague program: the improvement of political morals—a reaction against the "old" parties. In Transylvania, Octavian Goga joined him. His followers were not recruited

from any single social class. They were held together only by the reputation of the leader. In 1920, Averescu had a taste of power, but he lacked political talent to maintain himself against the intrigues of the Liberals. Six years later he was given another chance by Bratianu's resignation. Goga, his minister of the interior, who was to achieve fame later, engineered the most terroristic and corrupt elections in Rumanian history and won for his aging chief 292 out of 387 seats. Yet it was clear that the government existed only on the Liberal's sufferance. When the increasing independence of the Premier began to alarm the Bratianus, particularly in view of the King's impending death, they brought about Averescu's unceremonious downfall in June 1927.

The following month Bratianu, resorting to elections, "made" in good style 318 out of the 387 mandates. He seemed to be assured of another long reign—Averescu's group, characteristically enough, did not win a single deputy. But events began to turn. The King died July 21, after a long illness. Four months later Ion Bratianu, who had been premier no less than eleven times, was also carried to his grave. His brother Vintila headed the reconstructed government under the Regency. But the strength of the Liberal Party had passed with King Ferdinand and Ion Bratianu. Vintila was not of his brother's caliber. His economic policy failed to establish the promised paradise of national self-sufficiency. A grave economic situation was intensified by the failure of the maize crop. The National Peasant Party was radical in its demands for Vintila's resignation. Foreign bankers declined to help him out. Still, he was taken as much by surprise as his opponents when on November 3, 1928, the Regency accepted his resignation. Six days later Maniu was approved for the formation of his cabinet. Rumania's peasantry came into power.

The wane of the Liberals, and particularly of the Bratianu "dynasty," was an epochal event for the kingdom. With Bratianu's resignation the center of gravity in Rumanian politics shifted from the right to the left, from mercantilism to the peasantry. Never since have the Liberals regained their former power, assumed in progressive stages by King Carol, whose return in 1930 the fallen political leader was unable to prevent. Vintila's death in December 1930 marked the end of the power-

ful and corrupt Bratianu regime that had controlled Rumanian governments for seventy years.

Although the nominal leadership of the Liberals fell into the hands of the last of the three brothers, Dinu Bratianu, Carol succeeded in isolating him from power by appointing to the premiership two younger members of the party, Ion Duca, who was to lose his life by assassination, and Georges Tatarescu.

TERROR AND BRIBES

The fortunes of the Liberal Party were closely associated with the interests not only of entrenched urban wealth but also of the "educated" minority. When Rumania became independent, there arose a great need for men with schooling, however little. Nearly everybody so qualified was quickly absorbed by the government. This suited the upper-class Rumanians perfectly, because they have a natural dislike for mercantile occupations. These were left to foreigners, especially to the Jews. Public office and the liberal professions were looked upon as the only occupations dignified enough for the educated Rumanian. With the rapid growth of higher learning, the ruling class turned toward making new positions for themselves by political manipulation. As a consequence, the governmental overhead is a serious burden on the country. To get rid of the ever-growing bureaucracy is simply impossible.

While Rumania has no genuine middle class, her new *bourgeoisie* has been constantly growing. Today it is supreme ambition of every educated Rumanian to enter a liberal profession or public office. The emancipated peasant, too, wants his share of higher education for his children. In fact, the peasant masses have become the chief recruitment basis for the intelligentsia and the professions. The adventurous village youth from a prosperous farm aspires to a professional degree which will qualify him for a government job. Many Rumanians have been trained abroad, particularly in France, and most of them look upon politics as gainful employment. Moreover, those educated in other countries are in outlook and attitude closer to the average Western European than to the Rumanian peasant. As soon as the war was over, a large contingent of the rising generation began to flock to Rumania's universities hoping to participate in the development of a full-blown Rumanian

national culture.¹¹ Since the annexed territories provided only for a limited occupational outlet, the army of academically trained in search of professional and political careers has become a political menace. The *numerus clausus*, established in 1935 as a device for restricting admission to all universities and professional schools, will show its effect only as the number of future graduates decreases.

The widespread disillusion among younger university men has made itself felt in the political orientation of Rumanian youth. The nuisance value of the political activities of university students, more unrestrained than anywhere else, is considerable. In 1936, for example,

. . . . several of the Ministers received anonymous letters threatening them with death on account of their favorable attitude towards the Jews. As a result, five persons were arrested and brought before the Bucharest Tribunal but refused to speak a word. . . . The students threatened to organize a general strike as a protest against the arrests. The government stood firm and took energetic measures to maintain peace in the capital. All the colleges were surrounded by large contingents of police troops. The strike lasted two days, and there were a few incidents in the streets when the authorities had resort to hose pipes and tear gas. . . . The murderer of Dr. Duca was a member of the student class. . . . It is the forcing-ground of anti-Semitism. . . . The complete lack of discipline among students, who convey the impression of knowing no other form of control than that imposed by the intervention of the police or the closing of their colleges or universities, and who have never heard, at any stage of their existence, of the magic formula "It isn't done," must react on the whole national character.¹²

Of course, what is "lack of discipline" to the authorities may well be the "iron law of loyalty" to the students. The following incident is illustrative:

Mihail Stelescu was killed by thirty-six revolver shots fired at him while he lay . . . in one of the hospitals of Bucharest, by ten of his former associates, members of the Iron Guard, who declared

¹¹ W. M. Kotschnig, *Unemployment in the Learned Professions* (London, 1937), pp. 13 ff.

¹² *Great Britain and the East*, XLVI (1936), 666. See also *ibid.*, XLIII (1934), 1. Quoted by permission of the editor. Until 1935, the name of the periodical was *Near East and India*.

that he had betrayed their cause. Apparently Stelescu had refused to adopt the principle that murder was a legitimate method of gaining the ends and of getting rid of obnoxious personalities; he had therefore resigned from membership of the organization. He wanted to make certain disclosures to the authorities in connection with the murder of Duca. His aggressors were ten young students of 19–23 years of age. All of them are distinguished by their capability and studiousness. After committing the crime they went in a body to the officers of the law and gave themselves up.¹³

Manhandling must be reckoned with by anyone who makes himself the target of student agitation. In 1937, at Jassi, . . . the courageous Roumanian rector of the university, Trajan Bratu, lost an ear, slashed off by Cuzist terrorists attempting to assassinate him because he opposed anti-Semitic terrorism at the university.¹⁴

The unemployment problem among the intelligentsia can explain much of the factionalism in politics and the favorable reception accorded fascist theories. In addition, the unsatisfactory economic situation of the peasantry and the audible demands of their representatives keep the urban strata apprehensive lest the peasant revolt. It would seem that Rumania's economy is still so undeveloped as to leave room for the employment of thousands of young doctors, lawyers, administrators, and business executives. Unfortunately, most educated Rumanians dream of living in Bucharest, the "Paris of the East." It is here that they can make political capital. It is here that they can best foster governmental and political careers—regarded as *the* business of the Roumanian elite.

To belong to the party in power means to enjoy economic privileges. To govern means to become rich. No Roumanian can forget that any place whatsoever in the State machine brings economic advantages. A corollary to this is that if you are not connected with the State you are rather helpless. Then you are likely to belong to the exploited. So you join the peasant party or perhaps become a fascist.¹⁵

¹³ *Great Britain and the East*, XLVI (1936), 271. Quoted by permission of the editor.

¹⁴ *New York Times*, Feb. 3, 1938. Quoted by permission of the editor.

¹⁵ R. H. Markham, "Roumania for the Roumanians," *Christian Science Monitor*, Weekly Magazine Section (April 13, 1938), p. 2. Quoted by permission of the editor.

The bureaucracy has retained the psychology of the former Turkish masters. It is inclined to deal with official business in accordance with the ancient rule "Don't do it today, because tomorrow you may not have to do it at all." The civil service is notoriously underpaid and frequently left without compensation for months. Though a legal offense, bribery has always been in vogue in the Old Kingdom. Stricter administrative standards prevailed in Transylvania where malfeasance was less casually condoned because of the "striking contrast with the former administration of the Habsburgs."¹⁶ In general, however, the oversupply

. . . . of officials in Roumania has long been a feature of the administration, and the extent of the evil may be gauged by the fact that it has been considered better to continue a bad system rather than to face the social and economic dislocation that would be caused by any adequate reduction in the numbers. One Roumanian Government with a zeal for reform found it necessary to curtail the use of Ministries as a kind of club for the more favored section of the public. In the past the general attitude has too frequently been that an official post exists for the personal benefit of the holder. Much of the ill-will among the Balkan peoples has been due to the mistaken belief among officials that patriotism calls for the abuse of authority.¹⁷

While the bureaucracy could be trusted to support any established regime, the real power behind the throne was the army. As an organization, it was the stablest of all, and it was courted by the politicians. The military estate was placed high on the social ladder. It was capable of decisive political action. It was largely responsible for Carol's return to Rumania in 1930, and it gave meaning to the dictatorial aims of the King. Nevertheless, the texture of army politics is complex. In April 1934, for instance,

. . . . eleven officers, headed by Colonel Precup, [were] arrested. Colonel Precup was well-known in army circles, as he had accompanied the King in his exile and had actively contributed to his return to Roumania. He was arrested on a charge of conspiracy

¹⁶ G. Luetkens, "Roumania To-day," *International Affairs*, XVII (1938), 687. By permission of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.

¹⁷ *Near East and India*, XLIII (1934), 615. Quoted by permission of the editor.

against the Crown. . . . On Easter night, when the King was passing in procession slowly along the Calea Victoriei on his way to Church, bombs were to have been thrown at him from the windows of a room engaged for this purpose in the Boulevard Hotel. . . . It was hoped by this means to create such an atmosphere of terror that the people would gladly accept the military dictatorship which the conspirators intended to introduce under Colonel Precup.¹⁸

Perhaps it was too naïve an assumption that it requires an exceptional atmosphere of terror in Rumania to inaugurate a military dictatorship.

PEASANT UNREST

The period after World War I saw a slow change in the strained relations between the peasant and urban classes. The franchise introduced the town politician into the villages, and increasing trading activities brought the peasant into frequent contacts with the urban communities. A growing group of the young intelligentsia has become sincerely concerned with village life; the sociological school of Gusti, particularly, stressed the national importance of the Rumanian village, and has made rural conditions an object of scientific evaluation.¹⁹

The agrarian reform of 1919-1921 and the agitation of the National Peasant Party have been altering the religious and social mentality of the peasant. The clergy is unable to meet this challenge; it has been losing ground. The peasant is extremely nationalistic and patriotic, despite, or perhaps because of, the centuries of foreign oppression to which he had been subjected. Even today in some parts of Rumania we can observe that the villagers wear Dacian dress and build their homes just as they did when the Emperor Trajan's legions found them in the early second century. They died valiantly, these blue-eyed peasants, during both World Wars; but their hopes that their lot would be improved have always been doomed to disappointment. Right after the end of World War I, the peasant

¹⁸ *Near East and India*, XLIII (1934), 317, 357. Quoted by permission of the editor.

¹⁹ Cf. Joseph S. Roucek, "Sociology in Roumania," *American Sociological Review*, III (1938), 54-62; P. E. Mosely, "A New Roumanian Journal of Rural Sociology," *Rural Sociology*, II (1937), 457-65; A. Manoil, "Rumanian Sociology," pp. 732-40 in Georges Gurvitch and Wilbert E. Moore (eds.), *Twentieth Century Sociology* (New York, 1945).

received more than he even asked for—universal and compulsory suffrage—a measure appealing to the world which appreciated at that time anything associated with the word “democracy.” The makers of this constitutional measure, however, made sure that the gesture was noble but not too practicable, so with the other hand they took away the practical application, and the rule of the privileged upper groups went merrily on. The results were disastrous in every way. They had their consequences in the situation which eventually resulted in the return of King Carol and his dictatorship.

The political background of this situation was rather simple. Before World War I, Rumania was largely a feudal state and the peasant was bound by hand and foot to the feudal lords. The professional and intellectual classes, drafted into the new state organism, identified themselves very closely with the interests of the state, and used the means of the state for their special benefits. While Rumania has always been primarily an agricultural state, the state was to divert the surpluses of state economy into industrial and commercial undertakings in the hands of the small upper class. Since there was hardly any middle class, a great political abyss existed between the ruling group and the peasant. The Liberal Party became the concrete evidence of this dominance; in it were united, with the exception of the feudal masters (who had their own Conservative Party), all the leaders of Rumania's elite who had other interests at heart than the political and social rights of the peasant. Public office and the liberal professions, to a lesser degree, were the aim of every Liberal follower. The business and trade functions were left mainly in the hands of foreigners and Jews. Politically, the Liberals ran Rumania's prewar governments more often than the Conservatives who were politically weak and disunited.

During World War I, the Conservatives made the fatal mistake of having the Germanophile wing, under Marghiloman, conclude peace with the Central Powers, thereby signing their own death warrant; the *coup de grâce* to the whole Conservative Party was given by the agrarian reform of 1917. The Liberals had nothing to lose by the agrarian reform and they knew how to keep the machinery of the state in their hands in case of universal suffrage. With the disappearance of the

Conservatives, the Liberals became the real conservative party of Rumania under the attacks of radicalism and socialism and the rising leaders of the National Peasant Party.²⁰

The Peasant Party was formed shortly after World War I by a few village teachers, priests, and progressive intellectuals; it was put on a sound basis by Ion Mihalache, a rural school-master with the drive of a self-made man, but also a forceful speaker. The party took the place vacated by the Liberals on the left of Rumanian politics; with the exception of the Socialists, it became the main democratic element in the nation. Mihalache extended his party organization into the different sections of the kingdom, joining forces with the National Party of Transylvania, which since 1881 had fought against Magyarization under Dr. Juliu Maniu and Alexandru Vaida-Voevod. Maniu became the first president of the combined National Peasant Party, Mihalache and Vaida-Voevod, its vice-presidents. The fusion created a nation-wide peasant organization, with followers in the Old Kingdom as well as in the new provinces. It developed its agrarian ideology in juxtaposition to the mercantilism of the Liberals.²¹ It vocalized the peasant's resentment against the eternal exploitation of his economic and social position in the state, endless hours of humble waiting in governmental offices, the need to pay a *baksheesh* (tip) ever to have anything done by the state officials, corruption of Rumania's politics, the ever-growing burden of agricultural indebtedness; it advocated parliamentary democracy in one breath with the creation of the so-called "peasant state"; co-operative organization of peasant economy in production, marketing, and credit; subordination of industry to the interests of agriculture; and co-operative education for the peasantry.²² Firmly entrenched in the villages, the party was the chief opponent of Fascism and other forms of authoritarianism in Rumania.

The National Peasant Party suffered from the rivalry between Transylvania and the Old Kingdom. The Rumanians of the new western province, even though formerly they had

²⁰ For a valuable study of this problem, see David Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania* (New York, 1930).

²¹ Cf. Roucek, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-96; Mitrany, *op. cit.*, pp. 553-60.

²² Peter Neagoe's *There Is My Heart* (New York, 1936), and *Eastern Sun* (New York, 1934), and other novels are sensitive, faithful portrayals of Rumanian peasant life and hopes.

been relegated to an inferior position by Hungarians, Germans, and Jews, consider themselves European. They feel superior to the "Balkanized" Rumanians of the Old Kingdom with its "Byzantine culture." Since Bucharest is in unchallenged control today, the "new" Rumanians cultivate their superiority complex in terms of regional opposition.

When in 1928 Maniu succeeded Bratianu in the premiership, Rumania beheld the first peasant government in her history. Within a few weeks, press censorship and the state of siege were abolished; anti-Semitic riots were no longer tolerated; and the political, administrative, and financial system underwent reorganization. Centralistic tendencies gave way to revived local autonomy, and the minorities were treated more liberally. The elections of December 1928 gave the National Peasant Party 324 mandates out of 387. The elections were considered by neutral observers the freest and fairest that Rumania ever had.

Maniu fought, however, against overwhelming odds. His intention of building a new democratic and economic structure collided head-on with the heritage left by the Liberals. The bureaucracy boycotted the new cabinet. Economic rehabilitation measures required increased expenditures, partly met by foreign loans, partly by taxation. The public was sharply critical of the higher tax rate. Opposition soon became intense. With the world-wide agricultural crisis playing havoc with Rumania's markets, the domestic situation turned for the worse. There was general restlessness, and the influence of the Liberals over the economic and financial life of the country was slowly rallying. Maniu was forced to temporize. He turned to a safe issue—the repatriation of Carol.

The growing sentiment in Rumania in favor of Carol's return was a potent political factor. Carol, who in 1925 had renounced his right of succession in order to retain his mistress, Magda Lupescu, had been living abroad in self-imposed exile. Maniu engineered his repatriation as a preventive measure against the restoration of the Liberals under Vintila Bratianu, Carol's foe. In June 1930 Carol returned to Bucharest by airplane to displace his son, little King Michael. With the help of Nicholas, his brother and one of the regents, and with the support of the army and Maniu's adherents, Carol had the

parliament confer on his son the title of Prince of Alba-Julia, and proclaimed himself King Carol II—*de jure* effective since the death of Ferdinand in 1927.

Maniu's puritanical mind conceived the idea of a reconciliation between the new monarch and his wife, Helen, and a definite termination of the Lupescu affair. The King, however, soon tired of his moralizing premier, and in October 1930 replaced the Maniu cabinet by the government of Mironescu. Maniu had underrated both his economic difficulties and the growing power of the willful ruler. The peasant masses had gained little.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH

Iorga, Carol's former tutor, a prominent historian who played the role of a "lone wolf" in Rumanian politics, was the monarch's next choice for cabinet leadership. Although without a following in Parliament, Iorga succeeded in producing a ministry. No one was permitted to campaign in the subsequent elections without government authorization. Moreover, 60 percent of the candidates were selected from nonpolitical organizations and avowed supporters. The remainder was hand-picked from among those ready to make an "electoral agreement" with Iorga's party, the "National Union," composed mainly of old Liberals. The "National Union" thus obtained 48 percent of the votes in the elections of June 1931. On the basis of the electoral law guaranteeing full legislative control to the party polling at least 40 percent of the vote, Iorga secured in good fascist style 291 members in a chamber of 387. Actually, his supporters numbered not more than 3 percent of the electorate.

Clearly, the Rumanian politician selected by the King as his prime minister needed no strong popular support. If chosen, he had his chance to "make" an election. The return of an appropriate number of supporters was secured by the judicious appointment of local officials who were under no illusion as to the course that they were expected to pursue on polling day. The wishes of the electorate were of minor importance. The king's appointment was the deciding factor, and the result was an electoral parody, as exemplified by Iorga's or Averescu's rule. The efforts of the National Peasant Party to safeguard demo-

cratic methods soon came to naught. The principle that a political party—once in power for a parliamentary term—was entitled to remain in cabinet office for that period unless censured by an adverse vote, has hardly ever been acted upon in Rumania.

The withdrawal of the monarch's confidence was equivalent to the dismissal of parliament. A new election was ordered without regard to the composition of Parliament or the will of the electorate. Party responsibility was practically invalidated. Except on polling day, when the voters were the objects of special solicitude on the part of governmental representatives, the electorate was largely ignored by Rumania's politicians. Upon occasions these relied, when in opposition, on monster demonstrations to convey to the King the idea that the time had come for a change of government. To stress its eligibility for office, the National Peasant Party organized in 1928 a march on Bucharest. The Liberals, similarly, recommended civil resistance to their party following in 1933 in order to force the King's hand. They were promptly called to form a cabinet.

In Rumania party animosity is carried to extremes. Political campaigns feature extravagant charges and attacks. During the elections, brutalities and trickeries are the order of the day. Ballot boxes are stolen, candidates are arrested, gendarmes drive opposition voters at bayonet's point from the polling booths. The battle is fiercest at the center of political gravity—in Bucharest. If the Balkans are a hotbed of vicious rumors, Bucharest may be called the capital of scandal. Strangely enough the idea of according the members of the royal family any protection from malicious tongues is entirely foreign to the Rumanian. Scandalous and vitriolic accusations against any political figure are freely printed. Personal abuse has a fine native flavor. A postwar law providing severe penalties for disseminating "alarmist" news in print aimed less at press purity than at restriction of the opposition newspapers. Political oratory was on a high plane, for Rumanian politicians, like those in other Balkan countries, are mostly lawyers, physicians, and members of the other professions. The personnel of the National Peasant Party was an exception. There were relatively few army men in the lower house, because for them it was more appropriate to sit in the Senate.

The dictatorial tendencies of the Rumanian electoral system expressed themselves pointedly in the legislation introduced by the Liberals in 1926. By its provisions, the party receiving more than 40 percent of the total vote was given 60 percent of all the parliamentary mandates, and parties polling less than 2 percent of the total receive no mandates whatever. The result was that the government could easily ride roughshod over all legislative opposition. On the other hand, the small or inadequately represented parties, aware of the hopelessness of their situation, were driven to use every demagogical trick in their bag—unless they concluded electoral agreements with the government, without any substantial unity of program. Such alliances naturally could not present clearly defined ideological positions. The system encouraged faction leaders, anxious to be elected to Parliament, to change their political allegiance freely. Personalities were substituted for programs. Obviously, there could be no strict party discipline. The moving spirit of Rumanian politics has been men, not principles. Money was a controlling force. Hence the strongest organization was that of the Liberal Party, because it had considerable funds at its disposal.

In comparison with the Liberal and National Peasant Parties, the weaker groups were mere shades of their versatile stewards. In this classification belong Dr. Lupu's own peasant following, George Bratianu's dissident Liberals, and the adherents of Professor Iorga. Nicolae Titulescu joined most of the postwar cabinets at will as one wheel horse in the "team of ministers" of Rumanian politics. Dr. Argetoianu and General Averescu were others.

Socialism as a doctrine found no favorable soil in Rumania. It was a foreign flower. The small class of industrial workers proved none too responsive to Socialist propaganda. The Socialist Party was compelled to make several pacts with governmental coalitions. The Rumanian peasant, especially if he owns land, has displayed no Communist leanings. The Communist Party was dissolved in 1924 and again in 1933. Before 1939, such groups as the League of Communist Youth, the Red League, and the Farmers' and Workmen's Bloc operated under cover. The Magyars, Germans, and Jews tended to pledge their votes to that Rumanian party promising them a fair deal.

CAROL'S PERSONAL GOVERNMENT

During Carol's regime, political forces centered on the rivalry of individual leaders competing for power and the entourage of the royal court. After Carol's restoration, Rumania began passing through a series of grave internal crises. Yet for ten years the cunning of the King enabled him to reinforce his personal power and rule the country by playing against each other the two strongest organizations, the National Peasant and the Liberal Parties, and within each of them the several leaders. Often he bestowed his royal favor on second-raters, leaving the party leader in the lurch.

To achieve his aims [the King] had to have recourse to politicians who had already gained prestige, had been affiliated with parties and party politics, even if of the special Roumanian brand, and who were willing to work with him. They constituted the so-called Camarilla, a set of politicians, generals and industrialists, eager to assist the King, bent on developing a domestic industry and on the unification of the country. Tatarescu, the last Premier of the Liberal Party; Vaida-Voevod, leader of the "Roumanian Front" who formerly split from the Peasant Party; Goga; Professor Iorga, former tutor of the King; all of the friends of the King are on the best personal terms with the Camarilla.²³

The trend toward personal government became apparent as early as 1931, when the nonparty cabinet of Iorga took office. The regime of the eccentric professor ended with the refusal of the Liberals to support him in his efforts to raise a loan for the payment of government salaries. The incoming cabinet of the National Peasant Party, headed by Vaida-Voevod, soon met opposition from the King, who recalled Maniu to the helm. When Maniu proved less tractable, he was dropped in January 1933. The reappointment of Vaido-Voevod to the premiership was one of the steps whereby Carol turned these two peasant leaders against each other. But this was merely one episode. Ion Duca, a younger Liberal chieftain, was commissioned to form a new cabinet in November. After Duca's assassination by members of the Iron Guard in December 1933, Georges Tatarescu placed himself in the saddle of Rumanian politics for the next four years.

²³ Luetkens, *op. cit.*, p. 689. Quoted by permission of the editor.

It was hoped that Tatarescu would devote himself to improving both Rumania's position in international trade and the lot of the impoverished peasantry. But the government was more interested in extensive plans for rearmament and the modernization of the army. The Premier was wax in Carol's hands, but failed to check the rising tide of Fascism, which he hoped would help him to crush the democratic opposition of the Peasant Party. The Iron Guard, having done away with Duca, assaulted numerous peasant leaders, also threatened to murder Carol's Magda Lupescu, Titulescu, the foreign minister, and even the King himself. The Guard espoused ardently the cause of Prince Nicholas, who was forced by his royal brother to leave the country although he had been instrumental in bringing Carol back to Bucharest. And yet the government could not be stirred to take effective action against Codreanu's Fascist terrorists. It entertained the belief that it would be possible to come to an understanding with Codreanu and that he could be used against other factions. While leftist groups timidly avoided all co-operation with the Communists, the rightist parties tolerated and even supported the extremists on the other side. So did Carol, until it became obvious that Codreanu was under the sway of totalitarianism and that his opposition to the King was systematic and uncompromising.

THE CANCER OF RUMANIAN FASCISM

Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, son of a Polish father and a German mother, the founder of the Iron Guard, known also as "The League of the Archangel Michael," rode about the countryside on a white horse, a crucifix in his hands, a revolver at his belt. He began his political career in 1923 by shooting the police prefect and two gendarmes at Jassi when he was restrained in promoting anti-Jewish riots. Almost 2,000 Rumanian "patriots" stood up for the killer. Such a great number of defenders was perhaps not required; he was acquitted, and his followers combined in a religious society, which appointed the Archangel as its sponsor. Its emblem was a blue swastika on a yellow field. The society transformed itself into the Iron Guard in 1930, and later, when the Guard was declared dissolved by the government, into the Party *Totul pentru Tara* ("All for the Fatherland"). It became the first large-scale

political movement, with a million organized supporters, kept together by unconditional obedience to their leader.

Codreanu's Legion of fifty thousand activists—students, young physicians, lawyers, priests, university professors, retired army officers, and general riffraff—meant business. The orders of Codreanu killed Premier Duca; the murderers, all of Macedo-Bulgarian origin, were promoted to the highest ranks of the organization. Nicolae Titulescu, silver-tongued orator and Rumania's great international statesman, was also marked off by the Guard. He fell mysteriously ill; Carol soon chose the easy way out by dismissing him abruptly from office in August 1936. The movement, like its totalitarian prototypes elsewhere, exploited racial hatred, ignorance, and economic discontent; but it also capitalized on the popularity of revolt against bad government. The question may be raised how much of the movement was indigenous and how much Nazi propaganda. There is no question, however, that it was typically Rumanian in its anti-Semitism.

The periodic waves of Rumanian anti-Semitism can be attributed to the fact that the control of business, banking, and industry rested to a large extent with non-Rumanian elements—Germans, Hungarians, and Jews. Moreover, in every single Transylvanian city the Rumanians constituted a minority; they were considered inferior to other nationalities in large parts of their own land. Jews were prominent in the newspaper field, managed many of the moving-picture theaters, controlled a great number of the banks; they were the inn-keepers and moneylenders in the villages, and held leading places in the universities and in the professions. Most young Rumanians, unable to rise in the overcrowded professions, attributed their troubles to the Jews, who seemed to prosper in the midst of poverty.

Nationally, anti-Semitism was not a monopoly of the Iron Guard. In 1935 Octavian Goga, famed Transylvanian poet who was on excellent personal terms with Madame Lupescu, merged his National Agrarians with the National Christian Defense League of Professor Alexander Cuza, Rumania's Jewish-looking veteran Jew-hater. The outcome was the National Christian Party, which had much in common with the Iron Guard. In spite of their common scapegoats, however,

Codreanu and Goga hated each other, largely because of personal antipathies. Goga's Fascist agitation was doing its utmost to emulate German National Socialism, without possessing a sufficient basis and enough driving force. It militated against "liberalist democracy," but was strongly monarchistic and proposed to carry out its program through an absolutist royal government.

The vitality and aggressiveness of Rumanian Fascism were strengthened as Fascist nations won round after round in Europe's diplomatic encounters. It made headway in the schools as well as among the young officers and the rank and file of the army. Its appeal lay primarily in its anti-Semitism and its denunciation of Carol's Jewish consort, "Rumania's Madame Pompadour." As a movement aiming at "basic change," it had great attractiveness to unemployed intellectuals and academicians. Lubricated with money advanced by foreign powers, it prospered on domestic uncertainty and palace intrigue.²⁴

During the nominal rule of the pliable Tatarescu, Carol prudently shifted one foot from the Little Entente camp superintended by France to that of Berlin-Rome. Although the Premier was helpless in the face of Codreanu's excesses, Carol was satisfied with his tool, and permitted Tatarescu to plunge into parliamentary elections. These were held on December 21, 1937—a memorable day in the chronicles of Rumanian suffrage because for the first time the man designated by the King as premier failed to secure the mythical 40 percent which automatically means a packed chamber. Tatarescu's Liberal Party had polled only 38.5 percent of the total vote. It was the first public condemnation of royal domination in the history of Rumania. In fact popular resentment had become so great that Maniu, Francophile and a sincere democrat, had not hesitated to make an electoral pact with the Jew-baiting and pro-German Iron Guard.

No other party, however, was constitutionally qualified to take over the government. The National Peasant Party polled but 19.5 percent, about 3 percent more than the Iron Guard. In addition, Maniu as well as Codreanu were unacceptable because of their public attacks on the King's Lupescu. Lost in

²⁴ See H. C. Wolfe, *The German Octopus* (Garden City, 1938), pp. 124-36. See also C. Z. Codreanu, *Eiserne Garde* (Berlin, 1939).

the ruck, with only 9 percent of the vote, was the National Christian Front, the Fascist, Germanophile, anti-Semitic party of Octavian Goga and Professor Alexander Cuza. Determined not to give the country's democratic forces a chance to clean Rumania's Augean stable, Carol pulled a surprise. As premier he named Goga, who formed a cabinet of five National Christians, three National Peasants, and two others without party affiliations.

The Goga-Cuza combination came into power with a blaring of nationalist trumpets and unveiled threats against Jews. In the same breath the cabinet proclaimed its intention to live up faithfully to all treaties binding Rumania to France and the Little Entente. Subsequently, however, the stipulations of the Berlin Treaty of 1878 and the minority treaties were as brazenly violated as the Constitution. The anti-Jewish excesses, lasting forty-five days, had a disruptive effect on the entire economy. In addition, the government antagonized the powers that had been Rumania's closest friends. The brutal attacks on racial and national minorities aroused world-wide protests.

CAROL'S AUTOCRACY

The tragic farce ended early in March 1938, when the King sacrificed Goga. The general feeling of relief after the Goga nightmare was favorable to Carol's old ambition—to introduce a regime of royal autocracy, based on a military dictatorship. The King appointed a "Ministry of All Talents," a cabinet of "national concentration" under Patriarch Miron Christea, who was expected to win back, by the weight of his prestige, many of the Codreanu followers. Far-reaching political changes were soon to follow. Like the late King Alexander of Yugoslavia, Carol tore up the Constitution he had sworn to uphold; but, unlike Alexander, he was able to secure the support of a considerable number of politicians including several former premiers. The National Peasant Party was pushed off the stage and so was the ultrademocratic Radical Party of Gregory Iunian. Outside "national concentration" remained also the Iron Guard and the dispirited followers of Goga-Cuza.

The government program called for a raised standard of living for both labor and the peasantry, increased taxation of wealth, currency stabilization, a balanced budget, methodic re-

settlement of part of the Jewish population outside Rumania. Henceforth, government was to be by royal decree. The parties were declared disbanded, and the army, under martial law, was accorded the right of search. To give his personal dictatorship a semblance of legality, Carol ordered—in a country largely illiterate and still in a stage of siege—a “plebiscite” on the new fundamental law. The voters were commanded under penalties to appear before local authorities on February 24, 1938, and answer aloud whether they wished their names recorded as agreeing or objecting to the King’s irrevocable decision. When the tabulations were in, 5,413 voters were registered for “no,” and 4,283,395 for “yes.”

This simplified procedure for adopting a constitution indicates fairly accurately the practical significance of Rumania’s basic law. The first constitution, that of 1866,²⁵ drew heavily on the Belgian constitution of 1831. Theoretically, it was very liberal. But in practice the ruler had an absolute and unconditional right to veto all legislation. The electoral system was undemocratic. The senate, elected by the two colleges of large landowners and urban patricians, was a stronghold of conservatism. The constitution of 1923 was the child of the Liberal Party.²⁶ It guaranteed to all Rumanians—without distinction as to racial origin, language, or religion—freedom of worship, of education, of association, and of the press (Art. 5). It provided further that the constitution could not be suspended either entirely or in part (Art. 128). The executive power, vested in the King, continued to overshadow the legislative power.

Carol’s constitution of February 20, 1938, was a lengthy document.²⁷ Foremost among its one hundred articles were

²⁵ French translation in J. Delpech and J. Laferrière, *Les constitutions modernes*, II (4th ed., Paris, 1929), pp. 351–54. For an analysis, see H. F. Wright, *The Constitutions of the States at War 1914–1918* (Washington, D.C., 1919), p. 517; Roucek, *op. cit.*, pp. 218–21.

²⁶ French text in Delpech and Laferrière, *op. cit.* For an appraisal see Roucek, *op. cit.*, pp. 221–37; D. Mitrany, “The New Rumanian Constitution,” *Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law*, VI (1924), pp. 110–19.

²⁷ Official text: *Le Moment* (Bucharest), Feb. 23, 1938; summaries: *New York Times*, Feb. 21, 23, and 27, 1938; *Central European Observer*, XIV (1938), 66; A. Radulescu, “La nouvelle constitution,” *Revue de Transylvanie*, IV (1938), 3–13. For the text of the Minority Statute of August, 1938, see *Affaires Danubiennes*, No. 1 (1938), pp. 105–6 (Bucharest).

stipulations giving the King absolute veto power over all legislation and authority to appoint half of the senate membership. There was also an attractive phrase professing to safeguard legal equality for all Rumanians without racial distinction; religious freedom, too, was guaranteed, with the Orthodox Rumanian creed recognized as the state religion. The form of government was not greatly changed. Parliament and the cabinet were retained, but both were controlled by the King. The cabinet did not need to be representative of Parliament and was not dependent on it. One-half of the members of the senate were elected by popular vote; the other half were named by the King. Members of the lower house were chosen on the basis of three guilds: farmer-labor, commerce-industry, and intellectual-professions—corporative features.

Political parties were prohibited from participating in such elections. Parliament was convened only once a year; the session could be postponed for twelve months by royal order. The King alone could initiate legislation. Minority rights were respected, but only Rumanian citizens were permitted to own land in the villages. Government posts were to be reserved for citizens of "Rumanian race." The franchise was restricted to those citizens, including women over thirty, who were occupied in farming, handicraft, trade, industry, and the professions. Representation was purely occupational; farmers, for instance, could elect only a farmer to represent their interests. Thus the Parliament was nothing more than an advisory council. Many of the new constitutional provisions were designed to clip the wings of the Iron Guard and National Peasant leaders. Among them was one providing that no one could become a minister or premier whose family had not been Rumanian for at least three generations. In August 1938 a subsequent decree established a General Commissariat for the Minorities. The move reflected the desire of the monarch to place an effective buffer between the throne and an issue that, under National Socialist pressure, could well assume crucial significance at any time.

The centripetal tendencies of Carol's autocracy also affected the conduct of local government. Bucharest's control was tightening—a simple process since the country's administrative system was modeled on that of France. The kingdom was divided into counties headed by prefects and subprefects; the

counties were subdivided into cantons headed by "praetors." The prefect represented the central authority; his jurisdiction was far more extensive than that of his French counterpart. The smallest "autonomous" unit was the commune (village); the communes were combined into counties. Each commune was governed by its mayor and a communal council composed of a number of ex-officio members and others elected by the communal voters. The executive body of the county council was a standing committee of four council members; its chairman was the administrative head of the county, while the prefect supervised county affairs as the government's representative. Municipalities did not form an integral part of the county in which they were situated but were granted county status.²⁸ A strong regime had the institutions of local government well at its disposal.

Carol's autocracy was based on a clear-cut military dictatorship, although at the turn of 1939 a royal decree provided for the formation of a new national front comprising three groups—agriculture, labor, and the liberal professions. The official creed was that supreme power is vested in the hands of the King, and could not be left to the *Führer* of a domestic Fascist party. Two authoritarian doctrines thus conflicted; the strong-willed monarch made himself one of the main obstacles to a seizure of power by the Iron Guard. The system would stand or fall according to the King's ability to maintain himself as the dictator and to keep his people under the illusion of contentment. He embarked on a road on which there was no going back, as Alexander of Yugoslavia had found.

Believing himself safely in the saddle, Carol not only suppressed all opposition, but also boldly confronted his archfoe, Zelea Codreanu, whom he put behind prison bars. After this show of strength, he tested his bargaining position by visiting personally Europe's political centers—Paris, London, and Berlin. The result was inconsequential, but the Iron Guard used the King's absence to good purpose by organizing a campaign of terror throughout the country. This challenge Carol decided to meet. One gray morning, before 1938 had come to a close, the bullet-riddled bodies of Codreanu and a dozen of his lieu-

²⁸ For more details see Roucek, *op. cit.*, pp. 227-43; G. M. Harris, *Local Government in Many Lands* (2d ed., London, 1933), pp. 214-18.

tenants lay on a lonely road outside Bucharest—"shot while attempting to escape." The death in March 1939 of Patriarch Christea, who was more of a venerable figurehead than the leader of the cabinet, had no effect on the government's course, bent upon the complete destruction of the Iron Guard. The vice premier, Armand Calinescu, a Bucharest *boulevardier* pliable enough to be the real executor of Carol's will, was called to the helm. The same month saw Rumania's surrender to a Hitler ultimatum aiming at the integration of her system of production into the German economy. Carol sacrificed his country's economic independence for both the preservation of his dictatorship and what amounted to a German marketing guaranty for Rumania's agricultural and mineral output.

Carol's mailed fist gave Rumania the surface appearance of internal calm. But the government—though buttressed by the new law for the defense of the state that prohibits propaganda for a change of regime, redistribution of property, or class action—was in a precarious situation.

WORLD WAR II

CAROL'S DEPARTURE IN THE WILD WEST STYLE

There was suppressed civil war in Carol's reign, fostering hates and discontents leading to assassination and counter-assassination, not because Carol was a bloodthirsty tyrant, but because Carol had to survive and hence had to dispose of the most dangerous contenders for power by the familiar Balkan technique. In addition to the usual opposition forces, Carol had to face the threats of the Iron Guard, Rumania's "Fifth Column," supported by Hitler, whose problem he solved, temporarily, by having Codreanu, the Iron Guard's *Führer*, and his lieutenants shot. Carol, in fact, must be credited with rather successfully maintaining his government against his numerous internal foes. When the Iron Guard struck again at Carol in September 1939 during the confusion caused by the collapse of Poland, the government exacted terrible reprisals for the assassination of Premier Calinescu.

With the fall of France in June 1940 Carol tried to climb on Hitler's bandwagon, scrapped his Party of National Rebirth

for a new Party of the Nation—and the Iron Guard was given an invitation to join. But the course of events was against Carol's plans. Stalin's government, pushing Russia's frontier westward against the approaching war with Nazi Germany, sent an ultimatum to Carol, demanding Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, in June 1940. Then, in August 1940, the Axis forced Carol's government to cede Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria and a portion of Transylvania to Hungary.

Step by step Hitler was putting the skids under Carol, who was finally downed on September 6, 1940. Carol, in an effort to appease Hitler, appointed Fascist-minded General Ion Antonescu to head his government. Antonescu showed his gratitude by forcing Carol's abdication. The King hastily boarded a special train in the dead of the night, after scooping up all the art works and money he could lay his hands on. Pursued by a train of revengeful Iron Guardists, Carol and his Madame Magda Lupescu were able to reach the border, with bullets whistling over their heads; they eventually found refuge in Mexico City.

RUMANIA'S QUISLING, ANTONESCU

Marshal (then only General) Ion Antonescu, commonly known as the Red Dog, became Rumania's *Führer*. Like all other Nazi puppets, he sat on a sword, and he has an unenviable place in history with Vidkun Quisling and Pierre Laval for his base treacheries and mass murders.

A Transylvanian by birth, and educated in French military schools, he was a colonel at the time of the Armistice following World War I. Sent to Budapest as head of the highjacking squads, he stole railroad equipment, livestock, foodstuffs, works of art, and even robbed hospitals of medicines and instruments. Major General Harry Bandholtz, American member of the Inter-Allied Military Commission, denounced it as "common thievery," and on one occasion stood before the doors of the National Museum and beat off the looters with his riding crop.

A popular hero by reason of pillage, Antonescu climbed until he stood at Carol's right hand as Chief of Staff. From this post he watched the steady ascent of Hitler, and planned to do in Rumania what the Austrian-born *Gefreiter* (equivalent to Britain's lance corporal and America's private first class, not

America's corporal as is commonly supposed) had done in Germany. Slyly creating an Iron Guard in imitation of the Storm Troopers and fomenting pogroms against the Jews, the Red Dog began his plots against the throne plentifully supplied with Nazi money. Carol, however, struck first, and put Antonescu behind prison bars. A bold stroke, but Nazi pressure forced the traitor's release and then demanded his appointment as Premier.

This was on September 5, 1940. One day later, the perjured creature proclaimed himself dictator, and only Carol's hasty flight prevented his capture and execution. Donning the green shirt of the Iron Guard, the Red Dog now followed Hitler's pattern in savage detail, killing political enemies and turning every ghetto into a shambles. On the heels of these slaughters he sent messages of love and loyalty to the Führer and Il Duce.

The Iron Guard, a movement of revolt which had been fostered by the Nazis but which grew out of internal conditions, like all such growths springing up in the sour soil of Europe's youth movements, was surprisingly widespread in the army, in the universities, in the factories, and in the poorest villages. To most of the young Rumanians, living in a country striving so hard to be "modern," the movement was associated with machines, with the up-to-dateness of mechanical civilization. But, strange to say, this was part of the appeal of Germany to the youth of these backward Balkan countries, and the irony of this attraction was that the Germans were determined to throttle industrial development and force all the young men in the Balkans back to the farms to produce food for Germany.

At any rate the Iron Guard, which in its origin represented a revolt against bad government and which was later used by the Nazis to disrupt and divide the nation, finally went out of hand at the very end of November 1940. Split into fragments and driven by the hate it generated to terrorize and to kill, it worked for the Nazis by making anything but a completely Nazi regime impossible.

This permitted Antonescu to move the country closer toward the Axis. On October 12, 1940, the vanguard of German troops rolled into Rumania, to "train" the Rumanian army and to protect Rumania's oil wells from the British, the Germans said. During the first weeks of 1941, Rumania assumed a leading

role in the Balkan stage. German troops and military equipment moved in great numbers over the state railways of Hungary, from which German control officers barred almost all civilian traffic. As many as twenty-five trains a day rolled into Rumania in addition to boxcars by the hundreds containing enough soldiers to bring Hitler's strength in the Balkans up to approximately 600,000. German troop occupation had assured the Reich of steady delivery of Rumanian oil, as well as giving the Germans a foothold deep in the Balkans.

Antonescu's opportunity came on June 22, 1941, when Hitler broke his nonaggression pact with Russia and drove his Panzer divisions deep into Ukrainia. Ahead of the Nazis marched an army of Rumanian peasants, herded like sheep to the slaughter. Used only as living shields, between forty and fifty thousand were killed at Odessa alone. German victories restored Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to Antonescu's rule and, by way of compensation for Transylvania, Hitler gave him title to Trans-Istria, the broad sweep of territory between the Dniester River and the Styrr.

ANTONESCU'S DOWNFALL

The Germans stripped Rumania with the thoroughness of a locust swarm, and even wholesale executions could not still the reports of revolts of a starving people. After a failure of the Nazi drives for oil in the Caucasus and the Middle East during the German summer offensive in 1942, Hitler had to depend entirely on Rumania's oil production (plus a growing ersatz) for fuel output. Antonescu, who had signed the Axis Tripartite Pact on November 23, 1940, following by three days Rumania's far-from-beloved neighbor, Hungary, imitated Hitler with docile servility. He established a totalitarian state, with himself as *Führer* and the Iron Guard as the only political party. But the opposition was always cropping up, and soon the Marshal found it necessary to appoint himself Supreme Judge.

Antonescu was one of those rulers who never seem to profit from experience. His recognition that his country was no more than a junior branch of Germany, together with his knowledge that Hungary, certainly not Rumania's friend, was preferred by Hitler, did not dampen his original pro-Axis ardor. Between 1939 and 1942, the prices of vital commodities in Rumania

rose from 125 to 740 percent. The Nazis, controlling 80 percent of Rumania's exports, paid little in return. But what was of most importance to the Nazis was the Rumanian oil situation. Production had steadily decreased from a 1936 peak of 8,700,000 tons to 5,400,000 tons in 1942—owing to sabotage from the top by Rumanian technicians who formerly had worked for foreign-controlled corporations. Then came the sporadic but highly effective raids on the Ploesti oil field by Allied aircraft.

When the Russian juggernaut began to roll westward, panic-stricken Antonescu and his rouged dandies screamed for help, and Hitler was compelled to flood Rumania with troops sorely needed on other fronts, and also with Gestapo agents to guard against the Red Dog's genius for treachery.

ONE-MAN COUP

With the might of Russia's armies appearing just over the horizon, Antonescu's political critics and opponents tried to save the country. During the winter of 1943–1944, Prince Barbu Shtirbey left Rumania in the guise of a diplomatic courier. In Cairo preliminary armistice negotiations were held. The Soviet Union, holding the paramount position among the Allied spokesmen, drew up minimum armistice terms in April 1944. Molotov made public his country's statement on Rumania and declared that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had no territorial claims—beyond those portions (Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia) that she considered were indisputably Soviet lands.

The negotiations thereafter bogged down.

King Mihai, who was little heard of under Antonescu's rule, took matters into his own hands for the first time; he decided that the *pourparlers* were not proceeding fast enough. He lined up a few loyal military chieftains and prepared for a coup to displace the Germans and at the same time to pave the way for an attack on Hungary to regain northern Transylvania with formally promised Soviet approval and tacit British and American consent.

No fewer than seven times the King and his young collaborators had planned such a coup, the first early in 1942. The eighth—and successful—attempt was originally scheduled for

August 26, 1944. But word leaked out that Antonescu was leaving for the front; the King sent for the dictator on August 23, receiving him in his study, and had him arrested and imprisoned in the small vault where Carol used to keep his stamps. Besides Premier Sanatescu, the new cabinet included Maniu; George Bratianu, leader of the Liberal Party; Lucretiu Patrascanu, Communist; and Constantin Petrescu, Socialist.

The Germans reacted swiftly. Assembling all their available bombers, especially those on the main airfields just outside Bucharest, they struck savagely at Rumania's capital and devastated the royal palace.

TERMS FOR RUMANIA

Like Italy, Rumania at first hoped to terminate its alliance with the Nazis peaceably. But the bombing attacks forced the King's men to declare war on Germany on August 25, and Rumania was accepted as a cobelligerent on the same footing as Italy. These swift developments doomed the German Sixth Army in Moldavia and Bessarabia, already badly mauled in the tremendous Soviet break-through which had begun on August 20, and in four days had knocked Rumania out of the war.

In September, Lawyer Lucretiu Patrascanu signed an armistice in the Kremlin which took Rumania officially out of her war against the Allies and into an approved war against Germany and Hungary. The terms were regarded as lenient. Rumania was to get back most of Transylvania, perhaps all. She was to restore to Russia the provinces of Bukovina and Bessarabia, pay Russia \$300,000,000 in war damages, honor damage claims submitted by the other Allies, abolish all Fascist organizations, restore in good order all property seized from Allied nationals and permit a Russian-managed Allied Control Commission to supervise the government and press until a peace should be signed.

THE SOVIET CONTROL

Mihai's first independent government under General Sanatescu included the historic National Peasant and National Liberal Parties and the Socialist and Communist parties—the latter with its two satellite groupings, the Plowmen's Front and the Patriots' Union. The new coalition also announced plans for

an agrarian reform, which was to embrace all estates larger than 123 acres (with the exception of model farms).

Once the German danger evaporated, serious rifts cropped up in the coalition. While Maniu, Mihalache, and Bratianu represented the moderate wing, the extreme left, under the Communists—headed by Mrs. Anna Pauker, Emil Bodnaras, and Vasile Luca, representing only some 5 percent of the population—and Petru Groza's Plowmen's Front and Ralea's Patriots' Union tried to win more deliberately the peasant and middle-class elements of the population and insisted on purging the bureaucracy, trying war criminals, and enforcing agrarian and financial reforms. The Socialist Party of Titel Petrescu, standing between the moderates and the extremists, counted very little in the decisions.²⁹

The Communists forced the dismissal of the Peasant and Socialist representatives from the Cabinet in November; a month later General Radescu was replaced by General Sanatescu, and laws reversing the anti-Semitic ordinances of the Antonescu regime were passed. The latent conflict between the coalition forces and the Communists burst into the open on February 24, 1945, when large groups of armed Communists of the Communist-inspired National Democratic Front attempted to overthrow the government. Shooting occurred simultaneously in several provincial towns. As a result, four days later the entire cabinet resigned. The King appointed Prince Barbu Shtirbey (who had broken the ice for negotiations resulting in Rumania's armistice) to form a new government, but the unrest in the country continued. The King then acceded to Russia's pressure and selected Dr. Peter Groza head of the Leftist National Democratic Front.

GROZA: RICH "PLOWMAN"

A husky, good-natured, bald-headed man with curious cauliflower ears, Groza was far from being a plowman himself, although he was the head of an organization known as the

²⁹ For more details on this period, see: Cyril E. Black, "The Axis Satellites and the Great Powers," *Foreign Policy Reports*, XXII (May 1, 1946), 44-46; George Deneke and Leon Dennen, "The Balkans: Battleground of Two Worlds," *New Leader*, Vol. XXVIII (November 17, 1945), No. 46, pp. 8-10; Leigh White, "The Soviet's Iron Fist in Rumania," *Saturday Evening Post*, CCXVII (June 23, 1945), 18 ff; and Reuben H. Markham, "Bullies in the Balkans," *Collier's*, CXVIII (September 7, 1946), 19 ff.

Plowmen's Front. In reality he was a middle-aged Transylvanian businessman who had long opposed the Peasant Party's leadership. He came from the town of Deva, where he owned three hotels and the local bank, in addition to several thousand acres of farm land, which he deeded to the peasants who used to work for him. He also owned a small textile factory in Sighisoara and a distillery in Arad. Confined in a concentration camp when Antonescu was in power, he was brought into power by the Communist Party (like Gheorghieff and Veltcheff in Bulgaria) to serve as its front man.

The real power in Rumania was Anna Pauker, a carp-faced woman, broad of beam and of bosom, aged fifty-two (1945). She began life as a schoolteacher, and switched to being a professional Communist agitator by the time she was twenty-five. In 1925 she had to seek refuge in the Soviet Union; she returned a few years later and was active in underground work until her arrest in 1935. On her way to prison she was severely wounded by "rightist agents." After eighteen months' imprisonment, she was sentenced to ten years, but was later freed in exchange for certain Rumanian prisoners from the Soviet Union. Speaking fluent Russian, French, and German, Anna Pauker, wife of a doctor, held a Soviet as well as a Rumanian citizenship in 1945. She was the real power in the National Democratic Front, which comprised the Socialists, Communists, Plowmen's Front, and Patriots' Union and was sponsored by Russia's Foreign Vice-Commissar Vishinsky.

The Groza regime came into power on March 6, 1945. Four days later the Soviet government rewarded it with the administration of northern Transylvania. The revolutionary phase of Rumania's postwar politics began. The Peasant and Liberal Parties were isolated and their press and meetings were suppressed. Petrescu was ousted from the leadership of the Socialist Party. Since Groza's government was such an exemplary pupil of the Soviet's line and had set up in the summer of 1945 four joint Soviet-Rumanian corporations (oil, navigation, air transport, and banking), the regime was accorded full Soviet recognition on August 9, 1945. When King Mihai tried to reassert his influence, encouraged by the Potsdam communiqué, and demanded Groza's resignation, Groza refused. The King's request to the Big Three for help was in vain. The Russians

answered that the Groza regime, in their opinion, was amply "democratic." Washington and London remained strangely silent until the Moscow Conference in December 1945. Meanwhile, when Mihai refused to sign Groza's laws, Groza ruled by decree; it was not until January 1946 that normal constitutional procedure was restored.

Since Washington and London threatened to refuse recognition to Groza's government if elections were rigged, a long period of careful preparation produced electoral lists only in October 1946. The result was that dithyrambic cries of foul play went up from aging National Peasant Party Leader Iuliu Maniu and National Liberal Party Leader Constantin Bratianu.

But the Russians could afford to bide their time. Russia had been tightening her grip on Rumania's oil fields, principal source of Europe's liquid fuel. While diplomatic protests to Moscow had succeeded in preserving title to Rumania's oil properties owned by the United States, British, Dutch, French, and Belgian operators, this appeared to be an empty victory in the fall of 1946, for the Soviet Union was in full control of production quotas, prices, and distribution. Non-Russian interests, including those of Rumanians themselves, were being squeezed out of a field where production had been dwindling since 1935.³⁰

King Mihai was by this time ready to take his orders; he was the only Balkan leader to receive the exalted Soviet Order of Victory. There was Premier Groza, Soviet stooge, living with his mistress in Bucharest; there were the only two divisions of Rumanian troops repatriated, after proper indoctrination, from Russia, constituting an incipient praetorian guard. And there were the three real leaders of the Rumanian Communist Party, all able and none of them native Rumanians: Emil Bodnaras (real name Bodnarenko), a Ukrainian from Bessarabia; Laszlo Vasile Luca, a Hungarian from Transylvania; and Anna Pauker, a German-Jewish Communist whose husband was formerly an official of Amtorg (Russian-American Trading Company) in Manhattan.

On January 28, 1946, the National Democratic Front published a ten-point social and economic program similar to the

³⁰ "Russia Squeezing Competitors from Romania's Oil Fields," *World Report*, I (October 1, 1946), 13.

programs already in force in Poland, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria (land reform, compulsory education, the purging of "Fascists" from the army and government, the raising of living standards for workers and peasants, and the betterment of relations with the Soviet Union). The program was reasonable enough. But the methods used to implement this program were again the dictatorial methods of pre-Carol and Carol days—except that the personalities at the helm had been changed. While Carol had been a strong man of Rumanian politics, Groza was a façade for another ruling clique of Rumania, the Communists at that time. And, as always, it was again Rumania's peasant who was paying the bill for all the past, present, and future mistakes of the ruling cliques.

In another of those typical Balkan elections, the Rumanian government bloc voted itself a thumping majority of more than two-thirds of the votes cast and an almost 85 percent majority in the Parliament (November 19, 1946). The terrorization of the electorate, the suppression of the opposition, and the falsification of the election results were even more glaring than in Bulgaria and approached Tito's standards in Yugoslavia. The Communist Minister of the Interior boasted that he had refrained from widespread political arrests on the eve of the election, which he well could, since he had arrested some two hundred opposition leaders ten days earlier. In London a spokesman of Maniu's National Peasant Party, strongest opponents of the Communist government, accused Groza's followers of excluding 2,000,000—among them 25 percent of the Peasant Party—from the published lists of registered voters. Many of the 7,968,794 who succeeded in registering still voted stubbornly against the government in defiance of Russian threats, only to have their ballots "opened accidentally" and replaced by those marked in favor of Groza's six-party "National Democratic Front Coalition." After the votes had been counted—in many localities without opposition witnesses—the government "coalition" totaled 4,766,360 votes; the Peasant Party 879,927. Of the 414 seats in the new single-chamber parliament, the government received 348, the National Peasant Party 32.³¹

³¹ The new Chamber was to be made up as follows: Democratic Parties bloc, 348 seats; National-Peasant Party (Maniu), 32 seats; Hungarian

To complete the picture of exclusion of all opposition to the Communist-dominated government, on July 14, 1947, several members of the National Peasant Party were arrested on charges of "wanting to overthrow the regime." Among the arrested opposition leaders was Iuliu Maniu, president of the Peasant Party; Ion Michalache, vice-president; Nicholae Penescu, secretary-general; and Dr. Constantin Gafnko.

Meanwhile, "geopolitically," the U.S.S.R. was taking no chances on Rumania's foreign policy of the future. Since the summer of 1946, Russians have been arriving in large numbers in the region of Constanza, Rumania's vital Black Sea port. Some 50,000 of them roamed Constanza's countryside by January 1947, supporting their own schools, shops, theaters, and restaurants. While in most Rumanian cities King Mihai's photo was flanked by those of Rumanian Premier Groza and Premier Joseph Stalin, in Constanza's bars, shops, and hotels, Stalin's photo rated the center.

MIHAI'S DEPARTURE

While this book was in press, the Communist drive to eliminate all political opposition reached its culmination at the end of December with the abdication of twenty-six-year-old King Mihai I. On December 30, at 1:00 P.M., Mihai was forced by Groza to sign the abdication document; at 6:00 P.M., the obedient Parliament met, approved the abdication, and created a "People's Republic," headed by a Soviet-type Presidium. Mihai departed for Switzerland. Contemporary history's strangest paradox—a king by the grace of Soviet Communism—came to its end. Moscow's conquest of Rumania was complete.

People's Union, 29 seats; National-Liberal (Opposition) Party, 3 seats; Dr. Nicolae Lupu Opposition Peasant Democratic Party, 2 seats. The returns for the four main parties in the bloc of Democratic Parties were as follows: Social Democratic Party, 78 seats; National Liberal Party, 72; Plowmen's Front, 71; and Communist Party, 70. The deputies returned by the Hungarian People's Union, which ran a separate list in Transylvania, were pledged to support Groza.

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IX

BALKAN FOREIGN POLICIES

EUROPEAN international relations in the fifty years preceding the outbreak of World War I were closely bound up with Balkan problems—the disruption of the Turkish Empire, the rise of Balkan statehood, and the ensuing conflict of interests among the Great Powers.¹ Since Turkey controlled the Dardanelles and the eastern Mediterranean, the onslaughts weakening the Porte were of pivotal significance for Russia—posing as the natural protector of the Slavs as well as of Orthodox Christians in the Balkans. Austria, anxious to control the Danube to its mouth and the Dardanelles as the outlet for the Danube commerce, was deeply agitated over the possibility of having strong Slavic states under Russian mentorship at her back door. German jingoes, envisaging a great empire along the “transversal Eurasian axis,” devoted themselves to fostering the Berlin-Bagdad dream. England, eager to keep Russia out of Constantinople, doggedly worked for the safety of her gateway to India. France, accustomed to regard herself as the defender of Christianity in the Mediterranean orbit, found her claims contested by upstart Italy.

Each of the Great Powers had its own protégés among the Balkan nations, and each of these in turn sought to obtain territorial gains, including an outlet to the sea, without regard to the incorporation of national minorities in its domain. The Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 led, directly and indirectly, to World War I; enlarged and confident, Serbia grew attracted to

¹ Cf. D. Mitrany, *The Effect of the War in Southeastern Europe* (New Haven, 1936), pp. 3-56; W. W. White, *The Process of Change in the Ottoman Empire* (Chicago, 1937); W. E. Durham, *Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle* (London, 1920) is mostly a history of Albania and Macedonia. E. C. Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913* (Cambridge, 1938), is indispensable.

the idea of freeing all fellow Slavs from Austria-Hungary. Her hatred for Austria was to set off the spark.

BETWEEN WORLD WARS

ITALY VERSUS FRANCE

Postwar Balkan history can be divided into three definite periods.² The first, lasting from the "Great Parade" to the rise of Hitler's Third Reich, was characterized by the efforts of Italy to replace French and British influence in the Balkans—a region then seething with enmities among its states. The second period witnessed the struggle between centripetal schemes for Danubian co-operation with Franco-British encouragement. The third was formally inaugurated by the Munich Pact of October 1, 1938, which certified to the ascendancy of Germany's renewed *Drang nach Osten*, the retreat of the Western democracies in the Balkans, and the forceful extension of German supremacy, foreshadowed in the second period.

During the initial phase, Rumania, having more than doubled her territory and her population,³ saw herself favored over her defeated neighbors shrunk in size. Prudence induced Rumania to make her new possessions secure. The ever-present menace of a Hungarian or a Russian *revanche* caused her statesmen to orient their foreign policy in favor of a guaranty of the *status quo*. Her foreign ministers became the staunch defenders of the peace treaties. Rumania concluded a number of defensive alliances, not only with France but also with those beneficiaries of the new order bent on defending it at any price—Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. The partnership of Bucharest in the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente sprang from the desire to retain Transylvania and the other areas taken from Hungary as well as the Dobruja acquired from Bulgaria. Since Russia never formally acknowledged the loss of Bessarabia, relations with Moscow remained strained.

² See J. S. Roucek, "Central and Balkan Europe," in F. J. Brown, Charles Hodges, and J. S. Roucek, *Contemporary World Politics* (New York, 1939), pp. 326-55.

³ J. S. Roucek, *Contemporary Roumania* (Stanford University, 1932); C. U. Clark, *United Roumania* (New York, 1932); F. Dcák, *The Hungarian-Roumanian Land Dispute* (New York, 1928); H. Baerlein, *Bessarabia and Beyond* (London, 1935).

Yugoslavia was guided by identical considerations.⁴ This dictated her support of the League of Nations, her alliance with France, and her membership in the Little and Balkan Ententes. In addition, Belgrade had reason to worry about Italy. Rome controls the Adriatic gate to the Mediterranean, only fifty miles wide between the Italian coast and Albania, a satellite of the Duce's Foreign Office. Italy had sunk much money into Albania as the most convenient entrance to the Balkans.⁵ Tirana on her part had grievances against Yugoslavia, claiming that about 600,000 Albanians had been deprived of their minority rights. Zog's government had aligned itself with Bulgaria in a steady stream of complaints. In 1928, for instance, Albania appealed to the League of Nations against Greece's minority policy and the parcellation of Albanian estates under the Greek program of agrarian reform.

Dismembered Bulgaria had naturally turned into an articulate protagonist of treaty revision; nor had she forgotten about the outlet to the Aegean Sea.⁶ For obvious reasons, Macedonian lawlessness in Yugoslavia and Greece often received warm though unofficial support from Sofia. The deeds of nationalist passion helped to remind the world of Bulgaria's assertions that the rights of Macedonians (claimed as their kin by Bulgarians) were rudely discarded, in spite of the minority treaties. The population exchange with Greece further envenomed Bulgaro-Greek relations.

Military conquest from 1912 to 1918 gathered the bulk of the Greek people within the Greek state.⁷ But an attempt to create an empire in Asia Minor met with disastrous conse-

⁴ J. D. E. Evans, *Belgrade Slant* (London, 1937) is the best recent summary of Yugoslavia's foreign policies. L. Cermelj, *Life-and-Death Struggle of a National Minority* (Ljubljana, 1936) presents Yugoslav grievances with regard to the status of Italy's Yugoslavs.

⁵ H. Baerlein, *A Difficult Frontier* (London, 1922); E. P. Stickney, *Southern Albania or Northern Epirus in European International Affairs* (Stanford University, 1926); J. Swire, *Albania, The Rise of a Kingdom* (London, 1929).

⁶ Cf. L. Pasvolksky, *Bulgaria's Economic Position* (Washington, D.C., 1930).

⁷ Cf. N. S. Kaltchas, "Post-War Politics in Greece," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XII, No. 12 (1936), pp. 146-60; J. Mavrogordato, *Modern Greece* (New York, 1931); S. P. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities* (New York, 1932); A. A. Pallis, *Greece's Anatolian Venture—and After* (London, 1937), a reliable account.

quences in 1922. Turco-Greek relations did not improve for many years, owing to mutual expropriations and other problems connected with the population exchange. Since 1930, however, in the wake of the neutrality, conciliation, and arbitration treaty between the two powers, friendship has seriously been cultivated. Greece, being a Mediterranean as well as a Balkan country, had come to eye with distrust Italian imperialism. The Ethiopian War and the pointed Anglo-Italian rivalry revealed clearly that the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea might well become one of the danger zones of Europe. Fearing Italian expansion, Greece renewed her ancient amity with England and cautiously disentangled herself from some of the commitments of the Balkan Entente.

Undoubtedly, "if the Balkans are the powder magazine of Europe, it is the Great Powers who supply the powder." Above the bickerings of the Balkan states among each other there have appeared year after year the dangerous shadows of Europe's giants.⁸ From the time the peace treaties were signed, France had sympathized with Yugoslavia and Rumania. She supported the Little Entente, formed by these two powers and Czechoslovakia in 1921 with a single aim—to maintain the *status quo*. French sponsorship of the group, however, was on the whole limited to political encouragement and financial assistance. One definite commitment Paris incurred was the mutual-aid treaty with Czechoslovakia, negotiated in 1923. With Rumania and Yugoslavia the Quai d'Orsay signed merely pacts of nonaggression and consultation.

Italy, on the other hand, having gained far less by the peace treaties than she believed herself entitled to, soon manifested a desire to better her position in the Adriatic region at the expense of Yugoslavia. She met with partial success. The Italo-Albanian Pact of Tirana, concluded on November 27, 1926, and a defensive alliance agreed upon a year later testified to Italy's intention to consider the Balkans her legitimate sphere of influence. Time and time again Mussolini tried to assume the dominant role in the Danubian basin and the Balkans and to effect an arrangement which would offset the French influence exercised through the Little Entente. Still, French hegemony in

⁸ See M. W. Fodor, *Plot and Counterplot in Central Europe* (Boston, 1937).

the Balkans was never seriously threatened. Large Italian purchases from Yugoslavia, generous overtures to Bulgaria, maritime co-operation with Greece, and sedulous cultivation of the "Latin" ties with Rumania were unable to overcome Balkan distrust caused by Italian expansionism, subsidies to Albania, and rumors of *pourboires* to Macedonians.

THE BALKAN ENTENTE

The advent of Hitler in Germany opened a new chapter of Balkan history.⁹ Germany's aggressive attitude, the eclipse of the League of Nations, the disintegration of collective security, the creeping fear that the Balkans once more might become pawns in Europe's diplomatic game, coupled with the effects of world-wide economic crisis and a stoppage of loans from England and the United States—all these factors drove the Balkan states to a full realization of their mutual dependence upon each other. On February 9, 1934, Greece, Turkey, Rumania, and Yugoslavia signed a nonaggression pact.¹⁰

Its background lay in the moves toward substituting for a hegemony of one power some form of "Danubian Confederation," evidence of the more recent Balkan tendency to let bygones be bygones. The spadework had been done by the Rumanian-Greek nonaggression and arbitration treaty of 1928, the Rumanian-Bulgarian property agreement of 1930, the settlement of Greco-Yugoslav difficulties with reference to Salonica in March 1929, the Greco-Turkish neutrality, conciliation, arbitration, and friendship treaty of 1930, a similar treaty between Yugoslavia and Turkey in 1925 (renewed in 1933), and

⁹ See V. M. Dean, "Political Realignments in Europe," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. IX, No. 6 (1933), pp. 45-46; H. Fisher, "Cross-Currents in Danubian Europe," *ibid.*, Vol. XIII, No. 9 (1937), pp. 102-12; A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs* (London, annual); G. Hattan, *Is It Peace?* (New York, 1937), pp. 152-99; R. Freund, *Zero Hour* (New York, 1937), pp. 63-86; J. I. B. McCulloch, "Italy's Balkan Game," *Current History*, XLIII (1935), 238-42.

¹⁰ See R. J. Kerner and H. N. Howard, *The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente 1930-1935* (Berkeley, 1936), with bibliography, pp. 239-63; N. J. Padelford, *Peace in the Balkans* (New York, 1935); R. W. Seton-Watson, "Little and Balkan Ententes," *Slavonic Review*, XV (1937), 553-56; C. Galitzi, "Balkan Federation," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CLXVIII (1933), 178-82. See also Henryk Batowski, "Le mouvement panbalkanique," *Revue Internationale des Études Balkaniques*, VI (1938), 320-43.

the Turkish-Bulgarian neutrality, arbitration, and conciliation treaty of 1929 (affirmed in 1933). Furthermore, the Balkan Conferences, semiofficial gatherings of delegates, experts, and observers, held first in Athens in October 1930 and thereafter in other Balkan cities, had taught the Balkan statesmen the value of co-operation.

Yet the hopes placed on the Balkan Entente did not mature. Albania was never asked to join—on account of her subservience to Italy, which saw in the new bloc a threat to Roman supremacy in the Adriatic. Subsequently, the far-reaching military guaranties as originally envisaged were whittled down to a simple pledge of assistance against an unprovoked attack by another Balkan state. Bulgaria was approached with an invitation but refused because she did not want to jeopardize her revisionist aims. It was only in August 1938, after the restoration of her military freedom, that Bulgaria entered into a general pact of nonaggression with the Balkan Entente.

HITLER'S BID FOR HEGEMONY

Up to 1933, the Little Entente had no difficulty in coping with threats to its existence. Hungarian revenge was held in check, while Rumania with Poland, on the basis of a broad agreement signed on March 26, 1926, undertook to keep Soviet Russia inside her borders. Within a few months, however, the diplomatic situation changed completely. Hitler's desertion of the League of Nations and his successive abrogation of essential clauses of the peace treaties foredoomed the *status quo*. Russia could not cover the breach. Her admission to the League of Nations in September 1934, and the Franco-Soviet Pact of May 2, 1935, quickly implemented by the Czechoslovak-Russian Treaty of May 16, failed to counteract the rise of a new Central Europe. The weakness of France and Great Britain, obvious in the Ethiopian crisis, was demonstrated further by the unwillingness of the Quai d'Orsay to guarantee unconditionally the Danubian order without the endorsement of England. London, on the other hand, shied away from any such project.¹¹

The decline of France induced Yugoslavia and Rumania to follow a policy of counterinsurance. Francophile Titulescu,

¹¹ Cf. A. Geraud, "Eastern Europe: Vassal or Free?" *Foreign Affairs*, XVI (1938), 401-16.

long Rumania's minister of foreign affairs, was booted out in August 1936. In September the Little Entente dissolved the bonds of diplomatic solidarity, permitting each partner to negotiate individually with its neighbors. On January 24, 1937, Yugoslavs and Bulgars promised "never again" to make war upon each other. This pulled Yugoslavia out of the Balkan Pact which had obligated Belgrade to protect Greece, Rumania, and Turkey against an unprovoked Bulgarian attack. The Yugoslav-Italian Treaty of March 25, 1937, pointedly silent on the League of Nations, provided for Belgrade's consultation with Rome—a provision contrary to the Franco-Yugoslav Treaty of 1927 (renewed in 1932 and in 1937).

The rape of Austria in March 1938 and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in October and November—the latter in active co-operation with Chamberlain, Daladier, and Mussolini, and also to the benefit of Poland and Hungary—gave Hitler the first round in Germany's fight for European hegemony. Henceforth Germany was to be trusted to develop systematically her vision of *Mittleuropa*, of which the Balkans were an indispensable part.¹²

WORLD WAR II

THE TRANSVERSAL EURASIAN AXIS

As in prewar days, so in Hitler's days, Germany's *Mittleuropa* as conceived by her Utopians was to be a German empire based on the "transversal Eurasian axis" from Hamburg via Prague, Budapest, Constantinople, and Alexandretta to Basra on the Persian Gulf—nothing less than the shortest land route between the Atlantic Ocean (North Sea) and the Indian Ocean (Persian Gulf).¹³ What the West was to the United States in the past, the Balkans and the Near East was to National Socialist Germany—vast, undeveloped, and promising territories, with millions of potential buyers of German goods, an empire

¹² Cf. J. S. Roucek, "Czechoslovakia—the Watchdog of Europe's Peace," *Social Science*, XIII (1938), 277–83; and "Europe after Munich," *ibid.*, XIV (1939), 17–22.

¹³ E. M. Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway* (New York, 1923) is the best study of the Bagdad railway project. It has found some revision by J. B. Holp, *The Diplomatic History of the Bagdad Railroad* (Columbia, Miss., 1936).

that would bring lasting prosperity to the German *Herrenvolk*. Let England worry about her sea route to India, the artery of the British Empire—Germany was on the way to securing the land route to Asia.

From the economic point of view, on this "transversal Eurasian axis" could be found the two richest oil deposits of the Old World—the naphtha fields of Rumania and Mosul. The Balkans were a great reservoir of natural resources yet to be tapped. Germany wanted both oil and wheat to strengthen her *autark* economy in time of peace; without help from overseas, she needed them bitterly in time of war. Direct advance overland on the Hamburg-Basra axis was obstructed by the Black Sea, which could be passed either in the south via the Balkans and the Bosphorus, or in the north along the southwestern slopes of the Caucasus, through Ukrainia. Hence Hitler's sustained interest both in "saving the world from Communism" and in Balkan affairs.

Berlin's Balkan maneuvering took three distinct aspects. First, an attempt was made to bring the governments of the region under German influence—either directly or indirectly through the encouragement of indigenous Fascist movements. Second, efforts were under way to make Balkan countries dependent on Germany by means of economic machinations. Third, a determined drive was launched to split up the existing regional blocs, and to induce their members to make separate arrangements with the German government.¹⁴ with the disap-

¹⁴ H. C. Wolfe, *The German Octopus* (Garden City, N.Y., 1938) is probably the best presentation of the German influence in the Balkans. See also J. C. DeWilde, "The German Trade Drive in Southeastern Europe," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XII, No. 17 (1936), pp. 213-20; F. E. Jones, *Hitler's Drive to the East* (New York, 1937). Janko Janeff, *Der Mythos auf dem Balkan* (Berlin, 1936) propagates the notion that only Nazi Germany is able to comprehend the mystery of the Balkan soul. I. Korodi, *Deutsche Bilanz in Südosteuropa* (Berlin, 1936) presents the cultural position of the German minorities in the Little Entente and Hungary. See also Paul Einzig, *Bloodless Invasion* (London, 1938); G. Schacher, *Germany Pushes Southeast* (London, 1938). German preoccupation with Europe's Southeast has found expression in a growing body of writings. Cf. Hermann Gross, *Südosteuropa, Bau und Entwicklung der Wirtschaft* (Leipzig, 1937); the same, ed., *Mittel- und Südosteuropäische Wirtschaftsfragen, Wirtschaftsstruktur und Wirtschaftsbeziehungen* (Leipzig, 1931); J. Janeff, *Südosteuropa und der deutsche Geist* (Leipzig, 1938); H. Hagemeyer, ed., *Europas Schicksal im Osten* (2d ed., Breslau, 1938). See further the *Südost-Berichte* of the Southeast Committee of the German Academy (Munich, 1934-1936), and the *Leipziger Vierteljahrsschrift für Südosteuropa* (since 1937).

pearance of the Little and Balkan Ententes after the Munich Pact of 1938, the separation policy no longer found much opposition. Moreover, Rumania's Carol when visiting London and Paris a few weeks later failed to secure any pledges of support against Germany's encroachments on Rumania.

After the *Gleichschaltung* of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, the next steppingstone for the *Drang nach Osten* was Rumania. Here Berlin had supported and worked through a variety of fascist and semifascist groups: the Iron Guard, the Rumanian Front of Vaido-Voevod, the National Christian Party of Goga and Cuza, the "All for the Fatherland" combination of Cantacuzino and Codreanu, and the National Corporatist League of Manoilescu. The Liberal Party's Duca was assassinated in 1933; Titulescu, another prominent Francophile, decided to live abroad, fearing for his life. In fact, up to 1938, the terrorist groups had been able to hold sway by an extraordinary degree of official tolerance. Whether Carol's decisive turn against the Iron Guard, bringing death to Codreanu and sharp German censure, was to inaugurate a new era is a debatable question. Hitler's frontal assault on Rumania's economic sovereignty in March 1939, met virtually with no rebuff. Perhaps Carol hoped to gain time by yielding in form, though not intending to comply in fact. To organize the Balkans as a dependable hinterland was a gigantic task. Hence the actual extent of Rumania's surrender could be measured only in terms of the permanency of National Socialist domination in Europe. As long as submission did not extend beyond diplomatic concessions wrought by extortion, Germany's hold was to remain insecure.

The visit of Premier Stoiadinovitch in Berlin in January 1938—the first Yugoslav gesture of this kind—provided Germany with an entering wedge toward separating Yugoslavia from France and the Little Entente. The Munich Pact seemed to justify the new policy of *rapprochement* with Germany. A so-called "Technical Union" supposed to finance German trade with Yugoslavia offered the Third Reich another opportunity to support Yugoslavia's fascists, headed by Liotitch.¹⁵ They had previously received from Germany subsidies totaling

¹⁵ *Prager Presse*, March 1, 1937.

200,000,000 dinars (about \$4,000,000).¹⁶ It was significant that after Munich, S. Hodjera (not of Serbian but of Czech descent), leader of the blue-shirted Serbian Fascists known as *borbashi* (fighters), was appointed a member of Dr. Stoiadinovitch's cabinet.

In Bulgaria, the fascists were headed by Professor Alexander Tsankoff. "Cultural" propaganda was carried on by the Germano-Bulgarian Association. Berlin's influence could most clearly be traced in the Bulgarian Workmen's National Socialist Party, founded by Christo Kuntscheff in 1932, with the swastika and the Bulgarian lion as its emblem. World War I partnership had found new eulogists. It was not surprising that Bulgaria had displayed responsiveness to the Hitler style of map revision.

In Greece, German influence increased after the Metaxas coup of August 1936. The Premier was appointed for life with the full consent of the King and the acquiescence of Great Britain, which helped to restore the exiled monarch to his throne in the interest of Mediterranean "order." But the Germanophile tendencies of Metaxas, trained as a staff officer in imperial Germany and once closely associated with King Constantine, were marked. He had made his country largely dependent upon German trade, in spite of those who had counted on King George's amiable relations with Great Britain as a counterweight. The ineffectual role of the monarch was evidenced also by the fact that anti-Semitic agitation extended to Greece where heretofore anti-Semitism had virtually been unknown.

The Munich Pact conceded the right of racial or linguistic minorities to secede under the threat of force from a sovereign state. Since Balkan Europe is freckled with hopelessly scattered minorities,¹⁷ self-determination became an explosive doctrine which could well be applied by Germany at will. Even in 1939 Rumania was being reminded that there were "oppressed minorities" within her borders. In the absence of a larger compact

¹⁶ S. Pribichevich, "The Nazi Drive to the East—Yugoslavia, Roumania, and Hungary," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XIV, No. 15 (1938), pp. 174–84.

¹⁷ J. S. Roucek, *The Working of the Minorities System under the League of Nations* (Prague, 1928), presents the history and international aspects of the minority problem in the Balkans. C. H. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors* (New York, 1937), describes the development of the Hungarian minority problem in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia.

German element, the old Hungarian minority issue in Transylvania was exploited. The Third Reich claimed that thus far it had restrained the demands of the Hungarian people—which meant that Germany could start stirring up trouble if any of Hitler's demands were not met. The German minority in Yugoslavia served as leaven throughout the state, while other minorities together represented 21 percent of the total population. These caused well-founded anxieties despite mutual goodwill assurances between Hungary, Germany, and Italy on the one hand, and Premier Stoiadinovitch and his successor on the other.

THE SCHACHT OCTOPUS

National Socialist penetration of the Balkans had economic as well as political reasons. Germany needed oil, wheat, cotton, fats, coffee, and raw materials of every kind for her strained economy and her enormous rearmament program. Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece (and Turkey) were ideal supply bases in this respect. The Third Reich's long-range policy aimed to incorporate the Balkans under its supremacy and to acquire the direct control of their resources. The current policy was to manipulate international relations with the Balkans in such a way as to prepare for the eventual expansion and also to secure essential commodities by economic aggression. Normal trade was ruled out because of Germany's "closed economic order." The genius of Dr. Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht, until 1937 Germany's "economic czar" and afterward a ubiquitous—though less and less official—backseat driver, met the dilemma by a series of astute transactions. He signed with the Balkan nations clearing-house arrangements whereby, under a system of barter, goods were exchanged for goods without any cash payments in foreign exchange. A combination of circumstances placed the Balkans in a receptive mood toward Schacht's proposals. In 1930, a severe crisis had wrought economic distress throughout the region, and no relief came until the summer of 1936, when Schacht had captured most of the Balkan trade.

The participation of Germany in Balkan imports and exports¹⁸ is indicated in the following tables:

¹⁸ See *Frankfurter Zeitung, Technik und Betrieb*, Vol. XX, No. 24 (December 9, 1938), p. 6.

TABLE I
GERMANY'S TRADE WITH BALKAN COUNTRIES
(*Million reichsmarks*)

| Source | 1933 | 1934 | 1935 | 1936 | 1937 |
|----------------------|------|------|------|-------|-------|
| German imports from: | | | | | |
| Bulgaria | 31.3 | 33.7 | 41.4 | 57.6 | 75.8 |
| Greece | 53.4 | 55.2 | 58.5 | 68.4 | 76.4 |
| Rumania | 46.1 | 59.0 | 79.9 | 92.3 | 149.5 |
| Yugoslavia .. | 33.5 | 36.3 | 61.4 | 75.2 | 132.2 |
| German exports to: | | | | | |
| Bulgaria | 17.7 | 19.3 | 39.9 | 47.6 | 68.2 |
| Greece .. | 18.7 | 29.3 | 49.1 | 63.9 | 113.1 |
| Rumania | 46.0 | 50.9 | 63.8 | 103.6 | 129.5 |
| Yugoslavia | 33.8 | 31.5 | 36.9 | 77.2 | 134.4 |

TABLE II
GERMANY'S SHARE OF BALKAN TRADE
(*Percentages*)

| Country | Balkan Imports | | Balkan Exports | |
|------------------|----------------|------|----------------|------|
| | 1933 | 1937 | 1933 | 1937 |
| Bulgaria | 32 | 55 | 36 | 43 |
| Greece | 10 | 27 | 18 | 30 |
| Rumania | 19 | 30 | 11 | 20 |
| Yugoslavia | 13 | 32 | 14 | 22 |

In 1936 Greece, for instance, sold 68 million reichsmarks worth of goods to Berlin, Yugoslavia 75 million, Rumania 92 million, and Bulgaria 57 million. The balances were in German currency, which could not be drawn out. In the case of Greece, the Third Reich had bought large quantities of export tobacco, establishing almost a purchasing monopoly. Bulgaria, in desperate straits since the United States had ceased taking her tobacco, joyously delivered her chief products, and took in return German machinery, railway equipment, and armaments. A considerable portion of Yugoslavia's foodstuff and raw material exports were exchanged against German manufactured goods.

Simultaneously, Germany pursued a policy of strategically placed capital investment. She had obtained a footing in the mining industries of Yugoslavia and Rumania, whence she drew supplies of copper, lead, zinc, antimony, mercury, bauxite, and other raw materials vital to her heavy industry. She

financed soya bean cultivation on a large scale, and secured promises that Balkan production be adapted to German needs by a shift from food crops to industrial crops. Another step was taken immediately after Munich. Dr. Walter Funk, the Reich's new minister of economy, rushed to the Balkans and Turkey to sign long-term contracts for the purchase of agricultural products and raw materials. Prices were fixed in advance, on the basis of the low Danube freight rate and with an eye to the Rhine-Danube Canal, which was to link the Ruhr Basin with the Black Sea for lighter service.

RESHUFFLING OF BALKAN FORCES

When, on March 15, 1939, the Germans appeared in Prague, Mussolini could do nothing but again approve Hitler's step, although he gritted his teeth. Countering Hitler's acts in Central Europe, Mussolini's legions occupied Albania on April 7, 1939, in violation of the Anglo-Italian agreement of 1938. The British, trying to save the situation in Eastern Europe, countered with a pledge of assistance to Rumania and Greece; in May and June, Britain and France made arrangements for a mutual assistance pact with Turkey, but Hitler's plans went right ahead. In May 1939, the Rome-Berlin Axis was transformed into a military alliance, developing Hitler's decision of 1937 to start war.¹⁹ By this time Hitler had already decided upon a *rapprochement* with Russia.²⁰ On August 22, 1939, the Russians announced to a stunned world the conclusion of a Russo-German nonaggression pact. Poland having been disposed of in eighteen days, Hitler could turn his attention to the defeat of France in 1940. The entrance of Italy into the war extended the conflict to the Balkans and the Near East, despite Rome's promise not to attack Greece, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Turkey, or Switzerland.

The reshuffling of the Balkan line-ups was already on the way. Yugoslavia recognized, in 1938, the right of Bulgaria and Hungary to rearm. In November 1939 Bulgaria and Turkey agreed to demobilize their frontier forces. But both Italy and Germany wanted to reach their goals peacefully in the Balkans,

¹⁹ DeWitt C. Poole, "Light on Nazi Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, XXV (October, 1946), 130-54.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

in order not to interrupt the steady flow of Rumania's oil and Hungary's and Yugoslavia's cereals. With the collapse of France, his nominal ally, Rumania's Carol tried to save himself by offering more collaboration to Hitler, while the revisionist powers, Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary, were looking with more and more expectations to a bettering of conditions for themselves. Keitel succeeded in persuading Hitler that a German offensive against Russia during 1940 was simply impossible (although his definite orders to prepare the attack were conveyed to the General Staff on December 18, 1940). Hence he permitted Russia to get Bessarabia and northern Bukovina from Carol by an ultimatum (June 24, 1940). The Anglo-French guaranties of 1939 were apparently more than useless and denounced by Carol on July 1. Carol's hopes to gain Hitler's graces were in vain. By the Axis-dictated award of August 30, two-fifths of Transylvania, together with over a million Rumanians, were handed to Hungary; Southern Dobruja went to Bulgaria.

Hitler did not trust Carol's intentions and let the internal situation develop in such a way that the Nazi-controlled Iron Guard forced Carol's abdication on September 6. Thus the last potential major enemy of the Axis disappeared down the chute of history, and the situation appeared more and more promising to Hitler's advisers. Hungary and Bulgaria were meek followers of Hitler, and Yugoslavia was expected to succumb sweetly to German pressure and Greece to Italian coercion.

THE AXIS OVER THE BALKANS

For Antonescu, Carol's successor, there was no other choice left than to execute Berlin's orders. On October 12, 1940, the vanguard of German troops rolled into Rumania (already infiltrated by "tourists")—to "train" the Rumanian army and protect Rumanian oil wells from the British, the Germans said. On November 23, Bucharest, once the keystone of the Little Entente and the most strident satellite of France and Britain in the region, "formally" pledged its allegiance to the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo alliance.

By the end of February 1941, events were moving fast in the Balkans. Bulgarian newspapers reported the infiltration of German "tourists." Hitler's procedure followed the well-es-

lished pattern. He was methodically clearing the road to the East by "softening up" Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, after bloodlessly conquering Rumania. The German tactics consisted of promises, threats, internal demoralization, "peaceful" penetration, and the encouragement of national antagonisms—with a powerful military machine on the border to move if "the strategy of terror" should fail.

On March 2, 1941, Bulgaria was brought into the tripartite military alliance of Berlin-Rome-Tokyo, the seventh nation to join the "plunder-bund." Hitler's purpose was twofold: (1) to use Bulgaria as a base for operations against the Greeks and, if need be, the Yugoslavs; and (2) to bring Germany closer to the Mediterranean in case she should decide to attempt to dislodge the British from the Near East.

Yugoslavia, of course, was in a difficult position, since she was encircled by the hostile Germans and Italians whose "protecting" advances the nation wholeheartedly detested while her ruling clique half-heartedly declined.

ITALY'S ADVENTURE IN GREECE

As autumn of 1940 ripened and mellowed, the center of gravity of the war moved from the west to the east. Eastern Europe became the chief theater of military operations and diplomatic moves. Hitler and Mussolini seemed to have decided to a share-out of tasks in their interview at the Brenner Pass on October 4 and to have confirmed it at the Conference of Florence (October 28). Mussolini undertook to use force against Greece; Hitler, on his side, guaranteed to use the diplomatic pressure necessary to keep others out of the arena and to find the possibility of grouping this part of Europe within the New Order by making it join the Berlin pact.

Greece had always occupied a prominent place in the Fascist dreams of domination of the Mediterranean, *Mare Nostrum*. In September 1923, hardly a full year after his arrival to power, Mussolini had tried to make Greece feel the strength of his power by seizing Corfu at the very moment when Greece was exhausted by her war against Turkey. He was stopped by the League of Nations and the Conference of Ambassadors; thereafter he adopted a protective attitude toward Greece until April 7, 1939. Then the occupation of Albania gave him a first-class

strategic position on the very borders of Greece. From that time on, Mussolini continually pledged himself to respect the independence and integrity of his neighbor.

Early in August, Rome started a propaganda campaign against "Greek atrocities" in Albania, and after several "incidents" and the "war of nerves," Mussolini sent his ultimatum to Greece on October 28—Hitler had in the meantime occupied Rumania and had reached the Danube and the Black Sea, thus being able to cover Italy against any danger from the direction of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. In the typical Fascist way, Mussolini's forces attacked before the expiration of the ultimatum.

Berlin remained temporarily neutral but applauded the Duce for the brilliant strategic position he was about to occupy, one which would enable him to exercise a decisive action at the very spot where Asia and Africa met. The aim of the Italian attack was to reach Salonica in the north, and the Isthmus of Corinth in the south. But at the end of a week, the Italian advance, nowhere more than about six miles deep, was checked at all points. Less than three weeks after the offensive started, the Greeks were able to counterattack on a front of about 112 miles and to throw the Italian divisions into a state of confusion. After five weeks' fighting, not a single Italian soldier remained on Greece's soil. The campaign was continued entirely on Albania's territory.

That the Greeks, a nation of less than 7,000,000 people, could resist Italy with 43,000,000 for so long had seemed impossible when the war started. That they had been able to defeat the Fascist legions in the first months of fighting appeared to result from a combination of circumstances: (1) British aid in the air and at sea, with a consequent threat to Italian communications; (2) inadequate Italian preparation for the campaign; (3) overextension of Italian lines; (4) unwise use of mechanized equipment in mountain territory; (5) insufficient use of the Italian navy and air corps; and (6) Greek ability to make the most of Italy's errors. Rated as helpless underdogs, the Greeks "handed the invading army of Fascist Italy a defeat as shameful as those other Italian nightmares of Adowa, Caporetto and Guadalajara."²¹

²¹ *Life*, IX (December 23, 1940), 20.

COLLAPSE OF YUGOSLAVIA

The successive failures of the Italian armies left Hitler no choice but to rescue his Axis partner. With Hitler's troops in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, the familiar diplomatic "squeeze play" was attempted on Yugoslavia. Early in March 1941, Prince Paul was induced to come to Berlin with Premier Stoyadinovitz and secretly negotiated a pact which was to bring Yugoslavia into the Axis. Signing of the pact, however, was repeatedly postponed, for the Yugoslav people, especially the Serbian elements, were violently opposed to Germany. Under strong Nazi pressure, Prince Paul finally adhered to the Axis on March 25; two days later, a *coup d'état* led by General Schimovitz replaced Paul's regency with a government of national union under young King Peter. Hitler, "who nurtured an Austrian dislike of Serbs, held both Russia and England responsible; the Foreign Office was not so sure."²² This surprising event doomed the pact with Germany and announced to the world that Yugoslavia, unlike Hungary, Rumania, or Bulgaria, would fight for her freedom. Germany quickly prepared for the assault, and on April 5 the Nazi hordes invaded Yugoslavia and Greece simultaneously. The Yugoslavs, with the exception of some treacherous Croats, fought bitterly, but, like the Poles, their antiquated army and their want of air power doomed them to quick defeat. Within ten days Yugoslav resistance was broken. In Greece, the Germans were held back for more than three weeks. Reinforced by a few divisions of Australian, New Zealand, and British troops, the brave men of Hellas inflicted terrific casualties on the Germans. The fighting took place in cloud-capped mountains and along rugged passes. Hopelessly outnumbered, the Allies retreated steadily, and by the end of April the Germans hoisted the dreaded swastika on the ancient Acropolis of Athens. The British were now completely ejected from the continent of Europe, and Nazi arrogance mounted to new levels. Yugoslavia was partitioned between Italy, Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria—large sections of southern Serbia and most of Yugoslavia's Macedonia going to Bulgaria; the Dalmatian coast, in addition to the town of Ljubljana and the surrounding territory (formerly the Yugo-

²² DeWitt C. Poole, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

slav province of Drava) going to Italy; the "Independent State of Croatia" remaining a vassal of the Reich; and the province of Batchka and part of Baranya going to Hungary. Greece, on the other hand, lost the greater part of Thrace and Macedonia, and the Bulgarian Prime Minister cabled Hitler his "deepest thanks for the liberation of Macedonia and Thrace by the German Army"; this territory was named the "Aegean provinces" by Sofia; its western part was given the name of Bielo-morie ("White Sea"). The Germans kept a hold on Salonica and frequently clashed with the Italians over the administration of the whole unfortunate country.

But the punishment and misery suffered by the defeated Yugoslavs and Greeks contributed to the ultimate victory of the Allies, as revealed in the Nuremberg trials. For the order of Hitler to start an offensive against Russia on May 15 had to be cancelled, and the beginning of the German campaign against Russia was delayed until June 22. "The delay cost the Germans the winter battle before Moscow, and it was there the war was lost."²³

THE DIPLOMATIC DOUBLE CROSSES

In the background of the downfall of Yugoslavia and Greece were several "forgotten" treaties. In January 1937, Sofia signed a Pact of Perpetual Friendship with Yugoslavia—followed by a Nonaggression Pact with the Balkan Entente in July 1938, with the results already described. Hungary's Prime Minister, Count Teleki—who had signed a Treaty of Everlasting Peace and Friendship with Yugoslavia on December 12, 1940—committed suicide on the night of April 2, 1941, leaving behind a letter in which he declared he felt incapable, in future, of carrying on successfully his "difficult and painful task" of betraying the Yugoslav people. British and French attempts to head off German and Italian influence in the Balkans by means of generous trade agreements and pledges of military assistance—implemented by a formal alliance signed in October 1939—were but more scraps of paper, not to speak of a pact signed in Ankara in 1939 whereby both Greece and Turkey had guaranteed the inviolability of their common frontier. When King Peter and General Schimovitz were installed, the Russian press congratu-

²³ DeWitt C. Poole, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

lated the "brother people," and the Yugoslav Minister at Moscow secured a pact of nonaggression and friendship from Stalin (April 5, 1941); in fact, Stalin's government had also denounced Bulgaria's union with the Axis. But nothing was done until after the invasion of Russia by Hitler's hordes on June 22, 1941.

THE SHADOW OF SOVIET RUSSIA OVER THE BALKANS

While between 1937 and 1941 Nazi Germany had become the real master of the Balkans and Central-Eastern Europe—invading, partly at least, Russia's sphere of interest—the Soviet intentions in the region began to be formulated in 1943, when the Soviets demanded Poland's territory east of the Curzon line, and in Yugoslavia Mikhailovitch was denounced by Moscow because of his "reactionary tendencies" and Broz's government was supported.²⁴ As the Red Army gradually pounded back the German lines in that part of the world, the Balkans came more and more under the influence of Russia. Of tremendous consequence was the decision of the Allies not to invade Europe through the Balkans, as the English originally intended; instead, at the insistence of General Eisenhower, they decided to invade through France. Rumania was the first to sign an armistice on September 12, 1944, followed by Bulgaria on October 28, and Hungary on January 20, 1945. Since these states were in the Russian sphere of military operations, the Soviet government took the initiative in drawing up the armistice terms, all of which were signed at Moscow. By declaring war on Bulgaria at the last moment, Russia caught the Allies off their guard and gained the predominant position as occupying power in the one satellite country with which it had hitherto been at peace.

The armistice terms were based on the same general patterns and provided for an Allied Control Commission, under Soviet direction, which was given authority over all communications, transportation, and censorship and which supervised the joint military effort against the common enemy. Bucharest and Sofia undertook to repeal Fascist legislation, purge their bureaucracies of pro-Nazi elements, and restore United Nations property seized or destroyed in the course of the war. Rumania (and Hungary), in addition, were required to turn over

²⁴ David J. Dallin, *The Big Three* (New Haven, 1945), p. 115.

goods in the value of 300 million dollars over a period of six years. With the exception of 100 million dollars paid by Hungary, which was to be divided between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union was the sole recipient of these reparations. As regards the territorial settlements, except for Russia's annexations from Rumania in 1940 and that of Bulgaria from Rumania in the same year, the pre-1939 frontiers were restored pending final adjustment at the Peace Conference.²⁵ The armistice confirmed the cession of Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria and of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviets. In regard to Bulgaria, both the Greek and the Yugoslav frontiers were restored to their prowar status in the armistice terms, pending confirmations in the peace treaties.²⁶

THE UNITED NATIONS DISUNITED OVER THE BALKANS

The problem of formulating a common United Nations policy toward the Balkan nations became more and more obvious as the Balkan states were liberated from the Axis yoke. It was, in essence, one of reconciling the interests of the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States. All three powers had a general interest in world peace and prosperity and desired to see stability restored to the Balkan states. But here agreement ended. It was soon evident that it was Moscow's view that Russian interests required the creation of a sphere of influence in the Balkans (together with Central-Eastern Europe). The various countries within this sphere would follow the lead of Moscow to greater or less degree, depending on circumstances, in matters of domestic and foreign policy. Their commerce would be oriented primarily toward the Soviet Union, which would own a controlling share in many of the larger industrial enterprises. Selected military personnel would be trained in Soviet academies, and exchange of students and professors in all fields of learning would be fostered. Energetic efforts would be made to popularize Russian literary, musical, and scientific culture and to promote the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church and of Slavic traditions in general. The Soviet Union

²⁵ For more detail, cf. Cyril E. Black, "The Axis Satellites and the Great Powers," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XX, No. 4 (1946), pp 38-52.

²⁶ For more details, cf. Waverly Root, *The Secret History of the War* (New York, 1945), chapter vii, "The Balkans," pp. 207-51.

would thus succeed to the place held recently by the Germans, and only two decades ago by France, as the predominant power in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The traditionally limited British and American activities in this region would be sacrificed entirely.²⁷

Geographical as well as ideological reasons made London and Washington think differently than did Moscow. While Washington believed that the stability of the region could be best preserved by the formation of freely elected governments and by the inauguration of an open-door policy as regards commerce, investments, information, and cultural activities, London had its mentality influenced by political and strategic reasons also, fearing that unrest of that region could spread to the Middle East and that the domination of the Balkans by one power would threaten the traditional British position in the Eastern Mediterranean—not to speak of important British investments in Rumanian oil and Yugoslav chrome and other enterprises. Hence London was interested in the matters of strategy, collaborating with Washington's desire for open-door policies. Washington's interests, on the other hand, were political rather than economic, for America's investments in the Balkans, including a ten percent interest in Rumania's oil, were slight, and the United States policies were designed to assure to the Balkan states the political independence for which they had struggled for so many decades by allowing them to practice a considerable degree of self-government.

UNITED STATES AIMS THWARTED

De facto circumstances and international power relationships forced considerable deviations by the United States from its basic Balkan territorial conceptions and ideas. This became evident when making a comparison between the decisions reached at the sessions of the Foreign Ministers' Council (1946) and certain memoranda outlining Washington's aspirations for just settlements drawn up in 1944.²⁸

²⁷ For a sensational anti-Soviet interpretation, cf. Leon Dennen, *Trouble Zone: Brewing Point of World War III?* (New York, 1945); for Louis Adamic's attacks on American policy, with equal abandon, cf. "Who Represents the United States in Southeastern Europe?" *Trends and Tides* (January-February, 1946), pp. 1-30.

²⁸ C. L. Sulzberger, "U.S. Aims Thwarted in Eastern Europe," *New York Times*, July 6, 1946.

Yugoslavia, in addition to the hope that she would choose a popular government by a free voice, was to get Zara, the Dalmatian Islands, Fiume, and most of Istria, but not Gorizia or Trieste. This is exactly what happened, although Washington was unable to keep Trieste Italian. But Washington had other plans that did not mature. The State Department wished to see, by direct negotiations between Yugoslavia and Albania, the cession of a portion of southwestern Yugoslavia in the Struga and Dibra areas to Albania and the cession of a small piece of northern Albania, possibly including Scutari, to Yugoslavia.

Washington wished Albania to get Saseno—which she has—so it is most unlikely that any Greek claim to the little island dominating Valona and the Adriatic entrance will be countenanced. Washington did not, however, make up its mind in 1944 regarding Greek claims to North Epirus, but the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate favored the region's cession to Greece. The original "bible" of the United States territorial policy in the Balkans wished Greece to get the Dodecanese Islands (except Castelorizzo, which was to be given to the Turks). Greece got them in 1946, including Castelorizzo.

Washington wanted Cyprus to be given to Greece. The British were close to doing this in September 1945, but at least temporarily changed their minds for strategic reasons and because of fears of a Left-Wing government in Athens. This cession was not definitely excluded in the future. The State Department also wanted a slight rectification in Greece's favor in southern Bulgaria. Washington's desire was for a grant by Greece to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria of free port rights at Salonica, but international relationships in that corner of the world would have to improve first. The original program, aside from the proposed slight modification of the Bulgarian-Greek border, left Bulgaria her 1939 frontiers, plus southern Dobruja. That was done.

Rumania was to cede Bessarabia and North Bukovina to the Soviet Union, which was done, and South Dobruja was to go to Bulgaria. Rumania was to get back northern Transylvania, but the western strip of that region, including Oradea Mare and Satu Mare was to be left with Hungary. The United

States favored this policy right up to the Council session in Paris, but suddenly switched and no longer insisted on this small grant to Hungary. Hungary, according to State Department plans, was to get no other territory beyond the Trianon frontiers.

TERRITORIAL ISSUES SETTLED AND UNSETTLED

Commissions (or plenary sessions of the Peace Conference of 1946) approved practically all points in the Italian and Balkan treaties on which the Big Four had previously agreed. It was settled that Italy should cede the Dodecanese to Greece; Hungary should cede a tiny border area to Czechoslovakia and Transylvania to Rumania; and Rumania should cede Bukovina and Bessarabia to Russia and Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria. But the Big Four were at odds on several important questions: details of government of the free territory of Trieste, internationalization of the Danube, and details of reparations and restitution payments by Italy and the Balkan states—points approved in each case by a majority of the conference but against bitter opposition of Russia and the Slavic group of nations; the conference also left open the question of the Greek-Bulgarian frontier.

THE WAR OF CLAIMS: TRANSYLVANIA

Transylvania was one of the very few problems which was solved during the first conference of the foreign ministers in Paris; it was allotted to Rumania.

Transylvania has always been the most effective slogan of Hungarian and Rumanian propaganda. Up to 1918, Bucharest claimed the return of this province; thereafter it belonged to the stock-in-trade of the revisionism of Budapest. The Arbitration of Vienna by Ribbentrop and Ciano only meant the continuation of this competition over the territory. According to Budapest, Hungary's Transylvania is as ancient as the now irrevocably sunken Crown of St. Stephen—that is, a thousand years. The Hungarians assert that this region was empty and bare when their armies settled there in the eleventh century.

During Hungary's rule and *de facto* independence (1526–1726), the Rumanians were always deprived of their liberty and lived as small landholders and menial workers without

rights in policy or administration. In 1918 Transylvania, rich in agriculture and minerals (among them gold and silver), was allotted to Rumania as reward for her participation in the war on the side of the Allies. The population of three million was then 57 percent Rumanian, 34.3 percent Hungarian (including the Hungarian-speaking Jews), and 8 percent German. Leading politicians of both countries were and are Transylvanians—Count Bethlen, Maniu, and Groza. Budapest's government also waged the fight for Transylvania for social reasons; Bucharest had broken there the power of the titled landowners and of the estate-owning Roman Catholic Church. But even Hungarian farmers of Rumanian nationality profited from these measures; approximately 36,500 farm holdings out of the expropriated soil were distributed among them. After August 1940, the old feudal tenancy relations were again reintroduced in the portion given to Hungary.

The numerical relations of nationalities in Transylvania were, in 1946, probably not very different from those of 1918, but a considerable part of the Jews had been exterminated and there were practically no Germans left. An exchange of population was impossible as there were only 20,000 Rumanians in Hungary, whereas fifteen times as many Hungarians lived in Transylvania. The Hungarians claimed that a more ethically satisfactory frontier could be drawn fifteen miles east of the 1918 frontier. But this would satisfy 400,000 Hungarians at the expense of 20,000 Rumanians. Officially, Hungary's representative in Paris claimed a territory of 22,000 square kilometers. But Rumania won the argument, since she served the Allied cause in the last years of World War II quite well; even under Antonescu, Bucharest did not play the part of the hyena, nor did she take part in the rape of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

BULGARIA'S ACCESS TO THE AEGEAN SEA

At the Paris Conference, Bulgaria's Foreign Minister, Kulihev, read a memorandum raising anew old claims to Western Thrace.

The Berlin Conference of 1878, under Bismarck and Disraeli, frustrated Russia's St. Stephano policy for a greater Bulgaria with access to the Aegean Sea. In the Bucharest

Treaty of 1913, Western Thrace (a territory of 6,426 square kilometers between Enos and Xanthi) was allotted to Bulgaria, but she had to give it up in 1919 in the Treaty of Neuilly. To regain it was one of the main reasons for Boris' participation in World War II on Hitler's side.

The Bulgarian propaganda covered much paper with a fastidious interpretation of Article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly, which guaranteed their trade access to the Aegean Sea and in which they saw the promise of a territorial link. But the cession of the whole territory to Greece (the Treaties of Sèvres, 1920, and Lausanne, 1923) frustrated this interpretation. But in 1946 they counted on a return by Russia to the St. Stefano line, because they were convinced that Moscow was more than ever in need of a loyal ally at the Aegean shore.

It is interesting to note that Sofia demanded access to the Aegean Sea almost at the same moment that Russia proposed a revision of the Convention of Montreux about the Straits. Kulichev called the shore between Maritza and Mesta vital to Bulgaria's economic life. Whereas Manuilsky, Ukraine's representative, backed by Kulichev's demands, and the Polish representative Rzymowski drew a sharp dividing line between Boris' "Fascism" and the "democratic Bulgarian people," Sofia's demands were unanimously rejected by all Western delegates.

GREECE'S TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

The Greeks, who in World War II made more sacrifices in life and property than any other nation (except the Jews), put forward the biggest territorial claims. Greece never renounced the ethnically Greek Cyprus, though for reasons of world policy, Athens for the time being forsook this claim. Considering that their security has so often been threatened in the past, the Greek claims to the frontier changes with Bulgaria appeared justified to them. The minimum was the southeastern Rhodope Mountains between the Thracian frontier and the valley of the Arda, and the maximum was the extension of Greece to Burgas on the Black Sea shore. There was, however, no ethical basis for the Greek claim. In the Rhodope the Mohammedans (calling themselves Pomaks) speak the purest Bulgarian and they desired to remain within Bulgaria. But Athens stressed the necessity of strategic frontiers for the future,

pointing out that thrice in this century Greece had been attacked by the Bulgarians, and citing that 40,000 Greeks had been assassinated and 50,000 had been deported during the occupation of northeastern Greece during World War II. The Bulgars, on the other hand, had their counterargument—their strong revolutionary underground movement, the national liberation front *Otchestven*, active during World War II; armies of partisans in the last stage of the conflict; and the successful *coup d'état* of Gheorghieff and Veltcheff. Kulichev also stated in Paris that the Bulgarian army had lost 32,000 killed and wounded during the last eight months of war on the Allied side. But what was most important, in the background of these arguments, were the interests of Russia and Britain in the Aegean, Mediterranean, and the Black Sea.

SOUTHERN ALBANIA (NORTHERN EPIRUS)

The Southern Albanian problem was the most difficult question of them all. The strip of this territory is as poor as the rest of Albania. Its size is about 3,500 square kilometers, and it runs parallel to the 180-mile Greek-Albanian frontier (districts: Argyrokastro, Delvino, Chimarry, Tepeleni, Premeti, and the Macedonian country of Korytzy). The statistics of population are equally unreliable. Some authorities quoted a total number of 200,000 (120,000 Greeks and 80,000 Albanians); others again offered 270,000 to 300,000 Albanians and 30,000 Greeks.

Following the wishes of the Allies, Greece occupied Northern Epirus in 1914 and again in 1940 succeeded in conquering this frontier province, only to lose it with Hitler's invasion. But the Greek claims were never given up.

During the Peace Conference period, the Committee for Northern Epirus on Greek soil accused the Albanians of cruel mistreatment of their Greek minority. At the same time, Tirana spoke about the enslavement of Albanian minorities in Greece. The Greeks also claimed that Albania was a willing springboard for Mussolini's invasion of Greece and had contributed joyfully and without compulsion an army of 20,000 to Italy's campaign. Tirana, on the other hand, claimed to be the first victim of Fascism and pointed at the repeated risings against Italians and Germans and at the fighting spirit of their parti-

sans, showing that they co-operated closely with an Allied military mission.

THE UNSOLVABLE TRIESTE PROBLEM

The question of Trieste caused the failure of the first conference of foreign ministers; the second Paris meeting led to an agreement which, however, was refused by Tito's government. Pared down to its essentials, here was rivalry between Yugoslavia and Italy for the shipping, the shipbuilding, and the industrial and political assets of an area of 300 square miles containing a population of 500,000. The Paris Conference, over Yugoslav protests, drew a definite frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia through Venezia Giulia Province, leaving only Trieste and its environs as a continuing ward of the big nations. Yugoslavia got from Italy the coal mines at Arsa, bauxite mines at Albona, a string of small Adriatic ports (including Fiume and Pola), control of all but one railroad leading out of Trieste, full sway over the upper waters of the Isonzo River, and a new frontier thirty-five miles farther west at some points. Italy, on the other hand, kept the biggest shipyards in the area, a road and railroad to Venia, a railroad north to Austria, and title to the city of Gorizia.

What was left for the Security Council of the United Nations to run as the Free State of Trieste was a city and outlying area containing the best port in the Adriatic, important industries and shipyards, and a turbulent population split between an Italian majority and Slav minority, both unsatisfied with their new regime. While the Croats and Slovenes lived mainly in the countryside, the Italians were concentrated in the cities.

Trieste is the natural outlet for the trade of Central Europe. Under the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 58 percent of the port's business was with that northern trading area, and only 16 percent was with the Eastern Balkans. When Italy obtained the city in 1919, Trieste's trade dwindled. When Central-Balkan Europe came under Soviet influence, Russia saw the port as a major doorway for the economic life of that area. The Free State would contain shipyards with a capacity equal to that of all shipyards in Russia, and access to these facilities would help Russia build up her navy and merchant marine, which are

small for a country of Russia's size. In a military sense, Trieste dominates the Adriatic Sea—a long arm of water penetrating deep into Europe and giving access to the Mediterranean.

In 1946 Marshal Tito was deeply committed to get Trieste for his people; the United States and Britain were every bit as committed to prevent just that, determined to stop Russia's expansion on the Stettin-Trieste line.

THE BALKANS UNDER THE SOVIET AEGIS

World War II ended with the eviction of the Nazis and Italians from the Balkans. But in 1947 the Balkan peoples, with the exception of Greece, were under the direct and indirect control of Soviet Russia. They were hungry, the Balkanites, although ordinarily exporters of food; their industry, though based on rich resources, was chaotic, and most of its proceeds were being drained away. Internally, the countries were in a state of frozen civil war. Their situation, internationally, resembled that which marked the rise of Hitler and the impact of Dr. Schacht's economics. In 1947, as in 1939, they were not masters of their own destiny. But in 1947 it was not Germany which ruled the Balkan roost, but Russia.

Germany made the Balkans feed its economy before finally overrunning them. Russia, having first occupied them militarily, was organizing them politically and economically to become tributaries to the Soviet system, which was based on more solid foundations than Hitler's.

THE CHURCHILL AND STALIN DEALS

The plight of the Balkans in 1946 could be directly traced to the Teheran and Yalta agreements.²⁹ In October 1944 Churchill conferred with Stalin in Moscow, where Bulgaria and Rumania, being on the Black Sea, were recognized as part of the Soviet "sphere of influence." Britain, in exchange, received control of Greece. Corollary agreements, of which less is known, were made, giving the Soviet Union predominating

²⁹ George Deneke and Leon Dennen, "The Balkans: Battleground of Two Worlds," *New Leader* (Supplement), Vol. XXVIII, No. 46 (November 17, 1945); C. L. Sulzberger, "Britain Hold Blocked in Balkans as '44 Deal with Soviet Blows Up," *New York Times*, February 6, 1946; Cyril E. Black, *op. cit.*, p. 41; James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York, 1947); J. S. Roucek, *Central-Eastern Europe* (New York, 1946), pp. 657-67.

influence in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The United States, which had more or less given Britain a free hand for the Western Powers in the Eastern Mediterranean under the Casablanca agreement, was in a sense a tacit partner in this agreement.

Thereafter, the contest between Britain and Russia in this apportioned area was one-sided. The Russians obtained the right to train Marshal Tito's army, and the British were supposed to train his air force and navy. The British were unable, however, to implement their share, and a small training unit of the Royal Air Force sent to Zara had to be withdrawn. The British hoped to regain a share of Adriatic influence in Albania, where several special operations by parachute forces aided the guerillas. The Enver Hoxha government showed a tendency to tie itself to Belgrade and Moscow. In Bulgaria, Britain never had a chance. Despite wide sympathy with the United States in that country, the pro-Soviet element had the upper hand in internal political arguments after the Soviet forces controlled the country.

Subsequently, at Yalta, Roosevelt and Churchill set their seal of approval on this division of spoils and sanctioned Stalin's unilateral acts in the Balkans. In wording, at least, the Yalta Declaration of February 11, 1945, reflected the Anglo-American more than the Soviet point of view. It not only offered the joint aid of the great powers in the restoration of political and economic order in the satellite states, but it also pledged their assistance in the formation of democratic provisional regimes and the holding of free elections. The mere statement of agreement did not, of course, automatically resolve the differences in policy between Washington-London and Moscow, proving how little semantics influence the reality of power politics.

Despite the British-Soviet accord on Rumania, the Russians there were worried about their unpopularity prior to the Potsdam Conference. At that meeting President Truman and the Secretary of State, carefully briefed, stood firm on the principles set forth for that country. This firmness, after two days of vacillating, was again maintained after the London Council of the Big Five Foreign Ministers had been deadlocked in the autumn of 1945.

For this reason, the decisions of the Moscow Conference of the Big Three Foreign Ministers surprised many. The

Russians had been greatly strengthened in Rumania, and the Communist leaders (particularly Anna Pauker) started to talk openly on moves to communize the country.

In point of fact, most aspects of Soviet policy remained unchanged after Yalta. The one-sided support given to the Soviet authorities and the relatively small Communist parties, the quartering of large numbers of Soviet troops in these countries long after the cessation of hostilities, the close integration of the local intelligence services with the Soviet secret police, and the branding as traitors of persons who refused to follow the Communist line led to Anglo-American remonstrances that the restoration of democracy in these countries was being obstructed.

But they all were in vain. In Bulgaria, Premier Gheorghieff headed the Fatherland Front, catching the limelight, but Communist leader Georgi Dimitrov, though hiding in his house behind a high board fence, was the real government. Ambition of Rightist politicians served Moscow's purposes in Rumania and Hungary. Rumania's Premier Groza, a rich man, and his Foreign Minister, former Premier Tatarescu, were steering Rumania, in 1946, according to Moscow's wishes. In Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito and his partisans were rebuilding their country mainly after the Communist model. Foreign trade was completely controlled by the state, although land belonged to those cultivating it. Almost 70 percent of industry had been nationalized in Serbia; in Belgrade even the big hotels had been taken over by the government. The Federative Plan, whose adoption after World War I might have saved Yugoslavia much internal trouble, had been effected. Marshal Tito, who seemed to be almost as efficient as Generalissimo Stalin and far more picturesque, had proved to be Mr. Churchill's gift to Communism and Moscow. He had been entrusted with such important international missions as securing Trieste, and thus eventual Russian access to the Mediterranean, bringing pressure on the Austrian government by keeping the Carinthian border uneasy and organizing the Slav bloc in Central-Balkan Europe. In Albania, Hoxha was but a mere imitator of Tito's uniforms and pro-Communist techniques.

The Soviet insistence on British military evacuation of Greece in February 1946 marked the final phase in the deteri-

oration of a secret British-Soviet agreement made in the spring of 1944, which had been boomeranging ever since from the British agreement. Greece was, in 1946, the last outpost of British influence in the Balkans, and the situation came to a head in March 1947.

PAN-SLAVISM

There were about 20,000,000 Slavs in the Balkans, but they constitute not more than 40 percent of the people. Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Macedonia are Slav countries; Turkey, Rumania, Greece, and Albania are not. There are non-Slav minorities in the Slav countries and Slav minorities in the non-Slav lands. Hence Balkan unity, which is to be accomplished along the lines of Pan-Slavism is an interesting phenomenon of contemporary world politics.

On May 9, 1946, when the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav Pact of Friendship was signed in Belgrade, both the principal cities of Yugoslavia, Belgrade and Zagreb, witnessed a most elaborate and solemn military parade. Lines of mechanized equipment, heavy types of Russian tanks, motorized artillery, and marching soldiers filled the streets for hours and hours. The whole Yugoslav press and the speakers at the reception in honor of Czechoslovak guests, Premier Z. Fierlinger and Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk, stressed the brotherhood of all Slav nations and their strength in unity with Soviet Russia. Here was a great military parade as a visible symbol of Slav brotherhood—something new in the history of Pan-Slavism cluttered up, historically, with all kinds of Pan-Slavic bitter differences.

The term Pan-Slavism has had various interpretations. Roughly, it may be summarized as the doctrine that all Slav peoples should have as large a measure as possible of political solidarity. The term Pan-Slavism appeared for the first time in 1826, in a book by the Slovak writer Jan Herkel, and seems to be his invention. But long before Herkel's time the idea of the cultural unity of Slavs had occupied the minds of several of their thinkers. Perhaps the greatest and noblest figure of the early Pan-Slavists was the Croat priest Jurij Križanić (1618–1683), a missionary to Russia in the reign of Alexis, the father of Peter the Great; he dreamed of a cultural unity of all Slavs in the common religion, and he believed in the reunion of the

Eastern Slavs with Rome. Religious unity seemed to him a prerequisite of Slavic unity.⁸⁰

Later, in the first half of the nineteenth century, when a new Pan-Slavism began to flourish, the strongest impulse came from Slovakia. The great patriot and poet of Slovakia, Jan Kollár (1793–1852), and the Slovak scholar, Pavel Josef Safařík (1795–1861), were the great exponents of a humanitarian and romantic Pan-Slavism. In Bohemia and Moravia the idea of Pan-Slavism was greatly encouraged by the excellent linguistic and literary studies of the former Jesuit, J. D. Dobrovský (1753–1829), whose influence was also felt in other Slav countries. All this first generation of Pan-Slavists had a most idealistic conception of co-operation. Solidarity of the Slavs meant to them a lifting-up of suffering and subjugated peoples and a service to all humanity.

It is natural that the Pan-Slavism of poets, scholars, and dreamers should have been exploited by czarist Russia to further her imperialistic aims. Mutual understanding and co-operation among all Slavs was sustained and propagated by the so-called Slav Congresses. The first of them was held in Prague in 1848, and similar meetings were held in Moscow (1867), Prague (1908), and Sofia (1910). European Pan-Germanists and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy naturally combated all ideas of Pan-Slavism. To the German *Drang nach Osten*, Pan-Slavism meant a great obstacle and hindrance. In a certain sense, Pan-Slavism was a defensive reaction to the pressure of the growing Pan-Germanism.

That the Slavs were attracted by the ideology of Pan-Slavism is not surprising. Russia, before 1900, was the only free, powerful Slav state in Europe. All other Slav peoples had at that time been subjugated—Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, and Croats in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy; Serbs and Bulgars in the Turkish Empire; and Poland in Germany and Russia. Most of these naturally looked to Russia as their “big brother” and protector, and they strengthened their faith in their ulti-

⁸⁰ For more details on Pan-Slavism, see Joseph S. Roucek, *op. cit.*, pp. 662–65; E. M. Voyta, “Pan-Slavism—Old and New,” *America*, LXXXV (August 24, 1946), 492–93; Clarence A. Manning, “Panslavism, Its Use and Abuse,” *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, I (June 1945), 216–27; V. Clementis, *Panslavism Past and Present* (London, 1943); Hubert Ripka, *East and West* (London, 1944); etc.

mate liberation by pointing to the strong and powerful Russian Empire. Russia, in turn, used Pan-Slavism for her political purposes, especially by protecting the Slavs in the Balkans and the Turkish Empire.

It is true that the Slav nations had little in common; similarities in language seemed to be the sole link between the Slavs. They did have a common history before the consolidation of political states; but Slav unity was fatally broken through the invasion of the Danubian Plain by the Magyars at the end of the ninth century. This introduced a wedge of Asiatic origin between the East, West, and South Slavs which has lasted to this day. Russia isolated herself from Catholic Europe by the Great Schism (1054), and part of the South Slavs (Serbs and Bulgarians) also adhered to the Eastern Orthodox Church and Eastern culture. On the other side, Western Slavs (Czechs, Slovenes, Croats, and Poles) were all of the Roman Catholic Latin rite and were closely connected with the great spiritual and cultural movements of Western Europe. Russia, separated from them by religion and script and wholly different in spirit and culture, never loomed large—until World War II—in the lives of Czechs and Slovaks. In Poland, after the Partitions, the idea of Russia as protector and friend was, of course, absurd; Catholic Croatia and Slovenia also looked with suspicion on the Orthodox and anti-Catholic czarist regime. Only Serbia and Bulgaria, grateful for the help czarist Russia gave them in their struggle against the Turks, were pro-Russian. But even they occasionally revolted against the Czar's wishes.

After the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the idea of Pan-Slavism, made free and independent as a result of World War II, did not attract the Slavs (although a Slavic Institute in Prague operated as a government-supported institution). Only during the terrible days of World War II was Pan-Slavism revived, to become a powerful weapon in the hands of Moscow. Several all-Slav congresses were held in Moscow (1941, 1942, 1943), where a new theory of Pan-Slavism was formulated and methods were devised to spread the new movement. A new, revolutionary "people's Slavism" was proclaimed, and some leftists even spoke of the Marxist philosophy as the unifying basis of the Slav peoples.

At any rate, in 1946 a political bloc of Slav nations which

rallied around the Soviet Union—a possibility often contemplated with alarm by Western powers—was taking shape. Although border differences failed to be settled between Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Bulgaria, the scheme was efficient. All Slav countries were largely linked by outright alliances and pacts; more or less strong groups of local Communists, acting as proconsuls of Russia, were controlling the inner life of all Slav nations. The new Pan-Slavism was used for the interests of Russia's Communism. Even if the new Pan-Slavists avoided the word, Communism was their creed; it could not be otherwise in a movement sponsored by Soviet Russia and led by Communists in all the Slav states.

On the international front, the Pan-Slavonic cry was used by Tito for his demands to chop Macedonia from Greece and to form a Slavonic bloc which, in some strange ways of reasoning, was to include even Albania. Pan-Slavism was also used as an argument in regard to Trieste. To this end, Russia was helping the turmoil in Greece by encouraging Tito in his demands and the Greek Communists to oppose the British-supported monarchy re-established in Greece in 1946.

THE DANUBE: BEHIND THE IRON BOTTLENECK

Washington and London carried on their contest with Moscow not on the Pan-Slavonic front alone. There was also an issue considered by Washington as vital to Europe's peace—opening up the 1,750-mile-long Danube River to unrestricted international trade.

At the Paris Conference, a vague resolution for a special Danubian conference on internationalization was passed only over Soviet opposition and after all specific American proposals had been withdrawn. And at Lake Success, the United Nations Economic and Social Council narrowly adopted a similar American resolution. The Russian-dominated states threatened to refuse to attend any international conference which questioned their exclusive control of the river.

The problem was thus certain to arise to plague the United Nations. What was, before World War II, the main trade artery of seven Central-Balkan European states, with a fleet of about 3,000 vessels handling from 3,500,000 to 4,000,000 tons of cargo per year, was immobilized in 1946. The United States

controlled almost one-fifth of the Danube's length, including the narrow upper reaches of the river from Ulm in Würtemberg to Linz in the United States of Austria, thence along the right, or south, bank to Enns, where the Russians had stretched a cable across the river. Here, above Linz, the Americans held approximately one-third of the Danube fleet—971 Austrian, Czechoslovak, Yugoslav, Hungarian, French, Bulgarian, Rumanian, and Italian ships which had moved upstream in the last months of World War II carrying the retreating Germans and their supplies, or which had fled upstream after the war's end to avoid capture by the Russians. Thirty-four of these were passenger ships; 105 were tugs; 35 were motorized barges and tankers; and the rest were ordinary tankers and barges and miscellaneous craft such as floating cranes. The Soviets pushed their claims relentlessly.

Settlement of the Danubian conflict depends on a basic United States-Russian agreement. Russia has bottled up the Danube trade, which once flowed upstream to the West, and she wants to be the only Big Power to regulate trade on the river below Austria. In 1947 Russia ruled the Danube. A million Red Army troops garrisoned the countries on its banks from Austria to the Black Sea, and Russia sought a share of the ships held by the United States Army for a 50 percent interest in Austrian shipping companies. Through similar demands, Russia had already obtained a half-interest in Hungary's and Rumania's firms, and she was meeting Western pressure for free trade by insisting that the regulation of trade on the Danube was the business of only the Danubian countries, including herself. Russia became a Danubian country in 1940 when she recovered Bessarabia, a province at the Danube's mouth; in the United States view, this river frontage did not give Russia the right to dominate the Danube.

THE ECONOMIC STRANGLEHOLD

The Balkans were once the breadbasket of Europe. But hunger stalked, in 1946, even such rich farming countries as Rumania, while starvation had been averted in western Yugoslavia only by the interposition of UNRRA. Rumanian inflation was not so rapid or disastrous as that in Greece; Bulgaria and Yugoslavia managed to curb inflation by rigid controls—

one of the advantages of the police system in countries not naturally disciplined and co-operative.

While the war was, of course, the main cause of such economic difficulties, Russia's occupation and reparations policies played their part after the war. The appetite of Russian soldiers for food and of Russian statesmen for reparations were here the principal contributing factors. The methods employed by the Russians to tighten up the economic controls were especially shown in the ways whereby Russia was squeezing competitors from Rumania's oil fields. A similar pattern was followed. First, the satellite government in Bucharest could be depended upon to obey orders. Second, the Russians formed a holding company designed to give them control of all available oil. *Souvrompetrol* was, in theory, a Soviet-Rumanian partnership on a fifty-fifty basis. Actually, it was a way by which the Russians doubled the amount of oil shares they obtained in reparations and war booty. Russia's contribution to *Souvrompetrol* consisted of oil company shares captured from the Germans, which the Germans in turn had seized from other countries. Russia also contributed the share that Rumania surrendered to her in reparations and put up equipment labeled "war booty," which American and British firms say came from their properties. To match this, Rumania was required to contribute Rumanian-owned companies. Distribution of all oil produced was controlled by Russia, prices fixed by the pro-Russian government in Bucharest, and payments in Rumania's inflated *lei* at artificial rates.

PRESSURE ON THE BALKAN FLANK

Now that the Soviet Union had consolidated its strong position in the Balkans, proper pressure had been directed more strongly against its flank, a line stretching across Greece, Turkey, and Iran. The British, who understood such a trend some time ago, were believed to have offered the Russians a zonal agreement similar to that agreed upon in 1907, which established spheres of influence. Moscow was understood to have rejected the idea. The southward pressure was, at the end of 1946, slowly mounting from Albania to Azerbaijan, with the only tough resistance met in Turkey, which was facing the danger of being doubly outflanked.

Turkey's prosperity, enjoyed during the war years, when neutral Turkey was courted by both Germany and the Allies, was turning sour after World War II. Russian demands for more influence in the Turkish Straits required Turkey to maintain, and even increase, military preparations. The bonanza prices Turkey charged in wartime were turning out to be too high for competition in peacetime markets. Soviet Russia's pressure on Turkey began soon after World War II.

The struggle for the Straits was one major question left unsolved by World War II and recent peace conferences. Russia seeks control of this strategic gateway to the warm waters of the Mediterranean. The United States, Britain, and Turkey seek to forestall any change that is not in line with their own security requirements and with principles of the United Nations. Russia, through influence in Rumania and Bulgaria, now controls all the Black Sea coastline—except that in Turkey. The Russian ultimatum, denouncing the Russo-Turkish friendship, demanded a revision of the Montreux Pact of 1936 (whereby Turkey would regain the right to fortify the Straits and be freed from international supervision, while Russia would get important rights to send warships through the Straits and to limit entry of warships of outsiders) to give her a share in defense of the Straits. The United States and Britain were to be excluded from any part of the negotiations. Britain's stake in the quarrel is, as it has been since the Crimean War, the safety of communications in the Mediterranean; Britain and the United States agreed at Potsdam to revise the Straits Convention, but never intended to give Russia a base on Turkey's soil. After World War II, the United States, never before a party to a treaty regulating the Dardanelles took a leading role in opposing Russia's demands on Turkey, for she was unwilling to grant to Russia the right of closing the Straits to all except the Soviet fleet. The most important consequence of Soviet control over the Straits would be the shift in the center of gravity of the Soviet navy to the Aegean Sea. In this way Russia would automatically emerge as a new and great Mediterranean power. And the emergence of a new naval power in the Eastern Mediterranean is bound to create new tensions and dangers, with such issues as Palestine, the Arab League, and the disposal of Italy's colonies.

BALKANS BEHIND THE "IRON CURTAIN"

In 1946 a memorable phrase was stamped across the map of Central-Balkan Europe when Winston Churchill termed Russia's occupation line "the iron curtain which at present divides Europe in twain." All the nations behind that curtain, he charged, were subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence, but to "a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow."

Whatever Churchill's degree of accuracy about conditions in the Balkans, there was one certainty: if Russia remains strong in the Balkan countries, the Balkans can be written off by proponents of Western civilization. They are already lost to the Western world.

THE GREEK EXPLOSION

Giving dramatic emphasis to the importance of the Greek issue by one of his rare personal appearances before Congress, President Truman addressed a joint session of both Houses on March 11, 1947, on the critical situation created by the decision of London to abandon the Empire's foothold in Greece.

Realization of the United States' vital interest in that country had been growing gradually since the Casablanca Conference, when President Roosevelt consigned to Prime Minister Churchill control over the conduct of Allied military and political strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean.³¹ Under the curious machinery of United States diplomacy, so-called visiting "experts" had to be sent to the field before policy could be crystallized. But Lincoln MacVeagh, the United States able Ambassador to Athens, had been plugging at the idea for a long time—even before he transferred his *émigré* Embassy from Cairo back to Athens. Unfortunate phrasing by Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., then Secretary of State, in his exposition of United States neutrality in the Greek civil war gave the impression to the insurgents that they could rely on United States backing, although it was soon apparent that the Left-Wing EAM coalition in Greece, while advocating many praiseworthy reforms, was working in close harmony with what appeared to be an over-all Soviet political strategy to obtain dominance over all

³¹ C. L. Sulzberger, "Urgency of Greek Question Finally Impressed on U.S.," *New York Times*, March 5, 1947.

the Balkans. The Churchill-Stalin agreement of May 1944, which gave the Soviet Union *carte blanche* in Rumania against Britain's *carte blanche* in Greece, was being upset by EAM activities aided from Slav bases to the north. Carefully concealed guerrilla training went on in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia; supplies were parachuted into Greece and arms smuggled over the border.

The Soviet-British deal on Yugoslavia also became a joke. The British were supposed to have a zone of influence in western Yugoslavia and the Russians a zone in the east; the British were to train Marshal Tito's air force and navy while the Russians trained his army. But soon British missions were not even allowed in Yugoslavia.

The British, meanwhile, had done their share to make the situation worse in Greece. The British Cairo headquarters, although advised to the contrary by its representative in Greece, allowed the ELAS, the army of the ELAM, to acquire its first large amount of equipment from the principal Italian divisions in Greece at the time of the Italian armistice. After the beginning of the Greek civil war in December 1944, corruption, ineptitude, and inefficiency played into the hands of the Leftist forces. After King George's return, outside help to them from Russian puppet countries—Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia—increased.

MacVeagh eventually succeeded in getting Washington to send the battleship *Missouri*, then the carrier *Franklin D. Roosevelt*, and finally smaller fleet units to pay courtesy calls in Greece and thence on a similar mission all the way from Jidda on the Red Sea to Istanbul.

To the Russians this demonstrated that a great power frontier between zones of interests was being established along the northern borders of Iran, Turkey, and Greece. Supported by Washington, this policy was, however, actually "in charge" of the British, as a result of the Casablanca agreement. United States Lend-Lease had been cleared to Turkey by the British, and the British had supervised the training of the Turkish Air Force and establishment of air bases in Turkey. British troops remained in Greece.

The Greeks did not help much, however. They pressed their claims for border revisions at the Paris Peace Conference in a

naïve and inefficient way; in America they induced Senator Claude Pepper, through the Greek-American sponge-fishing colony of Florida, to force through the Senate resolutions that weakened any attempt at a positive United States policy in the Near East.

GREECE AS A TEST CASE

Meanwhile, the internal and international aspects of the whole Greek situation had been reaching the explosive point. In January 1947, a fact-finding commission of the United Nations Security Council began to probe for the truth behind the guerrilla warfare on Greece's borders with her Soviet-dominated Balkan neighbors—Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania.

Because the conflict between Greece and her neighbors was only a spark from a bigger fire—the conflict between Russia and the Western democracies—the facts the Commission could dig out might be highly explosive. For this reason, the appointment of the Commission had been a year in the making. In London, in January 1946, Russia started the ball rolling by charging that Britain was interfering in the internal affairs of Greece. The Council let this one go by, but in New York in September the Ukraine brought up the issue again, adding the charge that Greece was provoking incidents along the Albanian border. At this time the United States proposed an on-the-spot investigation, but Russia blocked it by using the power of veto. Early in December, Premier Tsaldaris of Greece left his troubled country to plead his case before the Council. He charged that Greece's Balkan neighbors were stirring up unrest and revolt inside his borders. Russia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania quickly hurled counter-charges. The American delegate, Herschel V. Johnson, revived the September proposal for an investigation. This time Russia unexpectedly passed up her power of veto and let the proposal go through. She will probably regret the decision as the first weeks of investigation by the Commission proved that the contentions of King George's government were well founded.

WILL THE UNITED STATES SAVE GREECE?

Meanwhile, the signing of an economic pact between Albania and Yugoslavia in November 1946, making Hoxha's

country virtually a province of Yugoslavia, indicated the direction of the over-all Soviet policy in the Balkans. But the real bombshell was dropped by the British government's announcement of its decision in March 1947 to drop its commitments in Greece, inviting the United States to come to the rescue to prevent being drawn behind the Soviets' "Iron Curtain" in the Balkans.

In May 1947 the main Balkan Commission turned back a combined Russo-Polish attempt to whitewash Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania of responsibility for bloody incidents on the Greek border. Its 253-page majority report grew from a draft which was first proposed by Mark F. Ethridge, the United States representative on the eleven-nation commission. The fifty-one-year-old publisher of *The Louisville Courier-Journal* learned his first lesson in diplomacy in 1945 and it was a lesson well remembered. As President Truman's special envoy he traveled through Balkan Europe. But his frank report was never published, because of the fact that it pointed too graphically at Soviet infiltration. The time was then diplomatically unripe for such an exposé.

Careful not to repeat that mistake, Ethridge toned down this Balkan report to suit his colleagues and the State Department. This tempered version, signed in Geneva, went to the Security Council for action. It put primary blame for Greece's border flare-ups squarely on Yugoslavia, but found Albania and Bulgaria also guilty, though to a lesser extent. Even Greece, the plaintiff, was not found blameless. Its harsh treatment of minorities, venal politics, and economic disintegration contributed materially to its trouble. However, the United Nations, said the report, should forget the past if only the governments concerned would discontinue the arming of "bandits." To forestall future incidents, the majority report proposed that the Security Council recommend to "the governments of Greece on the one hand and of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other" that they: (1) "do their utmost to establish normal, good-neighborly relations"; (2) negotiate frontier conventions; (3) remove all refugees from the troubled area into UN-supervised camps, and (4) "study the practicability of concluding agreements for the voluntary transfer of minorities."

On July 30, 1947, Russia, backed by Poland, used the veto

for the eleventh time in the Security Council, killing the American plan to keep peace in the Balkans. Herschel Johnson, denouncing the action as an abuse of power, declared it put the Council in a "very grave position."

For four weeks France and others had been trying to amend the resolution to a form acceptable to Russia, which argued that it was based on falsified evidence and wrong conclusions; it was also widely believed that Russia would at least refrain from voting and allow the resolution to pass.

Andrei Gromyko sat motionless during point-by-point votes on separate clauses of the resolution. Then when the whole resolution came up he voted against it.

On August 20, 1947, the United States asked the United Nations General Assembly to take over jurisdiction on the Balkan question. The new move by the United States was a reply to Gromyko, who a day before had vetoed a United States resolution ordering Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria to stop helping guerrilla warfare against the Greek government; during the same day Gromyko had vetoed an Australian resolution that made no finding of guilt but simply would have ordered all four governments to stop fighting. The world was shocked to see a great member Power deliberately block the operation of peacemaking machinery on precisely the kind of issue with which the United Nations was instituted to deal.

Despite opposition, however, the Political and Security Committee of the United Nations General Assembly succeeded in approving, on October 8, the creation of a special Balkan committee to watch over Greece's northern border. The vote for this commission was 34 to 6, with 9 abstentions. Led by Andrei Y. Vishinsky, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, the Soviet bloc announced that it would boycott the special Balkan group.

Three days later the Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly voted to drop the direct charges of responsibility against Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. However, it called on these three countries not to give support to the guerrillas fighting the Greek government. Vishinsky angrily branded this modification of the charges of guilt for the Balkan dispute as a "horse trade" and an "ultimatum."

The decision to support the Greek and Turkish regimes was

of supreme importance to the United States. The contest over the political, and in a minor degree, the economic, aspects of the Balkan problems will remain the main focus of world politics for decades to come. The joints of the British Empire are creaking in a high wind, and this has a direct and vital connection with the Balkan problems; today the Balkan region is the outpost of Russia's expansionist ambitions. The United States interest in Greece is not mere sentiment. Greece controls Eastern Mediterranean strategy; should Greece turn Communist, Turkey would be politically outflanked and could no longer resist a pressure that already is onerous. Without Turkey, Iran would go under. Without Greece, the international control of the Mediterranean would be lost.

For her own safety, America henceforth will have to be directly concerned with the internal and international aspects of the Balkan situation. The bitter contest of the Big Three over their share of influence in the domination of the Balkans is the core of world politics today.

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INDEX*

A

Administration (*see* individual countries)

Agrarian parties: Albania, 25 ff., 32, 129, 133 ff.; Bulgaria, 25 ff., 31 ff., 48 ff., 56 ff., 68 ff.; Greece, 25, 32, 183; Rumania, 24 ff., 31 ff., 212 ff., 224 ff., 228; Yugoslavia, 24 ff., 31 ff., 94 ff.

Agrarian reforms: Albania, 32 ff., 128 ff., 133 ff.; Bulgaria, 45 ff., 60 ff.; Greece, 173 ff., 183 ff., 253; Rumania, 212 ff., 224; Yugoslavia, 85 ff.

Albania: administration, 130 ff.; constitution, 15 ff., 20 ff., 137; economy, 5, 128 ff., 144 ff.; educational problems, 139, 144; elections, 15 ff., 24 ff., 137 ff.; history, 16 ff., 26, 125 ff., 131, 134 ff., 142; local government, 131 ff., 138 ff.; minorities, 17 ff., 129, 144, 146; parties, 21 ff., 25, 33 ff., 132 ff., 142 ff.; peasantry, 128, 136; social divisions, 32, 37, 127 ff., 133 ff.

Alexander, of Bulgaria, 44

Alexander, of Greece, 172, 187

Alexander, of Yugoslavia, 24, 28, 79 ff., 88, 98 ff., 111, 147, 235, 238

Alexandroff, Todor, 152 ff.

Antonescu, Ion, General, 210, 240 ff., 244 ff., 264, 274

Army, influence of, 23, 26 ff., 48, 53, 55 ff., 59 ff., 99, 102, 110 ff., 128, 133 ff., 177 ff., 222 ff., 281 ff.

Atlantic Charter, 74

Austria, 18, 37, 79 ff., 90, 112, 127, 164, 166, 169, 257, 259, 261 ff., 264, 280, 282, 285

Averescu, General, 23, 26, 218 ff., 228, 231

B

Balkan Union (conferences, Entente), 9, 155, 180, 252 ff., 255 ff., 259

Bessarabia, 210 ff., 215 ff., 240 ff., 244 ff., 252, 264, 269, 272 ff., 285

Boris, of Bulgaria, 45, 59 ff., 62 ff., 70, 76, 159, 161

Bratianu, George, 230, 244

Bratianu, Ion C., 23, 25, 217, 219

Bratianu, Ion I. C., 23, 25, 217, 219

Bratianu, Vintila I. C., 23, 25, 217, 219, 227, 247

Brož, J., *see* Tito, Marshal

Bulgaria: administration, 43 ff.; constitutions, 15 ff., 48 ff., 57 ff., 61 ff.; economy, 5 ff., 45 ff., 285; educational problems, 54, 61; elections, 15 ff., 52, 54 ff., 61 ff., 71 ff.; history, 4 ff., 7 ff., 16 ff., 26 ff., 43 ff., 67; local government, 53 ff., 61 ff., minorities, 7 ff., 17 ff., 47, 275; parties, 21 ff., 31, 33 ff., 48 ff., 60 ff., 66 ff., 72 ff., 259 ff.; peasantry, 45 ff., 60, 67; social divisions, 31, 37, 45 ff., 57 ff.

Bureaucracy, 20, 23 ff., 26 ff., 30, 53 ff., 88, 90, 96 ff., 134, 223

Byzantine Empire, 4, 13, 44, 139, 148, 171

C

Calinescu, Armand, 239

Carol (Charles) I, of Rumania, 20, 211, 217

Carol II, of Rumania, 24, 27, 210 ff., 217 ff., 223, 225, 227 ff., 231 ff., 234 ff., 239 ff., 248, 259, 264

Chetniks, 113 ff., 115 ff., 118, 142

Christea, Patriarch, 235, 239

Church, influence of, 4, 9 ff., 13, 44, 47, 50, 84 ff., 88 ff., 104 ff., 136, 148 ff., 176, 194, 215 ff., 235

Churchill, Winston, 107, 117, 193, 288 ff.

Civil service, *see* Bureaucracy

Codreano, Corneliu Zelea, 232, 234, 238 ff., 259; *see also* Iron Guard

Communism, 1 ff., 10, 18 ff., 25, 28, 32, 34, 51 ff., 56 ff., 63 ff., 66 ff.,

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69 ff., 94, 106 ff., 114 ff., 119 ff., 142 ff., 154, 162 ff., 169 ff., 181, 184, 193 ff., 199 ff., 202, 210 ff., 230, 245 ff., 280 ff., 284, 289 ff.; *see also*

Russia

Constantine, of Greece, 172, 177 ff., 186, 260

Constitutions, *see* countries

Croats, 27, 82 ff., 93 ff., 98 ff., 103 ff.; *see also* Yugoslavia

Cuza, Alexander D., 211, 233 ff., 259

Cvetkovitch, Dragisha, 105 f.

D

Damaskinos, Archbishop, 194 ff., 196 ff.

Dardanelles, 37, 75, 163, 165 ff., 169, 287

Davidovitch, Ljuba, 93

Dimitrov, Georgi, 19 ff., 36, 66, 70 ff., 76, 280

Dimitrov, G. M., 69

Dobrodja (Dobrogea), 63 ff., 75, 211, 215

Dragoitcheva, Tsola, 66, 71

Duca, Ion G., 218, 220 ff., 231 ff., 259

E

EAM, 161 ff., 192 ff., 288 ff.

Educational problems, *see* individual countries; intellectuals

ELAS, 162, 192, 194 ff., 289

Elections, *see* individual countries

F

Fascism (National Socialism), influence of, 6 f., 18, 25 ff., 28, 34, 52 ff., 56, 61 ff., 103 ff., 107 ff., 141 ff., 162, 188, 190, 223, 232 ff., 238 ff., 241 ff., 257 ff., 265, 275; *see also* Italy and Germany

Ferdinand, of Bulgaria, 45 ff., 51, 53, 59, 63, 151

Ferdinand, of Rumania, 212, 217 ff.

France, 1, 11, 13, 54, 169, 188 ff., 210, 235, 239, 251 ff., 259, 263 ff., 285, 290

G

George I, of Greece, 172, 182, 187

George II, of Greece, 1, 20, 25, 170, 172, 178, 181, 187, 193, 196 ff., 201 ff., 290

German minorities, 47, 82, 94, 111, 215 ff., 226, 230, 233

Germany, 10, 13, 54, 62 ff., 79, 83, 111, 161, 169, 178, 188 ff., 193 ff., 215, 234, 239, 241 ff., 251 ff., 255, 261 ff., 263 ff., 278 ff., 282, 285 ff.

Ghegs, 130

Gheorghieff, Kimon, 33, 60, 66 ff., 72, 74, 159, 165, 246, 296, 280

Goga, Octavian, 218, 231, 233 ff., 259

Great Britain, 1, 33, 36 ff., 74 ff., 107, 110, 116 ff., 125, 145 ff., 166, 169 ff., 192 ff., 199 ff., 203 ff., 241 ff., 247, 263 ff., 269 ff., 278 ff., 286, 290 ff.

Greece: administration, 188; constitution, 15 ff., 179 ff., 181, 186 ff.; economy, 5 ff., 173 ff., 191 ff., 203 ff., 285; educational problems, 174, 183 ff.; elections, 15 ff., 25, 174 ff., 180 ff., 184 ff., 195 ff.; history, 4 ff., 7 ff., 16 ff., 27, 171 ff., 181; local government, 188; minorities, 7 ff., 17 ff., 172 ff., 175 ff., 275 ff.; parties, 21 ff., 26 ff., 177 ff., 185 ff., 190 ff., 260; peasantry, 173 ff., 182 ff.; social divisions, 37, 183 ff.

Griswold, Dwight, 202 ff., 204

Groza, Peter, 19 ff., 32, 245 ff., 274, 280

Gunaris, Demetrios, 22, 178

H

Haidouks, 182

Hitler, Adolf, 6 f., 47, 63 ff., 85, 106 ff., 111 ff., 141 ff., 160 ff., 189, 199, 239 ff., 252, 255, 260 ff., 263 ff., 269, 278; *see also* Germany

Hoxha, Enver, 19 f., 33, 126, 143 ff., 145 ff., 279 ff.

Hungary, 37, 43 ff., 81 ff., 84 ff., 101 ff., 106, 127, 141, 210 ff., 227, 233, 239, 252, 261, 263 ff., 270 ff., 282 ff.

I

IMRO, 27 ff., 47, 51, 60, 91, 101 ff., 113, 147 ff., 151 ff., 156 ff., 176, 232

Industrialization, 6, 9, 23, 31 ff., 213 ff., 255

Intellectuals, 8 ff., 28 ff., 53 ff., 95 ff., 134, 183, 219 ff., 225, 231, 234

Iorga, N., 23, 228 ff.

Iron Curtain, 12 ff., 37, 163, 199, 288, 291

Iron Guard, 25 ff., 221 ff., 226, 232 ff., 237 ff., 239 ff., 259
Italy, 12, 37, 54, 84 ff., 101, 107, 110 ff., 127, 137 ff., 141 ff., 153, 161, 188 ff., 234, 252 ff., 257, 261

J

Jews, 28, 111, 130, 175 ff., 195, 209, 215 ff., 220, 227, 230, 233 ff., 241, 275

K

Kaltseff, 161
Klephts, 182
Kondylis, General, 179 ff., 186
Konitza, Faik, 135
Konitza, Mehmed Bey, 127 n.
Koroshetz, A., 25, 80, 89, 103, 105

L

Lend-Lease, 107, 289
Liaptcheff, André, 52
Little Entente, 160, 234 ff., 252 ff., 255 ff., 259
Local government, *see* individual countries

M

Macedonia, 36, 64 ff., 75 ff., 82 ff., 106, 112 ff., 117, 119, 147 ff., 170, 190 ff., 200, 253 ff., 267 ff., 284; *see also* IMRO
Magyars, *see* Hungary
Maniu, Iuliu, 218, 226, 231, 233, 248 ff., 274
Marie, of Rumania, 217
Matchek, Vladimir, 27, 90, 101, 105, 107 ff., 120
Maximos, Demetrios, 201 ff.
Metaxas, Jean, 22, 27, 179, 181, 188 ff., 195 ff., 199 ff., 201, 260
Michael (Mihai), of Rumania, 244 ff., 246, 249
Mikhailovitch, Draja, 73, 113 ff., 115 ff., 162, 269
Mihailoff, Ivan, 27, 154, 159, 161
Mihalache, Ion, 226
Minorities, *see* individual countries
Molotov, Vladimir, 12, 107
Montenegro, 83, 106, 112, 117, 164
Mussolini, Benito, *see* Italy

N

National Socialism, *see* Fascism
Nationalism, 10, 18, 29, 44, 49 ff., 61,

89 ff., 129 ff., 135 ff., 146, 148 ff., 152 ff., 185 ff., 216, 224
Noli, Fan, 133, 135

O

Oil, 65, 241 ff., 246 ff., 264, 271, 286
Ottoman Empire, *see* Turkey

P

Paissy, 44
Pangalos, General, 179, 186
Pan-Slavism, 71, 76, 79, 281 ff., 284; *see also* Slavs
Papanastassiou, Alexander, 25, 179 ff.
Parliament, *see* individual countries, elections
Parties, *see* individual countries
Pashitch, Nicholas, 22, 80, 91, 92
Pauker, Mrs. Anna, 245, 247, 280
Paul, of Greece, 201 ff.
Paul, of Yugoslavia, 102 ff., 106 ff.
Pavelich, Ante, 111 ff.
Peasantry, 25, 28, 29 ff., 37, 45 ff., 66, 86 ff., 94 ff., 128 ff., 136, 173 ff., 183 ff., 220 ff., 224 ff., 234
Peter I, of Serbia, 82, 101
Peter II, of Yugoslavia, 102, 107 ff., 113, 116 ff., 267 ff.
Petkov, Nikola, 68, 76
Plastiras, General, 180, 186, 195
Pribitchevitch, Svetoazar, 93
Protegueroff, Alexander, 152, 156, 159

R

Raditch, Styepan, 23, 31, 90, 92 ff., 98, 154
Rumania: administration, 233 ff.; constitutions, 15 ff., 217 ff., 225, 228 ff., 235 ff.; economy, 5 ff., 212 ff., 225, 285; educational problems, 213, 220 ff.; elections, 15 ff., 24, 217, 227 ff., 234, 236 ff., 248; history, 4, 7 ff., 16 ff., 26 ff., 209 ff.; local government, 237 ff.; minorities, 7, 17 ff., 24 ff., 214 ff., 227, 233, 237 ff., 260 ff., 274; oil, 65, 241 ff., 246, 264, 271, 286; parties, 21 ff., 31, 34 ff., 211, 216 ff., 225, 229 ff., 236 ff., 244 ff., 247, 249; peasantry, 212 ff., 216, 220 ff., 224 ff.; social divisions, 31, 37, 220 ff., 224, 225 ff.
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 117, 288

Russia, 1 ff., 10 ff., 20 ff., 26, 31, 36 ff., 43 ff., 48, 63 ff., 69 ff., 72 ff., 79, 106 ff., 117 ff., 145 ff., 149, 165 ff., 169 ff., 171, 190 ff., 210, 216, 244 ff., 246 ff., 251 ff., 256, 263, 269 ff., 278 ff., 282, 290 ff.

S

Schacht, Hjalmar, 189, 261, 278
Schimovitz, Dushan, 107
Schools, *see* individual countries, education
Serbia, *see* Yugoslavia
Simeon II, of Bulgaria, 64, 72
Slavs, 4 ff., 10, 43 ff., 51, 64, 81 ff., 102, 110, 160, 162 ff., 165, 175 ff., 182, 184 ff., 211, 251, 273, 281 ff.
Socialism, 25, 56 ff., 94, 226, 230
Sophoulis, Themistocles, 203
Spaho, Dr., 94, 103
Stalin, Josef, 12, 70, 79, 106, 118 ff., 240, 249, 269, 278 ff., 289
Stambuliski, Alexander, 25, 31, 49 ff., 56, 153, 157
Stoiadinovitch, Milan, 102 ff., 260 ff., 267
Subasitch, Ivan, 117

T

Tatarescu, Georges, 218, 220, 231 ff., 233 ff., 280
Taxation, *see* individual countries
Thrace, 44, 64 ff., 75, 160, 164, 190 ff., 200, 268, 274 ff.
Tito, Marshal, 19 ff., 27, 33, 36, 79, 114 ff., 120 ff., 126, 144 ff., 162 ff., 165 ff., 248, 269, 277 ff., 284, 289
Titulescu, Nicolae, 230, 232 ff., 256, 259
Tosks, 130
Transportation, *see* individual countries, economy
Transylvania, 210, 215 ff., 218, 223, 226 ff., 233, 240, 244 ff., 252, 264, 272 ff.
Trieste, 120 ff., 166, 272, 277, 280, 284
Truman, Harry S., 1 ff., 11, 169, 202, 204, 279, 288, 291
Tsaldaris, Constantin, 197 ff., 200 ff., 202, 290
Tsaldaris, P., 23, 179 ff.
Tsankoff, Alexander, 23, 27, 51 ff., 61, 153, 260

Turkey (Turks), 1 ff., 3, 8 ff., 16 ff., 24, 29 ff., 37, 43 ff., 47, 81 ff., 85, 88, 90, 107, 126 ff., 134, 148, 152 ff., 165, 170 ff., 180, 182, 185 ff., 201, 209 ff., 215 ff., 251, 254, 263 ff., 281 ff., 286 ff., 292

U

United Nations, 74, 125 ff., 145, 169 ff., 201, 270 ff., 277, 284 ff., 287, 290 ff.
United States, 1 ff., 12, 15, 33, 36 ff., 72, 74 ff., 79, 116 ff., 119 ff., 125 ff., 132, 145 ff., 156 ff., 166 ff., 169 ff., 171, 195, 202 ff., 204 ff., 209, 247, 257, 262, 270 ff., 284 ff., 286 ff., 290 ff., 293
UNRRA, 120, 195, 285
U.S.S.R., *see* Russia

V

Vaida-Voevod, Alexandru, 226, 233, 259
Veltcheff, Colonel, 32 ff., 56, 60 ff., 66 ff., 72, 246, 276
Venizelos, Eleutherios, 23, 172, 177 ff., 182, 185 ff., 195, 200

Y

Yalta, 278 ff.
Yevtitch, Bogoljub, 102 ff.
Yugoslavia: administration, 88, 90, 96 ff., 99 ff.; constitutions, 15 ff., 88, 91 ff., 99 ff., 103 ff., 118; economy, 5, 85 ff., 90, 94, 257, 261 ff., 285; educational problems, 87, 89, 95 ff., 99; elections, 15 ff., 24 ff., 91, 94 ff., 97 ff., 100, 102 ff., 104 ff.; history, 4, 16 ff., 24, 79 ff., 101 ff.; local government, 99 ff.; minorities, 17 ff., 84 ff., 94, 261; parties, 21 ff., 34 ff., 87 ff., 91 ff., 94, 97 ff., 102 ff.; peasantry, 86, 95; social divisions, 37, 85 ff., 94 ff.

Z

Zervas, Napoleon, General, 200 ff., 202
Zhivkovitch, Pera, General, 99 ff., 104
Zog, of Albania, 20, 27, 32, 126 ff., 133 ff., 140, 141 ff., 144, 253
Zveno, 66, 72

